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ABSTRACT 
This study is a comparative analysis of the rise of Neo-Confucianism in China during the 
eleventh and twelfth centuries, and the emergence of the school of Kabbalah in France 
and Spain during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries CE. This comparison is grounded in 
the observation that the two schools, in spite of their obvious differences, were an 
outcome of separate reactions to the rising popularity of foreign paradigms. I draw a 
distinction between synthetic and analytic modes of operation, arguing they represent 
contrasting cultural paradigms characterized by divergent cognitive, social, linguistic, and 
cultural temperaments. I argue that both the classical Chinese and Jewish worldviews 
conformed to the basic characteristics of the synthetic modality, and that they entered a 
period of acute crisis as a result of the rising popularity of the analytic Buddhist and 
Greek philosophical traditions respectively. As I define it, the synthetic worldview is 
characterized by the affirmation of the body and this-worldly life, an emphasis on ritual 
and community, cultural particularism, and associative, non-analytical modes of thought. 
The contrasting analytic worldview stresses individualism, de-contextualization of data, 
other-worldliness, contemplative spirituality, and universalism.  
 v 
In the context of this project, I develop a methodological framework I call genetic-
morphology. This methodology seeks to integrate a synchronic search for cross-cultural 
patterns with an emphasis on the diachronic evolution of traditions as they change and 
adapt to new environmental conditions. It also integrates data from diverse academic 
fields such as religious studies, anthropology, cross-cultural psychology, biology, and 
systems theory. As such this study offers a gestalt appreciation of cultural systems, their 
internal dynamic, the symbiotic relationship between their constituent parts, and the 
function of information in their operation. This dissertation concludes that Kabbalah and 
Neo-Confucianism can be understood as “defense theologies,” or adaptive responses 
devised to protect their classical synthetic modes of operation from the cultural pressures 
of analytic paradigms. Kabbalah and Neo-Confucianism were unique in their ability to 
appropriate powerful features from analytic traditions and subordinate them to native 
synthetic sensibilities, thereby equipping the Jewish and Chinese traditions with 
revolutionary theologies that dismantled the challenges of foreign analytic paradigms. 
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PREFACE 
 
Some twenty years ago, guarding at an outdoor military post in the contested Golan 
Heights, I accidentally stumbled upon a damp and worn out book laying abandoned on 
the ground. I must confess that at the time I wasn’t sure whether the familiar iconic face 
on the cover belonged to Ho Chi Minh or Mao Zedong. Unimpressed I picked the book 
up, shook the dust off its cover and started reading on a random page. The scene I came 
upon was so captivating that it made me flip to the back cover to verify whether I was 
reading history or fiction. It turned out to be a historical account of the Red Army’s epic 
Long March. Needless to say, I read the whole book and it left me overwhelmed with 
curiosity. Harrison Salisbury’s sympathetic portrayal of the communists and especially of 
Mao’s charismatic leadership fueled my enthusiasm to know more about these 
mysterious and distant people. 1 It was that fortuitous incident that eventually led me to 
enter the department of East Asian Studies at Tel-Aviv University with the intention of 
focusing on contemporary Chinese politics.  
But the more I read about China’s fascinating modern history, the more I became 
aware of the historical depth that preceded it. Confucius, with his great wisdom, taught 
that “a gentleman works at the root. Once the root is secure, the Way unfolds.”2 I 
followed his advice and it was the Confucian tradition that he himself spawned that 
became my root and has remained so ever since. After I completed my degree, equipped 
                                            
1 H.E Salisbury, The Long March: The Untold Story (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1985). Translated 
to Hebrew by Naomi Carmel (1987). 
2 Analect 1.2: The original passage associates the “root” with ritual and filial piety. 有子曰: 其為
人也孝弟, 而好犯上者, 鮮矣; 不好犯上，而好作亂者, 未之有也. 君子務本, 本立而道生. 孝
弟也者, 其為仁之本與! The Analects of Confucius, Simon Leys tr. (New York; London: W.W. 
Norton & Co. Ltd, 1997), p. 3. 
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with basic undergraduate level Chinese, I left to China fully committed to bringing my 
linguistic skills to an academic level. By that time I was already captivated by Chinese 
calligraphy, ink painting, philosophy, as well as Chinese pop culture. I also secretly 
developed an ambition to pursue my Master degree in a Chinese university. After four 
years of intense language courses in Beijing, I entered an M.A. program in Traditional 
Chinese Aesthetics, focusing on the history and theory of classical landscape painting. 
The three years I spent immersed in a Chinese academic environment were priceless. 
This period gave me a unique chance to experience China from within; taking classes and 
exams alongside local classmates who soon became close friends. Looking back, those 
were also the years that made me academically and linguistically ripe to work with 
Chinese texts.  
 Throughout my years in China I sensed that something about the Chinese tradition 
resonated with my own Jewish heritage. Curiously, it felt similar to a form of Judaism 
that I myself was distant from. I couldn’t help but sense subtle parallels between 
experiences in China and ones I had among orthodox Jewish communities, or what my 
friends and I frequent condemned as exilic Judaism. As a secular Israeli whose political 
and social worldview was nourished by Western humanism, my encounters with religious 
orthodox communities have often left me in a state of confusion. I was constantly torn 
between admiration for their warmth, informal casualness, and impressive scholasticism 
on the one hand, and their particularistic stubbornness and blatant utilitarianism on the 
other. Oddly enough, this was reminiscent of similar dispositions that I sensed among the 
Chinese, especially of older generations.  
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Perhaps the first thing that struck me was the uncanny similarities between Jewish 
and Chinese forms of pragmatism. To the Western idealist, both traditions were likely to 
tackle daily dilemmas from an angle that would appear distastefully utilitarian. This is 
especially true when it comes to commerce and material success, concerns that are 
unapologetically central to both Chinese and Jewish cultures. In honoring their dead, the 
Chinese will burn paper limousines, fake dollar bills, and other material amenities in 
order to provide deceased ancestors with financial security and physical comfort. 
Phenomena such as auspicious symbols for monetary success, New Year blessings such 
as “wish you become rich” (zhu ni facai - 祝你發財), and restaurant entrances adorned 
with money-gods (cai-shen - 財神) were all a common sight. This reminded me of one 
rabbi in Zafed who advised me that my career decisions should first and for most be 
oriented towards securing a high salary and prospects for promotion. I looked around in 
astonishment but no one around the holiday table felt that we were digressing from an 
appropriate “religious” discussion. As stereotypical as it may sound, Jews will often 
speak of financial matters as part and parcel of religious discourse, the two don’t seem to 
conflict as much as they do in the West where spirituality tends to shun away from 
matters of the world.  
I was amazed how many books about Jewish wisdom I found in Chinese bookstores 
and libraries. Most of these books were not dedicated to Marx, Einstein, or the Cohen 
Brothers; instead, they were overwhelmingly obsessed with entrepreneurial success. 
Initially, when Chinese people frequently claimed that “Jew were very smart,” I was 
flattered, until I realized that Jewish wisdom was mainly associated with the ability to 
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make money. What struck me the most was that such statements were completely free of 
anti-Semitic undertones; in fact, they involved true admiration and genuine curiosity. 
Today I feel comfortable to say that the traditional Jewish and Chinese worldviews, 
together with their exceptional veneration of scholarship and intellectual achievement, 
see financial security and monetary success as obvious and legitimate channels for the 
achievement of wellbeing, power, and fame. Nothing to be uneasy about - simply life.        
I could go on to speak of other resonances since there were plenty, perhaps one more 
example can help us sense the kind of subtlety that some of these similarities involved. It 
is well known that both traditional Jewish and Chinese societies held parents and 
educators in the highest esteem. But on a closer look, one is bound to be surprised by 
how this phenomenon plays out in actual life. My amazement regarding the relationship 
between students and professors in my Chinese University felt like a deja-vu from some 
of my Sabbath and holiday dinners in orthodox communities.3 Considering their 
traditional authority, when the Chinese teacher or Jewish rabbi spoke, one would expect 
the community to go into complete silence and full attention. In the Jewish case what I 
encountered was a constant chatter in the background, kids running and shouting without 
being hushed, some adults clearly attentive while others dividing their attention between 
food, listening, and occasional comments to neighbors - all this while the rabbi was 
attempting to communicate a message. I felt uneasy with this lack of respect to an 
authoritative figures and I found it strange that it was happening in a place where 
authority was considered to be extremely important. I found myself is endless similar 
                                            
3 J.Z Smith sees the deja-vu as that which is problematic about the comparative process. Here I 
use it in positive terms as a legitimate and inevitable part of our thought process. 
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situations in China and in both cases I was struck by how normal this seemed to the 
participants. Even more surprisingly, rabbis, like my Chinese professors, didn’t seem to 
be concerned at all with these situations, let alone offended.  
The formal attentiveness I was familiar with in the West was simply absent. A similar 
scene in an American classroom or church would have been utterly inappropriate; when a 
person of stature speaks the audience listens in silence, background noises would be an 
obvious sign of disrespect. Interestingly, the Jewish and Chinese leniency on such matters 
was countered by signs of authority that would be unthought of in the West. As an 
example, my Chinese professor would frequently order students to refill his tea flask, or 
even help him purchase books at a distant bookshop. In my department, Chinese students 
literally spent hundreds of hours editing and formatting a dictionary in honor of our 
university’s famous calligrapher, Qigong. They were clearly inconvenienced by this time-
consuming project, but since the head of the department “asked” them to, they complied. 
The paradox between authority and casualness felt extremely familiar to me. Indeed, the 
same contradictions are apparent in religious Jewish communities. A rabbi’s decision has 
final authority, he is rarely constrained by the same rules of etiquette prevalent in 
Western institutions. But in spite of this almost absolute authority, the interaction 
between the community and the rabbi could be surprisingly casual and informal. I was 
constantly asking myself whether such strange and somewhat elusive parallels actually 
meant anything?       
Throughout my seven years in Beijing I gradually came to believe that these 
apparently trivial cultural resemblances were actually significant. As I began to immerse 
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myself in traditional Judaism and in the China of the Analects and the Five Classics, I 
became increasingly convinced that a comparative analysis of these traditions was not 
only fascinating, but that it contained potential insights into the nature of culture in 
general. As I started looking deeper into the theological and philosophical underpinnings 
of the Confucian and rabbinic traditions I became increasingly uncomfortable with the 
prevalent dichotomy between East and West. If the traditional Chinese and Jewish 
worldviews shared common sensibilities in contradistinction to the West, wasn’t the 
common association of Judaism as a Western tradition misleading? Better yet, doesn’t the 
term monotheism obscure the fact that Jewish and Christian forms of monotheism were 
substantially different? And if this was true, what exactly made them so different, and 
how does their sibling religion, Islam, fit into this scheme?  
As a result of these lingering questions I became increasingly interested in 
comparative religion, comparative philosophy, and cultural studies. It became clear to me 
that this was something I wanted to explore and that pursuing a doctoral degree was the 
perfect place to do it. As I began reading academic literature in comparative religion I 
understood that the first hurdle I had to cross was methodological. The question I asked 
myself was how do I construct a comparative framework that could bring such elusive 
but nevertheless powerful “gut feelings” into a unified and compelling argument? At the 
time I was already familiar with Neo-Confucianism, a school of thought I was attracted to 
early in my undergraduate studies. Revisiting this tradition again, this time from a more 
educated position and with access to academic literature in Chinese, I began to see things 
in a different light. The central position of Buddhism in the emergence of Neo-
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Confucianism helped me better appreciate the differences between the Indian and 
Chinese worldviews. Echoing my suspicion towards the notion of “Western traditions” 
and “Monotheism” the Indian/Chinese tension led me towards a similar uneasiness with 
the somewhat simplistic and sweeping notion of Eastern traditions. Once I felt that both 
the Western and Eastern categories were destabilized for related reasons, I got the first 
inkling of a potential solution to my comparative conundrum. The debate surrounding 
culture and religion needs a theoretical framework that can help us look beyond 
East/West distinctions by introducing new cultural categories. What I will refer to as 
synthetic and analytic traditions enables us to do just that: to appreciate Judaism in 
relation to China while contrasting both traditions with the common analytic ethos of 
Christianity and Buddhism.  
I will keep the methodological details of this solution to the next chapter, suffice it to 
say that the more I looked the more I was convinced that behind the external diversity of 
China and Judaism lurked a common infrastructure, or cultural DNA. Being aware of the 
“perennial” dangers of such a claim, my doctoral research has been dedicated to 
articulating my argument in a way that avoids simplicity. Today, I am convinced that the 
methodological framework I am offering is successful in unveiling some of the mystery 
that engulfed my early reflections on China and Judaism. The next step is to convince my 
readers.   
My search led to another fortunate result. As I became more involved in theoretical 
questions, I came to believe that the methodology I was constructing was valuable in its 
own right. In other words, it was not only instrumental for my specific project but could 
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function as a theoretical framework for a wide range of comparative phenomena. I must 
confess that in the process of writing this dissertation I wasn’t always sure whether I was 
primarily comparing Kabbalah and Neo-Confucianism or whether I was using the 
comparison of these schools as a showcase for the instrumentality of my comparative 
methodology. I would like to believe that the two need not be mutually exclusive.  
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CHAPTER 1 
METHODOLOGY 
 
  
  
2 
1. INTRODUCTION  
One might wonder why comparing two foreign traditions such as Judaism and 
Confucianism is useful, or even possible? Not only do these cultures share very little in 
terms of content but they also operated in substantially different cultural environments 
with no indication of real contact or diffusion of ideas. On one hand we have vulnerable 
and isolated Jewish communities dedicated to a monotheistic worldview based on 
revelation, prophecy, and messianic redemption; on the other hand, a politically 
independent and culturally confident Middle Kingdom committed to a substantially 
different set of concerns and religious symbols. The choice to compare such unrelated 
traditions positions us at the heart of a turbulent debate regarding the validity, function, 
and instrumentality of comparative religion.  
 In her comparative analysis of the Confucian and rabbinic traditions Galia Patt-
Shamir asks: “my aim in the present chapter is to discuss the possibility of creating a 
fruitful dialogue between the two traditions, yet how can such a task be conducted? What 
methodology can we apply to systems that are essentially so different?”4 Considering the 
radically foreign cultural settings of the Confucian and Jewish traditions, focusing on 
what sets them apart seems trivial. On the other hand, when we detect similarities can we 
prove that they actually carry significance? How do we know whether cultural 
resemblances are not an outcome of humanity’s shared biological makeup,5 or perhaps a 
                                            
4 Galia Patt-Shamir, “Confucianism and Judaism: A dialogue in spite of differences,” in Avrum 
Ehrlich ed. The Jewish-Chinese Nexus: A Meeting of Civilizations (London; New York: 
Routledge, 2008), p. 61. 
5 Clyde Kluckhohn, “Universal Categories of Culture,” in A.L Kroeber et al., Anthropology 
Today: An Encyclopedic Inventory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953); Donald E. 
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result of historical contingencies? Scholars have long been aware of affinities between 
the Chinese and Jewish traditions in areas such as ritualism, their family based ethos, 
their stress on ethics, scholarship, and commentary. The problem is that as far as I am 
aware, a deeper causative explanation for such resemblances has yet to be proposed. 
Similarities between the two traditions are “floating in the air” without a theoretical 
grounding; they are first and foremost descriptive but rarely ask why commonalities exist 
and is there a deeper reason for their existence? All these complex dilemmas hinge on our 
ability to devise a methodology that brings Judaism and the Chinese tradition into an 
intelligible comparative framework. I believe that such a methodology is available, one 
that provides coherence to a joint appreciation of these traditions and especially, as I will 
argue, to the emergence of Kabbalah and Neo-Confucianism.6 Although concerned with 
                                                                                                                                  
Brown, Human Universals (New York: McGraw Hill, 1991); Pascal Boyer, The Naturalness of 
Religious Ideas: A Cognitive Theory of Religion (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994); 
Thomas E. Lawson and Robert N. McCauley, Rethinking Religion: Connecting Cognition and 
Culture (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993); William Paden. “Universals 
Revisited: Human Behaviors and Cultural Variations,” Numen Vol. 48, no. 3 (2001): 276-289. 
6 Comparative works dealing on the Jewish and Chinese traditions include: Joseph P. Schultz. 
“Reciprocity in Confucian and Rabbinic Ethics,” The Journal of Religious Ethics, Vol. 2, No. 1 
(Spring, 1974): 143-150; Some allusions by Katherine Young in Arvind Sharma, Women in 
World Religions (New York: SUNY, 1987), pp. 9–16; Rene ́Goldman, “Moral Leadership in 
Society: Some Parallels between the Confucian ‘‘Nobleman’’ and the Jewish Zaddik,” 
Philosophy East and West, 45, no. 3 (1995); Jonathan Schofer, The Making of a Sage: A Study in 
Rabbinic Ethics (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 2004); Schofer, “Virtues in 
Xunzi’s Thought,” Journal Of Religious Ethics 21, no. 1 (1993): 117-136; Andrew H. Plaks, Ta 
Hsueh and Chung Yung: the highest order of cultivation and on the practice of the mean 
(London; New York: Penguin Books, 2003); Robert Elliot Allinson, “Hillel and Confucius: The 
Proscriptive Formulation of the Golden Rule in the Jewish and Chinese Confucian Ethical 
Traditions,” Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 3, no.1 (December 2003): 29–4; 
Xinzhong Yao, Wisdom in early Confucian and Israelite traditions (Aldershot, England; 
Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006); Avrum Ehrlich M., The Jewish-Chinese nexus: a meeting of 
civilizations (London; New York, NY: Routledge, 2008); Galia Patt-Shamir, To Broaden the 
Way: A Confucian Jewish Dialogue (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2006); Patt-Shamir, “Way as 
Dao; Way as Halakha: Confucianism, Judaism and Way Metaphors,” Dao 5, no.2 (Summer 
2006); Galia Patt-Shamir and Yaov Rapaport, “Crossing Boundaries between Confucianism and 
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both similarities and differences, this methodology will begin by looking at what is 
common. It will argue that parallels between Judaism and Confucianism should not be 
treated as isolated phenomena, but rather understood as an outcome of profound 
structural affinities.  
I chose to refer to my methodology as Genetic-Morphology or alternatively the 
Morphogenetic method. Morphology is a living tradition; it is practiced in various fields 
and has roots that harken back to the eighteenth century. In order to clarify the details of 
this approach it is helpful to trace its historical origins. Such an analysis serves three main 
goals; first, it provides us with a better appreciation of the genesis of systematic 
comparative approaches to the study of religion. Secondly, it underscores the different 
theoretical and methodological problems that have haunted morphology. And finally, the 
analysis of early morphology can help us state the exact meaning of this term as it will be 
used in this dissertation and in contradistinction to earlier morphological approaches.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                  
Judaism,” in Jewish Chinese Nexus; Patt-Shamir, “Confucianism and Judaism a Dialogue in Spite 
of Differences,” in Jewish Chinese Nexus, pp. 137-158; Seligman et al. Ritual and its 
Consequences: An Essay on the Limits of Sincerity (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 
2008). In the first translation of the Analects to Hebrew by Daniel Lesley and Amatzia Porat, the 
translators makes frequent references to traditional Jewish sources, especially to the Talmudic 
Tractate Avot. Daniel Lesley and Amatzia Porat trans., Kong Fu Tze: Ma’Amarot [Hebrew] 
(Jerusalem: Hebrew University and the Bialik Institute, 1960). 
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1.1 THE MORPHOLOGICAL TRADITION 
The field of Morphology was originally inspired by Johann Wolfgang von 
Goethe, who coined the term in his 1790 book The Metamorphosis of Plants.7 According 
to Goethe, morphology is “a science of organic forms and formative forces aimed at 
discovering the underlying unity in the vast diversity of plants and animals.”8 Goethe’s 
pioneering morphological work was done in the field of Botany where his contributions 
left a lasting mark on subsequent generations of scientists. Indeed, the dilemmas involved 
in modern morphological approaches to comparative religion can be traced back to those 
early days at the end of the eighteenth century. Some of the most influential 
morphological approaches to comparative religion were rooted in that period’s romantic 
tradition; a stream of thought that was frequently attacked as an unscientific subjective 
idealism. There are three central issues that warrant our attention, all of which are present 
in Goethe’s early botanical morphology and remain influential, to different degrees, in 
twentieth century morphological approaches to comparative religion. The first factor is 
Goethe’s ‘delicate empiricism’ (zarte Empirie), an approach that sought to create an 
almost mystical relationship between subject and object.9 As Gordon Miller notes 
“starting from sense perception of the outer particulars, Goethe’s scientific approach 
                                            
7 J.W.V Goethe & Gordon L. Miller, The Metamorphosis of plants (Cambridge, MA; London: 
MIT Press, 2009). 
8 Gordon Miller, Metamorphosis, p. xvi. Goethe’s Botany was both a reaction and continuation of 
Carl Linnaeus’ (1707-1778) famous Systema Naturea in which the latter introduced his famous 
“binomial” taxonomic system, which categorized plants according to genus and species. 
Linnaeus’ classificatory system had a profound impact on the natural sciences. 
9 Miller, ibid., p. xxiii. 
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seeks the higher goal of an illuminating knowledge from within.”10 Although Goethe 
believed that empirical investigation was crucial for arriving at scientific insight, he also 
believed that the intuitive penetration of nature’s patterns led to a spiritual illumination, a 
sort of organic unity between the scientist and his object of investigation.11 Goethe’s 
idealistic inclinations sought to preserve a holistic unity in reality by avoiding the 
analytic separation of subject and object. The German school of Naturphilosophie to 
which Goethe belonged contained a sentimental, emotional feature that, in the eyes of 
rationalists, undermined its reliability as an objective science in the strict sense. In a 
passionate letter to his friend Charlotte von Stein Goethe states: 
 
What pleases me most at present is plant-life. Everything is forcing itself upon me, I no 
longer have to think about it, everything comes to meet me, and the whole gigantic 
kingdom becomes so simple that I can see at once the answer to the most difficult 
problems. If only I could communicate the insight and joy to someone, but it is not 
possible. And it is no dream or fancy: I am beginning to grow aware of the essential form 
with which, as it were, Nature always plays, and from which she produces her great 
variety. Had I the time in this brief span of life I am confident I could extend it to all the 
realms of Nature – the whole realm.12 
 
                                            
10 Ibid. 
11 According to J. Z. Smith Goethe’s scheme employed a “complex dialectic between the 
universal and the particular, between ideal and experience, between idea and appearance, between 
Being and history.” see “Adde Parvum Parvo Magnus Acervus Erit” in History of Religions 11, 
No. 1 (Aug., 1971): 83. 
12 Heinrich Duntzer, Life of Goethe, Thomas W. Lyster trans., (London: Macmillan, 1884), p. 
431. In a different instance Goethe states: "The happiest moments of my life were experienced 
during my study of the metamorphoses of plants, as the sequence of their growth gradually 
became clear to me. This method of regarding the plant world inspired me during my stay at 
Naples and Sicily; it became more and more precious to me; everywhere I gave myself to practice 
in its application.” In “Propitious Encounter” in Meuller, Bertha tr. Goethe’s Botanical Writings 
(Woodbridge, Conn.: Ox Bow Press, 1989), p. 219. 
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Goethe’s terminology, suggestive of bliss, ineffability, and intuitive insight all point to a 
unitive mystical experience of sorts. Immersed in the patterns of nature, Goethe began to 
sense a unitive resonance with nature. Amidst the mesmerizing botanical diversity of the 
lush Italian landscape, Goethe began to detect an underlying recursive pattern that stood 
at the root of all variation. As his own testimony indicates, with sufficient time he would 
be able to extend his insights from the realm of flora to that of fauna and eventually to 
“the whole realm of Nature.” His morphological project contained the grand promise of 
unlocking the secrets of nature through a penetrating analysis of reoccurring forms and 
shapes (μορφή, morphé).  
Goethe’s romantic streak became an important current in comparative religion, 
but it was also seen as increasingly problematic in the eyes of postmodernists. In the field 
of religious studies the detection of reoccurring forms led to a preoccupation with 
common patterns and grand theories. This growing trend attracted enthusiastic followers 
but eventually led to an over-reliance on impressionistic theories.13 In light of the 
postmodern critique, most scholars today agree that classical morphology is in need of a 
corrective. Comparative religion is in need of new methodologies that will constrain 
ungrounded associations.   
The second problem with Goethe’s morphology, the tension between what J.Z. 
Smith calls ‘Ideal and History,’14 has been particularly controversial in comparative 
religion. Although Goethe described three possibilities for a plant’s metamorphosis: 
                                            
13 Laurence Sullivan and Kimberley C. Patton, “The Net of Indra: Comparison and the 
Contribution of Perception,” in A Magic Still Dwells, pp. 206-234. 
14 Smith, “Adde Parvum,” p. 83. 
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regular, irregular, and accidental, he chose to almost exclusively focus on regular 
metamorphosis, the type that proceeds from seed to fruit, uninterrupted by unexpected 
environmental influences.15 Transported to the study of religion this led to the 
prioritization of ideal structures over historical context. Smith claims that “Goethe's 
scheme, despite the claims of some of his later admirers, was never evolutionary; it was a 
typological series that was fundamentally ahistorical…16” The conflict between history 
and cross-cultural phenomena highlights the paradox comparativists face; postulating 
perennial structures deems historical change redundant while the insistence on history or 
what Geertz terms ‘thick description’ ultimately excludes the possibility of shared cross-
cultural structures.  
The third distinctive feature of Goethe’s morphology was his focus on 
similarities. As Donald Kaplan notes, Goethe's goal was to discover what plants had in 
common, not what made them different from each other. In this regard, classical German 
morphology differed from contemporary botanical morphology where scientists focus on 
the differentiation of individual species.17 Goethe’s project was oriented towards unity 
and harmony, his famous Urpflanze, the prototypical plant, functioned as an ideal 
unifying structure that could be discerned across the plant kingdom. Such a methodology 
                                            
15 Goethe gave scant consideration to the second type, the ‘irregular’ or retrogressive 
metamorphosis, where the plant proceeds forward but then regresses a step or two, a motions 
which leaves some sections of the plant in an indeterminate stage of relative impotence. Goethe 
dealt with ‘irregular metamorphosis’ only as a means for understanding what is ‘unseen’ in the 
regular type. The third, accidental, metamorphosis that is affected by outside agents, mostly 
insects and severe weather is completely ignored. 
16 In another instance Smith writes: “Goethe shows how unexpected circumstances can change the 
course of metamorphosis but he chooses to eliminate this factor thereby excluding the 
contingencies of history,” “Adde Parvum,” p. 83. 
17 Donald Kaplan R., “The Science of Plant Morphology: Definition, History, and Role in Modern 
Biology,” American Journal of Botany 88, no.10 (2001): 1711–1741.  
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urges us to pay particular attention to the common features that lay at the core of 
variation.   
  In order to understand these methodological dilemmas in context we need to turn 
to Mircea Eliade who transported Goethe’s ideas to the field of comparative religion. The 
three aforementioned components of classical German morphology, the idealistic, the a-
historical, and the focus on similarities are all present in Eliade’s work, which dominated 
the field of religious studies prior to the postmodern critique. The romantic currents that 
flow through Eliade’s thought are impossible to ignore; the endless occupation with 
mythology, the prioritization of the archaic and pre-rational, and the reification of the 
sacred are all indications of an idealistic streak that is common with Goethe’s botanical 
morphology. Such idealism, as Wendy Doniger points out, has led many to label Eliade 
as a crypto or covert theologian.18 One scholar points out that Eliade’s phenomenology 
was "as normative as theology because it is based on an assumed ontology that is neither 
historically derived nor descriptively verifiable.”19 The intuitive features of Goethe’s 
morphological science resonate in Eliade’s approach where the latter insisted on turning 
his nostalgic gaze towards an archaic past, free from the analytical raptures of 
modernity.20 Eliade yearned to intuit the same kind of untainted experience that his homo 
                                            
18 Wendy Doniger, Forward to 2004 edition of Shamanism, p. xv. Doniger as well as Eliade 
specialists such as Robert Ellwood reject the crypto-theologian designation attached to Eliade. 
See Robert Ellwood S., The Politics of Myth: A Study of C. G. Jung, Mircea Eliade, and Joseph 
Campbell (New York: State University of New York Press, 1999), p. 111. 
19 Robert D. Baird, Category Formation and the History of Religions (Berlin; New York: Mouton 
de Gruyter, 1991), pp. 86-87; 152-53.  
20According to Allan Sun Eliade believed that: “Science could not provide the eternal truths he 
was looking for, its mode of acquiring knowledge based on the observation of contingencies. A 
society ruled by appearances, he held, is like a house built on sand. In order to avert the tragedy 
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religiosus experienced through the sacred, he believed that the scholar should be 
equipped with a special “immediate intuition” towards the sacred and the symbolic world 
through which it becomes manifest. Ironically, in Eliade’s eyes, the intuitive familiarity 
with religious consciousness is a prerequisite for a more scientific and reliable 
appreciation of the religious psyche, without which the scholar is unable to penetrate the 
very essence of what the field of religious studies is after.21 Although I agree that 
impulsive associations between religious phenomena may prove detrimental to our quest 
for objectivity, it seems that the exaggerated attack against the use of intuition and 
imagination is itself problematic. As I will show, new approaches to comparative religion 
have justifiably reacted against the postmodern attempt to exile imagination and intuition 
from the process of inquiry.   
 The second feature Eliade shares with Goethe’s morphology is his a-historical 
approach. There is an interesting affinity between Goethe’s famous Urpflanze and 
Eliade’s notion of the sacred. Both metamorphose into different manifestations that can 
                                                                                                                                  
of human finitude, Eliade posited the sacred: the transcendent ground of all being, including time 
itself. He eschewed the methods of science for those of intuition and religious experience, which 
he understood to emanate directly from this transcendent source, providing unmediated access to 
the secrets of the cosmos. Critics retort that this is hardly the disinterested pursuit of knowledge 
that ought characterize the academic enterprise; it is ‘covert theology’, a ‘religion after religion’. 
Claiming the existence of a totality no-one could actually observe, Eliade’s method is dogmatic in 
its propositions and unfalsifiable in its conclusions: the bugbears of bad theory.” Allen Sun, 
“Chasing One’s Tail: Some Reflections on the Methodologies of Mircea Eliade and Jonathan Z. 
Smith.” In On a Panegyrical Note: Studies in Honour of Garry W Trompf (Sydney: Dept. of 
Studies in Religion, University of Sydney, 2007), p. 192. 
21 Eliade, Mircea. The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace, 1959, [1987]), p. 98; James Cox, A Guide to the Phenomenology of Religion Key Figures, 
Formative Influences and Subsequent Debates (London; New York: T & T International, 2006), 
p. 182; Thomas Altizer echos the postmodern stance when he refers to the affinity between Eliade 
and German idealism as a mystical and romantic approach rather than a rational and scientific 
one. Thomas J. Altizer, Mircea Eliade and the Dialectic of the Sacred (Philadelphia: Westminster 
Press, 1963). 
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be perceived and studies empirically. The Urpflanze is the primal prototype behind the 
perplexing variation of plants. Similarly, Eliade’s Sacred reveals itself in the form of 
hierophanies, namely, manifestations of the holy that are expressed as a result of a 
dialectical process between the sacred and the profane. The a-historical form of the 
sacred (or Goethe’s Urpflanze) impresses itself on the contingencies of time and matter 
thereby revealing itself in the mundane world.22 Eliade tried to show that the sacred, in 
spite of its various cross-cultural manifestations, is subject to ‘modifications’ and 
‘degradations’ brought about by cultural and historical conditions.23 However, although 
Eliade rejected the possibility of understanding the sacred outside of time, he was often 
blamed for employing a method of investigation in which religious experiences were 
isolated, decontextualized, and all too often compared cross-culturally. It is apparent that 
he sought to excavate and recover something that transcended history; he strongly 
opposed the existentialist view that man is a product of his decisions and environment, 
devoid of an a-priori essence. Eliade asks us to acknowledge the archetypal human, the 
homo religiosus who stands above cultural conditioning. Humans interact with history, 
they adjust to history but they don’t owe their identity to it. His Archaic Ontology sought 
to penetrate our symbolic world and reveal an untainted sacred moment in illo tempore, a 
                                            
22 Douglas Allen. “Eliade and History,” The Journal of Religion, 68, No. 4 (Oct., 1988): 545-565. 
23 Both Goethe and Eliade were very much aware of the impact of environmental and historical 
circumstances on reality; it is exactly in this sense that Eliade was different from 
phenomenologist of religion such as Chantepie de la Saussaye, William Brede Kristensen, and 
Gerardus van der Leeuw. Robertson Smith’s controversial Religion of the Semites (1889) can also 
be seen as an early synthesis of synchronic typologies or the morphological stance with historical 
and evolutionary methodologies. See more in Paden, Religious Worlds, p. 43. Like the 
phenomenologist, Eliade exhibits an interest in the inner experiences of Homo Religiosus; ecstasy 
for instance, is beyond history, it is a human capacity linked to our biological constitution, and as 
such, stands above a particular cultural context. See for example Eliade, Shamanism: Archaic 
Techniques of Ecstasy (London: Routledge & K. Pauk, 1989), p. xiv. 
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“primordial paradise” as well as a prototypical human being, a human that history 
managed to obscure in many fundamental ways. His notion of the “terror of history” 
reflected the way archaic humans yearned to return to the perfection of creation and to 
the reassuring safety of cyclical time. Not so with modern humans, who have alienated 
themselves from their primordial roots by the adoption of a linear historical perspective, 
constantly haunted by the unknown future.24 
Finally, Eliade’s focus on similarities was yet another feature he shared with 
Goethe. In fact, the attack against Eliadean grand narratives that marginalize cultural 
particulars was one of the most central critiques of postmodernism, especially in the field 
of anthropology.25 Much like Goethe, the thrust of Eliade’s project is oriented towards 
                                            
24 Looking at Eliade’s work, it is almost impossible to ignore his own terror of history; in his 
journal he attests: “my essential preoccupation is precisely the means of escaping History, of 
saving myself through symbol, myth, rites, archetypes.” Douglas Allen, op. cit., p. 555. In spite of 
Eliade’s attempts to incorporate change into his theoretical framework, we are left with the strong 
impression that history is an obstacle in one’s quest to experience the Sacred. Ivan Strenski, one 
of Eliade’s main critics, claims that “Eliade's history of religions is based on a priori truths, which 
stand in an a priori relation to the historical data both logically and chronologically. These 
"truths" may sometimes be “confirmed" in historical materials, but falsification from these 
materials seems ruled out.” Allen attempts to demonstrate that many of Eliade’s supporters 
acknowledged and admitted his anti-historical stance without finding sufficient reasons to discard 
his project. According to him Eliade was not as troubled by his methodology as many would 
expect him to be. Allen, is a good example of someone who is generally sympathetic to Eliade’s 
approach, he tries to highlight the complexity of the latter’s phenomenology, and the intricate 
interplay between a-historical elements and historical particulars. Eliade comfortably admits that 
“at some point the historian of religion must become a phenomenologist of religion, because he 
tries to find meaning. Without hermeneutics, the history of religion is just another history - bare 
facts, special classifications, and so on.” Ibid., p. 548.  
25 Kimberley C. Patton and Benjamin C. Ray, A Magic Still Dwells: Comparative Religion in the 
Postmodern Age (Berkeley; London: University of California Press, 2000), p. 167. One of the 
main opponent of generalizations, and by extension the comparative method, was Clifford Geertz 
who believed that truth is in the particular rather than in the general. His notion of ‘thick 
description’ was highly influential on the anti-comparativist trends in Anthropology, especially as 
it was presented in his Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (New York: Basic Books, 
1973). Interestingly, Geertz’ Islam Observed; Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia 
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highlighting the common and unifying facets of religious traditions while brushing 
differences aside. This becomes apparent in Eliade’s penchant towards excavating cross-
cultural categories such as sky gods, sacred stones, symbols of regeneration, axis mundi, 
and myths of eternal renewal. His work reflected the idea that differences obscure what is 
fundamentally real and most important about religion.  
The Eliadean ‘golden age’ was followed by an extremely antagonistic backlash by 
postmodern and postcolonial thinkers and the subsequent decline of comparative religion 
as a legitimate field of inquiry.26 The postmodern and postcolonial critics were directed at 
‘classical morphology,’ the type of morphology associated with Goethe’s romantic and 
idealistic tradition and especially with the work of Eliade and his followers.27 
                                                                                                                                  
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968) is a comparative work par excellence, focused of the 
analysis of Islam as it developed in two different cultural settings Indonesia (Java) and Morocco. 
26 As Robert Segal notes, the comparative method in Anthropology and Religious Studies 
“….descended from a dominant position to a point where it is in general either not practiced or 
even condemned explicitly.” Segal, “In Defense of the Comparative Method,” Numen 48, no. 3 
(2001): 339-373.  
27 The synchronic method of comparing religions is best associated with the phenomenological 
approach of Gerardus van der Leeuw and Mircea Eliade. For more on phenomenology and the 
neglect of historical context see Daniel Pals, Eight Theories of Religion, 2nd ed., (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 197. Inspired by Edward Said’s Orientalism, postcolonialists 
blamed comparativism for the perpetuation of the colonial project. According to this position the 
comparativist imposes her own biased categories on foreign cultures, thereby distorting their true 
nature. In this view the Eurocentric analysis of non-Western cultures is yet another vestige of the 
West’s pretense of evaluating foreign traditions according to its own standards. The anti-
comparativist attack has also targeted the aforementioned inclination towards detecting 
similarities rather than differences. Such criticism was guided by the postmodern conviction that 
religious and cultural phenomena are fundamentally unique and that no two things can possibly 
be the same. In addition to these charges, historians have pointed out the comparative method’s 
neglect of context, attacking its synchronic tendency to isolate themes from their historical 
settings. 
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Subsequently, comparative religion has been forced to redefine itself; this entailed a 
methodological reorientation that the field is still undergoing today.28   
 
1.2 NEW COMPARATIVISM      
In the last decade of the twentieth century, following a long dormant period, 
comparative religion began to show promising signs of recovery. A new generation of 
scholars committed to revitalizing the field began to respond to the postmodern and 
postcolonial critiques by devising new methodologies that could enable students of 
religion to compare traditions responsibly. Fortunately, the scholars behind this recovery 
did not only offer creative methodologies, but also convincingly argued “for the 
continuing necessity—and relevance—of the comparative study of religion.”29 According 
to this position comparative religion is not something we should simply tolerate, but an 
enterprise we must actively engage in as responsible scholars.30 
                                            
28 At the conference held in 1973 in Turku, Finland on methodologies in the science of religion, 
sponsored by the International Association for the History of Religions, Lauri Honko (1979: xvii) 
observed: “At the turn of the 1970s it was becoming clear that Western science, not least in the 
humanities and social sciences, was undergoing a profound process of self-examination, which 
seemed to be leading to the breakdown of certain older paradigms and even, possibly, to the 
emergence of new ones.” See Cox Phenomenology, p. 211. Armin Geertz and Russell 
McCutcheon New Approaches, 2004 contend that the Turku Conference was an attempt to save 
the science of religion “from its theoretical naiveté and encourage interdisciplinary cooperation.” 
Certainly, they were referring in large measure to the phenomenology of religion, which by the 
1970s was being increasingly criticized for combining theological assumptions with a simplistic 
understanding of Husserl's work. 
29 Patton, A Magic Still Dwells, p. 1. 
30 Benjamin Ray argues that comparative religion has both an intellectual and moral purpose in 
promoting inter-cultural dialogue and broader understanding among different traditions, 
“Discourse about Difference: Understanding African Ritual Language,” A Magic Still Dwells, pp. 
101-116. 
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A landmark work in this effort of revitalization was Kimberley C. Patton and 
Benjamin C. Ray’s ed. A Magic Still Dwells: Comparative Religion in the Postmodern 
Age. The book’s title is in reference to Jonathan Z. Smith’s controversial article In 
Comparison a Magic Dwells, in which the latter articulated some of the problems 
involved in comparativism. The collective effort at correcting old methodologies has 
been termed “New Comparativism,” and has led to the construction of more nuanced and 
historically informed comparative strategies.31 New comparativists sought to offer a 
corrective to both classical morphology and to the exaggerated reaction against it; as in so 
many cases, the solution seemed to lay somewhere in the middle. Although they 
acknowledged that the exaggerated use of imagination and intuition was problematic, 
they also defended their tempered use as legitimate part of the intellectual process.32 
                                            
31 Some central examples are A Magic Still Dwells; Thomas Idinopluos, Brian C. Wilson, and 
James Constantine Hanges, Comparing religions: possibilities and perils (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 
2006); several works by William E. Paden, esp., Religious Worlds: the comparative study of 
religion (Boston: Beacon Press, 1988); Idem., Interpreting the Sacred: Ways of Viewing Religion 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1992); Robert Neville ed. Comparative Religious Ideas Project, in three 
vol. The Human Condition; Ultimate Realities; and Religious Truths (Albany: State University of 
New York Press. 2001). 
32 Smith, Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1982), p. 21. Smith illustrates this problem by referring to J.G. Frazer’s notion of 
‘homoeopathic magic’ in which there exists a “confusion of a subjective relationship with an 
objective one.” In The Golden Bough Frazer, following his teacher E.B. Tylor, contended that the 
misapplication of the ‘Laws of Association’ contains the danger of responsible science declining 
into magical practices, based on ‘contagion’ of similarities. According to Smith at some point in 
his research the comparativist will inevitably experience: “a sort of Deva-vu, the scholar 
remembers that he has seen “it” or “something like it” before…this unintended consequence of 
research, must then be accorded significance and provided with an explanation. In the vast 
majority of instances in the history of comparison, this subjective experience is projected as an 
objective connection through some theory of influence, diffusion, borrowing, or the like. It is a 
process of working from a psychological association to an historical one; it is to assert that 
similarity and contiguity have a causal effect.” J.G. Frazer, 3rd ed. (New York, 1935) 1:53 (see 
also 1:221-22) Ironically, Smith wrote his doctoral dissertation on Frazer which reaffirmed his 
feeling that Frazer’s Golden Bough was an immense ‘laboratory of comparison’ that nevertheless 
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Intuition and imagination, they argued, play a central role in the process of human 
discovery. If a falling apple could inspire the discovery of gravity in the sciences, why 
should we delegitimize the role of intuition in comparative religion?33 New 
comparativists also responded to the postmodern attack against the search for cross-
cultural patterns; they argued that historical specificity does not deny the existence of 
pan-human and cross-cultural patterns; the two can co-exist and even enrich each other. 
This dissertation follows both of these correctives: as noted in the prologue, it was an 
initial intuition that led me to this project. At present, I believe that this initial intuition 
can be supported by a wide array of facts. With respect to the tension between history and 
universal patterns, genetic morphology tried to demonstrate that overarching patterns are 
subject to gradual change and history gives us a valuable glimpse at the way these 
changes take place over time. 
I do not believe we can isolate a fixed method to compare religious traditions; our 
methodologies will inevitably change to suit the unique context, characteristics, and 
objectives of our projects. Since theory and methodology are forever intertwined, every 
comparison demands a tailoring of a procedure that is best suited to illuminate a specific 
set of data. What I refer to as genetic-morphology is an attempt to offer one way to 
approach comparative religion. In what follows I will try to clarify how morphology will 
                                                                                                                                  
lacks a reliable guiding methodology. This is related to the influence of works on association in 
the history of religion and philosophy, especially the ‘Laws of Association’ devised by Aristotle 
and later reformulated in the 17th century by John Locke. This stream of thought also influenced 
Tylor and Frazer’s theory of magic. 
33 See more on the role of imagination in comparative religion, A Magic Still Dwells, pp. 1-18, 
and Kimberley Patton, “Juggling Torches: Why We Still Need Comparative Religion,” pp. 153-
171, passim. 
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be used in this dissertation. I’ll begin by looking at some basic definitions of the term and 
then proceed to introduce my own definition.34  
                    
1.3 GENETIC MORPHOLOGY   
The Merriam-Webster Dictionary provides the following characterizations of the 
term morphology: “(a) The form and structure of an organism or any of its parts.”35 In the 
case of this study the main “organism” subjected to morphological analysis will be 
religious traditions, both whole traditions such as Judaism and Confucianism as well as 
sub-traditions such as Kabbalah and Neo-Confucianism. The Encyclopedia Britannica, 
offers the following definition: “The study of the size, shape, and structure of animals, 
plants, and micro-organisms and of the relationships of the parts comprising them.”36 
This definition helps us appreciate the importance of the interrelationships of constituting 
components, a factor that will be crucial to this work. J.Z. Smith argues that morphology 
“has as its necessary presupposition an a priori notion of economy in which there are 
relatively few “original elements” from which complex systems are generated.”37 Smith’s 
definition raises the notion of emergence, the idea that the interaction and interrelatedness 
                                            
34 J.Z. Smith notes that comparative religion lacks a robust methodological framework for 
comparing traditions. He asks and then replies: “Is comparison an enterprise of magic or 
science?....In no literature on comparison that I am familiar with has there been any presentation 
of rules for the production of comparisons.” Jonathan Z. Smith, “In Comparison a Magic 
Dwells,” in A Magic Still Dwells, p. 26. 
35 Merriam-Webster Dictionary: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/morphology 
36 This is a definition of morphology as it is applied in the field of biology. See Encyclopedia 
Britannica: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/392797/morphology 
37 In his definition Smith claims that morphology “is a logical, formal progression which ignores 
categories of space (habitat) and time.” As mentioned, one of the central goals of Genetic 
morphology is to incorporate diachronic considerations to the analysis of cultural structures. 
Smith, op. cit., p. 23. 
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of relatively few “original elements” leads to complex systems that cannot be accounted 
for by pointing back to their constituent features. I will try to demonstrate that although 
the Jewish and Confucian traditions look very different, their morphology adheres to the 
same synthetic modality.  
Finally, Goethe’s definition: “A science of organic forms and formative forces 
aimed at discovering the underlying unity in the vast diversity of plants and animals.” 
This definition adds the somewhat ambiguous notion of “formative forces.” What exactly 
are these forces? Are they something we should treat seriously or just an outdated 
philosophical idealism? Although fully answering this question is beyond the scope of 
this study, I will tentatively suggest that systems theory might help us understand the 
notion of formative forces in an updated scientific language.  
Before I proceed to offer my definition of genetic morphology a few words about 
the term genetic are in place. As we have seen, traditional morphological approaches 
tended to ignore history and context. I believe that our search for underlying patterns 
must by accompanied by a diachronic analysis that accounts for historical change, or 
genesis. The idea of genesis and change means that the cultural systems we are dealing 
with are dynamic and therefore exist in an ongoing relationship with their surrounding 
environments. In other words, although the cultural systems we are dealing with are 
robust and relatively stable, they nevertheless change over time and adapt to new 
circumstances. The notion of adaptation assumes a fundamental flexibility that organism 
or system must disclose in order to endure in hostile environments.   
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Based on the information above, I offer the following definition of genetic 
morphology: 
Genetic morphology aims to detect the irreducible components of cultural systems. It 
attempts to explore the internal dynamics of such systems by describing the way their 
constituent components interact with each other and relate to the whole. Genetic 
morphology explores the development and evolution of cultural systems in relation to 
their shifting historical contexts and aims to understand the mechanisms that enable such 
systems to adjust and adapt to new external conditions without compromising their 
underlying traits.      
 
With this definition in mind, the following pages will explore how genetic morphology 
can be applied comparing Judaism and Confucianism. Before proceeding to explain the 
details of my methodology I introduce a few terms that will frequently appear throughout 
this study. I present them from the specific to the general: 
1) Morphological Features: the irreducible constituent parts that compose a 
cultural system. This term will be interchangeable with ‘morphological components.’  
2) Morphological Levels: The three basic levels that compose a cultural system; 
the cognitive, social, and cultural. Each level is constituted of various morphological 
features.  
3) The Two Morphological Modalities: The way the three morphological levels 
and the morphological features that constitute them interact to form a cultural systems: 
synthetic or analytic.                                                     
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1.4 THE SYNTHETIC AND ANALYTIC MODALITIES  
This study postulates two modes of operation: the synthetic and analytic.38 The 
synthetic and analytic modalities are two ways of constructing culture that have proved to 
be exceptionally pervasive throughout history.39 My central argument is that in spite of 
the diversity of pre-modern traditions, cultural systems tend to conform to one of these 
modalities. Scholars from the humanities, especially Sinologists, have been well aware of 
essential differences between Eastern and Western cultures.40 Recently, studies by cross-
                                            
38 Robert Eno is an example of a Sinologist that refers to Confucian thought as “synthetic 
philosophy,” See The Confucian Creation of Heaven: Philosophy and the Defense of Ritual 
Mastery (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), pp. 8-9. 
39 Nelson Goodman, Peter Berger, and William Paden use the idea of ‘world construction’ and 
‘world-making.’ 
40 Jerome Bruner discusses the difference between Narrative and Logical interpretations of 
reality; modes of thought he detects as oppositional, see, Actual Minds, Possible Worlds 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986). Harvey Whitehouse has offered two 
categories the Imagestic and Doctrinal as representing two types of memory systems that stand at 
the core of two modes of religiosity, Modes of Religiosity: A Cognitive Theory of Religious 
Transmission (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2004); Cross-cultural 
psychologist Richard Nisbett offers a distinction between the Analytic and Holistic worldviews, 
Nisbett, The Geography of Thought: How Asians and Westerners Think Differently-- and Why 
(New York: Free Press, 2003); C.P. Snow in his The Two Cultures is a bit different in that he 
talks about the dichotomy between the sciences and Humanities. Some well known examples of 
Sinologists who were particularly interested in East/West dichotomies: Marcel Granet, La Pensse 
Chinoise (Paris: La Renaissance du Livre, 1934); Feng Youlan, A Comparative Study of Life 
Ideals: The Way of Decrease and Increase With Interpretations and Illustrations From the 
Philosophies of the East and West (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1934); Northrop, F. S. C., The 
Meeting of East and West; an Inquiry Concerning World Understanding (New York: Collier 
Books, 1966); Charles Alexander Moore, Philosophy--East and West (Princeton N.J.,: Princeton 
university press, 1944); Essays in East-West Philosophy; an Attempt At World Philosophical 
Synthesis (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1951); Philosophy and Culture East and West 
(Honolulu: Univ. of Hawaii Pr., 1968); Joseph Needham, Science and Civilization in China, Vol. 
ii (Cambridge: University Press, 1959); Hajime Nakamura, Buddhism in Comparative Light (New 
Delhi Bombay: Current Book House, 1975); Idem., A Comparative History of Ideas (London: 
KPI, 1986); Julia Ching, Confucianism and Christianity: A Comparative Study (Tokyo; New 
York: Kodansha International, 1977); Hans Kung and Julia Ching, Christianity and Chinese 
Religions (New York: Doubleday, 1989); A.C. Graham, Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical 
Argument in Ancient China (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1989); Schwartz, Benjamin I., The World 
of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, Mass.; London: Belknap Press of Harvard University 
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cultural psychologists and cognitive psychologists have supported the synthetic/analytic 
dichotomy with empirical evidence. Positing the two cultural modalities should not be 
seen as an act of reification, but rather a methodological divise for highlighting two 
pervasive modes of operation.  It is helpful to think of the analytic/synthetic distinction as 
extending on a continuum from highly analytic traditions to highly synthetic ones. It is 
also worth noting that cultural systems disclose an internal diversity that includes both 
synthetic and analytic currents; the function of comparative religion is to highlight the 
most dominant tendencies of traditions. Such generalizations are crucial for 
understanding what an exaggerated focus on details frequently obscures.  
The distinction between synthetic and analytic modes of operation helps 
problematize our common East/West distinctions. We have become accustomed to place 
monotheistic traditions in the same ‘Western’ category, and traditions as different as 
Hinduism, Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism in the same ‘Eastern’ category. The 
synthetic/analytic contrast re-organizes traditional typologies by placing the Jewish and 
                                                                                                                                  
Press, 1985); David Hall L., and Roger T. Ames, Thinking Through Confucius (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1987), Idem., Anticipating China (1995), and Idem., Thinking 
from the Han (1998); Roger Ames, Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary (Hong Kong: The 
Chinese University Press, 2011); John Berthrong, All Under Heaven: Transforming Paradigms in 
Confucian-Christian Dialogue (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), Concerning 
Creativity: A Comparison of Chu Hsi, Whitehead, and Neville (Albany, NY: State University of 
New York Press, 1998); Joseph Levenson, Revolution and Cosmopolitanism: The Western Stage 
and the Chinese Stages (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971); Francois Jullien, Detour 
and Access: Strategies of Meanings in China and Greece (New York: Zone Books, 2000), Idem., 
A Treatise on Efficacy: Between Western and Chinese Thinking (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i 
Press, 2004); Xinzhong Yao, Confucianism and Christianity: A Comparative Study of Jen and 
Agape (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1997); Idem., Wisdom in Early Confucian and 
Israelite Traditions.; Robert C. Neville. Ritual and Deference: Extending Chinese Philosophy in 
a Comparative Context (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2008); Henry 
Rosemont and Roger Ames, The Chinese Classic of Family Reverence: A Philosophical 
Translation of the Xiaojing (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2009).  
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Chinese traditions in the same category of synthetic traditions and contrasting them with 
the ancient Greek and Buddhist analytic traditions. The central argument of this study is 
that the emergence of Kabbalah and Neo-Confucianism was a result of a cultural clash 
between the synthetic Jewish and Chinese traditions and the analytic traditions of Greek 
philosophy and Buddhism respectively.  
 
1.5 THE THREE MORPHOLOGICAL LEVELS 
The synthetic and analytic modalities are each composed of what scholars have 
identified as the three fundamental layers of reality; cognition, society, and culture. The 
first level refers to the different cognitive strategies that synthetic and analytic traditions 
use. The second level refers to the way individuals organize into social entities.41 The 
third level refers to cultures, which includes both society (family units, kin relations, and 
clan structures) and additional elements such as human motivations, activities, and ideas. 
Perhaps the first thinker to clearly articulate the differentiation of the three layers was the 
sociologist Talcott Parsons who argued that:  
all human groups exist on three tiers, or levels, of organization: (1) individual 
personalities, which are shaped and governed by (2) a social system, which is, in its turn, 
shaped and controlled by (3) a separate “cultural system.” The last of these, which is a 
                                            
41 Under the influence of the Durkheimian tradition, sociologists and anthropologist formerly 
believed that in studying culture our basic unit of analysis was “societies.” It was only with the 
advent of American anthropology under the influence of Fraz Boas, Louis Kroeber, and Robert 
Lowie that anthropologists began to notice the important distinction between the social and 
cultural layers. These early thinkers noted that the unit of anthropological analysis was “culture” 
rather than simply society. They stressed the fact that society was only one element in a greater 
cultural arena that included ideas, customs, symbols, and institutions. 
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complex network of values, symbols, and beliefs, interacts with both the individual and 
the society, but for purposes of analysis it can be separated from them.42 
 
This tripartite differentiation of reality was adopted by Clifford Geertz who argued that 
“no matter how deeply interfused the cultural, the social, and the psychological may be in 
the everyday life… it is useful to distinguish them in analysis, and, so doing, to isolate 
the generic traits of each against the normalized background of the other two.”43 More 
recently, following Parsons and Geertz, scholars such as Robert Bellah and Merlin 
Donald have adopted the cognitive, social, and cultural distinctions as well.44  
                      
1.5.1 The Cognitive Level  
The first level will refer to the different kinds of cognitive strategies that synthetic 
and analytic cultures use. I use the terms analytic thought and synthetic thought to 
differentiate between these strategies. A tradition’s cognitive orientation towards thinking 
analytically or synthetically is not an ideology or content-based disposition but rather a 
mental temperament. Within the cognitive level I will discuss three opposing 
morphological features, which distinguish the synthetic and analytic mindsets.  
 
 
                                            
42 This was argued in Parson’s book The Structure of Social Action, Pals, op. cit., p. 266. 
43 Clifford Geertz “Thick Description: Towards an Interpretive Theory of Culture“ in The 
Interpretation of Cultures, p. 5. In Pals, Eight Theories, p. 260. 
44 Bellah in Juergensmeyer Teaching the Introductory Course in Religious Studies (Duke 
University Press, 1991); Merlin Donald, Origins of the Modern Mind: Three Stages in the 
Evolution of Culture and Cognition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991); Geertz, 
op. cit., p. 92. 
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a) Atomization of Data vs. Integration of Data (Holism)   
Analytical thought is oriented towards the differentiation of data into atomic units. 
The atomization and deconstruction of information and substances leads to a tendency 
towards reification and essentialism. Synthetic thought, on the other hand, is holistic in 
that it tends to preserve a rounded and all-inclusive unity of data. Linguistic, social, and 
metaphysical categories tend to be more ambiguous and undifferentiated than those in the 
analytic mode. Linguistically, analytic thought focuses on precise conceptual language 
while synthetic thought shows a greater use of metaphors and terms with a broad and 
multi-layered semantic range.  
 
b) De-contextualization vs. Contextualization  
Analytic thought tends to de-contextualize information such that there is an 
ongoing search for the static, immutable, and universal underpinnings of reality. De-
contextualization takes place on multiple levels: metaphysically, it leads to universal and 
static cosmological structures, while ethically it is inclined towards a typically Kantian 
categorical imperative, in which situations and events are subordinated to a universal and 
non-changing moral rationalism. In contrast, synthetic contextualization means that 
things and ideas are forever anchored in a specific situation and flow of events, which 
lends reality a more dynamic and process-oriented nature. 
These distinctions also have an impact on the manner in which data is integrated 
into a coherent whole. Analytic thought joins discrete units of data using content-free (de-
contextualized) formal or logical relations. In contrast, synthetic systems ‘navigate’ 
  
25 
information through association and analogy or through a certain plot or narrative. In 
other words, the content, value, and meaning of data in a synthetic system impinge upon 
the way information will be handled and integrated. Instead of strict logic, one’s 
associative thought will be central in determining the general progression of ideas.  
 
c) Self-Enclosed Linear Systems (Analytic) vs. Open-Endedness Non-Linear Systems 
(Synthetic) 
Analytical thinking works according to logical procedures in which information is 
presented in linear sequences that terminate with a conclusion based on preceding data. 
The progression of information can be inductive in which particular assumptions support 
a general conclusion, or deductive in which a general hypothesis is supported by specific 
examples and proofs. Most importantly, information is integrated so as to strive towards a 
self-enclosed and coherent whole. Synthetic thought, on the other hand, treats data 
organically and although there are certainly rules of organization, the presentation of 
information is based on non-linear networks of connections that are open-ended rather 
than teleological or enclosed.  
In conclusion, on the cognitive level the analytic and synthetic modalities are 
differentiated by three opposing morphological features: 1) atomization of data vs. 
integration of data, 2) De-contextualization (formal relations) vs. contextualization 
(association), and 3) self-enclosed and linear systems vs. open-ended and non-linear 
systems.     
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1.5.2 The Sociological Level 
a) Social Embeddedness vs. Social Autonomy  
On the sociological level I will distinguish between two types of social 
configurations: social autonomy and social embeddedness.45 In the analytic mode, the 
autonomous individual is seen as the most fundamental constituent of the community and 
is therefore perceived as a discrete entity. Theologically, such a social orientation 
provides individuals with private channels for accessing ultimate truths and achieving 
spiritual realization. Although traditional cultures that adhered to social autonomy 
disclosed strong familial and communal bonds, theologically the individual was 
perceived as the fundamental unit of spiritual fulfillment – I will refer to this as cognitive 
individualism in order to distinguish it from the type of social individualism that emerged 
in the modern West.46 Social autonomy leads to religious phenomena such as 
monasticism, celibacy, and asceticism all of which are unlikely to emerge in synthetic 
cultures.  
The synthetic modality conforms to social embeddedness in which the most 
fundamental social unit is the family rather than the individual. Although traditions that 
subscribe to social embeddedness are comprised of individual members with private 
                                            
45 I understand these terms as they are used by Shalom H. Schwartz. See Schwartz & Ros, M. 
“Values in the West: A theoretical and empirical challenge to the Individualism-Collectivism 
cultural dimension,” World Psychology 1, (1995): 99-122; Schwartz & Rubel, T. “Sex differences 
in value priorities: Cross-cultural and multi-method studies,” Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 89, (2005): 1010-1028; “A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and 
Applications” in Comparative Sociology 5, no. 2-3 (2006): 137-182. 
46 “The Hidden Hero: Creation and disintegration of the Ideal of Eremitism,” in Donald Munro,  
Individualism and Holism: Studies in Confucian and Taoist Values (Ann Arbor: Center for 
Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1985), p. 181. 
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lives, it is also the case that individuals in this modality are perceived in relation to other 
members of the family and the community. This is what sociologist Basil Bernstein 
termed the positional perspective in which the individual is relativized vis-à-vis other 
members.47 This positionality is especially apparent in the family, the first social entity in 
which we witness a relational dynamic. Family members in synthetic traditions are nested 
in a matrix of relationships that inhibits the emergence of extreme forms of 
individualism. Spiritual fulfillment in traditions of social embeddedness will be generally 
opposed to monastic and ascetic practices; the idea of sagehood in these traditions 
requires an intense social awareness and ongoing engagement in community affairs. Self-
realization outside the community is paradoxical since sagehood is first and foremost a 
social affair.48  
 
1.5.3 The Cultural Level 
 
The third morphological level is cultural, and consists of four morphological 
dichotomies: 
a) Ritualism (orthopraxy) vs. Contemplation  
Synthetic traditions, certainly Judaism and Confucianism, are characterized by 
dense ritualistic behavior in which a central part of one’s religious and social 
commitments is related to the following of preconceived and socially accepted patterns of 
behavior. This is opposed to analytic traditions that lay a stronger stress on contemplative 
                                            
47 Basil Bernstein, Class, Codes and Control (London; Boston: Routledge & K. Paul, 1974). 
48 This topic has been explored in detail by Durkheim and Mauss, the school of L’Annee 
Sociologique, and more recently by Mary Douglas in her Natural Symbols (Harmondsworth; 
Middlesex; England; New York: Penguin Books, 1978).  
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channels for religious realization. While orthopraxy focuses on physicality, 
contemplative techniques emphasize spiritualistic and reflective modes of operation that 
are theoretically free of physical constraints, and attempt to downplay the role of the 
body.  
Although analytic traditions certainly have rituals, they tend to occupy a less 
central position than those in synthetic traditions. Qualitatively, rituals in analytic 
traditions tend to evolve towards mechanisms that embody theological ideas rather than 
being oriented towards praxis or simply “doing stuff.” Conversely, synthetic traditions 
may have contemplative features but these are overshadowed by the stress on 
participation in communal ceremonies and embodied channels of communication.   
 
b) This-Worldly vs. Other-Worldly  
This dichotomy refers to the synthetic modality’s positive attitude towards this 
world rather than some other-worldly sphere such as the Christian Kingdom of Heaven, 
the abstract realm of Platonic Forms, or Buddhist Nirvana. World affirming conceptions 
see the human realm as the main domain of religious action and a valid sphere for self-
realization, while other-worldly cultures postulate a more sublime world that is superior 
to the one we live in. Consequently the analytic mode of operation tends to perceive this 
world of matter as blemished and inherently flawed, a sphere we attempt to escape.   
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c) Particularism vs. Universalism  
Particularistic traditions may disclose universalistic tendencies but they 
nevertheless insist on preserving a certain priority for members of a specific community. 
In Judaism this is reflected by the unique relationship God forges with the Jews as well as 
the distinctive function the Israelites play in the cosmic drama. In China particularism 
was mainly associated with a cultural affiliation that distinguished the well-cultivated 
Chinese from barbarians on the periphery. Although it was hypothetically possible for 
non-Chinese people to become part of China (中華民族), required foreigners to adopt the 
Chinese language and writing system, as well as subordinate themselves to the Chinese 
way of life and the indisputable superiority of  the Chinese imperial order.  
Analytic traditions such as Buddhism and the Greco-Christian tradition represent 
forms of religious universalism in which there are no hereditary or cultural distinctions 
between potential members of the community. Through active proselytization analytic 
traditions encourage people to become members of the group regardless of background. 
Procedures for joining analytic traditions are rather lenient and do not necessarily entail a 
substantial change in one’s life style, let alone her national, cultural, and ethnic 
affiliation.       
                                                    
d) Language: Non Indo-European vs. Indo-European 
Different linguistic orientations between the synthetic and analytic modalities are 
the fourth distinction on the cultural level. Cultures that belong to the Indo-European 
language family are predisposed towards the adoption of the analytic modality, while 
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non-Indo-European cultures tend to conform to the synthetic mode of operation. In our 
case the Chinese and Jewish traditions belong to the non-Indo-European rubric while the 
Greek, Christian, Indian and early Buddhist traditions belong to the Indo-European 
category. I will discuss the impact that language is believed to exert on the construction 
of reality and try to demonstrate why analytic traditions emerged out of cultures with 
Indo-European roots. Although radical forms of the Whorf-Sapir theory have been 
abandoned, most scholars working in the field today agree that language has a ‘non-
trivial’ impact upon the way we perceive and interpret the world. My intention is not to 
resurrect the position held by linguistic determinists, but rather to contend that language 
is one of several characteristics that shape a tradition’s cultural ethos.   
The categorization above represents a rough and preliminary sketch of the 
morphological structure of the analytic and synthetic modalities. Each mode is 
constituted of the three morphological levels (cognitive, social, and cultural) and the 
different morphological features that compose them. The main contribution I attempt in 
this study is to offer a more systematic analysis of these distinctly different cultural 
modalities; one that attempts to explain their fundamental constituent, internal dynamic, 
and adaptive nature.  
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Table 1: The Two Morphological Modalities  
   
 Analytic Modality  Synthetic Modality  
   
 Atomization of data  Integration of data (holism) 
   
Cognitive Level De-contextualization  Contextualization  
   
 Self-enclosed, linear systems  Open-ended, non-linear 
systems 
    
   
Social Level Social autonomy (personal)  Social embeddedness 
(positional) 
  
 
 
 
 Contemplation  Ritual  
   
Cultural Level  Other-worldly  This-worldly  
   
 Universalism  
 
Indo-European  
Particularism  
 
Non-Indo-European  
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1.6 METHODOLOGICAL COMMENTS    
 
1.6.1 Axial Traditions 
 My analysis of traditions will focus on what has come to be known by the 
controversial, albeit highly influential term, “axial traditions.” Exploring the vague topic 
of “axiality” is certainly beyond the scope of this study. Different views and 
interpretations of the meaning of the axial age have been offered in a host of articles and 
most notably in two compilations edited by Shaul N. Eisensadt and more recently by 
Robert Bellah and Hans Joas.49 There are three reasons for why I am highlighting the idea 
of axiality. The first is that axial traditions happen to be the most dominant traditions in 
our global landscape and those that we are by far most familiar with in terms of 
archeological, textual, and historical data. The second reason is that there are reasons to 
believe that the analytic mode of operation is an axial phenomenon; some, like Merlin 
Donald, convincingly argue that the roots of systematic analytic thought can be traced 
back to ancient Greece between the sixth and eighth centuries BCE, a period that 
according Karl Jaspers represents the beginning of the axial age. If he is correct, as I 
believe he is, the analytic mode of operation emerged as a reaction or alternative to the 
                                            
49 S.N Eisenstadt, The Origins and Diversity of Axial Age Civilizations (Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 1986); Robert Bellah and Hans Joas, The Axial Age and Its Consequences 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2012). Other works dealing with 
the Axial Age: Eric Voegelin, Order and History (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1956); Robert Bellah, Religion in Human Evolution: From the Paleolithic to the Axial Age 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011); Roetz Heiner, Confucian 
Ethics of the Axial Age: a Reconstruction Under the Aspect of the Breakthrough Towards 
Postconventional Thinking (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1993); Carlton H. 
Tucker, “The Axial Age to the New Age: Religion as a Dynamic of World History,” in The 
History Teacher 27, no. 4 (Aug., 1994): 449-464; B. Thomassen “Anthropology, Multiple 
Modernities and the Axial Age Debate” in Anthropological Theory 10, no. 4 (2010): 321-342; 
Yves Lambert “Religion in Modernity as a New Axial Age: Secularization or New Religious 
Forms?” in Sociology of Religion 60, no. 3 (1999): 303-333. 
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dominant synthetic modes of operation of the pre-axial age. Ironically, the emergence of 
analytic traditions also led to a counter-reaction and the emergence of more updated axial 
age synthetic modes of operation. Although hints of analytic thought can be found before 
the emergence of the rational Greek tradition, it seems tenuous and rather vague to 
discuss a clear opposition between synthetic and analytic cultural modalities before the 
axial age.50 
The third reason why I find axiality important is the centrality of sacred written 
texts in these traditions. For the first time, written language came to play an increasingly 
important role in the processing and transmission of information. This new phenomenon 
of storing information on a durable medium enabled axial traditions to disseminate 
information more efficiently and therefore persevere for millennia. It also enabled axial 
traditions to emancipate themselves form the growing burden of memorization by 
‘downloading’ information onto an external format thereby freeing people to engage in 
new mental tasks and activities. This is not only an issue of storing information 
externally; the peculiar interaction between humans and these new literary formats had 
important cognitive ramifications. According to Merlin Donald: 
external memory is a critical feature of modern human cognition… The brain may not 
have changed recently in its genetic makeup, but its link to an accumulating external 
memory network affords it cognitive powers that would not have been possible in 
                                            
50 Scholars such as Peter Machinist and Leo Oppenheim have argued that pre-axial traditions in 
Mesopotamia never disclosed the type of self-conscious reflection vis-à-vis other cultures. 
Similarly, Eisenstadt in intro to The Origins and Diversity, pp. 1-28, claims that in opposition to 
earlier near Eastern systems, axial traditions became strongly aware of their conventionality, a 
state of events that led them to form and develop in contradistinction to other cultural forces in 
their proximity and the lack of cultural identification in Mesopotamia. See Peter Machinist, “On 
Self Consciousness in Mesopotamia” In Eisenstadt, The Origins and Diversity, p. 184; 192. 
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isolation. This is more than a metaphor; each time the brain carries out an operation in 
concert with the external symbolic storage system, it becomes part of a network. Its 
memory structure is temporarily altered; and the locus of cognitive control changes.51 
 
For the purpose of this study I will define axial cultures as traditions that distinguished 
themselves from pre-axial cultures by the production of specialized written canonical 
corpuses that managed to endure as a living tradition to our present day. As such the 
general groups I have in mind are the Monotheistic (Judaism, Christianity and Islam), the 
Greek (Platonism, Neoplatonism, and Aristotelianism), the Sinitic (Confucianism and 
Daoism), and the Indian (Hinduism, Jainism, and Buddhism).52 
                                
1.6.2 The Greco-Christian and Indo-Buddhist Traditions   
My grouping of the Greek and Christian traditions under the same analytic rubric 
is a point that begs an explanation, one that is somewhat complicated by the fact that 
these two traditions were themselves in a state of continuous tension and ongoing 
conflict. Such tensions notwithstanding, I will treat Christianity as a tradition in which 
                                            
51 Merlin Donald, Origins of the Modern Mind, p. 312. W.F. Albright claims that the logical 
epoch of humanity begins first among the Greek in the 5th century BCE. Similarly in his Vienna 
lecture (1935) Edmund Husserl argued that the “The theoretical attitude has its historical origin in 
the Greeks,” see Quentin Lauer trans., Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy: Philosophy 
as a Rigorous Science and Philosophy and the Crisis of European Man (Harper Torchbooks: 
New York: Harper & Row, 1965). 
52 There is a reason for why focusing on Judaism, the Greco-Christian tradition, China, and India 
is beneficial. As part of my effort to understand the genesis of the morphology of cultures I am 
particularly interested in the ongoing historical interaction between the synthetic and analytical 
modes of operation. Such a focus renders an analysis of a latecomer such as Islam as less 
informative. Said differently, the best way to understand the enduring interaction between the 
synthetic and analytical modalities in the West is to look at the long term interaction between 
Judaism on the one hand and Greek philosophy and Christianity on the other; an interaction that 
preceded the birth of Islam by more than a millennium in the Jewish/Greek case and close to 
seven centuries in the Jewish/Christian case. 
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monotheism, under the intense impact of Greek culture, gradually shifted from its Jewish 
synthetic mindset towards the adoption of an analytic mode of operation. Indeed, the 
Greek features of the Christian tradition became apparent early in its inception, a fact that 
led to the emergence of various forms of Neoplatonic, and rationalist/Aristotelian 
theological strands.53 The rationalization of Christianity can be seen in misgivings that 
many Christian theologians had towards Christianity’s deviation from its original Jewish 
Eastern roots. According to one of them the doctrine of the trinity “arose from Greek 
philosophy rather than the gospel,” another complaint was that the trinity was a “gross 
perversity by those who take pride in Platonizing [Christianity]…brought upon us by the 
Greeks who have forgotten that ‘Christ was not speaking to philosophers…but to 
common people.”54 Much like Jewish thinkers throughout the ages, it seems that alienated 
Christians felt the inherent danger that lurked in the Greek mindset. I believe that it is in 
this sense that Peter Berger claims that “Christianity has been its own gravedigger,”55 a 
metaphor that points to the somewhat ironic fact that Christianity’s cultural DNA 
contained the subversive seeds of Greek rationalism and secularization. These 
contradictions led to an ongoing tension between faith and reason in the Greco-Christian 
tradition.  
                                            
53 One obvious example is Augustine’s Neoplatonic form of Christianity can be seen in his 
distinctions between the pure City of God and the corrupt and matter-based City of Man, a clear 
theological adaptation of Plato’s division between the sublime realm of Forms and the mundane 
sphere of shadows and imitations. 
54 Common to all these voices was the sense that Platonism corrupted the pure tradition of the 
apostles and a discomfort with the growing discrepancy between philosophical, Platonized 
Christianity and the original tradition of the founders. J.Z. Smith, Drudgery Divine: On the 
Comparison of Early Christianities and the Religions of Late Antiquity (London: School of 
Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1990), pp. 15-16. 
55 Peter Berger, The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion (Garden City, 
N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967), p. 128. 
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I will support the distinction between the Greek/Christian traditions and Judaism 
with many examples that will make this initially elusive dichotomy clearer. For now I 
will tentatively categorize Greek philosophy and Christianity as following the analytic 
modality and Judaism following the synthetic modality.  
The relationship between India and Buddhism reveals a similar internal 
complexity. Although many of the characteristics of the analytic modality are apparent in 
the early Vedic tradition, it is only with the advent of early Indian Buddhism that we see 
the analytic modality in its full-fledged form. This is somewhat complicated by the fact 
that Buddhism was later transported into China where it adopted many synthetic modes 
of operation. However, in spite of its Sinicization, Chinese Buddhism preserved many of 
its analytic characteristics. The common idea that Buddhism has been wholly Sinicized 
by the time of the Tang dynasty (618-907 CE), although correct in many important ways, 
downplays the fact that the Indian roots of Chinese Buddhism continued to exert foreign 
cultural pressures on native Chinese systems of thought. It is for this reason that my 
distinction between the synthetic and analytic modes of operation in the Chinese case will 
contrast the Chinese synthetic modality on one hand, and the Hindu, Indo-Buddhist, and 
Sino-Buddhist analytic modalities on the other hand. I will use the term Indo-Buddhist 
when referring to the early and more purely analytic forms of Hinduism and Buddhism; 
this will also include early non-Sinicized schools of Buddhism that operated in China 
such as the Yogacara or Consciousness Only School (唯識宗) and the Madhyamaka or 
Three Treatise School (三輪宗).  In contrast Sino-Buddhist refers to less analytic and 
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more Sinicized forms of Buddhism such as Tiantai (天台宗), Huayan (華嚴宗), and 
especially Chan Buddhism (禪宗).  
 
1.6.3 Periodization  
My analysis of the Jewish and Chinese traditions will begin by a comparison of 
their morphological physiognomy during what I refer to as the classical period. I chose 
the term ‘classical’ since the periodization I am suggesting does not quite correlate with 
the commonly used categories - antiquity, medieval, and modern.56 In Judaism by 
‘classical’ I am referring to the Mishnaic/Talmudic period which can be traced back to R’ 
Yehuda ha’Nasi in the first century CE. Although the Talmud remains the core of 
Judaism to this very day, the ‘classical’ stage refers to a time in which it was the sole 
literary extension to the Bible, a period before the emergence of the Zohar as an 
additional layer of the Jewish corpus. Therefore the classical period in Judaism begins in 
the first century CE, and ends at the tenth century CE with the emergence of philosophy 
and medieval mysticism.  
By ‘classical Confucianism’ I am referring to the consolidation of the Confucian 
tradition as an official ideology in the second century BCE, during the reign of Han Wudi 
(漢武帝). Under the influence of the Confucian scholar and cosmologist Dong Zhongshu 
(董仲舒 - 179-104 BC) the Five Classics became the textual foundation of Confucian 
orthodoxy, a trend that persevered until the emergence of Neo-Confucianism in the 
                                            
56 My term ‘classical’ is closest to the common ‘medieval’ category but nevertheless different 
enough to merit a term that distinguishes it from both the Chinese and Western Middle Ages. 
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eleventh century, when the Four Books eventually replaced the Five Classics as the focus 
of the imperial examination system.57  
The historical periodization I suggest is tailored to serve the specific goals of this 
dissertation but like any periodization it begins as an hypothesis that aims to highlight a 
specific interpretation of historical progression. I leave it to the readers to decide whether 
such a periodization is beneficial. As scholars have noted, historical categories “seldom 
fit neatly or exactly; historical events resist periodization into watertight compartments. 
But we must use such large-scale groupings and divisions unless our historical 
knowledge is to remain inchoate and meaningless.”58 The periodization of the Jewish and 
Chinese traditions into ‘classical periods’ is intimately related to a body of literature (the 
emergence of the Mishnah and the Talmud in Judaism and the rise of the Five Classics in 
China). Again, the Talmud and Five Classics remained highly influential long after the 
emergence of Kabbalah and Neo-Confucianism, but instead of representing an exclusive 
body of literature they were supplemented by additional literary layers, the Zohar and 
Four Books respectively. These new canonical texts reflected the revolutionary changes 
that took place in the Chinese and Jewish traditions as a result of the emergence of Neo-
Confucianism and Kabbalah.  
 
 
                                            
57 In both the Jewish and Chinese cases the ‘classical period’ excludes their earlier axial phases of 
development, namely, the Temple period that preceded Rabbinical Judaism and the era known as 
the Warring States Period between Confucius and the Han dynasty.  
58 Meribeth E. Cameron “The Periodization of Chinese History” in Pacific Historical Review 15, 
No. 2 (Jun., 1946): 171-177. 
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1.6.4 Scales of Analysis 
What are the scales to which a morphological analysis can be applied? If we look 
at various fields in which morphology is practiced it becomes apparent that scales of 
analysis vary according to the researcher’s goals and interests. In linguistics, for instance, 
morphology can pertain to the study of specific linguistic units such as affixes, root 
words (morphemes) or alternatively focus on the structural characteristics of entire 
languages. Similarly, biological morphological approaches vary from the exploration of 
the structural physiognomy of whole species, all the way to more focused examinations 
of particular features, as in the case of molecular morphology.59 Scholars have pointed 
out that “a subjective definition that includes system limits and a scale, or scales of 
interest must be imposed on the real world before we can achieve the clarity and rigor 
that good research demands.”60 Units of analysis may vary according to one’s objectives, 
but they cannot be completely arbitrary; we still need an objective feature, or a common 
trait, that will provide our choice with coherence. 
Part of the definition I proposed for the notion of genetic morphology is that it is 
oriented towards the detection of the irreducible components of relatively self-contained 
and self-validating systems.61 Due to the complexity of cultural systems it is difficult to 
clearly delineate the idea ‘self-contained’ units. Jonathan Z. Smith was aware of this 
                                            
59 As mentioned earlier there also exists a difference in scales of analysis between Goethe’s 
classical botanical morphology and modern forms of plant morphology, the former being focused 
on the general morphological structure of plants in their entirety while the latter concentrates on 
specific species of plants. 
60 Mark Sagoff, “The plaza and the pendulum: two concepts of ecosystem science,” Biology and 
Philosophy 18, (2003): 529-552. Quote from G.S. Cumming and J. Collier, “Change and Identity 
in Complex Systems,” Ecology and Society 10, no. 1, (2005): 29. 
61 I follow Paden’s terminology in Religious Worlds, p. 20. 
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problem; in his critic of E.P. Sanders’ idea of ‘holistic comparison’ in which the latter 
suggests that we compare an “entire religion, parts and all, with an entire religion parts 
and all,” Smith notes “I am baffled by what “entire religion, parts and all” could possibly 
mean for Sanders… I find no methodological hints on how such entities are to be 
discovered, let alone compared.”62  
I believe that identifying relatively self-contained cultural entities is indeed 
possible. David Sloan Wilson notes that social entities must be defined according to a 
common trait, a phenomenon he calls “trait-group.”63 Any social entity, be it a school of 
thought or a religion, must be defined according to that which endows it with coherence. 
The ‘trait’ I will use as a unifying factor for determining cultural units will be textual, or 
more specifically informational. According to Jan Assmann, one of the basic 
characteristics of axial-age traditions is their capacity to unite people into groups in 
which affiliation is to some extent related to a body of foundational written texts that 
members engage with through commentary and communally identify as authoritative.64 In 
his theory of cultural memory Assmann contends that memory and identity are derived 
from the documentation of cultural information that is not oral.”65 Similarly, Jacob 
                                            
62 J.Z. Smith, Imagining Religion, p. 34. Sanders quote in E.P. Sanders Paul and Palestinian 
Judaism: A Comparison of Patterns of Religion, p. 16. Sanders refers to his methodology as “the 
Holistic comparison of patterns of Religion,” or ‘holistic comparison.’ 
63 Interestingly, evolutionary biologists face the same problem of ‘scales of analysis.’ In Wilson’s 
case he is interested in groups related to in multi-level selection theory. David Sloan Wilson, 
Darwin’s Cathedral: Evolution, Religion, and the Nature of Society (Chicago, Ill.; London: 
University of Chicago Press, 2003), pp. 14-17. 
64 My italics. See Assmann on Axiality, Cultural Memory and Early Civilization: Writing, 
Remembrance, and Political Imagination (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011); 
“Cultural Memory and the Myth of the Axial Age” in Bellah, The Axial Age, pp. 366-407. 
65 According to Assmann “The concept of cultural memory comprises that body of reusable text, 
images, and rituals specific to each society in each epoch, whose ‘cultivation’ serves to stabilize 
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Neusner suggests that in order “to describe a system, we start with the principle 
documents…. Our task then is to uncover the exegetical processes, the dynamics of the 
system, through which those documents serve to shape a conception, and to make sense 
of reality.”66 Hajime Nakamura is in agreement with the textual framing of traditions 
when he suggests that comparativists must search for the literature that is “particularly 
esteemed by the people in question.”67 Without paying too much attention to this fact 
scholars have nevertheless been well aware of the importance of canon in the definition 
of a tradition as a distinct entity.  
When I highlight a tradition’s textual orientation as that which endows a group 
with coherence, I am not claiming that other features such as ritual, politics, finance, art, 
and cuisine, are not relevant. But I do believe that such features, especially in traditional 
societies, are strongly informed by the informational locus that is found in their sacred 
canons. The information contained in these texts represents an unalterable informational 
source that biases the entire system. The irrefutability of canon has a unique resilience 
                                                                                                                                  
and convey that society’s self-image. Upon such collective knowledge, for the most part (but not 
exclusively) of the past, each group bases its awareness of unity and particularity.” see Jan 
Assmann and John Czaplicka, “Collective Memory and Cultural Identity,” New German Critique 
65, (1995): 132. 
66 J.Z. Smith, op. cit., p. 34. Neusner replaces Sanders’ “Holistic Comparison” with the idea of 
“Systematic Comparison.” 
67 Hajime Nakamura. Ways of Thinking, p. 10 [italics in original]. According to Nakamura 
literature that is not pervasively recognized as authoritative and central “may be interesting from 
the point of view of the modern reader, [but] will be of little significance as sources for 
determining the ways of thinking common to the entire people.” 
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and ability to persevere over time, it also displays the necessary flexibility to adapt and 
adjust to new circumstances through commentary.68  
As an example, consider classical Judaism (pre-Kabbalistic Judaism). At the 
center we have the sacred canon, namely the Torah which is revealed, eternal, and 
unalterable; then the Tanakh which is not revealed but nevertheless binding; yet later we 
see the development of the Mishnah, Talmud, and Midrashic literature which are 
interpretations of more authoritative texts and themselves binding to different degrees but 
nevertheless dynamic and open to further interpretation. These texts consist of a central 
locus of information that deems Judaism a self-contained system in which information 
radiates from the center and biases and informs motivations, activities and institutions. 
The fact that all Jews perceive these texts as authoritative endows Judaism with an 
internal order that is distinct from its outer environment; maintaining such an order 
without this constant informational locus would be unlikely, especially for a traditions 
that is composed of geographically distant communities.  
In China, this informational nexus was the Classics and their commentaries. 
Although China had other important texts, it was the Confucian Classics that functioned 
as the core of the imperial system where power was concentrated and decision-making 
took place. It was these selected texts that stood at the center of China’s pedagogical 
system and state ideology. Theodore de Bary claims that “for our purpose it is enough to 
identify as Confucianists those who accept the authority of the Confucian classics as 
                                            
68 This includes what Roy Rappaport termed Ultimate Sacred Postulates. See his Ritual and 
Religion in the Making of Humanity (Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1999). 
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providing the most reliable guide to the conduct of life and government.”69 Like the 
canon of other traditions the Classics also offer a link with the ancient past, both to real 
historical figure as well as mythical figures, thereby functioning as a foundation for 
understanding who we are, where we came from, and where we should go.    
But what happens when we are dealing with systems within systems? How can 
we undertake a joint analysis of Judaism as a whole with respect to the school of 
Kabbalah? Or better yet, can the school of Kabbalah be subject to morphological analysis 
on its own right? I will attempt to show that an analysis of sub-traditions such as Neo-
Confucianism and Kabbalah is possible under the same informational logic. Scales of 
analysis are related to each other in a nested hierarchy in which smaller units (sub-
systems) are included within larger cultural units and are differentiated by distinct loci of 
information. Kabbalah and Neo-Confucianism are excellent examples of sub-systems that 
operated according to an additional informational locus that unified their members into a 
distinct community. Beyond the Torah, Tanakh, and Talmud, medieval Jewish mystics 
began to construct a new textual orientation that functioned as an extension to the 
primary textual layers of their tradition. Among many contending schools, theurgic 
Kabbalah managed to construct a theology that was institutionalized in the Jewish canon. 
The Zohar, its sefirotic structure, the sacred symbolism that accommodated its new 
theological vision, and the type of activities it informed represented a new informational 
bias that deemed mystics distinct from other Jews. By virtue of this new textual 
orientation and the type of biases and constraints it imposed on members, a new sub-
                                            
69 William Theodore de Bary, “Common Tendencies in Neo-Confucianism” in David Nivison and 
Arthur Wright, Confucianism in Action (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1959), p. 27. 
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system emerged that was both part of, and distinguished from its greater Jewish 
environment. Networks of symbols, rituals, and general commitments distinguished 
Kabbalists form other groups such as philosophers, other mystical schools, and schools 
that remained focused on Talmudic studies.  
Neo-Confucians were behind a similar textual reorientation in the form of the 
Four Books. Peter Bol notes that they recognized that “they differed from traditional 
Confucianism… there were people who could be called Confucians but did not accept 
Neo-Confucian claims.”70 Neo-Confucians saw themselves as a unique fellowship of 
people with their own mannerism, dressing code, institutions, and distinct ways of 
performing Confucian rituals. Neo-Confucians highlighted a new set of information that 
was not as dominant in the Five Classics that preceded the Four Books. This new 
information was studied in their academies and used to indoctrinate generations of 
students. In both the Chinese and Jewish cases new texts and commentaries facilitated the 
construction of a very distinct kind of memory that had a profound impact on the type of 
identity members constructed. My analysis will continuously look at the interaction and 
relationship between such sub-traditions and their greater native cultures, namely, 
between Kabbalah and the mainstream classical Rabbinic tradition and Neo-
Confucianism and pre-Song classical Confucianism.  
Morphology, as applied in this study, will therefore be oriented towards both the 
scale of ‘entire’ traditions as well as to the smaller scale of sub-traditions that are nested 
                                            
70 Peter Bol, Neo-Confucianism in History (Harvard East Asian Monographs. Reprint ed. 
Harvard University Asia Center, 2010), p. 83. 
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within their greater cultural systems.71 Although borders between social systems can be 
fuzzy and boundaries certainly overlap, networks of activities based on information can 
help us parse out different units within greater wholes.72 I will therefore follow 
information theory where it is argued that the distinctiveness of a system (unit of 
analysis) is an outcome of its dense internal connectivity in contrast to its sparse 
connectivity to its surroundings. I will argue that this connectivity is an outcome of a 
textual foundation that informs all other activities and interactions by virtue of being 
sacred and relatively unalterable.73  
 
 
                                            
71 This discussion will follow some of the ideas introduced in the above-mentioned A Magic Still 
Dwells, where it is argued that different scales of comparison facilitate different comparative 
goals. 
72 I will attempt to show that although sub-traditions tend to conform to the general modality of 
their greater traditions, they can nevertheless disclose slightly different biases and inclinations. 
Said differently, Neo-Confucianism and Kabbalah may represent a peculiar and distinct variation 
of the synthetic modality to which they belonged. The various morphological features that 
constitute Neo-Confucianism and Kabbalah, although clearly within the synthetic range, disclose 
a certain bias towards the analytic modes of operation. This was an outcome of the heavy 
borrowing of Neo-Confucians and Kabbalists from Buddhism and rational philosophy 
respectively. I will argue that sub-traditions, although possibly distinct, remain within the general 
morphological range of their greater native tradition. Too drastic a shift towards an opposing 
mode of operation will lead to allegations of heresy, or simply a gradual decline as a result of 
social disapproval. One pertinent example is the sharp decline of analytic modes of operation in 
the form Jewish philosophy in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. What seemed to conservative 
rabbis as the exaggerated departure of philosophers from native Jewish sensibilities led to 
ongoing attacks against philosophy and its eventual decline. Unsurprisingly, this happened 
precisely at a time that Kabbalah rose to prominence and provided a viable and efficient 
ideological substitute to Greek rationalism.  
73 Applying systems theory to pre-modern traditions is beneficial since as opposed to the modern 
age, in which we witness a large number of informational loci (government, supreme court, 
media, free-market economy, internet etc.), traditional societies disclosed a less complex 
architecture. Their authoritarian character did not allow for the establishment of alternative 
sources of information to thrive.73 Such centralization of power and strict control of information 
means that we can more clearly understand how these societies operated in term of processing 
and disseminating information.            
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1.6.5 Adaptive Systems & Symbiosis   
As described above, the morphology of the synthetic and analytic modalities is 
constituted of three basic levels: the cognitive, the sociological, and the cultural. As 
opposed to reductionist approaches that tend to prioritize one level over the other, I will 
argue that the cognitive, social, and cultural spheres interact in a symbiotic fashion such 
that each level has a profound impact on the other two levels.74 Here we are dealing with 
a tripartite feedback relationship in which cognitive and social realities are just as much 
an outcome of culture as the other way around. In the comparative chapters that follow I 
will attempt to demonstrate how the three morphological levels and the morphological 
features that constitute them interact symbiotically such that they support each other in a 
way that further consolidates their coexistence and the perpetuation of the system as a 
whole. I will also stress the incompatibility of morphological features that belong to 
different modalities. Such an analysis can help us understand why classical cultures 
displayed a proclivity to ‘coalesce’ into coherent matrices that belong to one of the two 
morphological modes but seldom to a combination of the two. Therefore, the robustness 
of the synthetic and analytic worldviews is a result a peculiar commensurability among 
their constituting features. The unique organization of a systems means that it will 
suppress certain possibilities and encourage others. In other words, the structural qualities 
                                            
74 The position taken by the school of Methodological Individualism is that society and culture 
are an outcome of individual agency. The opposing Durkheimian view sees society as the 
bedrock on which individuals develop. Others have argued that there is an interaction between 
these levels especially between the individual and the social sphere. See Peter Berger Sacred 
Canopy (1967), and Margaret Archer’s Realist Social Theory: The Morphogenetic Approach 
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995). Archer sees the impact of social 
realities and culture on individuals as the initial stage in a three phase dialectical process of 
interactions between society and individual. 
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of the synthetic and analytic worldviews impose certain constraints that bias the system 
towards a peculiar dynamic that leads to a coherent cultural temperament. With these 
topics in mind, I will try to explore the unique symbiotic dynamic of cultural systems and 
the nature of their interaction with their environments.75  
Genetic-morphology attempts to challenge the a-historical approach of classical 
morphology. It deals with the interaction of dynamic, albeit stable cultural formations, as 
they evolve and change considerably in time. Such an approach means that the traditional 
tension between static cross-cultural patterns and historical reality is to a great extent 
diminished. New approaches in comparative religion have been particularly concerned 
with the historical and phenomenological tension. In Religion of the Gods, Kimberley 
Patton notes:  
we do not have to make the artificial and, in my opinion, bitter choice between a 
historical or a phenomenological approach to the study of a religious question. For in 
making such a choice, we are robbed… religious evidence is at the same time culturally 
                                            
75 Scholars from different fields have not been oblivious to the coherence and self-validating 
character of traditions. After discussing the great flexibility of ancient Greek religion in 
contradistinction to the more dogmatic and rigid systems of Mesopotamia, Egypt, and Israel, 
Jean-Pierre Vernant reminds us that novelty, even in Greece, was strongly constrained by a broad 
cluster of cultural inclinations: “Even in the variations to which it lent itself, a myth obeyed the 
severe constraints of the community. During the Hellenistic period, when an author, such as 
Callimachus, wrote a new version of a legendary theme, he was not free to modify the elements 
or to recompose the scenario as he pleased. He belonged to a tradition; whether he conformed to 
it exactly or deviated on a certain point, he was restrained and supported by it and had to refer to 
it, at least implicitly, if he wanted the public to hear his tale….even when a narrator seemed to 
have completely invented a tale, he was actually working according to the rules of a “legendary 
imagination” that had its own functioning, internal necessities, and coherence.” Jean Pierre 
Vernant “Greek Religions” in Seltzer, Robert M. Religions of Antiquity (New York London: 
Macmillan, 1989), p. 167. 
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and historically specific as well as part of a larger picture in which common structures 
emerge, and can be talked about interpretively.76 
 
In the case of genetic-morphology, cross-cultural structures and history are not in tension; 
on the contrary, a broad historical overview of Kabbalah and Neo-Confucianism can 
provide us with insight into the peculiar dynamic of cultural patterns that otherwise seem 
static. Genetic-morphology enables us to appreciate both similarities in the structural 
foundations of traditions as well as how historical circumstances impinge upon such 
modalities, leading to their gradual adaptation to new environmental conditions.77  
 
1.6.6 Defense Theologies and Adaptation  
In order to explain the adaptive nature of cultural systems I will follow Gregory 
Bateson and Roy Rappaport’s informational definition, according to which “adaptive 
systems are organized in ways that tend to preserve the truth value of certain propositions 
about themselves in the face of perturbations continually threatening to falsify them.”78 In 
the case of Kabbalah and Neo-Confucianism ‘perturbations’ refer to the way classical 
Judaism and classical Confucianism were destabilized by the introduction and growing 
influence of foreign analytic traditions. I believe that the emergence of medieval Jewish 
                                            
76 Kimberley C. Patton, Religion of the Gods: Ritual, Paradox, and Reflexivity (Oxford; New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 20. 
77 Scholarship on Kabbalah and Neo-Confucianism has been dominated by interpretations of 
philosophical content while historical and sociological aspects have been relatively marginalized. 
Peter Bol tried to remedy this by a more balanced approach: ”In looking at Neo-Confucians in 
their times we must be historical, and in understanding their ideas we need to be philosophical. I 
hope that doing so will speak to the study of both philosophy and history in China’s past.” Bol 
Neo-Confucianism in History, p. 2. 
78 Rappaport, op. cit., p. 6. 
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mysticism and Neo-Confucianism represent a typical example of how adaptive systems 
operate in order to persevere and continually validate and reinforce their ‘truth value.’ In 
the ‘truth value’ of the synthetic and analytic modes of operation refers to the 
preservation of each modality’s foundational morphology. The adaptive flexibility that 
characterizes cultural systems is of much interest to this work; I will contend that 
Kabbalah and Neo-Confucianism should be understood as ‘defense theologies’ that 
emerged as an adaptive reaction to acute environmental pressures.79 These movements 
enabled the Jewish and Chinese traditions to safeguard many of their native features, 
which were suffering a decline as a result of the growing popularity of Greek philosophy 
and Buddhism respectively.  
In my analysis of the interaction between the synthetic and analytic modalities in 
China and medieval Europe I will use of terminology used to describe scientific 
revolutions by Thomas Kuhn. Using Kuhn’s theory, classical Judaism and classical 
Confucianism represent “normal religion” (see Kuhn’s normal science) which operates 
according to an uncontested paradigm, namely, what I refer to as the Talmudic and Five 
Classic paradigms. Kuhn’s “period of crisis” represents the destabilization of the Jewish 
and Chinese traditions by foreign analytic systems. This crisis led to the proliferation of 
contending schools that sought solutions to the emerging cultural crisis they confronted. 
Social Realists offer the terms homeostasis and morphogenesis, the former refers to 
                                            
79 In Axial cultures this flexibility is to a great extent a result of an additional symbolic level that 
is absent in biological systems that are confined to the re-combination and transmission of genetic 
information – information that is inevitably anchored in physicality. The symbolic or linguistic 
flexibility of traditions is related to their peculiar textual orientation and the unique adaptive 
nature of commentarial formats. 
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complex systems that tend to preserve or maintain their given form or organization, while 
morphogenesis refers to “those processes which tend to elaborate or change a system’s 
given form, state of structure.”80 These terms will be helpful in describing Judaism and 
Confucianism during their classical periods (homeostasis) and later during the period 
they were challenged by the Greek and Buddhist analytic paradigms between the tenth 
and thirteenth centuries (morphogenesis). Kabbalah and Neo-Confucianism will be 
understood as reactions that successfully enabled the Jewish and Chinese traditions to 
restructure themselves during periods of morphogenesis, and thereby return to a stable 
period of homeostasis.  
 
1.6.7 Comparative Generalizations     
The broad comparative nature of this project inevitably entails the use of 
generalizations – a practice that has been accused for trivializing the complexity of 
cultures. Indeed, generalizations, when applied too leniently, can lead to a simplification 
of religious traditions, and in extreme cases, to outright distortion. Since generalizations 
will play a central role in this work I will refrain from using controversial data to support 
my argument. Instead, I will rely on views that are shared by an overwhelming majority 
of specialists in the various topics in question.  
The very nature of generalizing is such that it entails exceptions to the rule, 
namely, examples and situations in which a generalization collapses or fails to reflect the 
reality on the ground. Generalizations are nevertheless both important and real; they are a 
                                            
80 Archer, op.cit., pp. 157-166. 
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necessary tool for understanding broad cultural trends, thereby giving us a better idea of 
the general context that informs the specificities of everyday life. As an example, when I 
contend that the Jewish and Chinese cultures are particularistic it doesn’t deny the fact 
that both traditions disclose various forms of universalism (e.g. the Jewish prophets and 
the Mohist school in China). Nevertheless, my argument that the Jewish and Confucian 
traditions failed to develop the type of universalism characteristic of Christianity and 
Buddhism is correct and can be supported by a wealth of data from  various  fields  of 
inquiry.   
When generalizations are used responsibly they expose us to the most dominant 
psychological, social and cultural trends of a tradition. The problem is that such dominant 
tendencies are forever accompanied by sub-currents that oppose them. This is why the 
mainstream analytic tradition is the West, represented by science and the legacy of the 
enlightenment, was frequently opposed by romanticists who advocated a more synthetic 
and emotive approach towards the acquisition of knowledge. Nevertheless, these 
romantic currents were constantly marginalized by the rationalistic thrust of Western 
civilization; the same mode of thought that informed the emergence of democracy, 
capitalism, and science. Similarly, China has produced several schools with stark analytic 
inclinations, but these were clearly overshadowed by the mainstream that conformed to a 
synthetic mode of operation.81 Attaching equal significance to a traditions central ethos 
and its various sub-currents is highly misleading and comes to show just how important 
                                            
81 As Graham argues, forms of extreme rationalism never survived in China. Disputers, pp. 315-
316. 
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generalizations are in giving us an inkling of the dominant forces responsible for the 
construction of a culture’s institutions, rules, and prevalent modes of operation.    
There is yet another important reason to go beyond mere particulars towards a 
more comprehensive appreciation of general patterns. The postmodern backlash against 
grand narratives has blinded us to the internal consistency and relatively self-enclosed 
nature of religious systems. This dissertation treats religions from a systems perspective 
that both acknowledges the complex texture of traditions but is ultimately interested in 
highlighting the overarching and relatively persistent patterns that emerge from this 
complexity. This is no longer an impressionistic analysis of religious traditions nor is it a 
form of perennialism, but rather an approach that analyzes cultural units according 
methodologies that have proved fruitful in dealing with complex and non-linear systems. 
In other words, genetic-morphology can be seen as one specific approach to how systems 
theory can be applied to religious traditions.  
In order to rise above the complexity of cultural systems we must pay attention to 
general patterns. Therefore generalizations, when informed by historical data, can help us 
rise above specificities and grasp a general dynamic that cannot be discerned “on the 
ground” or at any particular moment. 
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1.6.8 Methodological Eclecticism  
In supporting my argument I will resort to scholarship from a diverse range of 
academic fields. I follow what Moshe Idel terms methodological eclecticism in which 
different modes of analysis are employed according to their instrumentality in 
highlighting different sets of data.82 As part of this eclectic perspective, one of the main 
methodological suggestions of this work is our need to be informed by a more cross-
disciplinary approach, especially one that integrates the sciences into the study or 
religion.83 While scholars of religion have been reluctant to engage in biological, pan-
human, and cultural generalizations, scientists from diverse fields such as cognition, 
evolutionary biology, neurology, and cross-cultural psychology have been eagerly 
pursuing such directions with considerable success. Their work is presenting the 
humanities with a growing body of invaluable data for comparative analysis; information 
that is crucial for the advancement of new theories of religion.84  
                                            
82 Moshe Idel, Ascensions on High in Jewish Mysticism Pillars, Lines, Ladders (Budapest; New 
York: Central European University Press, 2005), pp. 1-12. Although Idel’s classification treats 
comparativism as one of nine methodological alternatives, it doesn’t seem to deny the possibility 
of using non-comparative methods in the service of comparativism. Idel’s nine methodological 
alternatives: the theological, historical, psychological, textual-literary, comparative, ritualistic-
technical, phenomenological, and cognitive. To these he adds perspectivism. 
83 Paden, “Universals Revisited,” p. 289. In response to Michael Carrithers’ warning against 
“severing ourselves as a species from the larger book of natural history,” Paden claims that: “In 
trying to think of religion and culture independently of nature and natural behaviors, I am afraid 
we have in fact so severed ourselves [from the sciences.] And in advocating that we close the gap 
it is not just my point that somehow behavioral science has now to inform religious studies but 
also, since religion is itself a part of nature’s performance, the other way around as well.” 
84 Some noteworthy works are, Anthony Wallace F. C., Religion: An Anthropological View (New 
York: Random House, 1966); Donald E. Brown, Human Universals; Creation of the Sacred: 
Tracks of Biology in Early Religions (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); Pascal 
Boyer, The Naturalness of Religious Ideas: A Cognitive Theory of Religion (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1994); Cognitive Aspects of Religious Symbolism (Cambridge; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993); Robert Bellah, Religion in Human Evolution: From the 
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Inter-disciplinary cross-pollination is far from being one-sided, just as the 
sciences are enriching the field of religion, experts in different domains of the 
humanities, culture, and religion can be extremely helpful in directing scientific research 
in stimulating directions or alternatively supporting or falsifying conclusion with concrete 
historical data. In fact, as Richard Nisbett shows, it was scholars from the humanities that 
have compelled scientists from the field of cognition to re-evaluate their well-ingrained 
conviction that human cognition discloses a universal uniformity. Recent scientific data 
has confirmed conclusion that have long been dominant in the humanities: different 
cultures disclose substantially different ways of perceiving and interpreting reality. The 
new complementarity that is emerging between the social and natural sciences should be 
used to our advantage in an attempt to provide a more broad and multi-layered picture of 
religious and cultural realities.            
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 1.6.9 Structure of Dissertation 
This study will be divided into five chapters; the current chapter dealt with 
methodology. The second chapter will focus on the comparative study of the two 
modalities during the classical period before the emergence of the schools of Kabbalah 
and Neo-Confucianism. The second chapter will establish that central distinctions 
between the synthetic and analytic modes of operation during a period of stability or 
homeostasis.85 The third and fourth chapters will explore the emergence of Kabbalah and 
Neo-Confucianism respectively. These chapters will examine the ways in which 
Kabbalists and Neo-Confucians grappled with, and eventually overcame, the growing 
pressures of analytic cultures – these are periods in which the Jewish and Chinese 
traditions went through a phase of morphogenesis. Finally, the fifth chapter will be 
dedicated to a re-examination of some methodological topics and concluding remarks.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
85 By Greek philosophy I am mainly referring to Aristotelianism and Neoplatonism, or what some 
have termed Neoplatonized Aristotelianism, which reached Judaism and Christianity via Muslim 
thinkers, especially Averroes (Ibn Rushd) and Avicenna (Ibn Sina). 
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CHAPTER 2 
TRADITIONS IN HOMEOSTASIS   
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2. JUDAISM AND CONFUCIANISM IN THE CLASSICAL PERIOD 
  One of the central arguments of this dissertation is that behind the different 
manifestations of the Jewish and Chinese traditions there exist important structural 
similarities. The morphological approach seeks to demonstrate that this common 
synthetic morphology sets the classical rabbinical and Confucian traditions apart from, 
and in opposition to, the analytical systems by which they were confronted in their 
respective historical environments. The following chapter will focus on what I refer to as 
a stage of homeostasis; a period before Judaism and Confucianism came into tensions 
with the Greek and Buddhist paradigms. In Kuhnian terms, this refers to ‘normal’ 
Judaism and Confucianism as they operated in relative comfort, unperturbed by 
destabilizing external pressures.86 This will be followed by chapters 3 and 4, which will 
explore Kabbalah and Neo-Confucianism respectively. The emergence of these schools 
represent periods of crisis, or morphogenesis, in which imported analytic ideologies 
began to infiltrate the classical rabbinic and Confucian worldviews leading to an 
inevitable process of adaptation and structural reorganization. 
Before continuing it is worth reiterating a point I made in the methodology chapter 
regarding the importance of literary formats. In order to understand the classical Chinese 
and Jewish traditions prior to the radical changes they underwent between the tenth and 
thirteenth centuries, we need to look at their most representative documents, those that 
                                            
86 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1962). According to Kuhn anomalies are discrepancies in a paradigm that are usually 
brushed aside as unimportant, or alternatively, problems to be solved in the future. A period of 
crisis begins when a proliferation of anomalies begins to undermine the authority of an existing 
paradigm and thereby compels the scientific community to embark on new research programs and 
explore alternatives directions. 
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Hajime Nakamura refers to as “particularly esteemed by the people in question.”87 As I 
argued earlier, the treatment of classical Judaism and classical Confucianism as distinct 
periods or phases in Jewish and Chinese history is first and foremost a textual 
designation. In Judaism, the Talmud and Midrash became the defining statements of the 
post-temple period. A testimony of their centrality is reflected by the fact that those who 
did not acknowledge the Talmud’s authority, such as the Karaites, were harshly attacked 
and frequently labeled as heretics. Classical Judaism was therefore a Talmudic and 
Midrashic-based tradition, it was in these corpuses that one could find the defining 
characteristics of how a Jew behaved and related to the world prior to the eruption of 
philosophy Kabbalah. 
In the Chinese case the Five Classics represented the quintessence of the Confucian 
tradition and the backbone of its ideological, bureaucratic, and pedagogical vision prior to 
the emergence of Neo-Confucianism.88 In exploring the classical Chinese and Jewish 
traditions I will base much of my analysis on the information that transpires through the 
pages of these highly esteemed canons, but I will also be concerned with their structure. 
Understanding how Rabbis and Confucians said things is just as important as 
understanding what they said. Their unique literary formats, their peculiar modes of 
                                            
87 Nakamura, Ways of Thinking, p. 10 [italics in original]. 
88 Originally six classics: the Yijing- 易經, the Classic of History - 書經, the Classic of Poetry - 
詩經, the Spring and Autumn Annals - 春秋, and the Classic of Ritual - 禮記. The Yuejing - 樂經 
or the Classic of Music was lost. What has come to be known as the ‘Thirteen Classics’ consisted 
of the Five Classics with the two parts of the Classic of Ritual the Zhouli 周禮 and the Liyi 儀禮, 
the three commentaries to the Spring and Autumn Annals, the Zuo Zhuan - 左傳, the Gongyang 
Zhuan - 公羊傳, and the Guliang Zhuan - 穀梁傳, the Analects - 論語, the Mencius - 孟子, the 
Classic of Filial Piety - 孝經 and the Er Ya - 爾雅 China’s traditional dictionary. 
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discourse, and the hermeneutical strategies they devised must be a central consideration 
in determining how these traditions perceived the world. 
 
2.1 THE COGNITIVE LEVEL  
In comparing the classical Confucian and Rabbinic periods I will follow the basic 
morphological categories introduced in the previous methodological chapter, beginning 
with the cognitive level. As elaborated earlier, the cognitive level is composed of the 
following three morphological dichotomies, which set the analytic and synthetic 
modalities apart: 
a) Analytic Atomization vs. Synthetic Integration    
b) De-contextualization    vs. Contextualization  
c) Systematicity vs. Open-Endedness      
 
First let me reiterate the fundamental differences between the synthetic and 
analytic mindsets in terms of cognition. Analytical thought encourages the type of 
economy and clarity that foreshadow the advent of rational philosophy and science. It 
tends to focus on well-defined and irreducible substances that are governed by a set of 
formal relations. As I will attempt to demonstrate, the efficiency of the analytic stance 
can be found in its unrivaled capacity to brush aside fluctuating elements and focus on 
the de-contextualized and immutable foundations of reality. The process of arranging 
atomic entities according to different formal matrices results in a peculiar form of rational 
coherence or systematicity, so adequately implied by the Greek notion of cosmos. 
Analytic thought therefore consists of three general layers beginning with the cognitive 
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disposition towards analysis and deconstruction, it then uses formal or causal relations to 
bond discrete components together, and finally it results in a self-enclosed system or 
conclusion that provides the lower levels with an overall context for operation. The whole 
is frequently arrived at through postulation, in which a higher order hypothesis is set 
forth as a general organizing framework for the interpretation of specific elements. The 
general assumption is that the logical reconstruction of constituent elements will result in 
proving the veracity and accuracy of the initial hypothesis.89  
As opposed to the atomizing tendencies of analytic thought, the act of synthesis is 
concerned with the integration of data. Synthetic thought refrains from treating 
constituent components as clearly distinct substances. Due to the ambiguity of boundaries 
between ideas, substances, and terms, synthetic systems can afford a fairly high level of 
coexistence among contradictory features. This is reflected by their unique ability to 
accommodate incongruities and unexpected incidents without severely destabilizing the 
system. The high capacity to absorb data entails a less frequent reevaluation of the system 
in light of new circumstances, which might also entail a lesser ability to promote change. 
Synthetic paradigms usually take the form of official ideologies rather than an 
indisputable truth that is arrived at logically. Jerome Bruner refers to this distinction as 
one between the search for Truth (analytic) and the attainment of verisimilitude 
                                            
89 Richard Nisbett, The Geography of Thought, p. 10. In Anticipating China Ames and Hall note 
that postulational thought is such that “rules at various levels of abstraction would be generated as 
hypotheses,” pp. 113; 118. In his Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities, F.S.C Northrop 
introduced his influential distinction between “concepts by postulation” and “concepts by 
intuition,” pertaining to Western and Eastern thought respectively. See “The Possible Concepts 
by Intuition and Concepts by Postulation as a Basic Terminology for Comparative Philosophy” in 
Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities (New York: World Publishing Co, 1947). 
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(synthetic).90 Since synthetic systems are not predominantly based on formal logic, and 
especially since they refuse to eliminate context from their interpretive procedures, they 
frequently present reality through a certain narrative. As opposed to proving a truth, the 
synthetic mind tries to convince us of the merits of living according to a certain 
worldview.91 Instead of formal relations and logical connection, synthetic systems 
disclose a greater stress on the use of association, analogy and imagination as devices for 
creating connections between ideas and concepts.92   
As I will argue throughout this study, it is not that synthetic morphologies do not 
exhibit analytic tendencies and vice versa. But it is nevertheless relevant that different 
cultures tend to prioritize one mode of interpretation over the other. In the case of the 
classical Chinese and Jewish traditions, the synthetic mindset dominated mainstream 
discourse. In both traditions a highly developed mode of analytic thought never emerged 
to the same extent that it has in the ancient Greek and Buddhist worldviews.93  
                                            
90 Jerome Bruner, Actual Minds, pp. 11-12. 
91 The notion of narrative thought also brings to mind Schelling’s idea of “narrative 
philosophies,” a notion that was later adopted by Gershom Scholem. See Moshe Idel “Rabbinism 
versus Kabbalism: On G. Scholem’s Phenomenology of Judaism,” Modern Judaism 11, no. 3 
(Oct., 1991): 292. 
92 While synthetic thought can be generally contrasted with analytic thought, it is not as simple to 
find correlates for the analytical reliance on formal relations. This elusiveness reflects the irony of 
trying to analytically capture a system that is inherently non-analytic. 
93 Cognitive neuroscientist Merlin Donald suggests that human culture evolved in four stages: the 
episodic, mimetic, mythic, and theoretic. The two latter phases are directly relevant to my 
distinction between the analytic and synthetic modes of operation. In his search for the 
overarching characteristics of axial traditions, Robert Bellah uses Donald’s four-stage theory as 
an explanatory device for understanding the axial breakthrough, arguing that axial traditions 
disclose a shift towards theoretical thinking. According to Bellah, the emergence of theoretic 
thought, or what Yehuda Elkana termed “second order thinking,” represented a pan-axial 
characteristic. It is here the Eric Voegelin’s idea of “Mytho-speculation” is helpful for a more 
nuanced distinction between the analytic and synthetic modalities. According to Voegelin, the 
synthetic worldviews that were systemized during the axial age developed a peculiar form of 
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2.1.1 Analytic Atomization vs. Synthetic Integration    
The distinction between atomization and integration is one of the hallmarks of 
analytic and synthetic thinking. Aristotle’s ten categories represent a quintessential 
example of an analytic classificatory system, one that forces the deconstruction of reality 
into fundamental attributes and organizational rubrics. The Indian tradition of analytic 
philosophy reflects a similar stress on the atomistic and logical stratification of 
knowledge; in both cases complex systems of classification sought to pinpoint the 
fundamental features of existence, displaying a tendency towards the fragmentation, 
deconstruction, and reification of ontological and epistemological qualities. The general 
cognitive trajectory is to depart from the ‘fundamental’ towards growing recursive 
patterns; in epistemology this is reflected in a progression from the constituting 
components of the individual psyche, such as the Buddhist skandhas, towards a complete 
theory of knowledge.94 In metaphysics, we see a move from foundational ontological 
substances towards a coherent and self-enclosed cosmological perspective, frequently 
referred to as substance metaphysics.  
                                                                                                                                  
theoretical speculation that was entertained within a mythic narrative, namely, “mytho-
speculation.” In contrast, Greek analytic thought of the same period disclosed a more radical 
departure from the mythological worldview towards philosophical conceptualization; “reflection 
for its own sake” or “thinking about thinking.” Bellah builds on this insight and argues that in the 
axial age we witness a “radicalization of mytho-speculation, but not an abandonment of it.” It 
would therefore be a mistake to assume that synthetic traditions remained in what Donald refers 
to as the pre-theoretical, mythic stage of cultural evolution. Bellah stresses the rule that in 
evolution “nothing is ever lost,” namely, that “analytic or theoretic thinking does not displace, but 
is added to, narrative thinking [synthetic thought].” Robert Bellah, “What is Axial About the 
Axial Age?” Archives Européennes de Sociologie 46, no. 1 (2005): 79-81; Elkana “The 
Emergence of Second-Order Thinking in Classical Greece” in Eisenstadt ed., The Origins and 
Diversity of the Axial Age; Eric Voegelin, Order and History, Vol. iv (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 1956). 
94 Also known as the five aggregates, the skandas are the most fundamental building blocks of 
human consciousness. 
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John Berthrong notes that “in terms of their religious significance, no other 
cultural region places more emphasis on the worth of categoreal reflection than the 
traditions deriving from the South Asian matrix.” Berthrong points out the similar 
argumentative approaches of Hindus and early Buddhists, characterized by complex 
“schemes of enumeration and classification.” The analytical proclivity towards 
atomization that Hindus and early Buddhists shared also led them to construct self-
enclosed systems: “What drives the Abhidharma search for an analysis…. is the desire to 
show how all the various elements relate to each other….as with many other forms of 
Indian Buddhist thought, the entire complicated dharmic world is connected by various 
causal relations….”95 Berthrong mentions all the three levels I stressed above: analytical 
atomization, causality (formal relations), and systematicity, all of which entered China in 
the first centuries of the common era through the introduction of the Buddhist tradition 
and its Indo-European traits. In their discussion of Western and Chinese thought, Hall 
and Ames claim that: 
the importance of the development of formal concepts in the Western tradition, born with 
the Socratic quest for “definitions,” illustrates the significance of knowledge as a function 
of enclosure. To “de-fine” is to set finite boundaries. On the other hand, the Chinese 
depend, for the most part, upon exemplary models or instances rather than strict 
definitions to evoke understandings. Knowledge under these conditions has an element of 
                                            
95 Robert C. Neville, Ultimate Realities, p. 245. Nakamura draws a strong distinction between the 
Japanese and Chinese traditions on one hand and Indian culture on the other. In the sphere of art 
he shows that Indian painting and sculpture are not grasped intuitively as in East Asia. One needs 
to reconstruct the different components logically in order to understand the whole as opposed to 
understanding it in one intuitive glance. Similarly, Michael Sullivan makes an interesting 
distinction between Indian and Chinese art; The Chinese is carefree and fluid whereas the Indian 
is inhibited by formal and intellectual aspects. See “Religion and Art in China” in Christian 
Jochim Chinese Religions: A Cultural Perspective (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 
1986), pp. 96-7. 
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rich, unbounded vagueness which contrasts rather starkly with the Western “Quest for 
certainty.”96  
 
Similarly, Robert Eno notes that Confucianism is “a nonanalytic philosophy. Ruists 
[Confucians] did not pictures the world as an infinite collection of intrinsically atomic 
particular entities structured by a limited set of deterministic relational laws…” In 
contrast, Eno claims that the Chinese worldview focuses of relational norms rather than 
logical ones.97   
While most scholars focus on the distinctions between Western and Chinese 
thought, it is important for me to highlight that the Western and Indian traditions share 
the same tendencies towards the analytic atomization of data. Hajime Nakamura claims 
that  
Westerners are said to be “postulational” or logical, and they try to grasp things 
systematically and by orderly planning. Indeed the ways of thinking of the Chinese and 
the Japanese may be characterized as “intuitive”. But in the case of the Indians this label 
is hard to apply… the intricate arguments of the Abhidharma literature are logical and 
can never be called intuitive…[therefore] We cannot say that only Westerners have a 
tendency to be analytical.98  
 
Nakamura’s description is helpful in that it both distinguishes between China and India, 
so often coupled together as “Eastern,” while it simultaneously stresses the common 
analytic temperament shared by India and the West. I believe we tend to ignore the 
analytic nature of Buddhism for two main reasons. The first reason is that Buddhism 
                                            
96 Hall and Ames, Anticipating China, p. xxii. 
97 Robert Eno, Creation of Heaven, p. 8. 
98 Nakamura, op. cit., pp. 13-14. 
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belongs to the ‘exotic East’ which we frequently contrast with the rational West, while 
the second reason is that Indian and Buddhist thought never led to the development of 
natural science which we usually see as the encapsulation of analytic thought. It is 
important to bear in mind that the fact that Westerners directed their analytic gaze 
towards the natural world rather than towards the structure of human consciousness as 
Buddhists have, doesn’t undermine the fact that both traditions used similar analytic 
strategies to interpret reality. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy notes that “the 
Abhidharma method presents the Buddha's teachings in technical terms that are carefully 
defined to ensure analytical exactitude… It does so by analyzing conscious experience—
and in this sense one's “world”—into its constituent mental and physical events.”99 
Indeed, Indian thought is analytical par excellence; its tendency towards the atomization 
of information represents one of its most salient characteristics.  
The Jewish case can be similarly contrasted with Greek analytic thought. 
Although classical Judaism is certainly concerned with sacred/profane dichotomies, 
nowhere in the tradition do we see the type of analytic atomization of reality into distinct 
categories.100 The Jewish corpus disclose a synthetic fluidity with very little interest in 
creating rigid and distinct categories. Jacob Neusner claims that the rabbis are attracted 
                                            
99 Stanford Encyclopedia: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abhidharma/ 
100 The Book of Creation (Sefer Yetzirah – הריצי רפס), a work that will be explored separately in 
the third chapter, is one rare example of a Jewish work of classification, but as many scholars 
have pointed out it is unclear when this document was authored and just how influential it was 
prior to the rise of Jewish philosophy and medieval mysticism. One point is well agreed upon, 
Yetzirah’s rise to prominence came at a time when the Jewish tradition sought to refine its 
cosmological categories in reaction to Greek philosophical formats. Moreover, scholars agree that 
Yetzirah was strongly influenced by Greek systems of thought, especially Pythagoreanism. 
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by ambiguity “a species” that lies in between categories.101 Structurally, tractates, 
chapters, and passages are only loosely classified, frequently overlapping and 
interpenetrating each other. Theodore Steinberg strikes at the heart of the Hebraic/Greek 
tension when he claims that: 
[the] Talmud is not organized according to the kind of logic to which Western readers are 
accustomed. Thus the first tractate in the Talmud is called Berakhot, Blessings. Had 
Aristotle written a book with that title, we would expect it to focus on blessings and to 
contain everything that Aristotle knew about the subject. Not so with the Talmud. 
Berakhot contains much material that has nothing to do with blessings, material that is 
arrived at by associative logic rather than deductive or inductive logic.102  
               
This passage highlights both the absence of rigid categories as well as the associative way 
in which ideas are related to each other, a subject I will turn to shortly. The synthetic 
insistence on the holistic fluidity of information brings to mind the rabbinical metaphor 
of the “sea of the Talmud.” In spite of the common distinction between Halakah (Law) 
and Aggadah (non-legalistic and homiletical discussions) the two are constantly 
intertwined, operating as general domains of discourse rather than distinct and rigid 
categories. Such lack of logical clarity evokes the ‘sea’ metaphor where pinpointing the 
end of one wave and the beginning of the next, or where the sea shifts from shallow to 
deep waters is impossible.  
                                            
101 Jacob Neusner claims that at the “bottom of this investigation lays a deeper metaphysical 
inquiry into the nature of entities as they relate to each other. Fusion and union, connection, 
division, and disintegration.” As an example, “Talmudist will frequently “manufacture” a conflict 
between two laws that don’t display an inconsistency by pointing to a possible conflict between 
their secondary implications.” in Take Judaism for Example, pp. 18-19. 
102 Theodore Steinberg. Jews and Judaism in the Middle Ages (Westport, Connecticut, London: 
Praeger, 2008), p. 31 [my italics]. 
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It is worth mentioning that the lack of analytic atomization in the Jewish and 
Chinese traditions is not confined to the domain of religious and philosophical discourse. 
As we shall see soon, the refusal of synthetic traditions to fragment the family and society 
into secluded and autonomous members is yet another indication of the non-analytic, 
holistic disposition that Rabbis and Confucians shared.    
 
2.1.2 Decontextualization vs. Contextualization  
 
The next difference between the analytic and synthetic modes of interpretation is 
related to methods of integrating data. Christopher I. Beckwith contends that strategies of 
argumentation that were originally devised by central Asian Buddhists were the origin of 
the European scholastic method, so well-known for its analytic and logical procedures of 
argumentation. Beckwith calls the Buddhist argumentative style the recursive argument, 
contending that its analytical procedures were content-free and therefore easily applied to 
theology, natural philosophy, and many other fields of knowledge.103 Beckwith suggests 
that objective formal qualities were foundational to both the Buddhist and the medieval 
European models of argumentation in which the central characteristic is a recursive 
repetition, or a ‘nesting’ of formal patterns. He argues that “the most characteristic 
features of the recursive method are its recursive and internal lists of arguments 
representing views, both real or hypothetical, on a problem…Formal recursion is the 
                                            
103 Christopher Beckwith, Warriors of the Cloisters: The Central Asian Origins of Science in the 
Medieval World (Princeton, N.J.; Woodstock: Princeton University Press, 2012), pp. 11-12 [my 
italics]. 
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distinctive, crucial aspect of the method.”104 The recursive argument formalizes 
information by explicitly numbering arguments, sub-arguments, and sub-sub-arguments. 
The complexity was such that even sub-sub-arguments were themselves likely to contain 
the initial argument writ small.105 This highly analytic procedure was “at heart a way of 
examining a problem systematically, logically, and in great detail.”106  
 Abhidharma analytic thought helped shape early schools of Chinese Buddhism 
such as the Yogacara (Consciousness-Only School 唯識宗), and the Three Treatise 
School (三論宗 – Sanlun Zong). These early forms of Buddhism in China were all 
characterized by their strict Indian formalism and tendency towards the construction of 
complex categories.107 The utter discrepancy between the Indian and Chinese mindsets 
presented translators with challenges that transcended the domain of language per-se. 
Transporting early Indian Buddhism to China entailed a process of decoding a cognitive 
orientation that was completely alien to the Chinese mind. Many consider the 
transportation of Buddhism into China as one of the most daunting intellectual projects in 
human history, a process that lasted for approximately one thousand years.108 Of 
particular importance is the fact that purely Indian schools of Buddhism eventually died 
                                            
104 Ibid., p. 22. 
105 Ibid., p. 23. Beckwith believes that the earliest preserved recursive argument can be found in a 
scholastic work written in Gandhari Prakrit as commentary on the Astagrantha a work written in 
the first century BCE in Gandhara. One of the main proponents of the Yogacara School, 
Vasubandhu (世親), used this very same method as early as the fourth century CE, while the 
earliest roots of this model can be traced to the first century CE. 
106 Ibid., p. 25. 
107 The earliest examples of the recursive argument including the characteristic Indian habit of 
numbering argumentative units, have only survived in Chinese translations, especially in Xuan 
Zang’s (玄奘, 602-664 CE) famous translation of the Mahavibhasa Sutra, which he obtained in 
the important Sarvastivada institution in ancient Bactra, todays northwestern Afghanistan.  
108 Julia Ching, Chinese Religions, p. 127. 
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out in China, an indication of their failure to be assimilated into Chinese culture. 
According to Chad Hansen this failure was to a great extent due to the theoretical 
complexity that characterized these Indian formats.109 The inability of analytic forms of 
Buddhism to survive in China was also reflected in the way that central Buddhist texts, 
especially those of the highly analytic Sarvastivada school, were radically transformed in 
China. As Beckwith points out, although a great amount of Buddhist texts based on the 
recursive argument entered China “Chinese Buddhist authors rarely, if ever, used the 
recursive argument method in their own personally authored Chinese works.”110 The 
Chinese, it seems, were more interested in the underlying conclusions of Buddhist 
thought while completely ignoring the procedural complexity of the argument. The 
fascinating story of the integration of Buddhism into China unfolded through a steady 
and laborious process in which Indian analytic features gradually gave way to native 
Chinese synthetic sensibilities. 
If the analytic modality shows a tendency towards the use of formal logic, what 
kind of methods did Chinese scholars and Rabbis use in constructing their systems of 
thought? In the Chinese case, important works such as the Yijing (The Book of Changes) 
and proto-scientific systems such as the Yin-Yang and Five Elements schools were 
overwhelmingly focused on a metaphorical language. The eminent A.C Graham argued 
that such classificatory systems could be referred to as correlative. According to Graham 
associative correlations display the capacity to harmonize categories that don’t disclose a 
                                            
109 Chad Hansen, Language and logic in ancient China (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1983). 
110 Beckwith, op. cit., p. 134. 
  
70 
necessary logical relationship. Instead of formal connections we see a reliance on an 
associative concordance between the different parts of the system.111 The associative 
clustering of notions such as ‘Heaven’, ‘Emperor’, ‘Father’, and ‘Center’ is only one 
example of how synthetic traditions manage to integrate information without the use of 
strict logic. A father, like an emperor, is expected to be benevolent and responsible while 
both father and emperor are in turn related to the idea of ‘center’ and therefore ‘heaven.’ 
Making such correlations involves a certain associative ‘leap’ that is predicated on a 
cultural narrative rather than logical inevitability. Instead of a linear logic, the Chinese 
system is based on non-linear associative relations that are anchored in a culture’s shared 
symbolic repository. As an example, our understanding of the function of the liver  is 
enhanced by its correlation to notions such as spring, birth, the element of wood, the 
direction East, and the color blue. Such relationships only make sense within a specific 
cultural and symbolic setting; there is nothing normatively inevitable about them. To 
further complicate matters, relationships can change and shift according to context: in 
Chinese medicine the chest is perceived as a Yin (female) area in relation to the back of 
the body, which is Yang (male). But once the context shifts and the chest is considered in 
relation to the pelvis it transforms into Yang and then returns to become Yin in relation to 
the head. As opposed to constant and static connections of analytic systems, synthetic 
                                            
111 A.C. Graham, Disputers of the Dao, pp. 313-316. According to Graham before the emergence 
of modern science in the West primitive magic and medieval proto-science were also correlative 
in nature (315): “such systems may include Gods, but in correlating them with colours, sounds, 
numbers, it reduces them to the same level and denies them transcendence.” Post Galilean science 
is when things take a shift –together with Kepler – the three planetary laws are the first modern 
laws of nature. Interestingly Graham claims that the two major components of science were the 
fusion of Greek logic and geometry with Indian Numerals (Both of which I consider as analytic 
traditions). 
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taxonomies, whether we name them correlative, associative, analogical, or intuitive, 
provide an explanatory model that is dynamic and fluctuating in nature. There exists a 
higher accountability for diversity with a greater capacity to absorb new information 
without offending the general coherence of the system. Such dynamism is related to the 
synthetic modality’s refusal to ignore the crucial role of context. This is why Robert Eno 
notes that from a Chinese perspective a situation or a claim cannot be analyzed or 
evaluated outside its own perspective.112 
Turning to the West, Merlin Donald argues that the emergence of formalized 
strategies of argumentation or theoretical thinking can be traced back to ancient Greece 
where the field of rhetoric became increasingly important.113 The Greeks were keen on 
refining their thinking strategies in an attempt to make arguments more effective. In fact, 
the formal procedures of their arguments became so dominant that the sophists began to 
emphasis “techniques of persuasion without regard to content.”114 The negative 
connotations of the word ‘sophistry’ is a reminder of this school’s somewhat shrewd 
ability to support contradictory views with equal logical coherence. Consequently, the 
refinement of one’s cognitive skills and techniques of argumentation became just as 
important as mastering fields that were content-based such as astronomy and natural 
science. In linguistics and grammar, domains that are of central concern to analytical 
cultures, Europeans began to search for universal rules and general patterns. In other 
                                            
112 Eno, Creation of Heaven, p. 9. For more on the correspondence of different numerical 
categories see Feng Youlan, A History of Chinese Philosophy, vol.ii pp. 11-16. 
113 Merlin Donald, Origins of the Modern Mind: Three Stages in the Evolution of Culture and 
Cognition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), 340. 
114 Ibid., 348. 
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words, the special attention to the structural features of language irrespective of 
vocabulary reflects another example of the Greco-European stress on decontextualized 
formal relations.115  
Christian theology is another case that can highlight the analytic/synthetic 
distinction. As opposed to Judaism, the analytic proclivity towards the construction of 
exclusive truths led Christianity down a polemical path that was based on debates 
between individual theologians, a form of communication that required efficient 
argumentative skills. These polemical procedures were very different from the Talmudic 
model where “decisions ordinarily record the main points, but not the successive steps in 
argument and counter-argument.”116 As in the Chinese case, Jewish thinkers preferred to 
focus on the practical implications of a dilemma rather than on its logical coherence. 
Whereas Jewish discourse was predominantly commentarial, Christians followed the 
Greek path of theory and argumentation. This bears a striking resemblance to the Chinese 
case; Nakamura notes that while the preferable mode of relating to canon in China was 
through the medium of commentary, the Buddhists had a clear preference towards the 
construction of thesis.117  
                                            
115 Ibid. 
116 Neusner, Reader’s Guide to the Talmud (Leiden, London: Brill, 2001), p. ix. 
117 As mentioned earlier, F.S.C Northrop echoes this view when he claims that "while the Greeks 
developed the way of knowing nature by postulation and scientific hypothesis, the Chinese 
approached Nature throughout their history only by direct inspection and aesthetic intuition. See 
Wing-Tsit Chan “Neo-Confucianism and scientific thought,” p. 327. Joseph Needham whose 
monumental project Science and Civilization in China, was to highlight Chinese scientific 
achievements strongly disagreed with Northrop. See Science and Civilization in China. vol. 2 
(Cambridge: University Press, 1959), p. 579. 
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Instead of strict formal relations between concepts Jewish discourse was founded 
upon association and analogy. Although the Talmud certainly displays some form of 
‘qualified’ analytic tendencies, it certainly did not employ linear formal relations as a 
dominant procedural tool. The Talmudic argument attempts to convince rather than 
prove; the agreement of several voices on a solution is more important than a solitary and 
conclusive logical argument. Adin Steinsaltz points to the organic and fluid nature of the 
Talmud in aesthetic terms. He notes that it is reminiscent of “great literary masterpieces, 
where the ultimate goal is to evoke and reflect life itself.”118 Steinsaltz’ life-metaphor 
points to the idea of a changing and dynamic organism, one that operates according to 
non-linear rules. As Steinberg argues, the rabbis do not have a formal procedure to 
navigate information, their discussions are based on an associative intuition.119 
Association is therefore quintessentially different from the linear causality of well-
structured analytic arguments; it is inherently relational and dynamic rather than linear 
and static.  
The absence of a rational Greek form of argumentation in Judaism does not, 
however, entail a lack of conscious procedures. Indeed, the Talmud displays a 
methodology that operates according to constant argumentative principles.120 Once we 
become aware of these underlying rules, it is apparent that Talmudic discourse, in spite of 
its flexibility, associative tendencies, digressions, and ad hoc contradictions doesn’t lack 
                                            
118 Adin Steinsaltz, Madrich la Talmud (Jerusalem: Keter, 1984), pp. 6-7 [Hebrew]. 
119 Theodore Steinberg, Jews and Judaism in the Middle Ages, p. 31. 
120 Louis Jacobs, The Talmudic Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).  
Hermann Strack, Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992); 
Jacob Neusner, The Rules of Composition of the Talmud of Babylonia: The Cogency of the 
Bavli’s Composite (Atlanta, Ga: Scholars Press, 1991). 
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structure; but it certainly is not the type of structure we are accustomed to in the West.121 
When a rabbi decides to move form one passage to another or to cite a biblical verse in 
support of an opinion, the methodology that guides him cannot be logically schematized. 
An examination of a certain topic can begin with a surprising assertion that has very little 
to do with the main issue, there can be endless digressions where the relationship 
between the central point and what is discussed seems increasingly accidental. 
Eventually, however, there will always be a return to the initial central concern.122 The 
relationship can be extremely tenuous and subtle but it is nevertheless real. Such subtlety 
functions as a stimulus for recognizing the elusive nature of boundaries and the delicate 
interrelationship of ideas. The Talmudic procedure mirrors the complexity and dynamism 
of reality rather than attempting to capture it through definitions, static forms, and the 
projection of hypotheses.  
Finaly, this distinction between de-contextualization and contextualization 
becomes especially apparent in the way the Chinese and Jewish traditions emphasized the 
field of ethics. In stark contrast to the typically analytic Kantian categorical imperative, 
in which universal laws are highlighted at the expense of context, the Jewish and Chinese 
ethical minds based their moral verdicts on real life situations and actual events. 
Although synthetic thought in the Chinese and Jewish traditions may have been 
expressed differently, the underlying disposition towards the analysis of moral dilemmas 
                                            
121 Not only were Talmudic methodological rules known implicitly through habit but they were 
explicitly put down in writing. e.g.: the 7 rules of Hillel and 13 rules of Ishmael. Neusner 
contends that these methodologies may be the result of the final redaction of the Talmud, 
nevertheless, he claims that it is beyond doubt that these methodologies were used and known by 
the Amoraim. Neusner, The Rules of Composition of the Talmud. 
122 Steinberg, Jews and Judaism in the Middle Ages, p. 31. 
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according to real situations was common to both traditions. Indeed, the way Jewish and 
Chinese thinkers insisted on contextualizing events was drastically different from the 
Greek and Indian obsession with objectification. In the former case one is interested in 
the uniqueness of the particular while in the latter case there is an attempt to capture 
eternal, static patterns.  
 
2.1.3 Systemization vs. Open-Endedness    
One of the most powerful illustrations of the synthetic approach in China and 
Judaism can be seen in the way these traditions chose to present and classify knowledge. 
John Passmore notes that as opposed to systematic philosophy in the West, Chinese 
thought is almost entirely composed of dispersed ‘pronouncements’ that lack an internal 
methodical organization.123 Confucian literature, even the parts that are considered 
relatively ordered such as the Mencius and Xunzi, lack the type of classifications and 
methodical advancement of ideas that we see in the early Indo-Buddhist tradition. Very 
much like the Talmudic corpus, it is impossible to find a portion in the Analects that 
systematically deals with a specific topic. Instead, ‘pronouncements’ about politics (政), 
ritual (禮), filial piety (孝), humanity (仁 ), and other themes are scattered throughout the 
text with no apparent logical order. Robert Eno claims that “the style of this [Confucian] 
philosophy is fundamentally different from what we have grown to expect from the 
                                            
123 John Passmore, “Philosophy.” In Paul Edwards, ed., The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 6 
(New York Macmillan and Free Press, 1967). See more on the non-systematic thought of the 
Chinese: Wang Jie discusses the inability of Confucianism to reach systematization and to link 
the different chapters of classics such as the Analects and Mencius. See Wang Jie (王洁) ed., Si 
Shu Ji Zhu [四書集注] (Nanjing: Fenghuang Press, 2008), p. 2. 
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analytic schools of the Western tradition. It was not analytic, and it made no categorical 
distinction between the spheres of theory and practice.”124 In his introduction to Zhuxi’s 
commentary on the Four Books Peng Lin (彭林) notes that together with their archaic 
and inaccessible terminology, the Confucian Classics lacked the systematic structure that 
helped Buddhist texts circulate among a broad audience.125     
Even a central classic like the Yijing, in spite of its intricate classificatory system, 
doesn’t exhibit an organization that is essentially logical in the analytic sense. Joseph 
Needham used to refer to this Classic as a ‘desk with a drawer for everything,’ but on a 
closer inspection we see that there is no attempt to systemize different categories 
according to rules of logic.126 According to Graham in spite of the existence of logical 
thinking in China, especially in the domain of practical inventions “piecemeal causal 
explanations do not add up to a cosmos, or even to single organized science. He points to 
the Chinese “contentment with piecemeal explanations, acceptance that nature is 
inherently untidy and that it is useless to demand the complete resolution of 
anomalies.”127 It has generally been agreed among Sinologists that Chinese philosophy, 
before the arrival of Buddhism from India: 
shows no impulse to metaphysical system building….thinkers as Mencius and Chuang-
tzu show little tendency to stand back and make an organized whole of their revised 
                                            
124 Eno, Creation o f Heaven, pp. 2-3. 
125 Wang Jie, op. cit. 
126 Consider the Yijing’s correlative association between the four seasons (四季) and the five 
elements (五行); in order to overcome the discrepancy between the number of seasons and 
elements, the ‘redundant’ element of wood is understood to be a neutral component that functions 
as an energetic median between the four seasons. This is only one example of the synthetic 
capacity to deal with anomalies and a-symmetrical features. 
127 Graham, Disputers of the Dao, pp. 318-19. 
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world-picture. Ancient Chinese thinking at its most logical, as in kung-sun-Lung and the 
Later Mohists, concentrated on specific problems….we have to correlate a lot of 
piecemeal evidence and work out the scheme for ourselves.128 
 
 The open ended non-systematic approach of Chinese philosophers was completely alien 
to the analytic search for cohesion and unity.  
 Turning to Judaism, Oona Eisenstadt notes that “The “Greek” is the ontological 
mode that seeks to describe the whole…. The “Hebrew” is the dialogical mode that is 
never complete and preserves dissent.”129 In contradistinction to the Greco-European 
stress on strict rules of logic and systematic wholes, Neusner claims that Western readers 
“…will be puzzled by the chaos of the Talmudic dialectic, its meandering and open-
ended character. And they will miss the formal elegance, the perfection of exposition 
that characterizes Plato’s writings….”130 The fact that the rational mind demands a 
‘bottom line’ that will lead to a conclusive insight led many non-Jewish readers to 
approach the Talmud with the seemingly natural expectation of detecting final decisions 
                                            
128 Ibid., pp. 204. 
129 Oona Eisenstadt, “Levinas Versus Levinas: Hebrew, Greek, and Linguistic Justice,” 
Philosophy and Rhetoric 38, no. 2 (2005): 145. 
130 Neusner, Reader’s Guide, p. ix. (my italics). Neusner holds the opinion that the Talmud is 
actually “systematic and orderly, once properly decoded” ibid. Much like the treatment of many 
19th century German historians of the Rabbinical tradition, Neusner believes that the Bavli was a 
rationalistic document par-excellence, composed by people who sought to interpret the world 
using rational terms and systematic methodologies. His argument goes against the majority view 
represented by Adin Steinsaltz who sees the Talmud as a document led by associative organizing 
principles. These polar views are also known in terms of ‘Systematic‘ vs. ‘Traditional.’ Neusner 
also attacks the traditional and majority opinion that sees the Talmud as a corpus that evolved 
through a multi-layered and ‘sedimentary’ process, a view best represented by J.N. Epstein and 
Ezra Zion, Mevo’ot Le-Sifrut Ha-’Amoraim: Bavli Vi-Yerushalmi (Jerusalem: Hotsa’at sefarim 
Magnes, 1962). According to Neusner the Talmud Bavli was edited and redacted by a “single, 
cogent and rhetorically consistent discourse…. the creation of single-minded geniuses of applied 
logic and sustained analytical enquiry,” for more on this debate and different opinions see Strack, 
Introduction to the Talmud. pp. 194-223. 
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and a self-contained system; instead, they were confronted with a non-linear and open-
ended literature that seemed inferior in its inability to yield meta-conclusions.131 Adin 
Steinsaltz notes that: 
the organization of the Talmud is not systematic and does not adhere to any normal 
(familiar) pedagogical rules, it is also not organized from easy themes to more difficult 
ones or according to any other logical principles. Nevertheless, the Talmud has an order, 
regardless of the fact that it is very different than what we are accustomed to.132  
 
While we can point to a general organization that is based on the six Orders of the 
Mishnah (Sedarim - םירדס), sub-categorized into sixty-three tractates (masekhot - תוכסמ) 
there is nevertheless no linearity to the content and no logical progression of a distinct 
argument. One can begin studying the Order Nezikim (Damages - םיקיזנ) where topics that 
are loosely related to criminal and civil law are discussed, and then quite naturally move 
to a tractate in a different Order. In fact, reading all the tractates of a specific Order 
chronologically makes very little sense. Beyond the Talmud, Midrashic literature is a 
good example of what Passmore termed “piecemeal pronouncements;” Much like 
Chinese commentary, the Midrash interrupts the canonical narrative with an interlinear 
commentary that seeks no resolution and shows no finality.    
 Beyond the structure of literary formats we can also see a clear divergence in 
fields of interest between synthetic and analytic traditions. Instead of systematic 
                                            
131 Neusner, Guide to the Talmud, p. ix. 
132 Steinsaltz, op. cit., p. 6 [my translation]. More on the unsystematic character of the Talmud see 
Ephraim Urbach, The Sages, Their Concepts and Beliefs (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University 
Press, 1987); Nachum Arieli, Ha'machshava Ha'yehudit bi Yemei ha Bena'im (Jerusalem: Sifriyat 
Elinor, 1995); and Hyam Maccoby, The philosophy of the Talmud (Richmond, Surrey; New 
York: Curzon, 2002). 
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cosmologies as in Greece and Buddhism, both rabbis and Confucians were far more 
concerned with historical analysis and its ethical implications. Here too, we witness a 
reality that discloses a general order but not one that can be finalized or captured 
statically through constant rules. The preoccupation with history in the form of stories, 
biographies, and experiences are all examples of a ‘narrative thought’ in which 
intellectual discourse lacks a clear chronological and self-enclosed structure.   
 
2.1.4 Conclusion  
This section has highlighted the similar ways the Chinese and Jewish traditions 
interpreted reality in contradistinction to analytical traditions. I showed that the cognitive 
strategies I referred to as synthetic are qualitatively unlike those adopted by the Greco-
European and Indo-Buddhist worlds. While similarities in modes of perception between 
the Greek and Indian traditions have long been noticed, a similar joint appreciation of the 
Jewish and Chinese traditions has been far too scarce. One reason for this scarcity can 
possibly be attributed to these traditions’ lack of a common evolutionary ancestry. In 
other words, since Judaism is seen as an integral part of Western monotheism, detaching 
it from its “natural” intellectual environment and comparing it with a tradition to which it 
is not genetically related seems arbitrary. But it is precisely for this reason that I believe 
such a comparison is important. The synthetic/analytic distinction allows us to re-
configure some of our most basic cultural categories and detect similarities that precede 
phenotypic differences. Contrasting synthetic traditions with the analytic nature of Greek 
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philosophy and Buddhism helps us highlight the structural similarities that lurk behind 
different developmental trajectories.  
The data I use to support my argument has been mainly drawn from the 
humanities, but important support comes from the sciences as well. Research in the fields 
of cognition and cross-cultural psychology has clearly confirmed the analytic/synthetic 
distinction. In their study of Asian and Western forms of perception Yuri Miyamoto, 
Richard Nisbett, and Takahiko Masuda have demonstrated that while Westerners tend to 
focus on “salient foreground objects” and their attributes, Asians are more inclined to 
focus on relationships and context. The focus on objects and central attributes among 
Westerners can explain their general tendency towards identifying autonomous and 
irreducible substances. In one experiment East Asians and Americans were presented 
with various kinds of visual data and asked to comment on what they saw. When students 
from both groups were shown a video clip depicting fish, small animals, various plants, 
and rocks, Americans overwhelmingly focused on the large and distinct fish in the 
foreground, while Asians paid more attention to relationships between different focal 
points in the scene. Multiple other studies have supported the view that East Asians 
perceive the world in holistic terms while Westerners perceive it analytically.133  
                                            
133 Yuri Miyamoto, Richard E. Nisbett and Takahiko Masuda, “Culture and the Physical 
Environment: Holistic Versus Analytic Perceptual Affordances,” Psychological Science 17, no. 2 
(2006): 113-119; Takahiko Masuda and Richard Nisbett, “Culture and Change Blindness,” 
Cognitive Science 30 (2006): 381-399; Shinobu Kitayama, Sean Duffy, Tadashi Kawamura, Jeff 
T. Larsen “Perceiving an Object and Its Context in Different Cultures: A Cultural Look At the 
New Look,” Psychological Science 14, no. 3 (2003): 201-206; Richard Nisbett, Kaiping Peng, 
Incheol Choi, Ara Norenzayan, Walter Mischel, “Culture and Systems of Thought: Holistic 
Versus Analytic Cognition,” Psychological Review 108, no. 2 (2001): 291-310;  Mutsumi Imai, 
Dedre Gentner, “A Cross-Linguistic Study of Early Word Meaning: Universal Ontology and 
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If Rabbinical Judaism and Confucianism both belong to the same synthetic mode 
of operation, we would expect similar results to show up in Judaism as well. Although 
studies that support these distinctions are extremely scarce, personality psychologist 
Zacharia Dershowitz has demonstrated that field-dependence, or attention to context and 
relational factors among Orthodox Jew is substantially higher than those among secular 
Jewish boys and even more so in relation to Protestant boys.134  This is relevant because 
the exceptionally conservative worldview of Ultra-Orthodox communities has managed 
to preserve many of the thought patterns, tightly knit family units, and cultural 
dispositions of ancient Jewish communities. In contrast, modern Jews and more so 
Protestants are mainly nourished by the analytic ethos of Western civilization. Of further 
interest, is the correlation Dershowitz draws between synthetic or holistic cognitive 
dispositions and social structures. His research demonstrates that high field-dependence 
shows up in societies in which role relations are explicit and social constraints are dense. 
Protestant children raised in a more flexible social reality in which higher levels of 
autonomy are tolerated demonstrated a more atomistic and analytical perception of reality 
(low field-dependence).135 These and various other studies strongly suggest that cultural 
                                                                                                                                  
Linguistic Influence,” Cognition 62 (1994): 169-200; Richard Shweder, Thinking Through 
Cultures: Expeditions in Cultural Psychology (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1991). 
134 Secular Jewish populations in Israel as well as in the U.S. are brought up and educated 
according to the assumptions and methodologies of the Western tradition. Therefore, the 
analytic/synthetic divide can clearly be seen between secular and orthodox populations within 
Judaism. 
135 Zecharaia Dershowitz, “Jewish subcultural patterns and psychological differentiation,” 
International Journal of Psychology 6, (1971): 223-231. 
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variations between synthetic and analytic cultures in terms of perceptual processes indeed 
exist. 
This is only one example of the kind of symbiotic relationship between the 
various morphological levels. In this case we see a commensurability between the 
cognitive and social levels. As I will argue in the following chapters, the symbiotic 
interaction of a culture’s cognitive orientations—synthetic or analytic—with an 
additional set of commensurable and reinforcing features such as social structures and 
cultural indoctrination lead to “symbiotic clusters” and the emergence of robust 
homeostatic cultural systems. The next step will be to explore the social level of the 
synthetic and analytic modalities and how it reflects substantially different views of the 
relationship between the individual and the community. 
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2.2 THE SOCIAL LEVEL 
The following sections will look at different approaches towards the inter-relationship 
between the individual, family, and society. I will argue that the main difference between 
the synthetic and analytic modes of operation in terms of social classifications is that 
synthetic traditions perceive the family unit as the most fundamental building block of 
society, while analytic traditions see the individual as the most irreducible social 
category. I will attempt to clarify the far-reaching implications of these different 
classificatory schemes and their possible impact on cognition and cultural indoctrination.  
                                                                                                        
2.2.1 Social Classifications: Individual vs. Family 
 In order to illustrate the different social realities that characterize the analytic and 
synthetic modalities I will make a distinction between two types of social structures: 
individual-based (analytic) and family-based (synthetic). The former structure is used in 
traditions that perceive individuals as having a unique access to ultimate reality, reflected 
in the devout Christian’s search for a personal relationship with God, the Greek 
philosopher’s rational contemplation of eternal forms, and the Buddhist practitioner’s 
meditative penetration of consciousness as a gateway to liberation. In all these examples 
we witness a similar introspective procedure that bridges between the individual and a 
higher reality. Hypothetically, women and men can engage in such practices in their 
solitude without any dependence on social institutions or a mediating priesthood; I will 
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refer to this as cognitive individualism.136 The synthetic modality is fundamentally 
different; there is no stress on the correlation between an internal private sphere and a 
transcendent reality. Instead, the individual is deeply embedded in social networks 
beginning with the family unit; religious fulfillment in this model requires ongoing 
communal engagement that is relational. The family-based model stresses public 
engagement and communal responsibility rather than mentalistic procedures that are 
private.    
 It is worth noting that although all traditional societies were family oriented, the 
synthetic modality reserves an exceptionally central role for the family in the process of 
indoctrination. Sociologist Basil Bernstein developed a model of social control that can 
help us appreciate the type of dynamic that characterizes the synthetic model or what he 
terms the positional model. According to Bernstein the positional model represents a 
social structure in which “the individual is encouraged to fit in with the group… one is 
controlled, therefore, on the basis of one’s position.”137 In this model we see the 
devaluation of the individual as a discrete agent in favor of a greater focus on relational 
                                            
136 There is an important distinction to be made between what I referred to as ‘social 
individualism’ and ‘cognitive-individualism.’ The former refers to the peculiar type of Western 
individualism one associates with the Enlightenment and later with Western democracy and 
capitalism. In this type of individualism society is seen as a collection of autonomous persons that 
enter a social contract designed to secure their rights and freedom. ‘Cognitive-individualism,’ on 
the other hand, refers to the way an individual in analytic traditions is granted access to ultimate 
truths through private and internal means. Although all analytic modes of operation, by definition, 
exhibit some form of cognitive-individualism, they do not necessarily endorse forms of social 
individualism. As the Greco-European and Indo-Buddhist experiences demonstrate although both 
adhered to different forms of cognitive-individualism, the development of social individualism 
was confined to the West at a fairly late stage. I will nevertheless argue that cognitive 
individualism diminishes the role of the family unit and therefore entails fewer structural 
restrictions on the individual, especially in one’s search for religious fulfillment. 
137 James V. Spickard, “A Guide to Mary Douglas's Three Versions of Grid/Group Theory”. 
Sociological Analysis 50, No. 2 (1989): 155. 
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networks for the construction of identity. The group is prioritized since it is only within 
the collective context that members establish their identity. In contrast to the positional 
approach, Bernstein offers the personal model, which I associate with the analytic 
worldview. The personal model refers to families in which “the range of decisions, 
modifications and judgments was a function of the psychological qualities of the person 
rather than a function of the formal status.”138  
Similar differences between two opposing social structures have been noticed by 
social psychologists as well. Shalom Schwartz, among others, has offered a general 
distinction between social autonomy and social embeddedness:  
In autonomy cultures, people are viewed as autonomous, bounded entities…. They are 
encouraged to cultivate and express their own preferences, feelings, ideas, and abilities, 
and find meaning in their own uniqueness… In cultures with an emphasis on 
embeddedness, people are viewed as entities embedded in the collectivity. Meaning in 
life is expected to come largely through social relationships, through identifying with the 
group, participating in its shared way of life, and striving toward its shared goals. 
Embedded cultures emphasize maintaining the status quo and restraining actions that 
might disrupt in-group solidarity or the traditional order. Important values in such 
cultures are social order, respect for tradition, security, obedience, and wisdom.139 
                                            
138 Bernstein, Class, Codes and Control, p. 153. Although Bernstein’s project was mainly focused 
on local urban communities, thinkers such as Mary Douglas have recognized the relevance of his 
work to the sphere of culture. See Douglas, Natural Symbols: Explorations in Cosmology 
(Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England; New York: Penguin Books, 1978). 
139 Shalom Schwartz, “A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications.” 
Comparative Sociology 5, no. 2-3 (2006): 137-82. An important point to stress is that although 
both Bernstein and Schwartz developed their theories in a modern context, their positional and 
embeddedness categories are helpful in better appreciating the nature of traditional societies. In 
contrast, the type of realities they are pointing to in their personal and autonomy categories are 
predominantly modern and therefore not as suitable in describing classical cultures such as 
ancient Greece, Hinduism and Buddhism. This is mainly because the traditional societies I am 
concerned with rarely enabled the type of individualism we are familiar with today. The term 
embeddedness was coined by economic historian Karl Polanyi as part of his “Substantivist” 
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Schwartz’ distinctions adequately capture some of the basic social sensibilities that 
Confucianism and Judaism shared in contradistinction to Greek and Buddhist thought. 
The point to stress is that scholars from different fields have acknowledged the existence 
of two different models of social control; my aim is to demonstrate that these two models 
conform to the social temperaments of the synthetic and analytic traditions. In what 
follows I will look at how these divergences were reflected in the Chinese/Hindu-
Buddhist and Jewish/Greco-European distinctions. 
 
2.2.2 Conceptions of the Self 
Although the early Christian movement was very much part of Judaism in the 
early first century CE, Christianity’s subsequent evolution on Greek and Roman soil led 
it down a religio-philosophical trajectory that gave it its distinct non-Hebraic 
physiognomy. The Greek features of Christianity led to a process in which monotheism 
was gradually transported form a synthetic mode of operation to an analytic mode.140 
Germane to the topic of social classifications, is the Christian stress on the believer’s 
                                                                                                                                  
approach. Economic Sociologist Mark Granovetter applied the concept of embeddedness to 
market societies, demonstrating that even there, "rational" economic exchanges are influenced by 
pre-existing social ties. See Granovetter, M. (1985). "Economic action and social structure: the 
problem of embeddedness". The American Journal of Sociology 91, no. 3: 487. 
140 These changes were first apparent in Pauline Christianity but later reached a culmination in the 
Augustinian project in which the final formation of Western culture transpired in the synthesis of 
Hellenic, Hebraic and Roman institutions. See Hall and Ames, Anticipating China, Ch.1 pp.1-109 
passim. Similarly, John E. Smith contends that the emergence of the Western Jewish/Greek 
distinctions can be traced back to Augustine’s theology. See Smith “The individual and the Judeo 
Christian tradition,” in Charles Moore, The Status of the Individual in East and West (Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 1968), pp. 251-267. 
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private relationship with God.141 In other words, under Greek influence, monotheism 
began to disclose an increasing concern with personal faith. These new dispositions 
entailed a shift towards the growing importance of the individual as the primary object of 
investigation in theological discourse. The analytical Greco-Christian approach atomized 
the world such that: 
it belongs to the nature of reality to be segmented or differentiated….On this view the 
individual is not reached as the result of a process of dialectic; the individual is, rather, 
the presupposition of all intelligible discourse. It is that with which we begin, and, if we 
cannot begin with the individual, we can never reach or derive it by specification from 
universals.142 
 
Christian theologians, beginning with Augustine and all the way to Aquinas saw the 
individual as a distinct and autonomous “finite substance.” This line of thought was later 
intensified by subsequent thinkers, from William of Ockham and Duns Scotus all the way 
to modern thinkers such as William James.143 Common to these theologians was the 
                                            
141 John E. Smith, ibid., pp. 256-7. The philosophical tangent Christianity followed can be traced 
back to Augustine’s Confessions and Soliloquies, where an increasingly individualistic tradition 
emerged. Wilfred Cantwell Smith stresses Christianity’s alliance with rationalism in its attack on 
paganism and the strong Platonic features of Augustine’s theology where man’s goal is to rise 
from temporal good (sense perception) to eternal good (intellectual and spiritual perception). The 
Meaning and End of Religion. (London: S.P.C.K., 1978), pp. 28-9; Rudolf Otto talks about the 
rational foundations of Christian theology, The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry Into the Non-
Rational Factor in the Idea of the Divine, and Its Relation to the Rational. (London; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1923), esp. ch.1 “The Rational and the Non-Rational.” In all these cases 
there is a clear stress on the individual believer. 
142 John E. Smith “The Individual and the Judeo-Christian tradition,” pp. 257-262. 
143 Thomas Aquinas characterizes the individual as a “finite substance.” For Scotus: the 
indivisible individual is not merely negatively so, by virtue of not being someone else, instead, 
there is a positivistic affirmation of the individual, an unprecedented reification of her ontological 
value. For Ockham, as for many Christian theologians, all existent realities are utterly particular 
“Genus is not something common to many things because of some identity in them, but because 
of a certain community of the sign…. Each individual is what it is and not another thing for 
universal structure is no longer in nature but in thought.” See John E. Smith ibid., pp. 257-262. 
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conviction that the individual represents an ultimate trait of reality and an irreducible 
entity that stands at the foundation of knowledge.  
The unprecedented autonomy that the Greco-European tradition invested in the 
individual gradually escalated and evolved into the Cartesian understanding of humans as 
secluded units of consciousness. In such a worldview the radically subjective philosopher 
inspects the external world through the increasingly solipsistic window of consciousness. 
Descartes’ cogito ergo sum was a natural outcome of this gradual reification of the 
discrete person in which we find an intense conviction that the thinking “I” is the 
foundation of knowledge. Such inclinations towards subjectivity and introspection led 
Mary Douglas to argue that modern philosophies such as Existentialism could have only 
evolved in the personalized model of the Greco-European tradition. In the biography of 
Sartre’s early years, Douglas detected the young philosopher’s alienation: “… from 
infancy he [Sartre] was tormented with the consciousness that his existence had no 
justification. There was no society organized in general categories of age, sex and 
hierarchy in which his developing role could be seen as necessary to some overall 
pattern.” Douglas goes on to claim that Bernstein’s ‘positional child,’ who I associate 
with the synthetic modality, “knows the pattern in which he belongs, [and therefore] 
cannot understand the anguish which Sartre has described so poignantly.”144 Existential 
alienation is therefore an outcome of the individual’s increasing detachment from the 
fabric of society and human relations. Although family-based traditions present their own 
set of problems, individual alienation was certainly not one of them. Jews could feel 
                                            
144 Douglas, Natural Symbols, p. 33. Douglas claimed that Bernstein’s personal model is one in 
which “ideas about morality and the self get detached from the social structure.” 
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alienated as a group but rarely as individuals within their communities. Both Chinese and 
Jewish individuals were deeply embedded in the family structure, in the social organism, 
and in a cultural memory that infused them with an intense sense of belonging and a 
distinct position within a matrix of relationships.  
 It is clear that the positional model does not entail a lack of individualism; on the 
contrary, the individual remains an extremely important part of the Jewish tradition, but 
as opposed to the Hero of the Greek epics, the antagonism between individual and social 
interests in the Jewish traditions is practically absent.145 Lenn Goodman notes that 
Judaism adheres to a form of socialization where “the zero sum game between 
community and individual is not shared…. Normative Judaism sets a complementarity of 
interests between community and individual.”146 The different cultural icons of the Greek 
and Jewish traditions can help us better understand their conceptions of the ideal 
individual. The Greek Hero of the Odyssey and Iliad does not necessarily conform to 
altruistic ideals; on the contrary, he frequently displays anti-social and highly selfish 
                                            
145 In Judaism this was reflected by the halakhic stress on securing the rights and the freedom of 
people. In fact, Jewish individualism goes all the way back to the formation of the tradition, Lenn 
Goodman notes that “The defining experience of enslavement led individual freedom and the 
dignity of the individual to be central.” Similarly, basic Jewish customs were devised to secure 
certain inalienable rights; the Sabbath, for instance, can be seen as an expression of individual 
autonomy and the irreducibility of a person to his work. Goodman convincingly argues that the 
“Mosaic phase is actually characterized by the rise of the dignity, privacy, and freedom of the 
individual…” Although the positional model does not deny the individual’s rights and dignity, 
one is nevertheless understood and defined within a relational/positional framework. Rabbis, 
unlike Greek philosophers, did not seek to explore the individual as distinct from society. Lenn 
Goodman in Daniel H. Frank, Autonomy and Judaism: The Individual and the Community in 
Jewish Philosophical Thought (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), pp.72-3; 79. 
146 Ibid., pp. 71-2. Goodman’s statement is equally applicable to Confucianism where the family 
represented the prototypical model for social behavior. Such complementarity between the family 
and the establishment is hardly detectable in the analytic mode of operation where the individual 
frequently finds himself in tension with familial and social commitments. 
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tendencies. The Hero was venerated by the tradition as a unique individual who is both 
part of the community but nevertheless distinct and separated from it by virtue of a rare 
personality.147 The courage, strength and radical autonomy of the Greek Hero were 
substantially different from symbols of glory entertained by the Hebraic imagination in 
which the persona of the intrepid individual was rarely entertained . In Judaism there is no 
“celebration of the heroic ego for the same reason that there is no explicit portrayal of the 
personality.”148  The nation of Israel, in spite of its great kings and fearless prophets, 
remains the central focus of the biblical drama. The story is ultimately about how Jews 
behave as a collective, and their dynamic communal relationship with God.149 The 
collective aspect of Jewish religiosity is especially apparent in the unique experience the 
Israelites had at mount Sinai; unlike the encounter of the individual prophet, nun, saint, 
rishi, or monk with the divine, here we have a miraculous encounter between God and a 
nation – hundreds of thousands of individuals experiencing a communal and 
                                            
147 Erwin Rhodes shows that the Greek hero cult evolved from a tradition of family and clan 
ancestor veneration but eventually transformed into a distinct civic phenomenon practiced within 
the polis. This led to a reality where families stopped tracing their lineages back to specific heroic 
individuals; instead, heroes came to represent city-states and the community at large. The old 
hero/family relationship was now replaced by a hero/community culture where the extraordinary 
person was placed on the pedestal of communal glory detached from family-based lineages. 
Erwin Rhodes, Psyche: the Cult of Souls and Belief in Immortality Among the Greeks (London, 
Harcourt, Brace: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1950). For another good overview of the Greek hero 
cult see Karl Kerenyi, The Heroes of the Greeks (London: Thames & Hudson, 1997). 
148 John E. Smith notes that “Although we tend to think at once of the towering importance of the 
great individuals – the Patriarchs, and especially Moses – in the founding Hebraic religion, the 
fact remains that it is originally the people or community with which the divine covenant is 
made…. At this point in the development, the individual is related to God only insofar as he is a 
member of the covenant community,” see ”The Individual and the Judeo-Christian tradition,” pp. 
253. 
149 Jacob Neusner notes that one of the predominant concerns of the Mishnah is the 
distinctiveness of Israel from the rest of humanity by virtue of its communal holiness. Neusner, A 
Short History of Judaism: Three Meals, Three Epochs (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992), p. 81. 
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simultaneous epiphany.150 Such social inclusiveness does not negate the existence of 
important figures, leaders, prophets, and role models but it certainly tends to integrate 
them into a narrative in which the community is prioritized and individual/society 
tensions are reduced.  
 One way the family-based model diminished individual/society tensions was by 
avoiding a reified characterization of the individual. Goodman notes that although 
individualism was a central concern in Judaism “… no ‘definition’ of the human 
individual emerges… no expression like zoon politikon can be expected to emerge.”151 
Said differently, Aristotle’s ‘political animal’ can be seen as a natural outcome of the way 
Greek thinkers investigated the essence of individual life and their clear articulation of 
what the individual universally represents. The cognitive inclination to clearly distinguish 
each component in the overall system represents an intellectual disposition that the 
Greeks shared with Hindu and early Buddhist thinkers. The proclivity of these traditions 
to capture the essence of secluded substances stands in clear contrast to the classical 
Jewish and Chinese stance in which a radically detached autonomous agent is absent.  
The tendency towards social embeddedness in synthetic traditions is also related 
to their stress on context. Rabbis and Confucians understood humans as an open-ended 
biography of real experiences and acts; human essence is not pre-determined but rather 
constructed as life unfolds. Rabbis therefore adopted a ‘silent’ or ‘negative’ strategy 
which “doesn’t ultimately define God and not individualism, it lets it construct itself…. 
                                            
150 Ibid., pp.125. “No one had ever imagined that the Jews would define their lives other than 
together, other than as a people, a political society, with collective authority and shared destiny 
and a public interest.” 
151 Smith, ”The Individual and the Judeo-Christian tradition,” p. 84. 
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Defining the individual is tantamount to defining the limits of freedom so there is no need 
to tackle the individual specifically.”152  
Turning our attention to China, Hall and Ames contend that if we were “to be 
strictly limited to the interpretative categories associated with Western theories of the 
self, the Chinese are, quite literally, “selfless”.”153 Countless scholars of Chinese 
civilization have insisted that “selflessness…is one of the oldest values in China… The 
selfless person is always willing to subordinate his own interests, or that of some small 
group (like the village) to which he belongs, to the interest of a larger social group.”154 
Livia Kohn notes that “groups predominate in all respects over individuals in Chinese 
society. That means that anyone is first a member of a family, clan, village, or state 
before he is an individual with needs and wishes.”155 The strong stress on context and 
particulars created an individual typified by a unique and irreplaceable biography, and 
most importantly in the Confucian hierarchical context, a particular and unique position. 
Hall and Ames argue that “in the model of the unique individual, determinacy lies in the 
achieved quality of one’s multivalent relationships.”156 The dichotomy they draw between 
the Western individual, characterized by agency, and his Chinese counterpart, unique by 
virtue of his positional relationship is highly reminiscent of Bernstein’s positional system 
of classification. In both cases one’s position rather than discrete personality will 
                                            
152 Ibid., p. 84. This clearly changed with the rise of philosophy and Kabbalah in which Judaism, 
under Greek influences, defined God with greater analytic detail. 
153 Hall and Ames, Thinking From the Han, p. 23. 
154 Ross P. Terrill, “The Shape of Chinese Values in the Eye of an American Philosopher,” in The 
China Difference (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), p. 40. 
155 Livia Kohn ”Chinese Religion” in Robert Neville, The Human Condition (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2001), p. 44. 
156 Hall and Ames, Thinking from the Han, p. 25. 
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determine one’s individuality.157 Agency is not absent but rather actualized in 
coordination, and with sensitivity, to one’s social surroundings. The Chinese worldview 
focused on social acumen where consolidating, preserving, and extending social 
relationships (guanxi- 關係 )  functioned as the main channel for self-determination. It is 
therefore a grave mistake to look at Chinese forms of individualism through the 
seemingly natural Western distinctions between the ‘public’ and ‘private’ spheres; the 
essentialist dichotomy between the individual and society simply does not appear as 
forcefully in the Chinese and Jewish contexts.  
 The Indo-Buddhist tradition offered a social model that was fundamentally 
different from the one practiced in traditional China. Buddhism’s approach towards the 
individual finds its roots in Hinduism where we see a typical case of what I call cognitive 
individualism. In this model the individual is encouraged to explore his spirituality in 
solitude away from the traditional household. Much like the Greeks, Hindus treated the 
secluded person as a discrete entity, offering a conceptual model that was very alien to 
the Chinese worldview. The Indian individual was frequently interpreted through a 
tripartite model of Tamasika (tamas), Rajasika (raja), and Sattvika (sattva). Each 
represents an ascending detachment from the material aspects of the Self, with the stage 
of sattva epitomizing the ability of the individual to operate on a purely mentalistic level 
that transcends materiality and one’s emotional entanglement in the world.158 In other 
                                            
157 Ibid., p. 25. 
158 Interestingly the Sattva level was further divided into two: the lower level entailing socio-
moral activity while the higher, more sublime level, was that of spiritual actions. See “The status 
of the individual in Indian metaphysics,“ in Charles Moore ed., The Status of the Individual, pp. 
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words, the ‘mental individual’ was elevated over and above social engagement (Dharma). 
An important example of Hindu priorities can be seen in the traditional life phases of the 
ashrama system, available to the three twice-born castes. This classification begins with 
study, proceeds to social and familial responsibility but then takes a typically analytic 
turn towards the exploration of the intimate self; an exploration that should ideally take 
place in the forest in seclusion. The articulation of spiritual realization as a process of 
detaching the self from culture, society, and the family would have been inconceivable in 
the Jewish and Chinese traditions.159  
 Kalidas Bhattacharyya notes that the overwhelming majority of Indian schools of 
philosophy agree that the individual needs to realize the self as an autonomous agency.160 
Both Hinduism and Buddhism shared the basic idea that understanding the inner 
workings of the autonomous individual was a prerequisite to arriving at Moksha or 
Nirvana. In both traditions we see forms of cognitive individualism in which humans are 
perceived as secluded units of consciousness that strive to unite or blend into a greater 
ultimate reality. Their spiritual methodologies are interested in the individual’s 
psychological and cognitive mechanisms, while social institutions, including the family, 
were theoretically undermined.   
One of the most noteworthy distinctions between the Hindu and Buddhist 
traditions is that the Buddhist individual, detached from a specific ethnicity, caste, or jati, 
                                                                                                                                  
48-9. The overwhelming majority of Indian schools of philosophy agree that the individual needs 
to realize the self as an autonomous agency. 
159 Although not all Indian householders abandoned their family for a spiritual life in the 
wilderness, the very fact that this took place and was socially condoned is sufficient to indicate a 
real dissimilarity with the Jewish and Chinese traditions.  
160 Kalidas Bhattacharyya “The Status of the Individual in Indian Metaphysics,” p. 55. 
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was free from the particularistic social constraints of the Vedic model. Perhaps more than 
any other religious tradition, Buddhism directs our attention to the inner structure of the 
universal individual consciousness. In spite of the many social concerns that Buddhism 
raises, the Buddha was predominantly interested in the individual as the root for 
eliminating suffering. Paradoxically, proving the illusionary status of the self in 
Buddhism requires an initial detailed explication of the structure of consciousness.161 The 
Buddhist stance, even in its Chinese manifestation, is almost antithetical to the traditional 
Chinese perception of the individual, who was construed in terms of conduct, reciprocity 
and social positioning. The dissimilar sensitivities towards the individual in these cultures 
represents one of the enduring points of contention in Buddhism’s long and gradual 
assimilation into the Chinese matrix. The family unit, so fundamental to the Chinese 
picture of life, was challenged by Indian monastic practices where believers were 
encouraged to seek liberation away from the family. In fact, As Gananath Obeyesekere 
points out “it should be remembered, form the Buddhist viewpoint, the life of domesticity 
is also a kind of prison.”162 Such socially oriented discrepancies, even after the intense 
sinicization of the Buddhist tradition, were never entirely dissolved and remained at the 
heart of an ongoing tension between the Confucian and Buddhist traditions.   
                                            
161 Wolfgang Bauer, “The Hidden Hero: Creation and Disintegration of the Ideal of Eremitism.” 
in Donald Munro ed., Individualism and Holism, p. 184. Bauer hints at this irony when he claims 
that the Chinese Buddhist tradition represents the “rising interest in the structure of the inner self 
and its various components. Buddhist meditation whether practiced in monasteries or home was 
apparently based on a much more active attitude than one might expect.  It tried systematically to 
discover the features of the self, like landmarks of an unknown continent, even while 
simultaneously denying the very existence of this continent.” 
162 Gananath Obeyesekere, “The Buddha’s Meditative Trance: Visionary Knowledge, Aphoristic 
Thinking, and Axial Age Rationality in Early Buddhism” in The Axial Age and Its Consequences, 
p. 127. 
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In conclusion, both the Jewish and Confucian traditions never offered the 
individual formal channels for avoiding family life as in the case of Buddhist and 
Christian monasticism. In spite of many differences between the Jewish and Chinese 
individual, an important generalization needs to be made: human fulfillment and self 
realization takes place within a social and relational reality which begins with the family 
unit. The individual in synthetic traditions such as Judaism and Confucianism is not an 
autonomous entity but rather embedded in a matrix of relationships.     
 
2.2.3 Conceptions of the Family  
  I the following section I will explore the very different relationship between the 
individual, family, and society in analytic and synthetic traditions. I will argue that the 
analytic modality’s marginalization of the family unit in favor of individual autonomy led 
to greater tensions between individual and social interests. Synthetic traditions, on the 
other hand, prioritize the family such that it becomes complementary with social 
institutions and a central institution in its own right. The Jewish and Chinese family, in 
other words, functions as a medium for the maintenance of social stability and order.  
C.K. Yang notes that the “emphasis on hierarchical harmony in the Chinese 
family inevitably tends to place structural constraints on the individual.”163 The question 
that comes to mind is what kind of constraints can the family potentially exert on 
members and by what means are such constraints enforced? Yang notes:  
 
                                            
163 Ambrose Y.C. King “The Individual and Group in Confucianism: A Relational Perspective,” 
in Munro ed., Individualism and Holism, p. 59. 
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the Western concept of individualism… runs directly counter to the spirit of the 
traditional Chinese family and is incompatible with the traditional loyalty to it…Self 
cultivation, the basic theme of Confucian ethics traditionally inculcated in the child’s 
mind from an early age, did not seek a solution to social conflict in defining, limiting, and 
guaranteeing the rights and interests of the individual or in the balance of power and 
interests between individuals. It sought the solution from the self-sacrifice of the 
individual for the preservation of the group.164  
 
As Yang suggests, what sets the Chinese tradition apart from the Western model is the 
way it anchors conceptions of the individual in communal life beginning with family 
relations. Traditions of social embeddedness tend to devise strategies of order that locate 
the summum bonum of spirituality within the communal sphere. Cultural role models 
promoted by the Chinese and Jewish traditions represent beacons of familial ties and 
communal involvement. The family inhibits the possibility for individuals to develop in 
separation from dense networks of relationships; the individual is ‘implicated’ in a matrix 
of duties and loyalties to which the tradition expects her and him to conform. It is only 
through such conformity that one can gain prestige and social recognition. The Chinese 
and Jewish worldviews refuse to establish a tension between the individual, the family, 
and the social sphere; the family is the tradition, it is where traditional values are 
inculcated and experienced in daily life, rituals, and holidays.165 Galia Patt-Shamir argues 
                                            
164 C. K. Yang, Chinese Communist Society: The Family and the Village (Cambridge, Mass.: M. I. 
T. Press, 1965), p. 172. 
165 Christian Jochim notes that in China the most fundamental religious obligations were practiced 
in the house where one could most probably find the family altar dedicated to specific ancestors. 
Therefore not only is the family the most fundamental economic unit it was also the most 
fundamental unit for religious practice. In the Confucian tradition all of society even government 
can be run according to the model of the family. The emperor is the son of Heaven and the 
ministers treat their emperor as a father. Jochim, Chinese Religions: A Cultural Perspective, pp. 
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that the concept of the Way (Dao and Halakha), as elaborated in the Analects and the 
Talmud is rooted in a family ethics. According to her, both the Confucian and rabbinic 
worldviews treated the family as the most fundamental domain of ethical and religious 
activity.166   
Traditions that prioritize the family over the individual reserve a very important 
function for the family unit in the preservation of political and social stability. Conflicts 
between selfish individual goals and the community are generally moderated due to a 
subdued sense of autonomy in family members and a relative concordance between 
familial and social interests. In both family and society there exists the basic assumption 
that human relationships and communal solidarity are an essential prerequisite for 
stability. Consequently, social demands do not seem to clash with the family rationale as 
much as they do with the private and potentially anti-social tendencies of the individual 
in analytic traditions.167 This is reflected in the type of religious virtuosos we encounter in 
                                                                                                                                  
21. Roger Ames argues that Confucian religiosity is enacted within the family unit. See Ames, 
Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2011). 
166 Galia Patt-Shamir, "Way as Dao: Way as Halakha: Confucianism, Judaism and Way 
Metaphors," pp. 137-158. 
167 The Chinese family-based model represents a social structure that countered both egoistic and 
universalistic tendencies. Mencius (孟子, 385-303 BCE), the Confucians philosopher to which all 
dominant schools of Neo-Confucianism traced their lineage, was very much aware of the 
destructive qualities of individualism and universalism. By positioning himself between the 
egoism of the early Daoist Yang Zhu (楊朱, 440-360 BCE) and the universal love (jian ai, 兼愛) 
of the philosopher Mo Zi (墨子, 470-391 BCE), Mencius convincingly argues for the merits of a 
social order based on the family framework. He warns his followers against the destructive 
ramifications of Yang Zhu’s egoism where the individual “would not pluck a hair from his body 
to benefit the world,” (拔一毛而利天下不為也). Similarly, he points to the lack of filiality and 
respect for the family institution advocated by the Mohist demand that one love all fathers, 
mothers, and sons as much as he loves his own. Egoism and universalism, which seem apparently 
oppositional, share at least one important feature. Although the Mohist utopian vision of love 
without distinction is communal to the extreme, it nevertheless represents a ‘contract’ between 
disparate individuals. The family, as in the case of Yang Zhu’s egoism, is marginalized in favor 
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the Greek, Christian, and Indo-Buddhist traditions, where instead of social engagement 
the individual frequently seeks a personal contact with ultimate reality within the solitude 
of the monastery and temple. Even the young Siddhartha, the prototype of the Buddhist 
tradition, left his wife and child in favor of a personal spiritual quest. Self-transformation 
away from society and the family unit implies the secondary status of communal ties in 
analytic traditions, in which converts are ideally expected to renounce, or at least 
subordinate, their tribal, ancestral, and familial affiliations to the Church or the Sangha.168 
The type of cognitive individualism we witness in the analytic modality invests the 
individual with a special significance that might clash with social interests. Since social 
constraints imposed by the family institution are relatively low in analytic traditions there 
emerges a higher probability for revolutionary changes that are subversive to, and in 
tension with central authority.  
                                                                                                                                  
of an individual-society relationship. By undermining the Confucian ideal of love-with-
distinctions (爱有差等), Mozi comes full circle to a reality composed of distinct individuals. 
Mencius therefore promotes the family unit as the ideal between the extremes of egoism and 
universalism. In both cases he is attacking an individual-society model in favor of the Confucian 
family-society relationship. Mencius 7:A 26. Mencius states: “Yangzi (Yangzhu) advocates the 
theory of each one for himself. He would not pull out a hair from his body for the benefit of the 
world. Mozi advocates the theory of love without discrimination. He would do anything for the 
benefit of the world even though he wore himself out from top to toe. Zimo took the middle 
course to avoid going to either extreme. 孟子曰: 楊子取為我, 拔一毛而利天下, 不為也. 墨子兼
愛, 摩頂放踵利天下, 為之. 子莫執中, 執中為近之. 
168 Bernstein attempts to show how family environments in the personal model (which I associate 
with analytic traditions), might encourage the development of autonomous agents. He argues that 
individuals in the personal model are to a great extent classified according to merit and their 
unique psychological qualities; those that excel in a particular activity will tend to take the lead in 
that field regardless of their age and gender. The Individual in such settings comes to realize that 
her future is to a great extent an outcome of her own efforts, such an approach is likely to further 
encourage members to express their uniqueness rather than conform to pre-established role 
stereotypes. Bernstein, Class, Codes and Control, p. 153. 
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One of the points I want to stress about family-based traditions is the co-evolution 
of the family and social institutions in a way that the two reinforce each other’s 
legitimacy. While it is common to stress the extension of family relations towards the 
political sphere, especially in the Confucian case, it is equally true that both the Jewish 
and Chinese traditions extended the function of the ruling institutions into the family. 
This is an efficient way for ruling institutions to “outsource” supervisory responsibilities 
to the family institution.169 In agreement with this assessment, Christian Jochim argues 
that the Chinese family as the basic social unit of Chinese religions did not let religious 
organizations evolve to high degree.170 The greater concordance between family and 
political and religious institutions meant that social control in synthetic traditions was less 
dependent on civil law imposed from above and more forcefully oriented towards self-
regulation from within the family.  
The Jewish family, much like its Chinese counterpart, was established as an 
extremely important component of social and religious life. Neusner claims that the 
family unit was the place where Jews were infused with the strong sense that survival is 
only possible as a communal effort.171 According to David Biale the Jewish family has 
been a major safeguard against extinction and assimilation, “perceived as one of the few 
stable and enduring elements in the tumultuous insecurity of Jewish history; without it, 
                                            
169 This was most probably not a deliberate or planned process, but rather a gradual co-evolution 
that proved extremely efficient as a structure for social control. 
170 Jochim, Chinese religions: a Cultural Perspective, p. 21. 
171 Neusner, op., cit., p. 62. 
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Jewish survival would have been far more problematic and difficult.”172 Robert Goodkind 
highlights the function of the family as a source of indoctrination: “Throughout Jewish 
history the family has been the center from which all else emanates: Jewish education, 
involvement with the community, religious celebrations and observances and Jewish 
identity and continuity.”173 Finally, Goodman draws our attention to familial activity as a 
channel for sanctification: “[Jews] seek to observe the laws of Levitical purity as a kind 
of reenactment of the old priestly function, laying claim to a spiritualized and 
intellectualized successorship to the priests, and making every family table a ritual 
surrogate of the altar of the Temple in Jerusalem.”174 The family sphere, due to its unique 
function within the tradition, was the place where Jews made life holy. The Jewish family 
is a transmitter of tradition through early and ongoing instruction and it perpetuates the 
tradition through procreation and marriage.  
Judaism, like the Confucian tradition, is an excellent example of the family-
society model where individualism is seen as a potentially destructive force, and is 
therefore subdued and controlled. The Jewish and Chinese systems tapped into the 
inherent characteristics of their social structures, using the family and its potent 
foundation of biological relations, affection, and authority as a microcosm for social and 
political stability. The synthetic model outsources social control to the family sphere 
thereby relying on its stabilizing effects while simultaneously constraining the potentially 
                                            
172 David Biale “Classical Teachings and Historical Experiences,” in Steven Bayme and Gladys 
Rosen eds., The Jewish Family and Jewish Continuity (Hoboken, N.J.: Ktav Pub. House, 1994), 
p. 133. 
173 Robert E. Goodkind, Introduction to The Jewish Family and Jewish Continuity, p. vii. 
174 Lenn Goodman, “The Individual and Community,” p. 96. 
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subversive effects of individualists. Stability is based on pre-arranged roles that to a great 
extent eliminate dilemmas and confusion that originate in the free choice of the 
individual. Below, I will look at two family-based mechanism for social control that are 
central to synthetic traditions.  
 
2.4.4 Family and Procreation 
Procreation is perhaps one of the most fundamental ideals in the Jewish and 
Chinese traditions. Although marriage, as the first step towards establishing a family and 
bearing children, is seen as a sanctified act by most religious traditions, there is a 
particular stress on child bearing in synthetic traditions. The differences between various 
traditions regarding procreation may be subtle but they are nevertheless real and 
important. As mentioned earlier, one way of establishing the family as an indispensable 
part of social order was by designating it as a primary domain for religious activity. 
Huguette Wieselberg points out that “an unmarried man is unable to fulfill many of the 
Jewish laws regarding marriage and child rearing.”175  This meant that self-realization 
could hardly be achieved outside the family unit where procreation became the most 
fundamental demand of a married couple. Being such a central factor of religious life it is 
clear that there was an intense pressure on individuals to marry and bear children. The 
Jewish demand to be fruitful and multiply elevated marriage and child bearing to an 
extremely central level. Rarely did rabbis feel compelled to justify or explain why 
procreation was important; childbearing was seen as good in and of itselve and sexual 
                                            
175 H. Wieselberg, “Family therapy and ultra-orthodox Jewish families: a structural approach” in 
Journal of Family Therapy 14, no. 3 (1992): 305-329. 
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relations within the confines of marriage were advocated as a desirable act which was 
sanctified by God.176   
Family-based traditions see success as a communal enterprise rather than an 
individual one. When the family is seen as the main unit through which members can 
gain social recognition and rise to power, it is more likely that there will exist an interest 
to establish large families. Procreation can enhance the chances of family networks to 
project their influence more efficiently.177 Procreation, when it is emphasized in such an 
exceptional way, becomes a strategy for reinforcing and perpetuating the function of the 
family as a central social institution. In synthetic cultures bearing children is not merely a 
strategy for survival but a positive act and religious duty. It is no wonder that few major 
rabbis during the Talmudic era remained single, and those who did were not considered 
role models.178 Biale notes that the sanctification of the family and marriage led to the 
absence of celibacy in Judaism. According to him it is quite amazing that “the only case 
                                            
176 Bayme and Gladys, The Jewish Family and Jewish Continuity, p. 263. 
177 In both the Jewish and Confucian traditions, a large number of male children increased the 
probability of reaching distinction in scholarship, the most efficient channels to increase family 
prestige. Males who did not excel intellectually could perhaps disclose resourcefulness by 
excelling financially. Daughters, especially attractive ones, were an effective channel for 
climbing the social ladder and marrying into more prestigious families; they were also an 
important workforce in running large traditional households. Although such disturbing gender 
roles seem offensive in a modern context, they were nevertheless crucial in all pre-modern 
societies. See Peter Bol, ‘This Culture of Ours’: Intellectual Transitions in T’ang and Sung China 
(esp. Ch.2 “The Transformation of the Shih”). Bol shows that before the Tang-Song transition 
promotion in government was almost exclusively confined to clan and family background while 
beginning in the early 8th century there was a gradual shift to an escalating reliance on scholarly 
merit. In both cases the family was seen as the unit of success. Official court hierarchies were of 
clans and not of individuals (eg. The Great T’ang Record of Clans.” Clans (Zu) were composed of 
collections of families (Jia) with a common Choronym. “Those families that failed to place 
successive generations of males in bureaucratic careers and had to live off the land…tended to 
lose their presence in the clan until they regained official careers,” Ibid., p. 38. 
178 Aliza Y. Krieger, “The Role of Judaism in Family Relationships” Journal of Multicultural 
Counseling And Development 38, (July 2010): 156. 
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for celibacy cited in the Talmud is that of the second-century rabbi, Ben Azzai, who 
declared “my soul is in love with the Torah,” but his example was rejected by the rabbis 
and was rarely regarded as a model for the behavior of others.”179 This can be clearly 
contrasted with the Christian advocacy of monasticism as a desirable religious ideal.  
The Chinese and Jewish experiences disclose striking resemblances. Monasticism 
was one of the most problematic obstacles in Buddhism’s acceptance into China where 
the idea of severing the genealogical chain of the family was highly unpopular. Individual 
seclusion in Confucianism was extremely rare and was mainly a way for expressing one’s 
dissatisfaction with political corruption. Such forms of seclusion were mainly practiced 
by married men and seen as a temporary act that would ideally end with the reintegration 
of the individual into an active social life. More importantly, Wolfgang Bauer shows that 
Christian and Buddhist forms of monasticism ideally included celibacy while Chinese 
forms of seclusion never categorically expected one to abandon family life and the ideal 
of procreation. According to Bauer, Christian and Buddhist celibacy reflects a pessimistic 
worldview:  
                                            
179 David Biale, “Classical teaching and historical Experience,” pp. 134-5. (Babylonian Talmud, 
Yevamot 63b). Interestingly “celibacy was evidently practiced by some of the Essenes in the late 
second temple period, but their practices had more of an impact on early Christianity than on 
normative Judaism.” Such an example is illuminating as it demonstrates how certain practices 
that did not conform to the basic tenets of Judaism, found a fertile ground in the more analytically 
inclined Christian world. The ability of celibacy to prosper in the Christian tradition is most likely 
related to its world-negating tendencies as well as to its more individualistic characteristics, 
which enabled members to forge a path outside the conventional family unit. Celibacy in 
Christianity is also a continuation of a Greek moralistic strand of thought that can be clearly 
detected in Plato’s idea of directing sexual energies to the ideal world in the Symposium, as well 
as in Plotinus’ mystical philosophy that showed clear tendencies towards celibacy and different 
forms of abstinence so clear in Porphyry’s De Abstinentia. See more in Wallis, R. T. 
Neoplatonism (London: Duckworth, 1972), esp. pp. 9-10. 
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With few exceptions, under the influence of these two religions, both monasticism and 
eremitism include celibacy as a conspicuous characteristic…. abstention from 
reproduction is the most radical expression of existential pessimism... In Buddhism and 
Christianity, a recluse or a monk raising a family is a contradiction in terms… In contrast, 
for the indigenous Chinese hermit, regardless of which philosophy he starts from, life 
long continence is never at issue.180  
             
In conclusion, synthetic traditions promote a worldview in which the failure to 
establish a family would entail severe social inconveniences. Yao Xinzhong notes that: 
“In the Confucian classics, incomplete families were taken as a shame on the society and 
‘old men without wives, old women without husbands, old people without children, 
young children without parents’ were considered to be the most destitute and had to be 
properly taken care of.”181 As in the Chinese case, the failure to establish a family in 
Judaism wasn’t even a rejected possibility, in fact, unmarried or childless individual were 
frequently perceived as being in a state of sin. The stigmas attached to those who failed 
or refused to bear children, were a strong reason for members, even those that were not 
naturally inclined towards marital relations and childbearing, to conform to tradition. 
Procreation, when elevated to such an important position can be seen as a structural 
feature that is designed to restrict possibilities that are potentially detrimental to social 
stability. One of the most obvious functions of early marriage and procreation is that once 
a couple establishes a family and raises children there in much less incentive to challenge 
social conventions and undermine stability. The centrality of the family, early marriage, 
                                            
180 Bauer, op. cit., p. 174. 
181 Yao demonstrates that both the Confucian and Jewish traditions constructed metaphysical 
systems that were related to the family order. See his Wisdom in Early Confucian and Israelite 
Traditions, p. 148. 
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and procreation should therefore be understood as efficient strategies of control that 
eventually evolved into central theological concern in synthetic traditions.    
  
2.2.5 Filial Piety 
Reminiscent of the fifth commandment where Jews are instructed to “honor thy 
father and mother”, the Classic of Filial Piety (孝經 )  placed the ideal of honoring elders 
 “at the very center of personal ,  family ,  and social existence . ”182  Galia Patt-Shamir notes 
that “many systems of thought advocate respect for one’s parents, yet in Confucianism 
and Judaism this virtue is made into a basic tenet in the whole structure of human 
relationships.”183 The early twentieth-century philosopher Hu She (胡適)  claimed that the 
centrality of filiality led to the complete submergence of the individual in familial ethics 
thereby striping persons  of an independent existence .184  The ideal of filial piety ,  so central 
to both Judaism and Confucianism highlights the family as the locus of ethical  behavior , 
 and although  honoring one’s  parents may  feature in all traditions ,  when it occupies such a 
 central  position as it does in Confucianism  and Judaism it is not unreasonable to consider 
it as an efficient method for control .  In analect 4 . 18  Confucius declares ,  “In serving your 
father and mother ,  remonstrate with them gently .  On seeing that  they do not heed your 
suggestions ,  remain respectful and do not act contrary ,  although concerned ,  voice no 
                                            
182 Ambrose Y.C. King, “The individual and Group in Confucianism” in Donald Munro ed. 
Individualism and Holism, p. 58. 
183 Galia Patt-Shamir and Yaov Rapaport “Crossing the Boundaries Between Confucianism and 
Judaism,” p. 55. 
184  Hu She, Chung-Kuo Che-Hsheh Shih Ta-Kang [中國哲學史大綱, An Outline of the History of 
Chinese Philosophy] (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1919), p. 129. 
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resentment . ”185 Analect 1.11 goes as far as declaring that after a father’s death “if three 
years later, the son has not veered from the father’s way, he may be called a dutiful son 
indeed.”186 The Confucian son ,  like his Jewish counterpart ,  is not encouraged to 
insistently advance new  ideas ;  reverence for one’s parents is simultaneously an 
acknowledgment that tradition should not be  aggressively  challenged and that  the 
perspective of elders should take precedence over  unrestrained  change. In their 
comparative work Patt-Shamir and Rapoport argue that: 
respect for parents must be shown throughout their lives, as well as after their deaths. 
Reminiscent of the  Lunyu  [Analects] attitude, we read in the Talmud: that  “A person 
must honor his father in life and in death” (Kiddushin 31.2)… One should respect parents 
even when provoked by them, exercise restraint, and do nothing disrespectful.187 
                           
The Talmud’s interpretation of  Leviticus 19 : 3 “You shall fear your mother and your 
father" is that "fear" means not sitting or standing in a parent's designated place and not 
                                            
185  Analect 4:18. 子日: 事父母幾諫, 見志不從, 又敬不違, 勞而不怨. Roger T. Ames, and Henry 
Rosemont trans., The Analects of Confucius, p. 93; James Legge‘s famous translation interprets 
this analect differently: “The master said: In serving his parents, a son may remonstrate with 
them, but gently; when he sees that they so not incline to follow his advice, he shows an increased 
degree of reverence, but does not abandon his purpose; and should they punish him, he does not 
allow himself to murmur.” James Legge, The Four Books: Confucian Analects, the Great 
Learning, the Doctrine of the Mean, and the Works of Mencius (New York: Dover Publications, 
Inc., 1971), pp. 170-1. More recent translations such as Simon Leys’ tend to agree with Hall and 
Rosemount: “When you serve your parents ,  you may gently remonstrate with them .  If you see 
that they do not take your advice ,  be all the more respectful and do nor contradict them .  Let not 
your efforts turn to bitterness.” Simon Leys trans., The Analects of Confucius (New York; 
London: W.W. Norton & Co. Ltd, 1997), p. 17. 
186  Analect 1.11: 子曰: 父在, 觀其志; 父沒, 觀其行; 三年無改於父之道, 可謂孝矣. 
187  Galia Patt-Shamir and Yaov Rapaport op. cit., p. 56. In a similar vein, the Book of Ben Sira 
(3:13) says “Even if He [your father] is lacking in understanding, show forbearance.” 
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contradicting a parent.188 The establishment of filial piety as a central concern of a 
tradition ,  so clearly the case in Judaism and Confucianism ,  provides  a model of order that 
establishes the family unit as the focal point of the tradition .  The central importance of 
respect for parents, beyond its clear ethical value, is simultaneously a stabilizing factor 
that decreases possibilities for self-actualization and anti-social activity. In other words, 
young, energetic, and possibly unrestrained individuals are more strongly domesticated 
and subordinated to a conservative generation of elders.189  Showing signs of disrespect to 
parents in such cultures could be extremely problematic and even heretical.  
Yao Xinzhong notes that “Confucian and Israelite families shared a number of 
features. A family was a place where the tradition, both religious and ethical, was 
maintained, the young were educated, and the old were respected as the embodiment of 
traditional values.”190 Yao goes on to claim that in the Jewish case “parents represented 
the authority, wisdom and tradition, whose instruction was believed to enable children or 
the young in general to ‘gain insight’.”191 The establishment of such a strict a family-
based ethic enables a tradition to locate social control within communal bonds rather then 
impose those laws form above. This meant that digressions and disobedience by 
individuals could be dealt with on a more local level.192 Confucius was very clear about 
                                            
188 Balylonian Talmud, Kidushin 31b. 
189  Kenneth  Abbott makes a helpful distinction between self-actualization as a spontaneous and 
personal form of improvement and expression in the West ,  as opposed to the Chinese concept of 
self-cultivation (修身 )  where the individual seeks to improve the self through an ordered and 
preconceived method. Harmony and Individualism (Taipei: The Orient Service, 1970). 
190 Yao Xinzhong, Wisdom in early Confucian and Israelite traditions, p. 147. [my italics]. 
191 Ibid., p. 149. 
192 This ideal is strongly echoed in Proverbs 4:1: “Hear, ye children, the instruction of your father, 
and attend to know understanding. For I give you good doctrine, forsake ye not my law. For I was 
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the relationship between filial piety and political obedience ,  his  disciple Master You (有
子 )  states :  “A man who respects his parents and his elders would hardly be inclined to 
defy his superiors .  A man who is not inclined to defy  his superiors will never foment a 
rebellion .  A gentleman works at the root .  Once the root is secure ,  the Way  unfolds .  To 
respect parents and elders is the root of humanity . ”193 Both the Jewish and Confucian 
worldviews share the idea that the basic relationships within the family unit are the 
source of our relationship with society at large .  Both traditions agree that once the  “root 
is secured”  within the family ,  one will foster a sense of obedience that stems  from 
sentiments of love ,  reverence ,  and respect rather than conformity that stem from fear of 
punishment and retribution .  When Confucius was asked why he refused to join politics he 
referred his students  to the Book of Documents (書經 ):  “Only Cultivate filial piety and be 
kind to your brothers ,  and you will be contributing to the body politic .  This is also a form 
 of political action…”194 the type of filial respect that the Jewish and Chinese traditions 
demand is not merely a local familial matter ,  it carries social and political ramifications 
that stand at the core  of stability and order .  The integrity and importance of the family 
unit is continuously supported by theological ,  social ,  and political discourses where 
                                                                                                                                  
my father's son, tender and only beloved in the sight of my mother. He taught me also, and said 
unto me, let thine heart retain my words: keep my commandments, and live. Get wisdom, get 
understanding: forget it not; neither decline from the words of my mouth.” 
193  Analect 1.2:  有子曰: 其為人也孝弟, 而好犯上者, 鮮矣; 不好犯上, 而好作亂者, 未之有也. 
君子務本, 本立而道生. 孝弟也者, 其為仁之本與. Simon Lays, The Analects, p. 3. 
193  Analect 1.2:  有子曰: 其為人也孝弟, 而好犯上者, 鮮矣; 不好犯上, 而好作亂者, 未之有也. 
君子務本, 本立而道生. 孝弟也者, 其為仁之本與. Simon Lays, The Analects, p. 3. 
194  Analect 2.21: 或謂孔子曰：子奚不為政？子曰:《書》云: 孝乎惟孝, 友于兄弟, 施於有政. 
是亦為政, (奚其為為政?). Leys, Ibid., p. 8. 
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familial ideals are presented as the foundation for ethical behavior  and  cosmological 
order .  
The weight that the Chinese and Jewish traditions lay on honoring elders ,  as well 
as those who symbolically represent elders such as  teachers and rulers ,  represents the 
tradition’s demand for the prioritization of communal needs over those of the individual . 
 Here again ,  the family ,  in practice and in  symbol ,  is used as a devise for the organization 
and legitimation of an official social  order .  A central idea in the rabbinic and Confucian 
visions of order is that caring for ones parents is perhaps the child’s most fundamental 
and sacred duty .  There are numerous examples in Confucian literature such as the  Book 
of Rites (禮記 ),  the  Analects ,  the  Mencius,  and the  Xunzi  where the ideal of caring for 
one’s parents is presented as the pinnacle of ethical virtue .  Beyond respect ,  there is a 
demand to pragmatically care for our parents’  material needs ,  a demand that is 
simultaneously a warning against abandoning one’s parents  at old age .  The Confucian 
and Jewish child was expected to care for his parents’  shelter ,  cloths ,  and food ,  a duty 
that would become practically impossible without physical proximity .  Entrusting children 
with  their parents’  welfare explains the emergence of the Chinese ideal of  ‘three 
generations under one roof’ (三代同堂 )  and similar attitudes in Judaism .  The  Talmud’s 
 interpretation of Exodus 20:12  “Honor thy father and mother”  explains the word  “honor” 
 as feeding parents ,  clothing parents  and helping them in and out of the house ;  certainly 
duties that necessitate a physical proximity between children ,  parents ,  and  grandparents . 
 In analect 4.19 the master declares :  “when your father and mother are alive ,  do not 
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journey afar ,  and when you do travel ,  be sure to have a specific destination . ”195 
Abandoning the family ,  even as an adult ,  is frowned upon ;  members are encouraged to 
remain together and care for each other . Hence, filial piety  and family-based social 
welfare were established as fundamental ethical ideals in cultures that adhere to  the 
 synthetic  modality.  
Earlier in this chapter I mentioned the potentially  subversive  tendencies of 
 analytic traditions -  tendencies that can possibly entail a rebellious attitude towards one’s 
own family .  Such anti-social features  find their roots in the way the individual  bypasses 
the familial and social spheres in favor of private modes of spirituality .  Analytic universal 
traditions  such as Christianity and Buddhism  claim  that siding with the truth might entail 
turning one’s back upon one’s own family and tradition .  In Matthew 10:35-37 ,  Jesus 
announces :  
For I have come to set a man against his father ,  and daughter against her mother ,  and a 
daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law ;  and one’s foes will be members of one’s own 
household .  Whoever loves father and mother more than me is not worthy of me ;  and 
whoever loves son and daughter more than  me is not worthy of me .   
      
Such a  proclamation ,  in spite of its possible non-literal meaning ,  is extremely  unlikely to 
feature in the Jewish or Chinese context .  Similarly ,  Buddhism’s demand to leave  the 
household  and dedicate oneself to the quest of liberation  reflects the same analytic, 
                                            
195  Analect 4.19: 子曰: 父母在, 不遠遊. 遊必有方. Confucius adds that filiality must be 
accommodated by a sense of respect, he states: “Nowadays people think they are dutiful sons 
when they feed their parents. Yet they also feed their dogs and horses. Unless there is respect, 
where is the difference?” Leys ibid., p. 7. see Analect 2.7:  子游問孝. 子曰: 今之孝者, 是謂能養
. 至於犬馬, 皆能有養; 不敬, 何以別乎？ 
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 autonomy-based model .  In order to justify the problematic Indian custom of leaving the 
family ,  the famous Chinese Buddhist polemicist Mouzi (牟子 )  argued  in his  Lihuolun (理
惑論-  Master Mou's Treatise Settling Doubts ) that  Buddhist filial piety is concerned  with 
the parent’s soul  rather than  the parent’s material well-being in this world.  Although this 
is a good example  of  how Buddhism’s mentalistic proclivities were creatively fused with 
native Chinese sensibilities,  the differences remain obvious. The Buddhist idea that filial 
piety could be practiced away from one’s household in favor of the soul in the afterlife 
was undermining the family unit as a central social institution.  
As I shall attempt to show throughout this study ,  the differences between the 
individual-society (autonomy) and family-society (embeddedness) models of social 
control are related to a large host of dichotomies between the analytic and synthetic 
modalities. Sociality is intimately interrelated with cognitive dispositions ,  strategies of 
communication ( codes ),  theological beliefs ,  and attitudes towards the body .  These 
complementary relationships are supported by scientific data as well ;  through a series of 
experiments ,  social psychologists Shinobu Kitayama and Hazel Markus have 
demonstrated that members of societies that conform to social embeddedness do not only 
perceive individuals as integrated  parts of the  social body ,  but they also tend to perceive 
other events and objects in a synthetic and organic way .196  In other words ,  the fluidity 
between the individual, the family, and social institutions in  synthetic  traditions is also 
                                            
196  H. Markus and S. Kitayama, “Cultures and the self: Implications for cognition, emotion, and 
motivation,” Psychological Review 98 (1991): 224-253. 
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reflected in a non-atomistic perception  of events and  objects, words, and symbols .197  As 
demonstrated in the last chapter Ultra-Orthodox communities disclose a similar 
relationship between social embeddedness and holistic field-dependence .  Yet another 
symbiotic relationship exists between social embeddedness ( social level )  and 
particularism ( cultural level ).  In a series of experiments ,  social and personality 
psychologists Sheena Iyengar and Mark Lepper have demonstrated that groups that 
conform to social embeddedness tend to disclose more hostility to out-group  members . 
 Such  in-group  empathy and external hostility  is more likely to give rise  to a particularistic 
cultural ethos .198   
                                                                                
2.2.6 Individual and Community in Literary Formats  
Before proceeding to the cultural level it is worth looking at how the unique 
qualities of literary formats reflect the ideal of social embeddedness. A dominant feature 
of pre-Kabbalistic rabbinical literature is its emphasis on a communal and inclusive 
discourse. It is not so much the dialogical format that gave Talmudic and Midrashic 
literature its communal characteristics, but rather the type of dialogue it endorsed. Indeed, 
Platonic philosophy is undoubtedly dialogical, but it lacks the strictly communal features 
of rabbinical literature. In other words, although Plato’s dialogues take place between 
multiple participants, they are ultimately structured towards revealing the truths that 
                                            
197  On more about the fluidity between the individual and society, especially the household in the 
Confucian tradition, see William Theodore de Bary, Learning for One’s Self: Essays on the 
Individual in Neo-Confucian Thought (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), p. 29. 
198  Sheena S. Iyengar and Mark R. Lepper, “Rethinking the role of choice: A cultural perspective 
on intrinsic motivation,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 76 (1999): 349-366. 
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Socrates, as an individual thinker ventures to promote. His companions function as a 
literary device for advancing a univocal perspective of reality that continually refutes the 
naiveté and shortcomings of his associates. As one scholar points out, the Socratic 
dialogues found in Plato’s works are more of a “covert treatise” than a joint communal 
effort at exploring the truth.199 Talmudic discourse, on the other hand, refuses to prioritize 
a particular rabbi’s opinion over those of others. William Scott Green notes that “rabbinic 
literature has no authors. No document claims to be the writing of an individual rabbi in 
his own words, and all contain the ostensible sayings of, and stories about, many rabbis, 
usually of several generations…. Rabbinic literature is severely edited, anonymous, and 
collective.”200    
The communal character of rabbinic literature stands in stark contrast to the 
Greco-Christian models in which individuals engage in philosophical and theological 
polemics, advancing their ideas vis-à-vis contending opinions. The communal nature of 
the Talmudic corpus is not merely an outcome of a pluralistic participation but rather a 
product of a highly egalitarian dialogue in which opinions interact and blend but are 
rarely excluded or rejected. The methodological assumptions of the Jewish tradition are 
such that the interaction between ideas is relational. Of paramount importance, is not 
simply the content of a particular opinion, be it correct or wrong, but rather the ability to 
harmonize and integrate different views into a coherent consensus.201 H.L. Strack stresses 
                                            
199 Beckwith, Warriors of the Cloisters, p. 13. 
200 Scott W. Green, “Storytelling and Holy Man: The Case if Ancient Judaism” in Jacob Neusner 
Take Judaism, for Example, p. 30. 
201 Green notes “This massive labor of homogeneity suggests that devotion to individual masters 
played little role in the motivations of the men who made up the texts…” Ibid. 
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the anonymity of the classical Jewish corpus: “in late midrashim the names of the rabbis 
become less and less frequent, and finally disappear almost entirely.”202 These non-
individualistic forces in Judaism represent one of the most salient characteristics of the 
tradition. The structural and methodological nature of Talmudic literature is a reflection 
of the pervasive prioritization of the communal organism over the secluded individual 
thinker. The written tradition represents “a literature of contention without victors, in 
which the sense of separate existences is minimal.”203 
The anti-individualistic features of the synthetic modality are reinforced by the 
centrality of commentary as the preferable form of religious discourse. Although all 
major religions rely on commentary to some extent, this form of discourse is 
exceptionally dominant in Judaism and Confucianism. The Chinese commentarial 
tradition was established as the foundation of the imperial examination system. The Five 
Classics , which represented the locus of the examination system, were printed together 
with a close and officially accepted interlinear commentary in the body of the text. In 
other words, the Classics were rarely open to the spontaneous interpretation of an 
individual reader. These conservative impulses safeguarded the tradition’s exclusive 
                                            
202 Strack, op., cit, p. 239. 
203 Green, op. cit., p.34. Trying to explain Talmudic literature in terms of content is problematic 
since the participatory element is absolutely crucial for grasping its essence. The great joy of 
studying the Talmudic text, so often alluded to by its towering students, is related to actually 
‘doing it.’ The rabbis engage in a type of intellectual acrobatic as they leap through the pages, 
parade their imaginative virtuosity, and offer creative solutions to new and changing 
circumstances. Non-Jews frequently misunderstood the true essence of the Talmud since without 
engagement the text remains incomplete; its potential and telos unrealized. I think the human 
component is indispensable in a very different way than an unread Shakespearian masterpiece. 
While Macbeth remains complete with or without a reader, the Talmud requires a unique set of 
human interactions in order to infuse it with the kind of dynamic necessary for its full 
actualization. 
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authority while names of authors and commentators were marginalized in favor of an 
anonymous communal voice.204 Similarities between the Jewish and Chinese 
commentarial traditions can be seen on several levels, it should therefore come as no 
surprise that Daniel Gardner chose to use Jewish Midrash to explain the nature of 
Chinese commentary; he claims that “what mediates between the text of the classic and 
the interpretive community in a sense, is not the single authoritative voice of any 
particular commentator but the multivocality–expressed in the voice of a particular 
commentator–of the received commentarial tradition.”205   
Commentary is a literature of constant engagement, this is clearly discernible in 
the Confucian tradition where selected commentaries were themselves established as 
classics and were made subject to further commentaries and even third layer 
commentaries. Gardner highlights the ‘elasticity’ of commentarial methodologies: 
“reading the range of commentaries on any one of these texts quickly reveals that there is 
no one shared “right” reading of the text, that different commentators lend different 
“reasonable” meanings to words, phrases, lines, paragraphs, and chapters, resulting in 
fundamentally different readings.”206 Again, the synthetic mode of operation tends to 
downplay confrontations in favor of harmonizing conflicting interpretations. Unlike the 
                                            
204  Even when a commentary is known to be authored by a certain individual i.e. the famous Zuo, 
Gong Yang and Guliang commentaries, it is accepted by virtue of a communal consensus and 
official legitimation. 
205  Daniel Gardner, “Confucian Commentary and Chinese Intellectual History” in The Journal of 
Asian Studies 57, No. 2 (May, 1998): 397-422; 402. Gardner quotes from Steven Fradde’s From 
Tradition to Commentary: Torah and Its Interpretation in the Midrash Sifre to Deuteronomy. 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), pp. 17-18. In the same article Gardner 
resorts to Midrash more than once in relation to the intensification of Midrashic activity at times 
of cultural pressure, a topic I will look at separately. See p. 411. 
206 Gardner, Zhu’s reading of the Analects, p. 5. 
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polemical legacies of Christians and Indian Buddhists, the ultimate concern is not to 
prove that one’s own truth prevails over all others, but rather to integrate divergent 
opinions into a coherent worldview. Traditions in which commentary is the central mode 
of religious discourse exhibit communal patterns that are less apparent in cultures in 
which individuals write personal monographs and engage in confrontational polemics. 
Indeed, in contrast to such individualistic trends, it is quite amazing that in Judaism for 
instance, there are no books authored by individual rabbis prior to the tenth century, 
precisely when Greek-influnced Jewish philosophy emerged. 
                                                  
2.2.7 Differences within Similarities 
The basic sociological orientation a tradition falls into, whether it is social 
autonomy or social embeddedness, can have a wide variety of manifestations. One 
example is the two very different ways social embeddedness was practiced by the Jewish 
and Chinese traditions. While rabbinic Judaism adhered to a form of egalitarian 
embeddedness, the Chinese tradition promoted a typically Confucian hierarchical 
embeddedness. Such variations not withstanding, the Chinese and Jewish approaches 
both disclosed a clear social bias towards an embedded and communal ethos that 
obstructed the type of autonomy so characteristic of analytic traditions. In the concluding 
fifth chapter, I will return to explore how traditions that belong to the same cultural 
model, be it synthetic or analytic, can express their common morphologies in a 
substantially different manner.  
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2.3 THE CULTURAL LEVEL 
The following chapter will be concerned with some of the cultural ramifications 
of operating under the assumptions of the analytic and synthetic modality. I will focus on 
four dichotomies that I see as central to the morphology of the cultural level: 
 
a) Orthopraxy vs. Contemplation 
b) Particularism vs. Universalism 
c) This-Worldliness vs. Other-Worldliness 
d) Non Indo-European languages vs. Indo-European Languages  
 
Generally speaking, these cultural distinctions reflect the different ways synthetic and 
analytic traditions treat the relationship between a) humans and their bodies, b) humans 
and other humans, c) and humans and the world/cosmos. The fourth, linguistic dichotomy 
transcends the realm of culture per-se; I chose to add it to the cultural level in order to 
highlight the interrelationship between language and the domain of ideas and behavior, 
but language clearly has implications that are relevant to the cognitive and social levels s 
well.  
 
2.3.1 Orthopraxy vs. Contemplation 
 On the most fundamental level, the distinction between orthopraxy and 
contemplation focuses on dissimilar approaches towards the body. One of the most 
apparent features of traditions that operate within the synthetic modality is their 
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affirmative and even reverential attitude towards the human body. In Judaism and 
Chinese culture one's physical and material existence occupies a positive and central 
function. In both traditions ritual activity had a far more dominant position than activities 
such as meditation and contemplation. In the introduction to his book titled the People of 
the Body Howard Eilberg-Schwartz attacks what he sees as the distorted image of Jews as 
‘People of the Book:’  
 
…the image of the Jew (who is always a male) pouring over a book is misleading. He 
appears to be involved in an elevated, spiritual pursuit. But if we could peer over his 
shoulder and see what his text says, he may in fact be reading about matters as mundane 
as which hand to use in cleaning himself…”People of the Book” is thus a deceptive 
image. It directs the gaze to the thinker but not to the subject that is tantalizing his 
imagination.207  
 
Talmudic themes are frequently concerned with the biological aspects of reality. In fact, 
as Daniel Boyarin suggests, numerous scholars argue the Talmud’s “thematics of the 
material body, the body of reproduction, is its major emphasis.”208 Graphic and detailed 
discussions of highly intimate physical and sexual matters in the Talmud have been a 
source of embarrassment for many contemporary Jews who sought to present their 
tradition from a less carnal perspective: “the designation “People of the Book” is thus one 
                                            
207 Howard Eilberg-Schwartz ed. People of the Body: Jews and Judaism form an embodied 
perspective, p. 3. 
208 Boyarin, “The Great Fat Massacre: Sex, Death and the Grotesque Body in the Talmud,” in The 
People of the Body, p. 69. 
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of the visible expressions of a larger modern strategy that attempts to disembody Jews 
and Judaism in hope of spiritualizing them.”209  
 Perhaps the most apparent reflection of the centrality of the body in the synthetic 
modality can be seen in its strong stress on ritualization. Although the rituals performed 
by Rabbis and Confucians were radically different and enacted in substantially different 
cultural contexts, both traditions saw ritual as the most central religious activity. Judaism 
is in many ways a tradition of sacred action; movement and deeds, as prescribed by the 
Torah and elaborated upon in the Talmud, are a fundamental feature of being Jewish. 
Unlike the rationalist worldview, classical Judaism did not lay a strong stress on 
contemplation, meditative techniques, and otherworldly themes. Talmudic discourse is to 
a great extent an investigation of how to act here and now. The strong stress of the 
rabbinic tradition on orthopraxy functions to sanctify and regulate life in all its domains. 
According to Gershom Scholem, Judaism was predominantly concerned “with a religious 
practice which seemed to be concentrated almost exclusively on the practical, physical 
performance of material deeds. Jewish religious law seemed to decide one's level of 
religious attainment solely by one's physical and bodily behavior, and not by recourse to 
any inner spiritual element.”210 In his Enchanted Chains, Moshe Idel asks scholars to pay 
greater attention to the centrality of observance and rules of ritual in their analysis of 
religious traditions, especially Judaism. He offers to reorient our methodological 
approach from one that stresses theological content—ideas, and beliefs— to a more 
‘technical approach’ focused on practices and techniques which are more detectable, 
                                            
209 Eilberg-Schwartz, op. cit., p. 3. 
210 Dan, “Scholem’s Reconstruction of the Kabbalah,” p. 51. 
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recognizable, and distinct. Although scholars such as Scholem and his student Isaiah 
Tishby were very much aware of the centrality of ritual in Judaism, according to Idel 
their work was strongly influenced by the Christian concern with ideas and beliefs rather 
than concrete activities characteristic of Judaism. One example of the Christian 
detachment from concrete activities is Rudolf Otto’s notion of the “Holy” as that which is 
separated and distant from the human sphere. Idel suggests that in the Jewish experience 
the Holy is part and parcel of action and ritual technique. The ritualization of life and the 
sanctification of performative acts entail a type of holiness that is intimate and connective 
rather than distant and radically transcendent.211 Idel goes as far as contending that the 
recognizable and punctilious performance of ordered sequences of action represents the 
possible “deep structure of classical Judaism.”212 According to John E. smith:  
…the Hebraic religion generally came to understand the self as requiring embodiment. In 
keeping with their high estimation of the visible world and of natural things, Hebraic 
thinkers were opposed to identifying the person merely with an “immaterial” aspect of its 
being. The self needs a body of some sort as a medium of expression; the self is not an 
ethereal spirit that is without localization and definite involvement in created, visible 
things.213 
 
Why Jews were obliged to perform the complex set of rituals prescribed by the tradition 
is not always clear, but the fact that they had to perform them was never seriously 
challenged until the modern age.  
                                            
211 Moshe Idel, “Ganz Andere: On Rudolph Otto and Concepts of Holiness in Jewish Mysticism,“ 
Da’at 57-59 (2006): 5-44. 
212 Idel, Enchanted Chains: Techniques and Rituals in Jewish Mysticism (Los Angeles: Cherub 
Press, 2005), p. 34. 
213 John E. Smith, “The individual and the Judea-Christian tradition,” p. 254. 
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Turning to the analytic mode of operation, we can make a safe generalization: 
analytic traditions downplayed the role of the body and shifted their attention to the 
mental world of ideas and faith. The contemplative features of the Greek tradition, so 
obvious in Neoplatonism, Aristotelianism, as well as in Christianity, are particularly 
obvious in contrast with Judaism and Confucianism. When Augustine was asked in the 
Soliloquia, “What is it that you chiefly desire to know?” his answer was “God and the 
Soul”. This reply reflects the emphasis on the abstract and intangible concerns of the 
Greco-Christian tradition where the body was gradually marginalized and at times 
explicitly attacked.214 St. Augustine highlighted the idea of spirituality as an intimate 
affair between the individual and God, it was in the meditating self that one could embark 
on his quest for God and Truth. This became a shaping force in the Christian world where 
in order to recover the presence of the divine, one was encouraged to reflect on his inner 
nature: “Each individual self must carry out the meditative process for himself, and, in so 
doing he comes to an understanding of himself not to be gained from external 
observation.”215 Monotheism, as never before, began to take place within the private 
contemplative jurisdiction of the individual. Such mentalistic approaches became highly 
influential in shaping Christian theology as well as the European philosophical 
tradition.216 Kenneth Seeskin shows that “Kant's emphasis on the supremacy of reason 
calls into question the need for ritual. In fact Kant looks forward to the day when 
                                            
214 Ibid., p. 257. 
215 Ibid., pp. 256-7. [My Italics] 
216 Ibid., pp. 267. Anslem, for instance, was reluctant to commit his famous ontological argument 
to writing, as he feared it would become objectified and thus prevent people from going through 
the necessary meditative process. See ibid., n.6. 
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“religion will gradually be freed from all empirical determining grounds and from all 
statutes which rest on history”.”217 This led to a shift from the Jewish deed-based tradition 
where ritual was mainly a public affair to an ethos that glorified accessing the divine 
through reason and the mental apparatus of the secluded subject. 
The experiences of the young Martin Buber provide us with a telling example of 
the discrepancy between the two modalities of religious engagement. After 
experimenting with ecstatic forms of meditation, Buber came to feel that the pursuit of 
mental states “took a person away from the human world of encounter, and that it is only 
through our encounters with the human that we can encounter God.” Buber’s distinction 
between Judaism and the Greco-European tradition touches at the heart of the 
morphological distinction between orthopraxy and contemplation: “Jewish spirituality 
centers on the authenticity of human encounters and not on the cultivation of special 
feelings of holiness or ecstasy….Judaism is a call to unity, not dualism, one that demands 
a Judaism of deeds, not mental states.”218 
                                            
217 Seeskin, Autonomy in Jewish Philosophy, pp. 15-16. Seeskin notes: “Kant considered Judaism 
the archetype of a statutory religion, which means, in effect, that it is not a true religion at all. 
Even the Ten Commandments, whose moral validity is obvious, “are directed to nothing but outer 
observance.'' In Kant's opinion, it is only with Christianity that we get a religion containing moral 
teachings that require no other proof than that afforded by reason. Kant's anti-clericism and 
frequent appeals to the freedom of conscience leave little doubt that if Christianity is a more 
advanced religion than Judaism, Protestantism is a more advanced form of Christianity than 
Catholicism.” 
218 Martin Buber, On Judaism (New York: Schocken Books, 1967). Introduction by Rodger 
Kamenetz pp. xviii – xix. [my italics]. Buber’s distinction between deeds and mental states is 
reminiscent of Augustine’s presentation of the Old and New Testaments as the continuum of 
body and soul; the Jewish bible focused on the embodied facets of existence while the New 
Testament focused on humanity’s psychological relationship with God. Buber locates God in 
human relations while Augustine seeks Him in faith and contemplation. 
  
124 
 The Chinese tradition, in all its major religious strands, discloses the same stress 
on the biological human sphere so characteristic of the synthetic modality. The three 
major native religious systems of China; Confucianism, Daoism, and the diverse set of 
practices known collectively as popular religion, all treat the body in positive terms. 
Central notions regarding self-preservation, longevity, procreation, ritualism and 
embodied spiritual techniques such as Qigong and Taiji all point to this common interest. 
Buddhism, in its Sinicized form, was to a great extent transformed in order to meet such 
sensibilities towards the body. Philosophically, classical Chinese thought adheres to a 
form of materialism; the most foundational ontological substance known as Qi (氣) 
functions as a metaphysical common denominator of all schools of thought. Idealism was 
predominantly an Indian innovation that in spite of its unquestionable influence, never 
managed to divert Chinese thinkers form their basic affirmative stance towards the 
human body and material reality. In contrast to the Indo-European distinction between 
mind and body, Chinese thought sees our physique as a natural extension of the world 
and nature: “Human beings are part of the universe and function in exactly the same way 
as all other existing things: they are not separated from natural existence, they are not 
created special, and they are not different in structure or organizing principle.”219 
Although humans may be distinct by virtue of their unique consciousness, even 
consciousness (Jue, 覺 )  and Mind (Xin, 心 )  were never drastically separated from the 
material world, but rather seen as a purified form of the same force that constitutes 
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material.220 Scholars have frequently highlighted the absence of the Mind/Body 
distinction in Chinese philosophy; they also constantly stressed the embodied nature of 
the notion of Mind.221 In other words, for the Chinese, the Mind and body “…cannot be 
dichotomized. The “purity” of mind abstracted from context, therefore, cannot be 
maintained.”222  
 There exists a clear action/contemplation contrast between Confucianism and 
Buddhism. Confucians strove to radically ritualize life; the great sage claimed that 
“Giving yourself to ritual that is humanity (ren, 仁)…never look without ritual, never 
listen without ritual, never speak without ritual, and never move without ritual.”223 
Reminiscent of Idel’s argument against the presentation of Judaism in Western 
theological terms, Herbert Fingarette in one of the most influential books on Confucian 
ritual opposes the presentation of Confucianism from a biased Christian and Buddhist 
perspective. His argument supports the general ritualism/contemplation contrast between 
the synthetic and analytic modes of operation:  
Buddhist ideas, however different from European ideas in so many respects, share with 
the latter certain fundamental biases: they favor the individualistic and subjectivistic view 
of man. It is individual mind, the inner life and reality of the individual, which is focal in 
                                            
220 The Chinese sage, for instance, is characterized by his pure qi (qing qi, 清氣 )  which is 
contrasted with the  turbid qi ( zhuo qi , 濁氣 )  of common people. 
221  Jacques Gernet, China and the Christian Impact: A Conflict of Cultures (Cambridge; New 
York; Paris: Cambridge University Press, 1985). Hall and Ames, Thinking Through the Han, p. 
29. Most authors in Charles Moore’s ed. The Chinese Mind, contend for the inseparability of the 
Mind and Heart. 
222  Hall and Ames, Thinking through the Han, p. 29. 
223 The Analects, 12:1: 子日: 非禮勿視, 非禮勿聽, 非禮勿言, 非禮勿動. 
  
126 
understanding man as viewed throughout the main course of Buddhist and European 
thinking.224 
 
Fingarette mentions at least two of the morphological features that I argue for, namely, 
individualism and introspection. He contrasts these with the communal and externalized 
nature of the Chinese traditions so apparent in the Analects.225 Fingarette attacks the 
biased mentalistic interpretations of Confucius, claiming the sage never considered the 
inner contemplative facets of the individual. He also points to the non-pessimistic 
dispositions that accompany such a perspective: 
Confucius’s vision provides no basis for seeing man as a being of tragedy, of inner crisis 
and guilt; but it does provide a socially oriented, action-oriented view which provides for 
personal dignity….we see then that the images of the inner man and of his inner conflict 
are not essential to a concept of man as a being whose dignity is the consummation of a 
life of subtlety and sophistication, a life in which human conduct can be intelligible in 
natural terms and yet be attuned to the sacred, a life in which the practical, the intellectual 
and the spiritual are equally revered and are harmonized in the one act – the act of li 
[ritual – 禮].226  
   
It seems so natural and even appealing to imagine Confucians and rabbis operating 
according to the assumptions of the analytic mindset; the individualism that dominates 
our modern world makes it counter-intuitive to think of religion in terms that are not 
contemplative and spiritualized. But this is exactly what Fingarette is arguing, and it 
                                            
224 Herbert Fingarette, Confucius: the Secular as Sacred (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), pp. 
viii-ix. 
225 Fingarette is cautious to focus of the more authentic and earlier strata of the Analects, books 1-
15 (16-20 are considered to be a later addition with distinct influences from the school of 
Legalism). He especially highlights the centrality of books 2-9 as the most reliable words of 
Confucius’ own circle. 
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seems that the data is in his favor. Prior to the emergence of the philosophical traditions 
of Greece and India there is very little indication that ancient religions entertained 
contemplative dispositions towards the divine. It seems that only with the advent of 
analytic axial traditions did mentalistic approaches begin to overshadow many ancient 
worldviews in which sacred existence found expression in community and action. 
Fingarette argues that “when we take into account Confucius’s stature as a moralist and 
his insightfulness into human nature, his failure to see or to mention the problem of 
internal moral conflict can only be accounted for by supposing that his interests, ideas, 
concerns, in short his entire moral and intellectual orientation, was in another 
direction.”227 
 A good example of the Western bias towards introspective interpretations of 
synthetic traditions can be seen in the understanding of the central Confucian notion of 
Humanity (ren – 仁 )  
…one of the chief results of the present analysis of jen [ren] will be to reveal how 
Confucius could handle in a non-psychological way basic issues which we in the West 
naturally cast in psychological terms. The psychological, subjective use of jen in Chinese 
is a later development, a use whose import is exaggerated both by the profound 
psychological bias of Buddhist commentators and by Western, Greco-Christian outlooks 
of translators. The truly novel aspects of Confucius’s doctrine of jen are precisely what 
we need to see but fail to see because they are novel and hence not easily formulated in 
the psychologically biased language we have ready to hand.228  
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Fingarette contends that ren is achieved in terms of ritual (li), especially ritual that is 
enacted in a reciprocal and communal sense. In other words, ritual “directs our attention 
to the traditional social pattern of conduct and relationships…” while the virtue of ren 
directs our attention “to the one who pursues that pattern of conduct and thus those 
relationships…the thing we must not do is to psychologize Confucius’s terminology in 
the Analects.”229 
In their collaborative work, Adam Seligman et al. propose a distinction between 
ritual and sincerity, which has some bearing on the contrast between the synthetic and 
analytic modalities. As in so many other books that explore the notion of orthopraxy, 
Ritual and its Consequences is predominantly focused on Confucianism and Judaism as 
showcases for ritualistic modes of operation:  
In any ritual, as with saying please, performing the act marks acceptance of the 
convention. It does not matter how you may feel about the convention, if you identify 
with it of not. In doing a ritual the whole issue of our internal states is often irrelevant. 
What you are is what you are in the doing, which is of course an external act.230 
 
On the other hand: 
[Sincerity] criticizes ritual’s acceptance of social convention as mere action (perhaps 
even just acting) without intent, as performance without belief. The alternatives it often 
suggests are categories that grow out of individual soul-searching rather than acceptance 
of social conventions. Sincerity thus grows out of abstract and generalized categories 
generated within individual consciousness. The sincere mode of behavior seeks to replace 
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the “mere convention” of ritual with a genuine and thoughtful state of internal 
conviction.231   
 
The acquisition of truth is a product of a correlation between one’s inner being 
and objective reality, a spiritualistic disposition that is common to both Christians and 
Buddhists.232 When authenticity becomes a central concern and the uniqueness of the 
individual is highlighted, it becomes increasingly problematic to construct communal 
modes of operation that are equally valid for different people. Consequently, 
contemplation on the cultural level works in concordance with cognitive individualism on 
the social level; the two reinforce each other in a way that they will naturally arise in 
concert. Said differently, it is highly unlikely for traditions that promote individual 
autonomy to be predominantly oriented towards rituals, just as it would seem logically 
absurd for communal traditions to foster an ethos of seclusion and introspection. Ritual 
and contemplation are therefore two distinct strategies for engaging in religious activity, 
and each approach is emblematic of traditions that adhere to different structural 
characteristics. While the body and ritual performance are seen as fundamental to the 
synthetic worldview, analytic traditions prefer to highlight an introspective form of 
religiosity, which marginalized and even openly attacks the biological facets of existence.  
 
                                            
231 Ibid., p. 103 [My italics]. 
232 More on the mentalistic feature of the Individual East and West see ”The Status of the 
Individual in Theravada Buddhist philosophy,” “The Status of the individual in Mahayana 
philosophy,” and “Indian Epistemology and the world and the individual,” in Charles Moore ed. 
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2.3.2 Particularism vs. Universalism 
There is a striking discrepancy between the inclusive universal message of 
Buddhism and Christianity and the particularism of the Chinese and Jewish traditions. 
Although both Judaism and Confucianism promoted many universal ideals, for the most 
part they did not actively invite foreigners to join their tradition nor did they develop a 
vision that was meant to be practiced outside their local cultural orbit.233 Jewish 
particularism was already hinted at in my discussion of the non-individualistic, 
communal, nation-based perspective of the biblical narrative and Talmudic discourse. It 
is clearly reflected in the exclusive function the nation of Israel played in the divine 
drama and the special relationship between God and the Jews. Jewish particularism was 
consciously nourished and was vital for survival in the hostile and increasingly 
universalistic environment of the Hellenic and Roman world.  
Many scholars have highlighted the universalistic message of central Jewish 
prophets. This study aims to demonstrate that although Judaism certainly contained the 
seeds of universalism, it was actually Christianity that most explicitly evolved as a 
continuation of the universal ethos of the prophetic tradition. As Tomoko Masuzawa has 
shown, central thinkers in the study of religion such Abraham Kuenen, C.P. Tiele, 
Chantempie de la Sausaye, and others have all traced the roots of Christianity to the 
Hebrew prophets. In her study of the emergence of the concept of ‘world religions’ in the 
                                            
233 Judaism was preached and promoted in the Hellenic world prior to the rise of Christianity, 
which replaced it as the main proselytizing monotheistic tradition. The ‘victory’ of Christianity in 
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West, Masuzawa convincingly demonstrates that in the eyes of nineteenth century 
intellectuals, Christianity and Buddhism were seen as the only full-fledged universal 
religions. Even Islam, which is usually categorized as universal, was seen as tainted by a 
form of tribalism that was diametrically contrary to the message of advanced world 
religions.234 It is not a surprise that Christianity and Buddhism caught the attention of 
scholars; these traditions disclose a type of urgency to disseminate their forms of 
spirituality that was simply absent in the Jewish and Chinese contexts. 
Chinese forms of particularism are less apparent but nevertheless real. Due to the 
strong political and demographic dominance of the Han ethnicity, the Chinese never felt 
an acute danger of extinction or mass assimilation. Such realities notwithstanding, China 
never managed to develop the type of universal vision and proselytizing ideologies that 
we see in Buddhism and Christianity. As Edwin Reischauer points out, “The Chinese 
clearly recognized universal principles, but tempered them with strong particularistic 
considerations.”235 Chinese particularism was rooted in a very strong sense of cultural 
superiority; this meant that universalism was accepted to the extent that foreigners 
adopted the Sinitic way of life. The Chinese never felt compelled to aggressively promote 
their culture beyond the borders of the empire; instead, they took pride in their exclusive 
cultural distinctiveness vis-à-vis non-Chinese groups who they condescendingly referred 
to as barbarians (夷). This changed dramatically with the introduction of Buddhism, 
which introduced into China a Universal Mind that was allegedly shared by all human 
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235 Edwin Reischauer, The Japanese (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1978), pp. 138-9.  
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beings. This meant that salvation and spiritual realization were unrelated to a specific 
ethnic origin, but rather attainable by virtue of humanity’s shared mental and cognitive 
faculties. Although Mencius famously argued that “all people can become a Yao or a 
Shun” (人皆可以為堯舜), it was still within the constricted context of the Chinese 
tradition that sagehood could be attained.236 Unlike Buddhism and Christianity, Chinese 
spiritual and philosophical systems were not easily transportable to foreign contexts. 
Unsurprisingly, a more universal Confucian paradigm began to emerge with the rise of 
Neo-Confucianism, when a process of adopting Buddhists characteristics enabled 
Confucianism to cross ethnic and cultural borders more easily. In other words, once 
philosophical and religious concepts were cosmologized, as they were in the Neo-
Confucian project, their former context-based and historically specific significance was 
translated into terms that were universally applicable. These universalistic tendencies 
notwithstanding, even after the Song Dynasty, Confucianism never managed to develop 
the universal thrust so characteristic of Buddhism and Christianity. In analyzing 
Kabbalah and Neo-Confucianism, I will look at how both these traditions shifted towards 
an increasingly universalistic worldview while insisting on preserving many of the 
particularistic features of synthetic traditions.     
                  
2.3.3 This-Worldliness vs. Other-Worldliness 
 Rabbis and Chinese thinkers strongly affirmed the centrality and legitimate status 
of the mundane world. As opposed to the ‘epistemological pessimism’ of analytic 
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paradigms, rabbis and Confucian literati shared an optimistic approach towards the 
human sphere, believing that the world that we experience is a reliable reflection of 
reality.237 Other scholars have pointed to similar distinctions; Lee Yearly and Jonathan W. 
Schofer follow J.Z. Smith’s distinction between locative and utopian traditions. Schofer 
contends that both rabbinic Judaism and Confucianism are examples of locative traditions 
that affirm and celebrate a cosmic order “that is created by bounding the chaotic. Such 
religions charge humans with finding a “place” that harmonizes with that order.238” Livia 
Kohn claims that the human condition in Chinese culture “is an overwhelmingly 
affirmative mode: it is good to be alive, it is most precious to be born human, it is not 
only desirable but possible to realize oneself humanity in and through this world.”239 
Kohn’s description can easily be applied to the Jewish experience where signs of 
suspicion towards the human sphere are extremely rare. In his famous Halakhic Man the 
late Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik states: 
                                            
237 Bryan Van Norden, Introduction to Classical Chinese Philosophy (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub., 
2011), pp. 231-32. Van Norden borrowed these terms from Thomas Metzger who sees 
philosophical optimism as a possible solution to an incurable Western skepticism. See Metzger 
“Western Philosophy on the Defensive” in Philosophy Now: a magazine of Ideas, Vol. 26 
April/May (2000). Metzger himself borrowed these terms form Karl Popper who used both 
negatively as flawed approaches towards thinking, in contrast with the correct ‘critical 
rationalism.’ 
238 Jonathan Schofer, The Making of a Sage, p. 204 n.64. Yearley’s distinction is between Smith’s 
locative and what he terms “open” traditions in which “fulfillment occurs when people transcend 
any particular culture.” The locative for is where “fulfillment occurs when people locate 
themselves within a complex social order that is thought to be sacred.” (see his Mencius and 
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of Symbols on Social Change,” in Smith, Map is Not Territory: Studies in the History of 
Religions (Leiden: Brill, 1978), pp. 129–46. 
239 Livia Kohn “Chinese Religion,” p. 21. In the Chinese matrix Kohn includes all major religious 
traditions including Confucianism, Daoism, Sinicized Buddhism or the variety of practices 
known as popular religion. 
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Halakhic man does not long for a transcendent world, for “supernal” levels of a pure, 
pristine existence, for was not the ideal world – halakhic man’s deepest desire, his darling 
child – created only for the purpose of being actualized in our real world? It is this world 
which constitutes the stage for the Halakhah, the setting for halakhic man’s life. It is here 
that the Halakhah can be implemented to a greater or lesser degree, it is here that it can 
pass from potentiality into actuality. It is here, in this world that halakhic man acquires 
eternal life!240 
 
 As I will show in the following pages, the Greco-European and Indo-Buddhist 
traditions treated the human sphere with various degrees of suspicion, which led to the 
construction of transcendent spheres that humans strove to reach by escaping the shackles 
of concrete existence. In the monotheistic tradition we see these distinction manifest in 
the different soteriological approaches of Jews and Christians. Unlike the early Christian 
focus on the advent of the Messiah, Jewish thinkers of the same period “did not present a 
richly developed doctrine of salvation and therefore did not assign to the Messiah seen as 
Savior an important place in its larger system…They worked out issues of sanctification 
rather than those of salvation…”241 In later stages of its development when Judaism came 
under increasing Greco-Christian influences, we witness a greater focus on salvific 
themes, especially in the late portions of the Talmud. Nevertheless, the stress on 
sanctification in this world remained an indisputable hallmark of the tradition. Even in its 
later soteriological narratives, Judaism promoted a messianic message that suggests a 
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worldly vision of the reinstitution of the Davidic lineage and the renewal of Temple 
sacrifice.242 The differing messianic visions of Judaism and Christianity reflect 
substantially different attitudes towards the mundane world, where Christianity is 
theologically oriented towards a separate and sublime sphere of existence while Judaism 
strives towards a this-worldly political renaissance.243     
Attitudes towards salvation are also related to the issue of embodiment. 
Traditional Judaism believed that after death the body remains significant, as it will 
eventually be resurrected; non-physical resurrection was not a possibility since a human 
devoid of physicality lacks the fundamental bodily apparatus to operate in the world, 
especially by following the commandments. This is also a testimony to the fact that the 
advent of the messiah was not seen as the transportation of humanity towards a separate 
sphere but rather the reestablishment of an ancient past. One of the biggest controversies 
in Jewish history erupted around this exact point, where anti-rationalist thinkers such as 
Samuel ben Ali and R’ Meir ben Todros Abulafia (The Ramah) attacked the controversial 
Maimonidean theory of spiritual resurrection in which the body was marginalized in 
favor of an eternal rational soul.244 Although Christianity adopted beliefs of bodily 
resurrection from Judaism, the Greek component of mental immortality endured as a 
                                            
242 Theodore Steinberg, Jews and Judaism in the Middle Ages, p. 54. As Steinberg points out “To 
Jewish belief, the concept of a messiah who had died verged on the oxymoronic. After all, how 
could a dead messiah lead the people to political independence?” 
243 Menachem Kellner, Must a Jew Believe Anything? (Oxford; Portland, Or.: Littman Library of 
Jewish Civilization, 2006), p. 13. Kellner notes that in Judaism faith means “faith in” while in the 
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prevalent feature, beginning with Paul and more forcefully with Augustine.245 In spite of 
the Christian ideal of the resurrection of the entire human being, body and soul, the 
Aristotelian and Platonic separation between matter and spirit made a strong impact on 
the tradition and led it down a path in which the entire monastic institution prioritized the 
mind over matter.246  
Such mentalistic dispositions are even more obvious in the Indo-Buddhist 
tradition. Kalidas Bhattacharya argues that the central common features of all Indian 
philosophical schools are that a) every individual has a spiritual side, b) the spiritual side 
is more important than the material side, c) the autonomy of the spiritual needs to be fully 
realized, and d) that this realization happens through progressive detachment.247 These 
religious proclivities are clearly contrary to the Chinese engagement with the world. 
Moshe Idel’s contrast between Jewish and Hindu mystical techniques is helpful in 
highlighting the common synthetic mindset of the Jewish and Chinese traditions, in 
contrast to the analytic world-negating stance of the Indo-Buddhist traditions. According 
to Idel, whereas the Indian “arresting” or static practice of Yoga strives to enhance the 
capacity of concentration and the radical transcendence of ordinary life, Jewish 
mysticism seeks to intensify ordinary modes of activity. He also associates the yogic 
worldview with the “anticipation of death,” highlighting some of the central distinctions 
between the analytic and synthetic modalities: the pessimistic, trans-mundane, 
                                            
245 More on Paul’s body/spirit dualism see Daniel Boyarin, A Radical Jew: Paul and the Politics 
of Identity (Berkeley; London: University of California Press, 1997), esp. ch. 3. According to 
Boyarin Paul doesn’t negate the body but he represents the beginning of an increasingly Platonic 
process in which the body is subordinated to the soul. 
246 Julia Ching, Chinese Religions, p. 86. 
247 Kalidas Bhattacharyya, “The Status of the Individual in Indian Metaphysics,” p. 48. 
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contemplative features of Hinduism on one hand, and the affirmative, this-worldly, and 
action-based qualities of Judaism on the other.248 “Arresting” Hindu concerns find a 
continuation in Buddhism where the detachment from the material world and physical 
activity reaches a new climax. The Buddhist denial of the Vedic caste system and 
especially its audacious challenge to the Hindu notion of Atman represented an additional 
stage in the Indo-European development towards the ‘abolition’ of reality. Such 
illusionism gives believers a greater impetus to disregard the world of human activity and 
thus focus on mentalistic channels for liberation – that is, liberation from the Samsaric 
world, the world of human activity. It should therefore come as no surprise that such 
Indian qualities were completely transformed in the synthetic world-affirming Chinese 
context. This was accomplished by bringing the sublime, static sphere of nirvana down to 
the province of everyday life; instead of escaping the world, Chinese Buddhists sought to 
discover bliss within the domain of human activity. The world of materiality was no 
longer characterized in terms of contamination or ignorance, instead, it was argued that 
enlightenment could be found in its midst, in the quotidian realm of everyday action.  
This-worldly themes run through native Chinese thought like a red thread. When 
asked about the proper way to serve spirits and gods Confucius famously retorted: “you 
are not yet able to serve men, how could you serve the spirits?” when asked about death 
he replied in similar vain: “you do not yet know life, how could you know death?”249 
Even the Daoist religion that became increasingly other-worldly under Buddhist 
                                            
248 Idel, Enchanted Chains, p. 75. 
249 Analect 11.12. 子路問事鬼神, 子日: 未能事人焉能事鬼. 敢問死, 日: 未知生, 焉知死. 
Simon Leys trans. 
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influences,250 devised forms of self-transcendence that were very different from the Indo-
European tendency towards the abolition of experience. Perhaps the most obvious 
example of this difference can be found in the way the Daoist Immortals (xianren, 仙人) 
and Worthies (xianren, 賢人) remained in constant contact with the human sphere; they 
might dwell in exotic realms of vapor, wandering between clouds, constellations, the 
moon, and the sun, but they never completely depart or cease to operate vis-à-vis the 
world. Immortality was a supreme concern but it was a biological form of immortality in 
which people sought to extend life through alchemical and internal processes rather than 
abolish it. Instead of escaping the world, the Chinese spiritual virtuoso strove to remain in 
it for as long as possible: “There is no immortality without the physical basis of the 
body”251 and such immortality was reached in the human sphere or in constant contact 
with it rather than in an abstract Buddhist paradise.252 As Livia Kohn points out, in all 
Chinese religious traditions, including sinicized schools of Buddhism, those who attain 
access to a higher sphere can always return to this world. In popular religion and various 
forms of Daoism the celestial sphere is a crisp reflection of the bureaucratic structure of 
this world.253 Therefore, even when trans-mundane spheres of existence are imagined 
they remain in conformity with, and analogous to the mundane imperial order. The 
sublime, both for the Chinese as well as for Jews, is never unrelated to the dynamic and 
tangible world of “here and now.”  
                                            
250 Kohn, op. cit., p. 22. 
251 Ibid., p. 36. See also Julia Ching, op. cit., p. 86. 
252 Wing-tsit Chan, “the Individual in Chinese Religions,” in Moore, The Chinese Mind, pp. 289-
290. 
253 Kohn, op. cit., p. 37. 
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2.3.4 Monasticism, Asceticism, and Celibacy  
Celibacy and monasticism were briefly mentioned in my discussion of the non-
individualistic family-oriented dispositions of the Jewish and Chinese traditions; here I 
will say a few more words about their relationship to our current topic. The world 
affirming inclinations of the Confucian and Jewish traditions meant that in both cases a 
well-developed monastic tradition and ascetic practices never emerged. Moshe Idel notes 
that “rabbinic Judaism developed as a religion of communities in which there was an 
implicit and explicit rejection of forms of individualism. Perfection was achieved not by 
secluding oneself from the community but rather by joining it.”254 Traditions operating 
within the synthetic mode devised forms of self-cultivation and actualization that 
 necessitated a communal context based on human interactions. In terms of the physical 
world, the Chinese and Jewish body was always perceived as a precious asset. As 
opposed to being defamed, deliberately injured, portrayed as a cage of the soul, or 
subordinated to sublime conceptual ideals, the body was valued as the vehicle and 
paramount medium for actualization and spiritual fulfillment.255 Unlike the Christian and 
Buddhist traditions in which celibacy and monasticism were perceived as extreme forms 
of devotion, holiness, and purity, the classical Jewish and Chinese traditions harshly 
attacked practices that went against social engagement, procreation and the body.  
In the Western sphere we see a fundamental opposition between Jewish and 
Greek-influenced Christian approaches to religious transformation and spiritual 
                                            
254 Idel, Studies in Ecstatic Kabbalah (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), pp. 
103-4. 
255 See Plato’s Phaedo in which the body is seen as the soul’s tomb. 
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fulfillment. Modes of ascetic seclusion and monasticism in Judaism never came to 
symbolize a desirable religious prototype. Monastic tendencies in the Jewish Essenes 
movement for instance, were more influential on early Christianity than on rabbinical 
Judaism. While Christianity was attracted towards world-negating practices rabbinic 
Judaism developed as a tradition that attacked forms of escapism. Paula Fredriksen 
contends that in spite of many points of dispute between different Christian 
denominations, celibacy remained one of the predominant shared feature of the tradition: 
“Celibacy for all these different Christians was a way to transcend existence kata sarka. 
To renounce sexual activity – as renouncing normal family ties to enter into a new fictive 
family of choice, the Church – was to escape the human condition…”256 Christian 
monastic practices represent a choice to go against one’s inherent and deeply embedded 
biological drives; this is a type of self-inflicted violence that is sometimes magnified to 
full-fledged ascetic practices. Frequently, celibacy is closely associated with asceticism 
and both are related to the acquisition of power where it is believed that taming natural 
urges can channel the energies of desire to more spiritual domains. Similarly, pain is 
often associated with transcending mundane considerations and the ability to tap into 
forces that are otherwise inaccessible. It is for this reason that some of the greatest 
religious figures in the Christian, Hindu, and Buddhist traditions were secluded celibates 
admired by the community for their unique social position, purity, and spiritual powers. 
The virgin birth of Jesus and the Buddha’s unusual birth from his mother’s side indicate a 
basic cultural disposition that perceived celibacy in positive terms of purity and holiness. 
                                            
256 Paula Fredriksen, in The Human Condition, pp. 147-8. 
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The Buddha himself renounced sex when he left his palace and although he already had a 
child, his only son became a monk and thereby ended the family line. Jesus was also 
believed to have led a celibate life while theories about his possible marital relationship 
tend to stir anger in many Christian communities.  
Such phenomena were practically absent in Judaism and Confucianism, where 
power is more often associated with being a member of a productive family unit. Unlike 
traditions that promoted asceticism and construed sexual activity in terms of the 
dissipation of power, Chinese and Jewish views see procreation as the very essence of 
power and continuity. Eliezar Diamond reminds us that rabbis equated celibacy with 
sinfulness; they saw sexual abstinence as highly problematic since it was in conflict with 
creation.257 The emergence of Jewish parcices with ascetic and monastic undertones such 
as ‘Hitbodeduth’ (seclusion - תודדובתה) or religious titles such as ‘Perushim’ (Celibates - 
םישורפ), ‘Nazir’ (Monk - ריזנ), ‘Hasid’ (Pious One - דיסח), and ‘Kadosh’ (Venerable - 
שודק) came to the fore fairly late during the emergence of philosophy and Kabbalah, a 
clear indication of Greco-Christian individualistic and introspective influences that began 
to infiltrate the traditional Jewish worldview between the eleventh and thirteenth 
centuries.258  
                                            
257 Eliezer Diamond “And Jacob Remained Alone: The Jewish Struggle with Celibacy,” in Carl 
Olson, Celibacy and Religious Traditions (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), ch. 3 pp. 
41-64. 
258 Isadore Twersky, Rabad of Posquieres: A Twelfth-Century Talmudist (Cambridge: Harvard 
Univ. Press, 1962), pp. 26-27. 
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The case of the Chinese confrontation with Buddhist notions of celibacy shows 
just how acute the tension between the indo-Buddhist and Chinese minds was. John 
Kieschnick argues that Buddhism introduced: 
a new repertoire of deities, rituals, and vocabulary that were eventually incorporated into 
Chinese culture. But perhaps no idea was so strange or faced so many obstacles to 
success as the notion of celibacy, embodied in the Buddhist reverence for an order of 
trained religious professionals with shaved heads and distinctive robed who swore to 
renounce all sexual activity.259  
 
Examples of Confucians harshly criticizing Buddhist monastic and celibate practices are 
abundant. Pre-Buddhist Chinese medicine advocated regular sexual activity, including in 
old age, as a way to extend life, settle the blood and steady the heart. Elaborate manuals 
presented sex as a useful exercise and fundamental in staying healthy, there were also 
explicit attacks against sexual abstinence as detrimental to the body.260 As Buddhism 
consolidated its position in China, celibacy and monasticism were partially accepted, but 
constant suspicion towards these institutions never ceased. Indeed, Chinese history is 
replete with violent and non-violent attacks against Buddhist communities; the main 
target of these attacks was the lack of productivity and social involvement on behalf of 
monastic orders.   
Finally, the absence of monastic orders, celibacy, and asceticism in the Jewish 
and Chinese traditions is a reflection of their refusal to rebel against the human sphere. 
The synthetic mode discloses cultural tendencies that are based on an affirmative 
                                            
259 John Kieschnick, “Celibacy in East Asian Buddhism” in Olson, Celibacy and Religious 
Traditions, p. 226. 
260 Ibid., pp. 226-7. 
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appreciation of materiality, both in terms of the human body, procreation, ritualistic 
action, as well as in regards to humanity’s natural sphere of existence in this world.  
 
2.3.5 Historical Narratives vs. Synchronic Cosmologies 
The following section will look at the synthetic modality’s stress on historical 
analysis in contrast with the tendency of analytic traditions to focus on the sphere of 
metaphysics. I chose to conclude this chapter with this analysis since these diverging 
concerns adequately convey many of the most basic distinctions between the analytic and 
synthetic worldviews.  
In their comparison of the Chinese and Western traditions, Hall and Ames 
describe the Chinese perspective as “acosmological in the sense that the particularities 
defining the order are unique and irreplaceable items whose nonsubstitutability is 
essential to the order. No final unity is possible in this view...”261 Therefore, according to 
Hall and Ames, what I call the synthetic modality is concerned with the uniqueness of 
historical experience in which particulars such as human interactions, national 
experiences, or natural phenomenon are scrutinized in great detail and are expected to 
yield meaning. Following the social psychologist Edward I. Hall, such a worldview can 
be termed high-context where instead of brushing away experience in favor of 
discovering underlying static structures, there is an ongoing concern with analyzing the 
nature of dynamic events. Such strategies never reach a convenient or comfortable 
conclusion; thinkers are constantly engaged in a never-ending exploration of a reality that 
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refuses to conform to a single repetitive and self-enclosed pattern. From the perspective 
of high-context traditions, life is an impulsive and erratic affair and it is in history that 
one finds data that yields insights into the nature of reality.       
In Judaism, understanding history is a method of better appreciating the subtle 
and mysterious nature of God and His expectations of humans. In fact, one of the main 
innovations introduced by the early Israelite religion was the way it replaced 
Mesopotamian mythological narratives with concrete historical events and real human 
experiences. This shift represented a groundbreaking move towards a more diachronic, 
and realistic time frame that humans can relate to experientially. Understanding history 
within a divine narrative never occupied a similar position in the Greek tradition where 
historical analysis emerged as a secular form of objective documentation, best 
represented by the work of Herodotus. In his The Origin and Goal of History Karl Jaspers 
contends that: “Christians have not tied their empirical conceptions of history to their 
faith. An article of faith is not an article of empirical insight into the real course of 
history. For Christians sacred history was separated from profane history, as being 
different in its meaning. Even the believing Christian was able to examine the Christian 
tradition itself in the same way as other empirical objects of research.”262 The Greeks, 
especially after Socrates, were more concerned with a-temporal metaphysics; Levinas 
and Derrida had an ongoing dialogue about the unique interplay between the Jewish and 
Greek facets of Western civilization. The Greek search for perfection stressed the 
immutable facets of reality, reflected by Aristotle’s un-moved mover and Plato’s eternal 
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Forms. In Judaism on the other hand we see a focus of change; Derrida claimed that in 
judaism “there is no merging, but instead an infinite tension in which Greek identity is 
challenged by Hebrew difference; history is a patternless set of events, each meaningful 
in itself and not as part of a whole.”263 The Hebraic sense of rapture treated history as a 
story with unexpected twists and turns, making the perfect and harmonious cosmos of the 
Greeks seem very unlikely.  
Greek motionlessness and Jewish dynamism represent a constant tension in the 
midst of Christianity, the former stressing synchronic structures, the latter focusing on the 
significance of human events. Although the Judaic sacralization of history remained 
central to Christianity, it was nevertheless qualified and tempered by the Greek stress on 
a-temporal cosmologies. The early Neoplatonic and later Aristotelian currents of the 
Christian tradition promoted rational cosmological structures in which the Hebraic 
obsession with the intricacies of history gave way to a more purified picture, in which 
history was narrated in broader brush strokes and focused on secluded major events such 
as the life of Jesus, his crucifixion, resurrection, and our expectations for redemption. 
According to Robert Neville: 
…Christianity finds unity only within God and in a divine life of heavenly world that 
transcends history in the ordinary sense… Christianity thus involves as essential dualism 
in which ordinary history is taken to be at odds with the full reality in which human 
beings are existentially unified with God… In Christianity, there is no existential unity 
within history in the ordinary sense, as there is or ought to be for Judaism…264 
 
                                            
263 Oona Eisenstadt, “Levinas Versus Levinas: Hebrew, Greek, and Linguistic Justice.” 
Philosophy and Rhetoric 38, no. 2 (2005): 147. 
264 Neville, The Human Condition, p. 194. 
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With the Greek synchronic temperament lurking in the background it is no wonder that 
Deism became a growing trend among European intellectuals who sought to free history 
from the deterministic shackles of divine intervention and thereby open new horizons for 
human agency. 
Turning to the Chinese case, history was a politicized and cosmologized domain 
that functioned as a template for ethical behavior, righteous rulership, and the ongoing 
attempt to reach cosmic harmony. The famous Spring and Autumn Annals (春秋－  Chun 
Qiu), the Classic of History (書經  –  Shu Jing ) , the Classic of Poetry (詩經  –  Shi Jing) 
and their subsequent commentaries together with the imperial historiographical tradition 
pioneered by Sima Qian (司馬遷 ) all  reflect  the unique position history occupied in 
Chinese culture .  The Chinese believed in  the method  of  ji  gu (稽古 )  “studying the ancient 
ways , ”  in which truth was to be found in the past . According to this approach,  history 
presents humans with the drama of the rise and fall of dynasties giving us unique access 
to the inner workings of  Heaven and Earth .  “learning about the world and the great men 
of the past causes people to become more virtuous ,  raises their awareness of social and 
natural harmony ,  and thus provides the necessary knowledge of how to do the right thing 
at the right time and the right measure . ”265 In agreement, John Berthrong claims that 
 “Confucianism is a resolutely historical tradition  that affirms the importance of  history 
for the cultivation of a just society and even for the nurture of a refined mind-heart . 
 History is a mirror that the past holds up in order to remind us that we ,  too ,  will  be judged 
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worthy or at fault . ”266  To say that the Chinese did not engage in theoretical thinking is 
clearly an exaggeration; they too speculated on the ultimate nature of reality and they too 
constructed over-arching, universal categories. However, it is worth noting that most of 
their abstract categories were ethical in nature and therefore could be verified and 
examined both through human interactions at the present as well as by historical analysis. 
This is what E.R Hughes seems to suggest when he argues that “one indispensable 
method of achieving reliable knowledge was the historical method. It was as if a man’s 
contemporaries said to him, “speculate, theorize, as much as you like, but check up on 
your speculations by finding out what has happened in the past”…. According to this 
approach, the object of knowledge was not abstract and changeless, not a logical entity. It 
was shot through and with a sense of the particular.”267  
 The  Chinese  tradition can be  contrasted with the disregard for  historical 
documentation  in the Indo-Buddhist worldview  in which  mundane  events  were 
 marginalized to an extremely negligible position .  Considering the analytical 
characteristics of the Indian mind and its peculiar form of  abstract cosmology this should 
come as no surprise .  Throughout the ages both Western and Chinese intellectuals visiting 
India were perplexed by the lack of local interest in rigorous historical documentations . 
 The characteristic  ‘tyranny of universals’  in  Hindu thought deemed historical  events 
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 illusory and therefore undeserving of serious consideration .  Arvind Sharma contends that 
in  “Hindu metaphysical illusionism,”  historical events  were  not only pushed to the 
backgrounds but often perceived as unreal .268 In his Ancient India, R. C. Majumdar 
contends that “one of the gravest defects of Indian culture, which defies rational 
explanation, is the aversion of Indians to writing history. They applied themselves to all 
conceivable branches of literature and excelled in many of them, but they never seriously 
took to the writing of history…”269 Here again, even more so than in the case of the 
Greco-European tradition, we see a characteristic Indo-European inclination towards low-
context interpretations of reality; the more detached things are from the contingencies of 
mundane affairs the more infused they are with ontological reality.  
 The prominence of history in the a-cosmological worldviews of China and 
Judaism is to a great extent  one of the most important channels for the interpretation of 
reality in these traditions .  Wars ,  exiles ,  victories ,  defeats ,  earthquakes ,  and the life of 
 emperors  and kings  all functioned  as  fingerprints  of an elusive reality .  In other words, the 
way rabbis and Confucians  “did  metaphysics”  was  by contemplating the significance of 
actual events.  This approach should be distinguished form the way history is done in 
specialized secular traditions .  Although in its modern form historiography certainly 
teaches us moral lessons ,  the Chinese and Jewish traditions accentuated the 
 extramundane  qualities of historical narratives .  According to Kohn  “the major salvific 
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activity of the [ Confucian ]  tradition consists in conscious and historical learning . ”270 As 
 for Judaism ,  Levinas ,  like  many others ,  believed that  “history ,  rather than what is outside 
it ,  becomes the arena for the spiritual life.”271 The cosmological and spiritual significance 
of history  functioned as  a  Rosetta Stone for deciphering  a higher  level of reality .  As 
opposed to metaphysics as a speculative and highly abstract field of inquiry , 
 “cosmology”  in the Chinese and Jewish traditions was often part and parcel of historical 
analysis and the exploration of particular situations.272  
 In conclusion, the distinction between historical analysis and metaphysics reflects 
many of the fundamental contrasts between the synthetic and analytic worldviews: 
 a) Contextualization vs. De-contextualization: the synthetic modality’s concern 
with historical analysis reflects the tendency towards contextualization on the cognitive 
level. In contrast the analytic focus on universalistic cosmologies with cross-cultural 
applicability reflects the cognitive disposition towards de-contextualization. 
 b) Open-endedness vs. Systematicity: historical analysis as an ongoing process of 
exploration means that such modes of discourse will remain open-ended rather than 
closed and conclusive. In contrast, a-historical cosmologies are not constrained by 
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evolving narratives and therefore have the capacity to offer self-contained metaphysical 
visions.     
 c) Action vs. Contemplation: history is the realm of action and behavior.  By 
following the commandments, Jews are expected to be obedient both as individuals and 
as a nation. Similarly, the Chinese follow the ritualistic patterns of Heaven in order to 
reach social stability and cosmic harmony. In contrast, the analytic tendency to construct 
static and structured worldviews offers the possibility to postulate a potential 
correspondence between the psychological and cognitive apparatus of the individual and 
the structure of the universe, one that exists above and beyond the particularities of a 
specific history or personal experience. 
 d) Particularism vs. Universalism: the inclination towards context in the synthetic 
modality leads to the stress on dynamic historical narratives, which in turn lend 
themselves to a particularistic ethos that highlights a specific group’s own biography. 
Therefore, the disposition towards contextualization on the cognitive level operates in 
concordance with particularism on the cultural level. In contrast, the timeless 
metaphysical structures that analytic traditions advance are oblivious to ethnic 
background, thereby having the ability to bring people with disparate historical 
experiences under one universal paradigm. 
 e) This-worldliness vs. Other-worldliness: Finally, historical analysis is concerned 
with this world. The essence of reality is believed to be found in the sphere of human 
events and daily reality. In contrast, the emphasis on cosmology and static structures 
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assumes that there is a superior world the humans should strive to reach by escaping the 
problematic world of material. 
  
 
2.4 STRATEGIES OF MEANING: COMMUNICATION AND LANGUAGE 
 
The following section will explore the very different approaches Indo-European 
and non-Indo-European cultures adopted towards language and communication. As a 
reminder, the Chinese and Jewish traditions belong to the non-Indo-European rubric 
while the Greek, Christian, Indian and early Buddhist traditions belong to the Indo-
European category. I will use Basil Bernstein’s theory of linguistic codes in order to 
highlight the differences between analytic and synthetic strategies of meaning. Although 
Bernstein’s work was primarily concerned with differences in language used among 
working and middle class families in London, his model of linguistic codes is valuable as 
an explanatory framework for creating broader distinctions between cultures; Mary 
Douglas’ Natural Symbols was the first important step in that direction.273 In this study 
the central goal of applying Bernstein’s code theory to the domain of culture will be to 
further establish the distinctions between the synthetic and analytic morphological 
models. Paraphrasing Huntington’s “the West and the rest”, I will argue for an “Indo-
European and the rest” distinction; such a generalization makes it possible to classify 
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languages as dissimilar as Chinese and Hebrew under the same non-Indo-European 
rubric. Following Merlin Donald and others, I will contend that such a generalization is 
helpful due to the distinct characteristics of the linguistic group known as Indo-European. 
Indeed, this group of languages gave rise to highly influential systems that were efficient 
in creating discursive models of analysis, and religio-philosophical paradigms with 
universal applicability. 
 
2.4.1 Basil Bernstein and Linguistic Codes 
The central distinction Bernstein draws is between what he calls the restricted 
code and elaborate code.274 The former points to a linguistic world where speakers draw 
on shared assumptions that create a sense of communal exclusivity. This type of code 
affirms and strengthens the boundaries of a community and protects a certain discourse 
from foreign participation. In Bernstein’s words: 
the most general condition for the emergence of this code is a social relationship based 
upon a common, extensive set of closely-shared identifications and expectations self-
consciously held by the members… The speech is here refracted through a common 
cultural identity which reduces the need to verbalize intent so that it becomes explicit… 
The meanings are likely to be concrete, descriptive or narrative rather than analytical or 
abstract. In certain areas meanings will be highly condensed….The major function of this 
code is to define and reinforce the form of the social relationship by restricting the verbal 
signaling of individual experience.275  
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The elaborated Code on the other hand is a form of discourse in which there is no 
presupposing of any shared cultural assumptions among participants. The explicitness of 
the elaborate code facilitates a situation in which different people from diverse cultural 
backgrounds can understand and relate to each other using a transparent universal 
discourse. According to Bernstein this code will arise when:  
the intent of the other person cannot be taken for granted, with the consequences that 
meanings will have to be expanded and raised to the level of verbal explicitness. The 
verbal planning here, unlike the case of a restricted code, promotes a higher level of 
syntactic organization and lexical selection. The preparation and delivery of relatively 
explicit meaning is the major function of this code… The code will facilitate the verbal 
transmission and elaboration of the individual’s unique experience. The conditions of the 
listener unlike that in the case of a restricted code, will not be taken for granted…276  
 
My main goal will be to demonstrate that the basic characteristics of the elaborate and 
restricted codes reflect the same cultural sensibilities that are typical of the synthetic and 
analytic modalities respectively. Perhaps one method of better understanding these 
differences is by recognizing their most extreme manifestations: the elaborate code, when 
developed to its full potential, will express itself through an abstract and hypothetical 
discourse that we can loosely term ‘theoretical thought.’ The restricted code, in contrast, 
moves away form the world of cognitive abstractions towards escalating forms of 
concrete communication, the most extreme being ritualism. In other words, the elaborate 
code, which is distinguished by its clarity and explicitness, leads to the development of a 
type of specialized conceptual language that has become the hallmark of the Greek and 
Indian philosophical legacies. Both these traditions are famously recognized as 
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developing discourses, that in their extreme forms, were highly theoretical, abstract, and 
universalizable.277 On the other hand, thinkers such as Bernstein, Roy Rappaport and 
Mary Douglas have suggested that ritual behavior, so dominant in Judaism and 
Confucianism, is representative of more ‘concrete’ restrictive discourses.278 In other 
words, ritual is seen as concrete since it operates upon para-verbal and embodied signals 
that have localized meanings that are restricted to local groups. Ritual, the most concrete 
form of restricted code is highly particularistic and oriented toward the establishment of 
social distinctions.   
 We can imagine a spectrum of strategies of communication that ranges from 
analytic cultures’ proclivity towards theoretical abstractions on one extreme and concrete 
ritual behavior on the synthetic extreme; forms of communication such as analogy, 
association, and symbolism represent the subtle continuum between these two extremes.  
 
Diagram 2: The Axis of Communication 
      
 
  Theory/Math       Logic           Science       Association/analogy      Symbolism         Ritual 
 
I will begin my discussion by suggesting that the Indo-European language family 
possessed certain qualities that provided the earliest conditions for the emergence of 
                                            
277 Once Buddhism abandoned the particularistic Hindu caste system it was free to evolve towards 
a universalism that transcended class and ethnic distinctions. 
278 Rappaport, Ritual and Religion in the Making of Humanity, pp. 50-51. Bernstein, Class, Codes 
and Control, p. 126. 
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analytic thought and the reliance on modes of communication that were disembodies and 
abstract.  
 
2.4.2 Indo-European Languages 
I have already discussed the peculiar characteristics of analytic thought and its 
reliance on objectification and system building based on logical and formal relations. I 
showed that this became especially central in specialized strategies of argumentation such 
as the Abhidharma recursive method, Greek dialectics, and the scholastic argument in 
Europe. The fact that these analytic forms of discourse emerged in Indo-European 
cultures suggests the possibility that language played a role in biasing such traditions 
towards certain strategies of communication. In recent years research in cognitive science 
has offered interesting insights into these topics. Neuropsychologist Merlin Donald traces 
the emergence of analytic thought to the distinct attributes of the Greek language, which 
he contrasts with the common narrative cultures inclined towards storytelling and 
symbolism.279 Indeed, both the Confucian and Jewish discourses were based on 
paradigms that were rooted in official narratives. In both cases there was no dominant 
intellectual trend that sought to explore man’s internal psychic mechanisms, be it the 
structure of consciousness as in Buddhism, or the correlation between our cognitive 
faculties and the cosmic order as in Greco-European rationalism.  
Chinese and Jewish thinkers were exploring very different facets of reality, using 
more concrete or condensed linguistic mechanisms such as metaphor, analogy, 
                                            
279 Donald, Origins of the Modern Mind, p. 343.  
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association and symbols but certainly not the conceptual language of the Indo-European 
kind. Following Jerome Bruner, Donald’s distinction of the two modes of thinking in 
modern humans correlate with what I termed synthetic and analytic thought: 
One is sometimes called narrative thought, and the other is variously called analytic, 
paradigmatic, or logicoscientific. In modern culture, narrative thought is dominant in the 
literary arts, while analytic thought predominates in science, law, and government. The 
narrative or mythic, dimension of modern culture has been expressed in print, but it is 
well to keep in mind that in its inception, mythic thought did not depend upon print or 
visual symbolism; it was an extension, in its basic form, of the oral narrative.280  
        
Reading the above quote one is led to assume a certain superiority of the analytic mode 
over narrative thought. Certainly, Donald suggests that the emergence of analytic thought 
represents a new phase in human cognition, but this advantage was temporary rather than 
permanent. Recognizing the inherent advantages of analytical thought, non-Indo-
European cultures gradually adopted many patterns and linguistic aspects that were 
initially confined to the Indo-European language family.281 At a later stage I will explore 
how Jewish philosophers and kabbalists, as well as their Neo-Confucian counterparts, 
invested unprecedented efforts in reinventing and refining their vocabularies in a quest to 
meet the strict demands of analytical reasoning. Although I am arguing with Donald that 
                                            
280 Donald, Origins of the Modern Mind, p. 273. 
281 Eric Voegelin’s notion of Mytho-speculation is helpful here as it points to a form of discourse 
in which theoretical speculation takes place within a mythic medium. This distinction is helpful in 
stressing how the new theoretical inclinations of synthetic cultures during the axial age could 
nevertheless retained a fairly mythic, symbolic, or narrative-based discourse. In other words, 
although all axial traditions showed a certain shift towards more evolved forms of speculative 
discourses, some remained anchored in historical narratives, or official stories, while others, 
emerging form the Indo-European world, began to develop increasingly ‘elaborate’ discourses 
based on the objectification of information.  
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Indo-European languages were distinct in their ability to establish highly analytic 
discourses, it is important to stress that the sustained and parallel development of non-
Indo-European discourses, both oral and written, led to cultural discourses that excelled 
in penetrating aspects of reality that were frequently neglected by the analytic mode. 
Bernstein notes that “it is important to realize that a restricted code carries its own 
aesthetic. It will tend to develop a metaphoric range of considerable power, a simplicity 
and directness, a vitality and rhythm.”282 This special aesthetic and exceptional 
metaphoric range is exactly what makes discourses produced by Jewish and Chinese 
thinkers so profound and attractive in their own right. Indeed, the sort of ambiguity of 
symbolic language with its exceptional semantic range, colorful undertones, and 
imaginative power, has a unique capacity to say things differently from analytic 
discourse. When words are condensed with several meanings as opposed to being precise 
and specific, they have an immense suggestive power allowing for a greater imaginative 
range.283 Robert Bellah raises yet another important advantage of narrative discourses; 
following Jerome Bruner he claims that domains such as ethics cannot be replaced by 
theoretical thought; all attempts to create a science of faith, politics, religion, and 
                                            
282 Bernstein, op. cit., p. 136. 
283 This is a topic Françoise Jullien beautifully explores in his book Detour and Access. Jullien 
points to the powerful ability to employ the idea of ‘suggestive language’ or ‘implicit language’ 
(Wei Yan - 微言); he shows how the Chinese have a habit of saying little in order to 
communicate more; their ability to detour (not to say things explicitly) but nevertheless access. 
This is known as Weiyan Dayi (微言大意) or, ‘suggestive language extensive meaning.’ Francois 
Jullien, Detour and Access: Strategies of Meanings in China and Greece (New York: Zone 
Books, 2000). The ability of Chinese to convey meaning in ways that are different to the Indo-
European reliance on linguistic precision is also attested to in Shigehisa Kuriyama’s analysis of 
the different ways Chinese and European doctors describe their patient’s pulses. See Shigehisa 
Kuriyama, The Expressiveness of the Body and the Divergence of Greek and Chinese Medicine. 
(New York: Zone Books, 1999), p. 62. 
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behavior have failed “because stories really have been replaced by theories in natural 
science, some have come to believe that this can occur in all spheres.”284 These important 
differences can help us understand the Chinese and Jewish natural tendency towards 
ethics and historical analysis, both of which rely on narrative discourses.   
  
2.4.3 From Mythos to Logos 
One might wonder how the Greek and Indian philosophical traditions managed to 
“detach” themselves from their earlier mythical roots and embark on a new philosophical 
path. After all, it is hard to imagine something more starkly mythological than Homeric 
and early Vedic narratives. In discussing the initial “detachment” of philosophy from its 
mythic roots, it is important to qualify the extent to which this occurred and to bear in 
mind that this process was gradual. On the other hand, it is legitimate to speak of such 
detachment, especially when we contrast it with traditions such as Judaism and 
Confucianism in which an analytic philosophical tradition never managed to consolidate 
itself as a major intellectual trend prior to the impact of ndo-European traditions.285       
How then did the Greeks and Indians manage to slowly develop forms of analytic 
discourse that were fairly distinct form their ancient mythological backgrounds? In his 
important article “Judaism and Myth” (תודהיו סותימ) Yehuda Liebes offers a persuasive 
                                            
284 Jerome Bruner, Acts of Meaning (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1990) p. 111; 
Robert Bellah, “What is Axial about the Axial Age?” p. 85. 
285 In the Chinese case we have the schools of logicians and the later Mohists, but these schools 
were short-lived with a marginal impact on the tradition as a whole. It is important to bear in 
mind that although both the Greek and Vedic traditions managed to create discourses that were 
philosophical and relatively free of the dense mythological narratives that preceded them. 
Although both traditions retained varying degrees of ‘restricted’ cultural symbolism, their 
analytical philosophical intellectual currents played a crucial role in their historical development. 
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explanation of this historical shift in the West.286 According to Liebes pre-philosophical 
ancient traditions displayed a certain tension between the universal and the particular. 
Examples of the particular are local clan-based narratives, and personalized and 
anthropomorphic gods. Such local mythologies, Liebes believes, are oppositional to 
universalistic features of traditions that see the divine as an abstract and conceptual entity 
that is devoid of local qualities. What Liebes calls the ‘mythological tension’ is a balance 
between the concrete and the abstract, an endless dialectical tension between oppositional 
forces: emotional and rational, aesthetic and philosophical, personal and impersonal, 
material and spiritual, and mundane and holy. Myth oscillates between these polarities 
but never completely identifies with one or the other; such identification would lead to its 
demise.  
As opposed to many scholars who promote the view that early Judaism was 
distinct in its cultural milieu by its rejection of myth, Liebes’ definition of myth leads us 
to a contrary conclusion: Judaism is characterized by a highly charged mythic tension 
which invests its God with a special ontological resilience.287 This is especially different 
from Greek mythology where the polytheistic diversity of deities led to a ‘dissipation’ of 
the mythic tension resulting in a laxity of narrative in which stories regarding the 
different gods changed and took on different versions. As opposed to the relative 
coherence and immutability of the monotheistic narrative, the multiplicity of stories in 
polytheism entailed a multiplicity of meanings and interpretations; accounts were not as 
                                            
286 Nachum Arieli argues that the shift from mythos to logos took place between Thales and 
Socrates; a period in which Greek mythos disintegrated, especially apparent in the realm of 
Cosmology. Nachum Arieli, Ha’Machshava Ha’Yehudit, p. 19. 
287 Peter Berger hints at this irresolvable tension in Judaism. See Sacred Canopy, pp. 73-4. 
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concentrated on one dominant theme and therefore lacked the same ontological 
significance that was invested in the God of Israel. This enabled the Greeks to break 
through the mythic dialectical gridlock and move towards the extreme pole of the 
universal, abstract, and conceptual.288 This becomes clear in Plato’s Republic where there 
is an attempt to introduce a new model of what the gods represent, an attempt to 
articulate the old Homeric gods in terms of logos rather than mythos.  
Liebes’ argument seems to be relevant to the Indian case as well. The shared 
Indo-European origins of these traditions made the shift from crude anthropomorphism 
toward a hypostasized and impersonal depiction of nature more likely. Hajime Nakamura 
points out that the Indo-European roots of Sanskrit meant that it had an inherent 
propensity towards describing reality in terms of abstract universals, a feature that is 
certainly typical of Greek thought as well. Much like Greek culture, the Vedic tradition 
discloses a wide range of changing narratives regarding its gods; suggesting a similar 
lack of mythic tension that Liebes associates with ancient Greek culture. Nakamura 
seems to be arguing the same point: 
In the West, God is the center of the whole religious system. In the Indian religions, on 
the other hand, God does not hold such a prominent position as in the West. Indians have 
their own very richly and elaborately developed idea of God, but they never consider God 
as the Absolute Being… almost all the ancient philosophical schools of India [Hindu, 
Buddhist, and Jain] regarded the gods as being of no great significance.289  
 
                                            
288 Yehuda Liebes, “Yahadut U Mitos.” In Alilot Elohim: Hamitos Ha’Yehudi - Masot u 
Mechkarim ( Jerusalem: Carmel, 2008). 
289 Hajime Nakamura, Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples, p. 166 [my brackets]. 
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The mythic laxity of Indo-European systems can be seen in the relatively smooth shift 
from the Greek Titans and the Vedic Asuras to the new generation of gods that replaced 
them. At a later stage even these gods are slowly transcended by a conceptual language 
that enabled an additional shift from mythology to philosophy – such a transition is 
apparent in Greek stoicism, which understood gods as different powers. Eliade argued 
similarly that Indo-European deities tend to represent cosmic energies; gods with 
anthropomorphic and anthropopathic characteristics gradually shift to represent natural 
powers such as thunder, fire, and the sky.290 Later, even these natural powers become 
subordinated to more distilled abstractions and concepts such as Brahman, Rta (rita), the 
law of dharma, Karma, Platonic Forms, and Neoplatonic emanations. This can explain 
the frequent phenomenon of Deus Otiosus in the Indo-European world where gods slowly 
disappear or become relatively redundant.291  
 Indo-European languages are inherently inclined towards the conceptual depiction 
of reality; such conceptualism made it more likely for a plurality of gods to emerge, each 
vaguely representing natural and human forces.292 In what follows I will discuss how 
communication and the distinctions between Indo-European and non-Indo-European 
languages pertains to many of the morphological features discussed in the cognitive, 
social, and cultural levels. 
                                            
290 Eliade, “The Religion of the Indo-Europeans: The Vedic Gods,” in A History of Religious 
Ideas (London Chicago: Collins University of Chicago Press, 1979), pp. 187-214. 
291 This is very different from the Western deus absconditus. The monotheistic god can seem 
‘absent’ or unknown by the human mind but He certainly cannot become redundant. 
292 It seems that the convergence of the propensity towards construing reality in abstract terms 
together with the lack of a mythic tension characteristic of Indo-European polytheism, created 
some of the necessary conditions for the emergence of analytic discourses in both these cultures. 
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2.4.4 Language and Cognition     
 Benjamin Lee Whorf believed that the morphological, syntactic, and lexical 
features of a language determine the way speakers experience and interpret reality. In its 
relatively short and tumultuous history, Whorfianism, or the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, 
went in and out of vogue, some subscribing to strong versions of what came to be know 
as linguistic relativism (also known as linguistic determinism), others to weak versions, 
and yet others denying it altogether. Today there exists a fairly balanced consensus 
among linguists and cognitive scientists that language exercises ‘non-trivial’ influences 
on the way we conceptualize the world, with more attention directed to the interface 
between cognition, language, and culture.293 Without going into the details and different 
camps of this debate, in line with the more multi-layered approach we see today, I will 
argue that language is a significant factor in shaping the general perceptions of the 
synthetic and analytical modalities.  
It is worth reiterating that both the analytic traditions this dissertation focuses on 
emerged in Indo-European cultures, a fact that I believe is not coincidental.294 Looking at 
the specific case at hand, I will attempt to demonstrate that the analytic mindsets that 
emerged from the Indo-European language group are a testament to the considerable role 
language occupies in the way traditions perceive reality. This assumption is strengthened 
                                            
293 See Koerner, "Towards a full pedigree of the Sapir–Whorf Hypothesis: from Locke to Lucy" 
in Martin Putz and Marjolyn Verspoor ed. Explorations in Linguistic Relativity: Current Issues in 
Linguistic theory (Amsterdam; Philadelphia: J. Benjamins, 2000). For more on proponents of 
Linguistic relativism see Paul Ehrlich, Human Natures: Genes, Cultures, and the Human 
Prospect (Washington, D.C.: Island Press Shearwater Books, 2000), p. 378 n. 48, 52, 54. 
294 Paden notes that there is an Indo-European lineage that correlates with a certain family of 
religions. Religious Worlds, p. 42. 
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by the fact that the various common features that scholars have attributed to the Greek 
and Indian traditions have been overwhelmingly associated with their shared Indo-
European origins, namely, their common linguistic ancestry. The same is true for cultures 
with non-Indo-European origins; especially those that reached a high level of cultural 
sophistication as a result of millennia of sustained growth and the emergence of elaborate 
literary formats. Such traditions, in spite of their substantial variations, operated 
according to certain biases and constraints that were inherent to the non-Indo-European 
physiognomy of their languages. In other words, the dichotomy I draw between two 
categories of linguistic orientation means that non-Indo-European languages, in spite of 
their significant differences, were similar in that the essential characteristics for the 
development of an objectified/analytic discourse were absent. I believe that such inherent 
biases towards one form of discourse rather than another are an outcome of their reliance 
on the more condensed, symbolic, or restricted side of the communication spectrum.             
Let us turn to more concrete examples of the way Indo-European and non-Indo-
European languages biased speakers towards distinct sets of cultural sensibilities. In the 
introduction to their translation of the Confucian Analects, Roger T. Ames and Henry 
Rosemont argue that Indo-European languages are substantive and essentialistic whereas 
classical Chinese is eventful; the former languages tend to construe reality in terms of 
‘things’ while the latter in terms of a ‘procession’ of events. Ames and Rosemont 
attribute the Indo-European focus on ‘things’ and ‘substances’ to the structures of Indo-
European languages. They mention several characteristic linguistic features such as the 
definite articles, a strong stress on nouns, and the unique use of pronouns as likely 
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reasons for such Western mindsets.295 According to Ben-Ami Scharfstein, the definite 
article is responsible for reifying adjectives such as ‘good’ into nouns such as ‘the Good;’ 
he provides an example showing how the definite article makes it much easier to 
transform a verb in the sentence “the man is conscientious” into an adjective “the man 
has a conscience.”296 Other scholars such as Wilfred Cantwell Smith stress the 
overwhelming reliance of the Greek language on nouns, claiming this language is a 
“preeminently reificationist-idealist” language.297 In contrast to these Indo-European 
tendencies, Ames and Rosemont demonstrate that:  
classical Chinese has no definite article (or any articles at all), and its pronouns do not 
function just as modern English pronouns do. Essentialism is virtually built into English 
– indeed, into all Indo-European languages….”  
 
Ames and Rosemont point to the difficulties of translating Chinese Classics into an Indo-
European medium in which the important concept of dao (道)  almost inevitably 
transforms into  “the  Dao” ,  a move that  reifies and objectifies the term and thus misleads 
the reader in  fundamental ways .  They note that the Chinese dao  has as much to do with 
the subject’s quality of  understanding as it does with the various aspects of the felt 
experience. Said differently, they claim that the notion of dao defies Aristotle’s 
                                            
295 It is important to stress that although Ames and Rosemont are particularly interested in 
English, the language of their translation, their contrast is between Chinese and Indo-European 
languages in general. Confucius, Roger T. Ames, and Henry Rosemont. The Analects of 
Confucius, pp. 20-65. 
296 Ben-Ami Scharfstein, Philosophy East/Philosophy West: A Critical Comparison of Indian, 
Chinese, Islamic, and European Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978), p. 22. 
297 Wilfred Cantwell Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion, p. 72. 
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categories, being all of them at once.298 Such linguistic ambiguity entails a different type 
of intellectual discourse. In agreement, several scholars have argued that Chinese 
philosophy lacks structure and systematicity because of its linguistic foundations.299  
 Indo-European languages are not only distinct from Chinese but also form 
Hebrew and other Semitic languages. Scharfstein shows that the “Indo-European copula 
be and its tendency to be confused with the be of existence, lead to the creation of 
substance-attribute distinction more easily.” He contrasts this with Chinese, and to a 
slightly lesser extent, with Semitic languages, which he sees as a middle ground between 
the two. In agreement with Scharfstein, Thorleif Boman claims that the differences 
between the Greek and Jewish conceptions of ‘being’ are substantial, a subject to which 
he dedicates a complete chapter in his famous comparative work on Greek and Jewish 
thought.300 The point to stress in Boman’s analysis is Hebrew’s lack of a strong 
reificationist tendency. Following earlier linguists, he notes that biblical Hebrew does not 
even possess a word for ‘a thing’, he argues that although Dabhar (רבד),  Keli ( ילכ)  , and 
 Hefetz ( ץפח ) may come near to describing material  and even an  object ,  it is always in 
reference to some kind of practical use ,  never an  ‘object’  as an abstract entity .301  The 
concrete aspect  of  ‘a thing’  in Hebrew, he argues, is related to the absence of a highly 
essentialistic tendency in its linguistic  structure .     
                                            
298 Rosemont and Ames, op. cit., p. 20-65. 
299 Carsun Chang [Zhang Junmai], The Development of Neo-Confucian Thought. Vol.1. (New 
Haven, Conn.: College and University Press, 1957), pp. 39-40 
300 Boman goes on to argue that hayah has a less reificationist status in Hebrew and that it can 
mean different things such as ‘to become’, ‘to be’ and ‘to effect.’ Thorleif Boman, Hebrew 
Thought Compared With Greek, pp. 38-9. 
301  Ibid., pp. 184-5. 
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The lack of stress on the discreteness of objects and substances in the synthetic 
mode of operation has been discussed earlier; here it is important for me to highlight the 
relationship between language and what I termed synthetic thought. The inherent 
qualities of languages that operate as restricted codes pay less attention to delineating 
specific meaning to words. This phenomenon is related to what Mary Douglas calls 
condensed vocabulary, best exemplified in symbolic language, a communicative 
mechanism that is frequently used in synthetic traditions. Ames and Rosemont argue that:  
 
…the heavy grammatical burden placed on the semantic component of classical Chinese 
contributes to what may appropriately be called “semantic overload” in the literary 
language. The average lexical item found in the literature (especially the basic 2500+ 
characters) is so rich in semantic content that meaning differentiation is difficult, with the 
consequences that virtually every passage is ambiguous, being subject to a multiplicity of 
readings until and unless a specific interpretation is given to it (which is then handed 
down in the form of commentary).302  
 
According to Scahrfstein, the precision of Indo-European philosophical terminology may 
seem over pedantic to outsiders: “from the Chinese stand point, the speakers of a 
European languages have to say too much in order to say anything at all.”303 As we can 
                                            
302 Rosemount and Ames, op. cit., pp. 42-3. Such obscurity should not be seen as a disadvantage. 
Those familiar with the type of vagueness that characterizes restricted codes appreciate their 
peculiar beauty. Ames and Rosemont explicitly attack the disadvantages of the obsessive 
precision of analytical discourses. They argue that “many Western scholars have of course called 
attention – often loudly – to this ambiguity and lack of precision in classical Chinese, seeing it as 
a liability. But perhaps their perception is biased. The lack of precision could be a decided 
communicative asset, a kind of “productive vagueness”…. [on the other hand] precision might be 
counterproductive because it could, for example, make the elements of the expression too 
discrete, and their interrelations too obscure.” Ibid. 
303 Scharfstein, op. cit., p. 28. 
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see, the main distinction made here between Indo-European and Chinese strategies of 
communication clearly resonate with Bernstein’s idea of precision and ambiguity in the 
elaborate and restricted codes.  
The next distinction I would like to point out is between the dynamic nature of 
Hebrew and Chinese and the static qualities of Indo-European languages. Boman points 
our attention to the dynamic character of verbs of inaction and verbs of condition and 
quality in Hebrew: “The verbs, especially, whose basic meaning always expresses a 
movement or an activity, reveal the dynamism variety of Hebrew’s thinking. When a 
verb is to express a position like sitting or lying, it is done by a verb which can also 
designate a movement.”304 As for verbs of condition and quality he notes that: “it is 
characteristic of Hebrew and the other Semitic languages that all of these verbs designate 
first of all the ‘becoming’ of the conditions and qualities in question.”305 Based on the 
research of former specialists in Semitic languages, Boman’s account spreads over forty 
pages, giving numerous examples of the way “movement is carried through to a 
standstill, or seen from the other side, standing is viewed as the result of a rising or a 
placing.” He concludes that  
exceedingly great number of stative verbs in Hebrew (as well as in other Semitic 
languages) constitutes fresh evidence for the fact that the Hebrew (and Semitic) mind is 
directed to the dynamic and the active. The relationship of an action to its objects in 
Hebrew experience is apparently not of the same meaning as in our [European] 
                                            
304 Boman provides several translations of biblical Hebrew in which different translators chose 
different alternatives of a single verb, some choosing a static version while others preferring a 
dynamic process-oriented version: וֹלֳהאָ חַתֶפּ שׁיִא וּבְִצּנְו ,םָעָה-לָכּ וּמוָּקי ,לֶֹהאָה-לא הֶֹשׁמ תאֵצְכּ ,ָהיָהְו  as in 
Exodus 33:8: “…all the people rose up (qum), and every man stood (natsbh) at his tent door” as 
opposed to “every man stepped under the door of his tent.” 
305 Op. cit., pp. 27-71. 
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conception; plainly, it is the degree and kind of activity contained in the verb that 
counts.306 
 
In another instance he notes: 
While the Hebraic kind of thinking was in the main dynamic, the kind of thinking 
employed by the Eleatic school of philosophers was not only diametrically opposite but 
contradictorily so. They considered being not only as the essential point, but even more, 
as the only one since they flatly denied the reality of motion and change. Only what is 
immovable and immutable exists…307 
 
Scharfstein stresses the linguistic origins of these different Indo-European and Semitic 
conceptions of being: 
This joining of the existential and copulative functions in the same verb is characteristic 
of Indo-European languages… [which] are said generally to assign the different functions 
to different verbs, or even to ignore one or another function, as if there were no particular 
need to express it. Surely in Semitic languages, such as Hebrew and Arabic, there is no 
verb that combines the two functions. The most equivalent Hebrew verb (hayah) 
expresses meanings such as develop, become, be caused, and exist. It is not used, at least 
not in the present tense, as a mere link or copula. The English sentences, ‘The wind is 
strong’, ‘The house is here’, ‘He is a good man’, ‘This sand is white’, become in a 
Semitic language, ‘The wind (or, The wind it) strong’, ‘The house here’, ‘He good man’, 
‘This sand white’.308 
 
With respect to China, Ames and Rosemont give examples of how dynamism is 
intrinsic to Chinese; they contend that this led to a metaphysics based on process in 
which philosophers are “not concerned with seeking the essence of things – that which 
                                            
306 Ibid. 
307 Ibid., p. 51. 
308 Scharfstein, op. cit., pp. 20-1. 
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remains constant throughout the changes manifest to the senses. On the contrary, they 
seem to have presupposed that the only constant is change itself….” Dynamism, in their 
eyes, is also related to a type of relational understanding of reality that is characteristic of 
both Chinese thought and language: “…the reader should expect to find in classical 
Chinese texts a more relational focus; not a concern to describe how things are in 
themselves, but how they stand in relation to something else at particular times… [a] 
process that requires the language of both “change (bian 變)” and  “persistence ( tong 通 ) ” 
 to capture its dynamic disposition”309 
The dynamic and correlational nature of Chinese thought is reflected in the 
peculiar structure of its classical language: “Imagine a language in which the words are 
unchanging root-words, which cannot be inflected or have prefixes or suffixes….while 
remaining the same, they can assume so many different meanings….the relationships 
between the words, and therefore their meanings, are established very largely by their 
order, which is to say, by their placement either before or after the word or words they 
are related to.”310 The prevalent idea of constant change (sheng sheng bu xi, 生生不息) 
which features in all major philosophical schools in China, is to a great extent reflected in 
the nature of its classical language. This is opposed to the Indo-European foundations of 
Hinduism and early Buddhist thought: 
Some special characteristics of this way of thinking can be found in the Indian usage of 
parts of speech. First, it can be said that the noun (or verbal noun) is more likely to be 
used than the verb in a Sanskrit sentence, because the noun expresses the more stable and 
                                            
309  Ames and Rosemont, op. cit., pp. 22-26. 
310 Scharfstein, op. cit., pp. 22-3. 
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unchanging aspects of the thing. Secondly, the adjective which modifies a noun is used 
much more frequently that the adverbial form which is seldom used in Sanskrit.311 
 
Nakamura explains at length why such linguistic features, as well as others, contribute to 
the Indian propensity towards construing reality in terms of static universals. Such 
characteristics are essentially opposed to the Chinese and Jewish stress on change and the 
particular. Again, in spite of the differences between Sanskrit, Pali and ancient Greek - 
Indo-European languages, as a group, tend to disclose clear structural affinities which 
bias them towards certain possibilities of conceptualizing the world. Linguistic properties 
create certain proclivities that make it easier and more probable for people to cognize 
reality in one way rather than another. The peculiar physiognomy of a language impedes 
or denies the likelihood of certain forms of expression, making it counter-intuitive for 
speakers to articulate reality in ways that may seem natural to speakers of a different 
language. This creates a certain focused range of possibilities of expression, or biases, 
that manifest in thought.  
 Although Bernstein was not concerned with cultures his characterization of the 
distinctions between the restricted and elaborate codes is strikingly reminiscent of 
differences scholar have highlighted between Hebrew and Chinese on the one hand and 
Indo-European languages on the other. Consider his description of the impact of the 
restricted code on perception: “Words and speech sequences refer to broad classes of 
contents rather than to progressive differentiation within a class. The reverse of this is 
also possible; a range of items within a class may be listed without knowledge of the 
                                            
311 Nakamura, op. cit., pp. 60-111. 
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concept which summarizes the class. The categories referred to tend not to be broken 
down systematically.” The lack of differentiation and categorization of family 
resemblances that Bernstein mentions reflects the type of ambiguity that scholars have 
associated with synthetic discourses. He contrasts these linguistic tendencies with the 
elaborate code, which tends to break down categories systematically.312  
 
2.4.5 Specialized Linguistics  
It is well known that both the Greeks and Indians invested much energy in 
investigating the properties of their languages, a trend that was practically absent in the 
Jewish and Chinese experiences:  
Unlike the Greeks and the Indians, the ancient Chinese produced no works on grammar 
or syntax… Even though some Chinese pilgrim monks became acquainted with the 
Indian science of grammar, they did not attempt to establish a parallel science… grammar 
was very important in the history of Indian philosophy, whereas a scientific grammar was 
developed in China only after the impact of Western civilization.313 
 
A.C Graham claims that the lack of inflections that “call attention to word classes and 
sentence structure” meant that Chinese thinkers were “to a considerable extent blind to 
the structure of their own language.” He notes that even the later Mohists, considered by 
many as the most analytical school of Chinese philosophy, began to pay attention to 
distinctions between sentences and strings of words only in very late works. The 
characteristic ambiguity of the Chinese language makes it difficult to parse its exact 
                                            
312 Bernstein, op. cit., p. 134. 
313 Nakamura, op. cit., p. 189. 
  
172 
morphology: “even with resources of Western linguistics it is proving very difficult to 
analyze Classical Chinese syntax.”314 Such facts suggest that there is something about the 
structure and morphology of a language that makes it less susceptible to analysis or less 
likely to pique one’s curiosity to study its inherent structure.315 Merlin Donald agrees 
when he argues that Indians and Greeks focused much of their attention on language as a 
strategy for refining their logical argumentations and philosophical analysis.  
 The question that is of interest is why is it that Indo-European traditions lay a 
stronger stress on the study of grammar? What makes these traditions more inclined to 
methodically investigate the properties of their language? Scharfstein claims that the 
highly inflective nature of Indo-European languages led to a greater interest in one’s 
thought structure. He notes that the presence or absence of word-inflection: 
creates a different attitude towards logic and grammar and, in consequence, a different 
kind of thought-structure. To be more specific, the necessary concern of the Indo-
European languages with grammatical structure helps to create an interest in thought 
structure as such, or, in other words, in the correctness of the form of a statement 
irrespective of its factual content.316  
                                            
314 A.C. Graham, Disputers of the Dao, pp. 390-391. 
315 The Confucian notion of the Rectification of Names (正名 - Zheng Ming) reflects an interest in 
the correlation between one’s official position and one’s actions rather than trying to penetrate the 
structure of language. As in the famous case of “let the lord be a lord; the subject a subject; the 
father a father; the son a son.” The Duke of Qi’s response is: “Excellent! If indeed the lord is not 
a lord, the subject not a subject, the father not a father, the son not a son, I could be sure on 
nothing anymore – not even my daily food.” The predominant concern of Confucius with 
language is therefore related to its manifestations in everyday life and the ability to use it in a 
manner that is conducive to social stability, ethical behavior, and proper governance. Just like the 
Jewish case there is an absence of the analytical study of the structure of language and its relation 
to the thought process. See Analect 12.11: 齊景公問政於孔子. 孔子對日: 君君, 臣臣, 父父, 子
子. 公日: 善哉! 信如君不君, 臣不臣,  父不父, 子不子, 雖有粟, 吾得而食諸? Simon Lays, op. 
cit.,  p. 57. 
316 Scharfstein, Philosophy East/Philosophy West, pp. 26-27. 
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Scharfstein’s description reminds us of the Indo-European stress on formal relations, but 
this time from the perspective of linguistic analysis. The highly inflective nature of 
Sanskrit and ancient Greek almost invites analysis; is does so by virtue of its ability to 
emphasize the fact that change is subject to constant rules. Penetrating the rationale of 
these rules highlight what is changeless in language. The great emphasis the Indo-
Europeans laid on linguistic analysis reflected their understanding that a deeper 
familiarization with grammar and syntax was a potent tool for philosophical inquiry and 
logical argumentation.317 It makes sense that only under the impact of Greek philosophy 
via Islam, did Jewish thinkers begin to attach more importance to grammar and 
linguistics.318 This age led to a sharp increase in works on grammar and language, 
especially among rationalist philosophers.  
                                            
317 The emphasis on linguistics in analytic traditions does not mean language occupied a more 
important position in these cultures; on the contrary, one could argue that the ontological 
centrality of Hebrew in the Jewish worldview is unparalleled, but such importance never led to a 
specialized treatment of grammar as we see it in the Indo-European case. This difference is 
especially interesting if we consider the fact that in the eyes of Hindus, Sanskrit shares a similar 
ontological status to Hebrew; in both cases we are dealing with languages that were frequently 
conceived as divine and a-priori to humans and even creation. Interestingly, the similar normative 
nature of Sanskrit and Hebrew did not lead Jews and Hindus down the same path regarding 
language; this suggests that linguistic commonalities within the Indo-European language group 
(Greek and Sanskrit) were to a certain extent more influential than theological similarities 
(Hebrew and Sanskrit) in determining approaches towards language. The above distinctions are 
not unrelated to Moshe Idel’s discussion of various forms of ‘Ontic Continua,’ where he shows 
that although language is used in describing ontic structures in the Neoplatonic and Neo-
Aristotelian worlds, language as an ontological reality is precluded from the system. In other 
words, language in the Greek case is a tool for verbal explicitness while in Judaism it represents 
the inherent foundations of reality. This is of course a highly “restricted” form of ontology since 
it assumes that the Hebrew language, one that is confined to a specific group, constitutes the core 
of a supposedly universal ontological reality. See Idel’s distinction between linguo-theology and 
linguo-theosophy as opposed to the onto-theology of Neoplatonism and Neo-Aristotelianism in 
Enchanted Chains, esp. pp. 24-25. 
318 Colette Sirat, A History of Jewish Philosophy in the Middle Ages, pp. 212−218. Also see 
Merlin Donald, Origins of the Modern Mind, pp. 344-352. 
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P.T Raju highlights the pervasiveness of the study of language in various Indian 
schools of philosophy: “Sanskrit has its own philosophies, not merely one but many. Of 
them, the philosophy of the Grammarians is the most pertinent….Semantics was from the 
beginning of the systems a part of epistemology, for the word was recognized as a 
distinct means of valid knowledge by almost all the schools…” As opposed to Jewish 
thinkers who believed that the sacred status of Hebrew was to a great extent beyond 
human understanding, for Hindu thinkers “grammar was prescribed as an indispensable 
subsidiary study to the Veda…the philosophy of the grammar must be almost as 
important as the philosophy of Veda and has to support it…Thus, the interest in the 
nature of language, grammar, and semantics was intense from the very beginning.”319 
While both Jewish and Hindu thinkers believed their languages represented the most 
pristine and unadulterated linguistic form, only Hindus focused on the philosophical 
investigation of language, the goal of which was to reach the primordial patterns of 
human cognition. This peculiar understanding of the role of language is a rationalistic 
move par excellence as it postulated a correlation between human cognition and 
metaphycsical reality. Such structure of reality, according to Hindu grammarians, could 
be accessed through the analysis of what they believed to be a “universal, inward 
language common to all men.” The analytic Indo-European mind gravitates towards the 
logos, and in India logos was perceived by many, notably Sankara, as indistinguishable 
from the “higher Brahman.” Language can reveal being and is therefore perceived as one 
of the most imperative fields of inquiry. In fact, in modern terms, many schools of early 
                                            
319 P.T. Raju, “Indian Epistemology and the World and the Individual,” p. 121; see more on the 
importance of grammar in Indian thought in Nakamura, Ways of Thinking, p. 150. 
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Hindu philosophy were radical Whorfians, for them “there is no cognition without a 
corresponding verbal sentence… The individual is ultimately a formation of the Logos 
and can have no separate Being of its own. The world consists of the formations of the 
Logos and is its manifestation.”320  
The term logos, is of Greek origin of course; the fact that it denotes both 
‘language’ and ‘logic’ is a testimony to the intimate relationship these two fields shared 
in the Greek mind. Consequently, both Plato but especially Aristotle dedicated much 
attention to language. The latter constructed systematic theories of logic, rhetoric, 
dialectics, all of which were intimately associated with the structure and essence of 
speech. Like Hindu philosophers, Aristotle demythologized language in a quest to subject 
it to rational investigation. He also provided the first semantic analysis of propositions to 
facilitate his theory of truth as correspondence.321 An additional noteworthy contribution 
was his designation of nouns and verbs as word classes. Again, this interest in the 
structure of language represents an attempt to better understand the nature of cognition 
and being; it was a strategy for the refinement of logic, rhetoric and the art of dialectics. 
Aristotle was acutely aware “of the importance of grammar; not worrying over concepts 
so much, but getting down to the living molecule of thought…” indeed, he was interested 
in “the bear bones of syllogizing.”322  The Greeks were therefore responsible for the first 
systematic strides in the development of Western linguistics, but most importantly they 
                                            
320 Ibid., p. 128. 
321 Aristotle distinguished between the two constituents of propositions, namely, the predicate 
(expressing properties) and the ‘remainder’ of the proposition pointing to the substance to which 
the property is assigned. 
322 E.R Hughes “Epistemological Methods in Chinese Philosophy,” in Moore ed. The Chinese 
Mind, p. 89. 
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were the first Western thinkers to pay attention to the relationship between the formal 
structure of language and ultimate reality, a recognition that made the specialized 
investigation of language an indispensable tool for the advancement of knowledge, both 
epistemic and metaphysical.  
 
2.4.6 Restricted and Elaborate codes and Sociality  
The following section will explore the important social ramifications of the 
restricted and elaborate codes. As I suggested above, the restricted code coincides with 
traditions in which members share long-term and well-established common cultural 
assumptions. Whether such assumptions are shared on a conscious or sub-conscious 
level, they nevertheless function as a powerful medium for cultural cohesion. On a more 
specific level Bernstein notes that the lack of explicitness in the restricted code facilitates 
a communal ethos that strongly inhibits possibilities for individual self-expression. In 
other words, condensed forms of communication, symbolic and ritualistic, lack the 
linguistic explicitness of Indo-European languages and therefore limit possibilities for 
“signaling of individual experience.” Mary Douglas notes that the restricted code 
functions in a way that “every utterance is pressed into service to affirm the social order. 
Speech in this case exercises a solidarity-maintaining function…”323 Appreciating the 
interrelationship between social realities and language helps us understand Bernstein’s 
theory in relation to his positional and personal social models. As Bernstein clearly 
notes, in the restricted code “individuals relate to each other essentially through the social 
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position or status they are occupying…324 the concept of self will tend to be refracted 
through the implications of the status arrangements. Here there is no problem of self, 
because the problem is not relevant.”325 The restricted code is oriented towards 
reinforcing relational dynamics in which social positions are mainly articulated in terms 
of relations rather than positions occupied by individual agents. The communal facets of 
condensed forms of communication are also reflected in the fact that “the perception of 
symbols in general, as well as their interpretation, is socially determined.”326 The 
restricted code is therefore a form of communication that is tailored towards a communal 
ethos in which human relations determine the position of individuals. Such a dynamic is 
precisely what characterizes family-based traditions such as Judaism and Confucianism 
in which extreme forms of agency are subordinated to the interests of the family and 
one's relative position to others. This can be contrasted with the elaborate code in which 
the shift away from ritualism and symbolism is simultaneously representative of a move 
inwards towards the “private internalizing of religious experience.”327 
 The relationship between ritual and language is a point I will discuss in more 
detail in my analysis of Kabbalah and Neo-Confucianism; at this point it is enough to 
suggest the possibility that the different characteristics of Indo-European and non-Indo-
European languages have social ramifications. The gradual Indo-European shift towards 
discursive and explicit strategies of communication was simultaneously conducive to a 
more individualistic mindset. The ability to express onesef more explicitely rather than 
                                            
324 Bernstein, Class, Codes and Control, p. 126. 
325 Ibid., p. 132. 
326 Ibid. 
327 Douglas, Natural Symbols, pp. 7-9. 
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use communally determined symbols opens a space for a cross-cultral dialogue that 
undermines local communal cohesion. Douglas notes that “in its extreme forms anti-
ritualism is an attempt to abolish communication by complex symbolic systems.”328 The 
abolishment of symbolic systems that have a mediating role between individuals is 
slowly replaced in Indo-European languages by a linguistic code “that has the primary 
function of making explicit unique individual perceptions, and bridging initial 
assumptions.”329  
 The similarities between Bernstein’s code theory and the way scholars have 
contrasted Greek thought with Chinese and Hebraic thought is quite extraordinary. The 
relationship between ndo-European languages, theoretical thought, the ability to ‘think 
about thought itself,’ as well as the construction of different forms of cognitive 
individualism, displays an uncanny resemblance to Bernstein’s characterization of the 
elaborate code. Consider the following passage: “an elaborate code user comes to 
perceive language as a set of theoretical possibilities available for the transmission of 
unique experience. The concept of self, unlike the concept of self of a speaker limited to a 
restricted code, will be verbally differentiated, so that it becomes in itself the object of 
special perceptual activity.” Indo-European languages, like the elaborate code bias 
speakers towards a more analytic theoretical discourse that is likely to take place in a less 
coercive social environment. The elaborate code, which I associate with Indo-European 
languages, is also conducive to the construction of forms of spirituality that place the 
individual at the center of religious fulfillment, or what I termed cognitive individualism.  
                                            
328 Ibid., p. 21. 
329 Ibid., p. 24. 
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 Such resemblances seem to support his Durkheimian position that linguistic codes 
emerge as a result of different social environments. Again, it is not my aim to explore 
whether social classifications impact language or vice versa, instead I want to highlight 
the co-dependency and concurrence of morphological features; in this case, language and 
sociality.  
 
2.4.7 Restricted and Elaborate Codes with Respect to Particularism vs. Universalism, 
and This-Worldliness vs. Other-Worldliness.  
In the second chapter, I discussed the Jewish and Chinese stress on commentary 
as a central form of discourse, in this section I will look at some of the linguistic aspects 
of this topic. The complex commentarial traditions that Confucians and rabbis 
constructed are good examples of how the restricted code operates. The condensed and 
culturally specific terminology commentary uses necessitated a close familiarity with a 
large range of background assumptions and central texts. Such characteristics constrain 
possibilities for foreign participation as well as safeguard the authoritative position of 
certain intellectual elites. William Scott Green’s description of the restricted features of 
rabbinic literature gives us a better idea of just how opaque this tradition must have 
seemed to outsiders:  
Rabbinic documents do not introduce or explain themselves to their readers, and they 
provide no easy access for tyros and noninitiates. The literature as a whole, especially its 
halakhic content, presupposes not only considerable information but also codes for 
interpretation. Its terse and formulaic syntactic constructions and its lean and disciplined 
vocabulary constitute a scholastic shorthand. Even the most elementary halakhic 
statement presumes a tacit dimension of rabbinic knowledge, attitudes, behaviors, and 
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motivations. Rabbinic literature virtually ignores the world beyond its own 
preoccupations…. Rabbinic writing addresses rabbinic specialists; it is parochial 
literature wholly obsessed with itself.330   
 
The restricted code is therefore oriented towards preserving a form of exclusivity that is 
extremely difficult to penetrate; this becomes especially apparent if we bear in mind that 
commentarial traditions are founded upon earlier strata of the tradition and therefore 
require constant reference to the past as well as a deep familiarity with a certain process 
of development from past to present. As mentioned earlier, the Chinese commentarial 
tradition’s constant reference to past resources led to a situation in which central 
commentaries on major classics became classics in their own account, leading to the 
formation of commentaries on commentaries. The strategy commentarial traditions use 
for legitimizing innovation is through reference to precedence. New interpretations of 
scripture can be extremely creative but they always point to the past by attributing new 
meanings to ancient terms and verses. This process “magnifies” the semantic field of 
certain terms thereby “condensing” them to include increasing layers of meaning. A 
familiarity with the genealogy of terms is therefore of great importance to the scholar; old 
layers of meaning are rarely jettisoned, instead, they are “stored,” so to speak, in the 
tradition’s memory and can always be reused for future hermeneutical needs. The 
commentarial dialectic between past and present, old and new, creates a certain linguistic 
depth that we can associate with the idea of implicitness typical of the restricted code.  
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The ongoing process of condensing traditional terminology with increasing layers 
of meaning is unlike the philosophical tendency of inventing or manufacturing new 
terminology. Bernstein detected a similar phenomenon in the societies he studied; in 
describing the kind of impact the restricted code has on speakers he claims that “The 
speech is epitomized by a low-level and limiting sentence organization and there is little 
motivation or orientation towards increasing vocabulary.”331 The process of “condensing” 
old terms with ever growing layers of meaning is opposed to the unique ability of 
analytic traditions to manufacture terminology to serve new needs. Nakamura reminds us 
of the wide semantic range of different terms in the Chinese language, an ambiguity that 
“explains why the exegesis of the classics has produced an immense variety of 
interpretations, many of which are directly opposite in sense to others.”332  
In contrast to the restricted code, elaborate or analytic discourses enable an 
accelerated advancement of knowledge by allowing a constant influx of new terms that 
adequately capture changing realities. Such a strategy simultaneously refrains from 
“encumbering” old terms with secondary meaning thereby preserving their relative 
stability and accuracy. This is a form of verbal precision characteristic, and indeed 
necessary, for the construction of efficient, publicly accessible, and pluralistic discourses. 
The type of literary output that emerge in Greek and Buddhist discourses, in spite of their 
great complexity, were far more accessible than the condensed commentarial traditions of 
Confucianism and Judaism. Both the Buddha and Socrates went into great extremes to be 
clear and explicit; the reader is asked to exercise her rational faculties but there is almost 
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no demand to be in command of information or assumptions that are not explicitly stated 
in the text. Although guidance is important, such forms of discourse are not as reliant on 
tutorship as they are on reason. Instead of guarding themselves from outside 
participation, as in the case rabbinic and Confucian discourses, the linguistic code of 
analytic systems is oriented towards transparency and broad participation.  
Edith Hamilton stresses the democratization of knowledge as one of the main 
hallmarks of Greece during the age of the philosophers, but she does not treat the 
linguistic aspects of this accessibility to information.333 I would like to suggest that 
appreciating the function of language in the development of Indo-European systems may 
help us understand why a more universal discourse emerges in some cultures rather than 
others. The Indo-European inclination towards theoretical and disembodied discourses 
can help us better understand why it was more likely for Greco-Christian and Hindu-
Buddhist traditions to develop a-historical cosmological systems that were detached form 
the particular background of a specific group. Universality is also related to explicitness; 
Bernstein notes that when “meanings are made explicit and are conventionalized through 
language, meaning may be called universalistic, whilst if they are implicit and relatively 
less conventionalized through language, meanings can be called particularistic.”334 The 
universalizing effects of the elaborate code can therefore be related to the downplaying of 
                                            
333 Whereas Merlin Donald believes that new linguistic and cognitive capacities made information 
more accessible to the masses, Hamilton focuses of the absence of the “jealous” priesthoods in 
Greece, typical of the old world. She claims that non-Greek cultures such as Egypt disclosed an 
elitist priesthood that obsessively guarded knowledge from the masses: “All they knew must be 
kept jealously within the organization. To teach the people so that they would begin to think for 
themselves, would be to destroy the surest prop of their power.” Edith Hamilton, The Greek Way 
(New York; London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1994), p. 20. 
334 Bernstein, Class, Codes and Control, p. 129. 
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condensed extra-verbal communication. Explicitness means democratization of 
knowledge and transparency, which in turn are conducive to the transportability of ideas 
to various cultural settings.  
Scholar of religion Hans Jonas agrees with this characterization of the Greek 
mode of thinking; he offers an interesting account of the universal aspects of Hellenic 
culture with a special stress on the role its language played in this story. In his influential 
The Gnostic Religion Jonas points our attention to the linguistic contrast between the 
mythical-symbolic character of Judaism and the conceptual language of Greek 
philosophy. Logos, in his view, was the greatest contribution of the Greek tradition to the 
world, and the most unique and innovative characteristic of Hellenistic culture. The 
linguistic qualities of the Greek language were instrumental to the Hellenization of 
strangers, not by force, but through the power of a universally accessible culture. As 
Jonas points out, being Greek meant a certain type of education, language, and cultural 
affinity, rather than a specific ancestral affiliation (restricted code). Greek universalism 
enabled the conquered of the East to become real Greeks through education, without the 
need to prove an ethnic relationship to their rulers. This unique universalism was an 
immense power in drawing foreigners to join and ‘feel at home’ in Greek civilization, 
“where one of the central characteristics of becoming Hellenized was the adoption of the 
Greek language.”335 Both Donald and Jonas agree that the Greek language (and in 
Donald’s case the Indo-European language family) contained the seed of theoretical 
thought; they associate such theoretical tendencies with a universalizable characteristic 
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that was absent in other cultures. It should therefore come as no surprise that both the 
Greek and Indian traditions were largely responsible for the emergence of the world’s 
first two universal religions: Christianity and Buddhism. 
Finally, the restricted and elaborate codes are also oriented towards this-
worldliness and other-worldliness respectively. The capacity to communicate in a 
theoretically sophisticated manner increases the probability towards the construction of 
idealized realities perceived as superior to quotidian life. As we have seen, Indo-
European languages are structurally geared towards the expression of abstractions that in 
turn tend to prioritize mind over matter and therefore look at the body and the world of 
materiality with suspicion. The a-historical cosmologies that the Greco-European and 
Indo-Buddhist traditions constructed were therefore oriented toward a sublime sphere of 
existence. Languages that were not structurally oriented towards the de-contextualization 
of information did not encourage speakers to highlight the typical Indo-European 
distinction between phenomena and noumena.  
Recent scientific experimentation seems to support the view that language directly 
impinges of forms of perception. Linguistic anthropologist Shirley Brice Heath has 
shown that American parents deliberately decontextualize language in their 
communication with children, this tendency is reflected by the Indo-European stress on 
nouns as well as its “subject-prominence” as opposed to the Asian “topic-prominence.”336 
As Richard Nisbett notes, the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is “currently undergoing one of its 
periods of greater acceptance;” Nisbett argues that “there are in fact a remarkable number 
                                            
336 Heathe B. Shirley. “What no bedtime story means: Narrative skills at home and school.” 
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of parallels between cognitive differences and differences between Indo-European 
languages and East Asian languages.337  
 
2.4.8 Restricted Code and Ritual  
I titled this chapter “Strategies of Meaning: Communication and Language” 
because the notion of language fails to exhaust the wide range of available strategies of 
communication. Implicit forms of communication, or what Bernstein calls para-verbal 
communication can consist of local gestures, tones and pitches of speech, and most 
importantly to our discussion ritual. These non-verbal channels of communication 
represent ‘compact’ or ‘dense’ strategies of meaning that can be seen as forms of 
restricted code. Many scholars have highlighted ritual as a method for creating cultural 
boundaries; J.Z. Smith, for instance, argues that ritual is above all the assertion of 
differences.338 The Chinese were very much aware of this function, The Classic of Ritual 
(禮記 )  states that “similarity and union are the aim of music; difference and distinction, 
that of ceremony.”339 Thinking about ritual in terms of Bernstein’s code theory helps us 
appreciate different strategies of communication and the relationship of such strategies to 
different languages, especially the distinction I have called ‘Indo-European and the rest.’ 
Ritual does not necessitate complicated discursive abilities; instead it relies on bodily 
                                            
337 Richard Nisbett, The Geography of Thought, pp. 159-163; 156. See also Nesbett, Richard E., Ji 
Li-Jun, and Zhang Zhiyong, “Is it Culture of is it Language? Examination of Language Effects in 
Cross-Cultural Research on Categorization,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 87, 
no. 1 (2004): 57-65. 
338 J.Z. Smith, To Take Place: Toward Theory in Ritual (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1987), p. 109. 
339 The Classic of Ritual (19:10): 樂者為同, 禮者為異. James Legge trans. The Li Ki (The Book 
of Rites) Sacred Books of the East, vol. 27. 1885. 
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performance and fairly simple and repetitive linguistic injunctions.340 Whereas taking part 
in the Chinese and Jewish commentarial traditions meant being part of an intellectual 
elite, ritual was a highly accessible and rudimentary strategy for the construction of 
identity among common people. As Roy Rappaport argues, ritual enables members to 
repetitively communicate and affirm their group affiliation.341 In other words, both the 
intellectual and ritualistic forms of communication that rabbis and Confucians devised 
were oriented towards safeguarding in-group boundaries. Just as “rabbinic discourse 
shields itself from intellectual penetration by others,”342 so does ritual play a similar role 
on a more popular level as an efficient transmitter of cultural DNA. 343 The transmission 
of culture through the medium of ritual emerges in traditions that are under relatively 
tight social control.344 Therefore ,  ritual  as a strategy for cultural transmission is much less 
likely to be applied by universal traditions with proselytizing ambitions .  Consider 
Hellenic culture as it spread throughout the old world ,  Christianity‘s dissemination in 
Europe, or Buddhism as it spread from India eastwards ; these  traditions downplayed 
ritualism in favor of strategies of communication  that were more discursive and 
                                            
340 Rappaport referred to such simple injunctions as Ultimate Sacred Postulates, e.g. “Hear O 
Israel the Lord your God the Lord is one.”  
341 Rappaport, Ritual and Religion in the Making of Humanity, chs. 3-4 pp. 23-106, especially 
chapter 4, pp. 69-106. 
342 Arthur Green, “Religion and Mysticism: The Case of Judaism,” in Neusner ed., Take Judaism, 
for Example, p. 39. Full quote: “The content of rabbinic documents virtually certifies that they 
were produced for an internal audience. They are of rabbis, by rabbis and for rabbis; they 
constitute a rabbinic conception of rabbinic culture, composed for itself and addressed to itself 
…Rabbinic discourse shields itself from intellectual penetration by others; it is the work of a 
group bounded bad set apart.” 
343 This is what Mary Douglas points to when she observes that applying Bernstein’s approach to 
the analysis of ritual can “help us to understand religious behavior if we can treat ritual forms, 
like speech forms, as transmitters of culture.” Douglas, Natural Symbols, p. 23. 
344 Mary Douglas  contends that when a  “social group grips its members in tight communal bonds , 
 the religion is ritualistic ;  when this grip is relaxed ,  ritualism declines .” Ibid., p. 14. 
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universally applicable .  Ritual ,  by all means ,  remained an  important component of 
universal systems ,  but instead of functioning as a medium  for  cultural and social 
 distinctions, it took on a more spiritualized role that did not inhibit the inclusion of new 
convert from various cultural backgrounds.  
In conclusion, the Chinese and Jewish traditions, which I argue conform to the 
synthetic mode of operation are more inclined to resort to restricted forms of 
communication, both linguistic and ritualistic. In language this is reflected in dense 
symbolism and terminology that is local, relatively ambiguous, and multi-layered. The 
restricted code is an extremely efficient tool in safeguarding and consolidating forms of 
particularism by which a tradition can highlight cultural boundaries through the 
application of a linguistic shorthand inaccessible to foreigners. The use of restricted 
codes enhances social solidarity at the expense of the verbal elaboration of individual 
experience.345 The same setting of boundaries is applicable to ritualistic behavior. Ritual 
can be seen as a restricted code taken to the extreme, such that language is reduced to 
central religious propositions and non-verbal communication enacted through the 
medium of the body. This becomes central in signaling the acceptance of social 
conventions and the ongoing affirmation of one’s membership in a community. 
Therefore, while analytic, Indo-European traditions overwhelmingly relied on elaborate 
forms of communication, abstractions, conceptualism, theory, and allegory; synthetic 
traditions resorted to various forms of a restricted code such as metaphor, association, 
multi-layered terminology, and ritual.    
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2.5 CONCLUSION: TRADITIONS IN HOMEOSTASIS   
  In this chapter I established the central distinction between the synthetic and 
analytic morphological modalities during a period stability, or homeostasis. The main 
goal was to demonstrate that the Jewish and Chinese traditions, in their classical phase, 
were both operating according to synthetic modes of operation in contradistinction to the 
foreign analytic traditions with which they came into conflict. I suggest that the 
distinctions between the two modalities consist of three rudimentary layers that can be 
roughly divided to the cognitive, social, and cultural. Not only do these levels interact 
symbiotically, but also each level is itself composed of a range of reinforcing 
morphological features. There exists a continuous synergetic relationship between these 
various constituents such that it is impossible, indeed misleading, to use reductionistic 
approaches or a causative hermeneutic to understand their emergence. Each modality 
displays an internal consistency in which its general structural characteristics and the 
totality of sensibilities that guide it, coalesce into a highly resilient and self-validating 
cultural system. Such inner coherence lent synthetic and analytic axial cultures their 
undeniable robustness and ability to persevere through the centuries.  
An additional point to consider is that the internal symbiotic nature of cultural 
systems means they will rarely disclose a combination of synthetic and analytic 
characteristics. Systems self-organize into clusters of commensurable components that 
are destabilized by traits that are foreign to their internal logic. As an example, consider 
the synergetic relationship within the analytic modality; the atomization of data, social 
autonomy, introspective techniques practiced in seclusion, the distinction between matter 
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and spirit, asceticism, other-worldly perspectives, and universalism are all interrelated in 
various ways. Lets assume that such a cluster of interlocking analytic traits were to 
interact with synthetic features such as a restricted linguistic code and ritualism. The 
dissonance becomes fairly obvious: a restricted code denies external participation which 
conflicts with the universalism of analytic traditions, it also impedes the type of self-
expression conducive for individual forms of spirituality. Similarly, dense ritualism and 
the reliance on embodied forms of religious behavior will conflict with the introspective, 
world-negating, and mentalistic tendencies of analytic traditions. Numerous other 
examples can be used to show the discrepancies between analytic and synthetic 
temperaments, the point being that such internal conflicts will radically reduce the long-
term resilience of a cultural system. Traditions tend to gravitate and spontaneously self-
organize into coherent, self-enforcing, and self-validating matrices such that anomalous, 
social, or cognitive dispositions will not be likely to persist. The self-organization of 
components is never linear but rather multi-faceted; each morphological component 
reinforces, and is reinforced by several other components, which self organize into a 
coherent whole that works adaptively in relation to shifting historical and environmental 
circumstances. In order to better understand the fascinating internal dynamic of cultural 
systems in relation to their environments, in the following third and fourth chapters I will 
look at the emergence of Kabbalah and Neo-Confucianism in a historical context. This 
will help us revisit the topic of adaptive systems with more historical nuance in the 
concluding fifth chapter.  
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CHAPTER 3 
TRADITIONS IN MORPHOGENESIS – KABBALAH 
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3.1 PERIODS OF CRISIS: FROM HOMEOSTASIS TO MORPHOGENESIS  
The following two chapters will focus on a more specific historical period in 
Jewish and Chinese history. As opposed to my general examination of the Chinese and 
Jewish traditions as they functioned in relative stability prior to the emergence of 
Kabbalah and Neo-Confucianism, here I will look at the specific historical events that 
took place between the ninth and twelfth centuries in the Confucian case, and between 
the tenth and thirteenth centuries in the case of the Jewish tradition. My central claim is 
that during this period the Confucian and rabbinic paradigms were destabilized by similar 
factors, leading to a profound cultural crisis in both traditions. My goal is not only to 
support my argument regarding the analytic/synthetic clash with historical data, but more 
importantly, to show how the morphological approach can shed light on these historical 
events, helping us understand the Neo-Confucian and Kabbalistic phenomena from the 
more broad perspective of self-adaptive and self-organizing cultural systems.  
This story can be told using Thomas Kuhn’s approach to the structure of scientific 
revolutions. I use Kuhn's theory more than metaphorically; I believe, in agreement with 
Hans Kung, Ian Barbour and others, that religious revolutions disclose many of the same 
dynamics that Kuhn detected in scientific revolutions.346 Before going into further detail 
                                            
346 Ian Barbour, in his Myths, Models and Paradigms; the Nature of Scientific and Religious 
Language (London: S.C.M. Press, 1974), and Religion and Science: Historical and 
Contemporary Issues (New York: Harper One, 1997) was one of the first scholars to look at the 
possible links between scientific and religious revolution using Kuhnian concepts. Similarly, in 
Theology for the Third Millennium (New York: Doubleday, 1988) the theologian Hans Kung 
analyzed the evolution of the Christian tradition through a Kuhnian lens thereby providing an 
important foundation for the application of Kuhn’s ideas to religious communities. Other 
adaptations of Kuhn’s philosophy of science as it was reiterated and modified by Imre Lakatos’ 
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there is a crucial question that begs an answer. Since it is clear that cultures constantly 
react to, and interact with their environments, what makes the Neo-Confucian and 
Kabbalistic phenomena a full-fledged revolution rather than mere change? I will try to 
answer this question in terms of information theory. I already argued that the most 
fundamental characteristic that deems a tradition a self-contained ‘unit,’ is its unique 
textual orientation or common informational foundation. In the case of cultural systems 
both whole (Judaism and Confucianism) as well as sub-traditions such as Kabbalah and 
Neo-Confucianism, this informational aspect is most clearly represented by a group’s 
authoritative textual nexus. Consequently, I will argue that the rapid and abrupt shift in 
the textual orientations of the Jewish and Chinese traditions during the period under 
examination deems the Neo-Confucian and Kabbalistic phenomena distinct from 
ordinary change. In both cases, we witness a radical—and in historical terms—swift 
over-haul of the classical canons. Considering the magnitude of these changes, the degree 
to which Neo-Confucianism and Kabbalah were accepted in their respective traditions is 
baffling.347 The Zohar established itself as one of the three pillars of the Jewish tradition 
alongside the Bible and the Talmud. The Chinese case is just as astounding; the Neo-
Confucians led to a textual reorientation in which the venerable Five Classics, were 
surpassed by the newly edited and commented upon Four Books, which eventually 
became the new foundations for the imperial examination system. It is form this 
                                                                                                                                  
were applied to religion by Nancey Murphy in her Theology in the Age of Scientific Reasoning 
(Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 1990).  
347 In both traditions, opposition is apparent and real but substantially overshadowed by a general 
acceptance of a new textual reality, which led to the eventual canonization of the Zohar and the 
Four Books (with Zhu Xi’s commentary). 
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textual/informational prism, so I believe, that the revolutionary and transformative nature 
of Neo-Confucianism and Kabbalah becomes most apparent. Never before and never 
again have such extreme textual revolutions occurred in the midst of the rabbinic and 
Confucian traditions. 
The period of crisis I will explore in the following pages is one in which both 
traditions were confronted with a growing number of anomalies. As opposed to 
inconsistencies that could normally be brushed aside or dealt with by commentary, 
Kuhnian periods of crisis are characterized by a large host of incongruities that can no 
longer be ignored.348 Such were the historical conditions that foreshadowed the 
emergence of Neo-Confucianism and Kabbalah. This distinct moment in Jewish and 
Chinese history opened the gates for a more pluralistic and polemical cultural dialogue. 
Indeed, one of the central indications of periods of crisis is the spontaneous proliferation 
of contending schools of thought seeking solutions for the growing irrelevance of their 
traditions in face of external pressures. As in science, such periods are characterized by 
the audaciousness and range of solutions that are offered by contending voices. The 
period that led to the ascendency of theurgic Kabbalah and the Neo-Confucian School of 
Principle is a fascinating example of this type of cultural fermentation and intellectual 
heterogeneity. As in science, the victorious Kabbalistic and Neo-Confucian worldviews 
managed to attract the largest number of followers and become the leading candidates for 
the establishment of a new cultural paradigm. Not all contending schools had a similar 
                                            
348 Kuhn claimed that ‘normal science’ suppresses novelties when they are subversive to its basic 
commitments. Scientific Revolutions, p. 5. 
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fate; those that did not manage to attract followers, authoritative support, or intentionally 
remained confined to small circles were marginalized or perished.    
As I will try to demonstrate, the changes that swept over the Chinese and Jewish 
worlds were not confined to the domain of ideas, they must be understood in the broader 
context of substantially new social, demographic, economic and technological realities. 
Of particular importance was the emergence of new and more sophisticated cultural elites 
that had unprecedented access to education and knowledge. This is a situation in which 
old elites were no longer the only articulators of their tradition’s present and future 
agendas. Scholars have not been oblivious to the role played by new elites in the 
emergence of new cultural paradigms. In the Jewish case Moshe Idel, Hartely Lachter, 
and Bernard Septimus have pointed out the emergence of new elites during the period in 
which Kabbalah and philosophy rose to prominence.349 In China, Peter Bol, Dieter Kuhn, 
and others have shown that the collapse of the Tang aristocracy and the rise of the literati 
class was one of the central reasons behind the Neo-Confucian revolution. This is not a 
surprise if we look back at other large-scale cultural revolutions. As an example, one of 
the most powerful explanatory frameworks for the emergence of axial age traditions has 
been related to the crystallization of new intellectual elites. Bruno Snell, for instance 
contends that the emergence of philosophy as a replacement, or addition to mythological 
tradition reflects a transition from the Homeric age of ‘nobles’ to the rise of the 
                                            
349 Idel, “The Kabbalah ‘Window of Opportunities’, 1270-1290.” In Ezra Fleischer et al. ed., 
Me’ah She’arim; Studies in Medieval Jewish Spiritual Life, in Memory of Isadore Twersky 
(Jerusalem: Magnes, 2001). 
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philosophically inclined commoners.350 Scholars have pointed our attention to similar 
social transitions that instigated, or at the very least accommodated, the emergence of 
other axial-traditions.351 I will discuss these topics with greater detail in what follows, for 
now I will only note that our understanding of the Neo-Confucian and Kabbalistic 
revolutions should not be confined to the history of ideas; the rise of new elites, 
technological breakthroughs, and economic changes were all intimately related to the 
historical changes that this study sets to examine. I will especially try to stress the 
relationship of these factors to information, the way it was accessed, stored, and 
transmitted by cultural systems in transition.  
In the following pages I will argue that behind the substantial phenotypic 
differences that characterize the Confucian and rabbinic traditions, we can detect cultural 
systems that disclose similar structural dynamics. In their classical manifestations prior to 
the emergence of Kabbalah and Neo-Confucianism these two traditions generally 
conform to a synthetic physiognomy – this represents a phase in which both 
Confucianism and rabbinical Judaism consolidate themselves as stable homeostatic 
cultural systems. The period dealt with in this section attempts to look at how such 
systems were perturbed and destabilized, leading to their shift towards a prolonged 
adaptive phase of morphogenesis and adaptation. Once the process of responding to the 
destabilizing effects of the analytical modality was completed, reflected by the 
ascendency of Kabbalah and Neo-Confucianism, we witness a return to a new phase of 
                                            
350 Thorleif Boman, Hebrew Thought Compared With Greek (London: SCM Press, 1960), p. 22 
n.4. see also Bruno Snell, The Discovery of the Mind: In Greek Philosophy and Literature (New 
York: Dover, 1982), pp. 1-22. 
351 Especially in Eisenstadt, The Origins and Diversity of Axial Age Civilizations. 
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homeostasis and relative stability. It is in this sense that I will refer to Kabbalah and Neo-
Confucianism as ‘defense theologies;’ I treat these schools as adaptive mechanism that 
complex cultural systems are able to launch at time of crisis in order to protect their 
traditional ways of life. In what follows I will try to show how the Chinese and Jewish 
worlds went through this process of adaptation and reformulation. I will discuss the 
Jewish and Chinese cases separately beginning with the story of Kabbalah.  
 
3.2 JUDAISM AND THE EMERGENCE OF KABBALAH   
In order to understand Kabbalah from a morphological perspective, the central 
development I will try to highlight in the Jewish medieval story is the intensification of 
rationalist philosophical tendencies, beginning with Saadia Gaon’s (892-942 CE) 
qualified Kalamic rationalism and reaching maturity with Maimonides’ (1138-1204 CE) 
more controversial Aristotelianism.352 It is during the approximately two centuries 
between Saadia and Maimonides that we can trace how the Greek worldview managed to 
make inroads into the Jewish tradition. Being the two most influential philosophers in the 
medieval period, Saadia and Maimonides conveniently frame the two centuries between 
the birth of medieval Jewish philosophy and its culmination in the Maimonidean 
controversies during the first third of the thirteenth century. I will demonstrate how Greek 
thought led to the formation of a Jewish rational tradition characterized by many of the 
                                            
352 Sarah Stroumsa, “Saadya and Jewish Kalam,” pp. 72-75. Kalam was attacked by philosophers 
as too theological and by conservatives as to rationalistic, thereby representing an initial middle 
ground between these two camps. Maimonides criticized Kalam as an aberration in which 
philosophical techniques are harnessed for the defense of religion. Instead of building one’s 
beliefs on rationality and science, Kalamists bent facts to fit their religious convictions. 
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morphological characteristics of analytic traditions, and then proceed to show how 
mystics began to counter philosophy using anti-rationalist methodologies which enabled 
them both to address the same set of questions raised by philosophers as well as provide 
creative solutions that were more congenial to the synthetic mindset. The timeframe 
under scrutiny will begin in the 930’s with Saadia’s philosophical work and ends with the 
victory of the school of theurgic Kabbalah and the appearance of the Zohar towards the 
end of thirteenth century.353   
 
3.2.1 The Rise of Philosophy 
The first signs of change in the Jewish world can be traced back to the Geonic 
period, especially the tenth century with the appearance of the first Jewish philosophers. 
This watershed moment, which eventually gave rise to diverse forms of contending 
intellectual currents within Judaism, took place at a time of unprecedented prosperity, 
flourishing of the arts and sciences, and the increasingly expanding geographical borders 
of the Muslim world. It is almost impossible to overemphasize the cultural implications 
of the first translations of Aristotelian or Neoplatonized Aristotelian philosophy into 
Arabic. It is probably not a coincidence however, that the crisis in Judaism that this study 
attempts to reconstruct, can be traced to the thought of Saadia Gaon who worked at the 
same time and place these translations first appeared.354 It is important to stress the kind 
                                            
353 By Saadia’s philosophical work I am mainly referring to his commentary on the Book of 
Creation, and his magnum opus The Book of Beliefs and Opinions (תועדהו תונומאה רפס) between 
931-933CE. 
354 The Geonic era refers to a period between the seventh and eleventh centuries in Babylonia. 
The Geonim were the leaders of the Rabbinical colleges of Sura and Pumbetida. The “Translation 
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of urgency and sense of crisis that propelled central Jewish authorities such as Saadia to 
embark on the daunting task of reinterpreting Judaism. Generally speaking, Jews were 
experiencing an escalating sense of dissonance between their traditional worldviews and 
the rapidly changing reality they were living in. The new methods promoted by Muslim 
philosophers created a sense of confusion among rabbis who were becoming aware of the 
inevitability of confronting the dilemmas posed by rational philosophy.  
Although philosophy was mainly an elitist occupation, it would be a mistake to 
assume that only highbrow intellectuals were aware of the new winds of change that were 
blowing their way. In other words, while philosophy as a specialized field of inquiry was 
confined to fairly small groups of progressives, the impact of an increasingly rationalist 
mindset went far beyond these groups and could be discerned in diverse domains of 
human activity such as commerce, science, the arts, and politics.355 The unprecedented 
prosperity and cultural confidence that marked the Muslim golden age was certainly part 
of the favorable reception of rational thought and the willingness of Muslims to subject 
their system of belief to the scrutiny of reason. As in the case of Hellenism more than a 
millennium earlier, this new rational mindset, with its universalistic thrust was conducive 
to the expansion of Muslim culture and religion beyond its native geographical borders. 
Indeed, as I will argue, the analytic mode of operation is a potent tool for cultural 
                                                                                                                                  
Movement” refers to a period approx. between 800 -1150, a time when Arab intellectuals were 
actively searching to translate Greek philosophical works. 
355 The Islamic golden age began with the ascension of the Abbasid Caliphate (mid-eighth 
century) where the Geonim operated. Toby Huff notes that "In virtually every field of endeavor—
in astronomy, alchemy, mathematics, medicine, optics and so forth—Arab scientists were in the 
forefront of scientific advance.” See Huff, The Rise of Early Modern Science: Islam, China, and 
the West (Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 48. 
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expansion and therefore in conformity with the interests of powerful empires. In Judaism, 
new rationalist tendencies were highly compatible with the prosperous and cosmopolitan 
Jewish elites that were in close contact with the ruling Muslim aristocracy in Bagdad and 
later in Spain, and yet later in Spain and France under Christian rule.356 But the 
seductiveness of rationalism and its corrosive effects upon orthodox narratives proved to 
be a double edged sword, one that was meant to strengthen Judaism but ended up 
dangerously threatening it. Before looking at the cognitive, social, and cultural levels, I 
will dedicate the following section to an examination of the political and socio-economic 
conditions that led to the cultural crisis Judaism faced.  
The ascendency of the Abbasid Caliphate represented the beginning of a glorious 
era of cultural self-assurance in which “the Muslim world became an intellectual center 
for science, philosophy, medicine and education as the Abbasids championed the cause of 
knowledge and established the House of Wisdom in Baghdad; where both Muslim and 
non-Muslim scholars sought to translate and gather all the world's knowledge into 
Arabic.”357 This monumental translation project is a typical example of how the 
systematic transmission of information from one cultural medium to another can function 
as a catalyst for profound cultural change. Technological progress is yet another 
important feature to consider. Owing to the establishment of the first paper 
manufacturing plant in Bagdad in 794 “literary creativity was stimulated to an 
                                            
356 Yehuda Liebes, “Judaism and Myth,” in Liebes, Studies in Jewish Myth and Jewish 
Messianism (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), pp. 22-23. 
357 Vartan Gregorian, Islam: A Mosaic, Not a Monolith (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution 
Press, 2003), pp. 26–38. 
  
200 
unprecedented degree.”358 Together with specialized translations, such technological 
advances represent important channels for the efficient transmission of information. The 
increase in literacy was certainly another important factor that contributed to the growing 
circulation of information, both in terms of people who could read written manuscripts as 
well as those who could reproduce manuscripts by copying them. Such shifts were all 
related to the radical socio-economic changes of the age. One substantial change in 
Judaism that I would like to highlight was the shift from a communal Talmudic discourse 
to the proliferation of monographs. I will explore this change in the section dedicated to 
the social level; for now it is worth noting that changes in formats of transmission reflect 
greater social mobility and the rise of a more individualistic ethos. Moshe Idel describes 
this as the “de-institutionalization of the regular mechanisms of transmitting and 
preserving traditional knowledge,”359 a phenomenon he associates with the decline in 
power of traditional elites and the rise of alternative ones. Although Idel focuses on the 
end of thirteenth century Spain, I will suggest that social and cultural changes in the tenth 
century already point to the rise of a new class of intellectuals that introduced modes of 
transmission that were destined to intensify during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.  
As mentioned, the new cultural dispositions of the age permeated society in 
pervasive ways that went far beyond the domain of the philosophical ivory tower. Signs 
of crisis were not confined to distinguished leaders of the Jewish community; rabbis 
began to sense a widespread dissatisfaction and confusion among common believers. 
                                            
358 Salo W. Baron, A Social and Religious History of the Jews. Vol. 1 (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1952), p. 355. 
359 Moshe Idel, “The Kabbalah ‘Window of Opportunities,” p. 180. See also Idel, “Kabbalah and 
Elites in Thirteenth-Century Spain.” Mediterranean Historical Review 9 (1994): 5-19. 
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‘Confusion’, ‘perplexity’, ‘uncertainty’ were terms frequently used by thinkers from 
Saadia onwards as euphemisms for a profound religious and cultural crisis. In The Book 
of Beliefs and Opinions Saadia writes:  
For I saw in this age of mine many believers whose belief was not pure and whose 
convictions were not sound, whilst many of the deniers of the faith boasted of their 
corruption and looked down upon the devotees of the truth although they were 
themselves in error. I saw, furthermore, men who were sunk, as it were, in seas of doubt 
and overwhelmed by waves of confusion and there was no diver to bring them up from 
the depths nor a swimmer who might take hold of their hands and carry them ashore...360 
 
As Saadia suggests, the essence of this crisis was reflected in a new skepticism and 
decline of belief. Indeed, one of the central features of analytic thought is its ability to 
encourage suspicion towards conventional systems with normative claims.361 Saadia’s 
words reflect a period in which an increasingly secularized population looks down upon 
the dogmatism of devotees who followed old cultural conventions.  
                                            
360 Saadia Gaon, The Book of Beliefs and Opinions, Samuel Rosenblatt tr., (New Haven: Yale 
Univ. Press, 1948), pp. 6-7; David Blumenthal, “Religion and the Religious Intellectuals: The 
Case of Judaism in Medieval Times.” in Jacob Neusner Take Judaism for Example, p. 123. In 
another instace Saadia writes: “What has prompted me to speak explicitly about this matter is my 
observation of the state of many people in regard to their beliefs and convictions…. my heart was 
grieved for my species, the species of rational beings, and my soul was stirred on account of our 
people, the children of Israel.” Ibid. 
361 See more on suspicion and rationalism in Ernest Gellner, Reason and Culture: The Historic 
Role of Rationality and Rationalism (Oxford UK; Cambridge Mass.: Blackwell, 1992). Such 
suspicion towards traditional values is beautifully captured in the way Plato’s philosopher-king 
challenges traditional assumptions in The Republic: “They will take the city and the characters of 
men, as they might a tablet, and first wipe it clean – no easy task. But at any rate you know that 
this would be their first point of difference from ordinary reformers, that they would refuse to 
take in hand either individual or state or to legislate before they either received a clean slate or 
themselves make it clean.” Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns ed., The Collected Dialogues 
of Plato (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993). Plato’s Republic book vi. p. 736. 
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It was during the Geonic era, and specifically during the lifetime of Saadia, that 
we witness the emergence of Jewish philosophy as a dominant cultural force, a trend that 
gradually escalated and was seen by many as a real threat to the Jewish tradition. Like 
Philo centuries earlier, Saadia’s goal was to show that Greek philosophy was compatible 
with Judaism.362 But, as opposed to Philo, whose influence was almost exclusively 
confined to the Christian world,363 Saadia had an immense impact on the Jewish 
Babylonian community, and very soon afterwards, on the Jewish world at large; 
especially in the Iberian Peninsula and Germany.364 As we shall see, the evolution of 
rationalism in Judaism was carried by what came to be known as the Geonic-Andalusian 
tradition. Bernard Septimus notes that for many Jews, this developmental trajectory 
represented a real awareness of a coherent cultural thread that extended form Babylon 
through north Africa, to Andalusia in Spain. This lineage can be seen as unified cultural 
current, a rational lineage that began with Saadia and culminates with Maimonides.365  
                                            
362 It is customary to present Saadia Gaon as the first Jewish philosopher in spite of the fact that 
he was preceded by Isaac Israeli and al-Muqammas. Sarah Stroumsa argues that as opposed to the 
latter two thinkers it is only with Saadia that this strand of thought reaches a level of maturity that 
merits the title philosophy. See Stroumsa op. cit. 
363 Philo represented one of the first attempt to introduce Greek methodologies and content into 
Judaism but his work was mainly influential on Christian thought rather than on Jewish thinkers. 
David Shatz contends that “The founding of a systematic Jewish figurative interpretation of 
Scripture is usually credited to Philo of Alexandria (c 20 BCE-50 CE). Philo understood the 
Bible, particularly Genesis, as Greek philosophers troubled by Homer’s gods understood Homer: 
as an allegory to be construed via the principles of Hellenistic thought, in his case middle Platonic 
thought in particular” See Shatz, “The Biblical and Rabbinic Background to Medieval Hewish 
philosophy’” in Cambridge Companion, p. 26. 
364 For more on Saadia’s influence on Eliezar of Worms see Scholem, Ha’Kabala Bi Provence 
(Jerusalem: Academon, 1975), p. 153. 
365 Bernard Septimus, Hispano-Jewish Culture in Transition: The Career and Controversies of 
Ramah (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), p. 88. 
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The eruption of new mystical doctrines as a reaction to these new rational trends 
can be better understood if we come to appreciate the extent to which philosophy 
departed form anything that preceded it in classical Judaism. The Geonic period was the 
first time that Greek methodologies were adopted by towering rabbinic authorities on an 
unprecedented scale. David Shatz contends that in spite of the fact that Jewish rationalists 
often dealt with themes taken from rabbinic discourse, “a frequent noted feature of 
medieval Jewish philosophy is its prima facie lack of continuity with biblical and 
rabbinic Judaism…. the philosophical views advocated by the medieval philosophers 
entered Judaism via contact between Jews and other cultures…. The resultant views, 
however, do not seem to be characteristic of either biblical or rabbinic thought.”366 The 
sudden introduction of a drastically new form of cultural discourse into Judaism had far 
reaching ramifications; suspicion towards old cultural conventions advanced through an 
extremely powerful, systematic and analytic procedure, forced Jews into a predicament. 
Said differently, if the Bible tells Jews what to do, and the Talmud tells them how to do 
it, rationalism demanded an answer to a much more disturbing question, namely, why 
should we do it in the first place? Why should we follow the commandments? Why is 
Judaism preferable to Islam, Christianity, and different forms of Greek philosophy? For 
the first time people were expecting reasoned and well-structured arguments for why 
Judaism was a valid system of belief. The irony of the matter is that while committed 
                                            
366 Shatz, “The Biblical and Rabbinic Background,” pp. 17-18. In spite of the clear discontinuity 
between classical Judaism and philosophy, Jewish philosophers were adamant in claiming a 
continuity with the past. Some of them argued that the original character of Judaism was lost as a 
result of ongoing persecutions. There were also radical conservatives, such as Shem Tov ibn 
Falaquera and to a certain extent Halevi, who advanced absurd theories about the Greek stealing 
philosophy form the Jews. Ibid., p. 18-19. 
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Jewish rabbis such as Saadia and Maimonides were trying to equip Judaism with answers 
to these disturbing questions, their agreement to play according to the foreign rules of 
Greek rationalism was implicitly undermining some of the most fundamental 
assumptions and ultimate concerns of the Jewish way of life. Kabbalah can be seen as a 
native counter ideology that sought to protect those ultimate concerns. The morphological 
approach attempts to analyze this historical dynamic in a comprehensive way, one that 
integrates both the historical background and the cognitive, social, and cultural aspects of 
this story. Understanding Kabbalah as a defense theology can also help us appreciate why 
its radical departure form rabbinical Judaism was accepted with so little resistance and 
why Kabbalistic theology took the specific shape that it did.  
   
3.2.2 The Talmudic Crisis 
 One of the central developments that led Jewish authorities to acknowledge the 
inevitability of reform was the general sense that the Talmud, the encapsulation of the 
Jewish worldview, was incapable of responding to the new dilemmas of the age. A more 
concrete sign of this decline was reflected by the escalating attacks against the Talmud 
that came from several different sources. In the initial Geonic phase, “critics of rabbinic 
Judaism – from Karaites, to Christians and Moslem polemicists, to skeptical thinkers 
from within – assailed rabbinic thought as absurd.”367 The criticism of the Talmudic 
paradigm was not confined to the Geonic phase of our story; the ever-growing prosperity 
and expansion of Islam into the Iberian Peninsula in the following two centuries led to a 
                                            
367 Ibid., pp. 30-31. 
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further weakening of the Talmud’s stature. Changing attitudes towards traditional 
knowledge were also reflected in skepticism towards the aggadic portions of the Talmud. 
The aggadah was inclined towards fanciful story telling, seen by many as an intellectual 
embarrassment, especially in regards to its anthropomorphic and anthropopathic 
characterization of God. As a result, aggadah was marginalized and treated by many as a 
non-literal and non-binding pedagogic device.368   
An escalation in voices advocating a broader intellectual program reached a 
climax during the highly progressive Andalusian period. So strong were the rationalist 
tendencies of the time, and so neglected the study of traditional themes, that some have 
referred to it as the “dark age of Spanish halakah.”369 Septimus argues that the state of 
Talmudic studies reached an all time low in southern Spain, where people preferred to 
circumvent the cumbersome intricacies of Talmudic rulings by turning to the more 
accessible and abridged Halakhot (rulings) of Rabbi Alfasi (1013-1103), also known as 
the “Little Talmud.” At a later stage, Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah was another step in 
the same direction, representing a further escalation in the simplification of Jewish law, 
and the decline of the Talmud as an exclusive form of discourse.370 In fact, this process of 
making Jewish law more accessible can be traced back to Saadia, who realized that 
                                            
368 Septimus, Hispano-Jewish Culture, p. 77. As Septimus notes for the French Tosafists 
disagreeing with an aggadah of a Tamudic sage was perceived as heresy. 
369 Ibid., pp. 20-23. Septimus is referring to aprrox. 1150 and 1200 CE. 
370 The trend of simplification and the greater accessibility of Jewish lore can be detected as early 
as Saadia who omitted references to authorities in his discussion of laws of worship, realizing that 
his audience was composed of common people with practical needs rather than a circle of 
intellectuals. See more on Saadia’s simplification of Jewish thought in Judah Goldin, “The Period 
of the Talmud (135 BCE-1035CE)” in Louis Finkelstein ed., The Jews: Their History, Culture 
and Religion (London: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1961), esp. p. 198 onwards. 
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common people were struggling to follow the intricate pilpul (sharp analysis) of the 
Talmud. Although Saadia, Isaac Alfasi, and Maimonides held the Talmud in the greatest 
esteem, their democratization of its contents was undermining the Talmudic monopoly 
over information and implicitly legitimizing the exploration of new domains of 
knowledge.371  
Different approaches towards traditional studies became a dividing point of 
contention and an indication that classical Judaism was in need of a corrective. This 
conflict reached new heights in the Maimonidean controversies of the early thirteenth 
century, in which conservatives harshly attacked Maimonides for his departure from 
accepted Talmudic methodologies. As so many scholars have pointed out, the 
Maimonidean controversies had an unprecedented polarizing effect upon the Jewish 
world. As opposed to just any dispute, they touched at the heart of what it meant to be 
Jewish, making it very difficult for anyone to avoid taking a position. Such a rift was very 
uncharacteristic of “normal Judaism,” and I would like to argue that it is emblematic of 
unique periods of crisis that foreshadow historical paradigm shifts. 372 As we shall see in 
the chapter on the Chinese experience, a very similar period of factionalism and social 
unrest preceded the rise of the Neo-Confucian paradigm. Most importantly, I will argue 
that in both cases these periods of crisis were instigated by the introduction of an 
increasingly analytic temperament into the Jewish and Chinese traditions. In both 
                                            
371 In the intro to his Mishneh Torah Maimonides states that “all of Israel are bound to follow 
everything found in the Babylonian Talmud, and we should force the Jews of every city and 
country to adhere to all customs established by the Talmudic sages.” 
372 Here I use this word as Kuhn uses “normal science.” 
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contexts, pervasive partisanship and acute social instability were a reflection of a phase of 
morphogenesis experienced by the Jewish and Chinese traditions.  
As in most traditions, societies usually give rise to conflicting conservative and 
progressive currents. In the classical rabbinic period between the first and tenth centuries 
these camps were to a great extent discernible by their divergent approaches towards 
textual authority. Conservatives believed that Jewish curriculum should be confined to 
the Talmud, whereas the more tolerant and progressive camp advocated the study of both 
the Talmud as well as external wisdom.373 This began to change beginning in the tenth 
century when both progressives represented by philosophers, and later conservatives 
represented by Kabbalists, understood that the classical Talmudic paradigm could no 
longer sustain the intellectual needs of the age. As Moshe Halbertal demonstrates, even 
medieval mystics were no longer comfortable with the reduction of Jewish curriculum to 
Talmudic studies. They, too, especially after they began to develop a more systematic and 
defensible position, believed that studying the Talmud without Kabbalah was tantamount 
                                            
373 Moshe Halbertal quotes the Babylonian Talmud, Menachot 96b where Ben Damah, the son of 
R. Ishmael's sister, once asked R. Ishmael, "May one such as I, who have studied the whole of the 
Torah, learn Greek wisdom?" He thereupon read to him the following verse: "This book of the 
law shall not depart out of thy mouth but thou shall meditate therein day and night' (Jos. 1:8). Go 
then and find a time that is neither day nor night, and learn then Greek wisdom." Halbertal 
provides other sources that address the problem of "Greek wisdom" such as the Bavli’s Sotah 
49b, where it says: "Cursed is the man who will teach his son Greek Wisdom." See also Mishnah, 
the end of Tractate Sota; Tosefta, Avoda Zarah 1:20; and Tosefta, Sota 15:8. Halbertal, People of 
the Book: Canon, Meaning, and Authority (Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press, 
1997), pp. 100; 171 n.31. Saul Lieberman tries to narrow the prohibition of the study of Greek 
wisdom in these sources to the prohibition against fathers teaching Greek wisdom to their young 
children. See S. Lieberman, Hellenism in Jewish Palestine (New York: Jewish Theological 
Seminary, 1950), pp. 100-05. Maimonides and Meiri took a more tolerant stance towards Greek 
Wisdom, see Maimonides, Perush ha-Mishnah, Sotah 4:14; Meiri, Beit ha-Behirah, Baba Kamah 
83a. 
  
208 
to focusing on the garment and the body rather than soul and the essence.374 In a more 
broadly comparative perspective, I will argue that both progressive and conservative 
camps in the Jewish and Chinese worlds understood their traditions could no longer be 
sustained upon the foundations of the classical textual corpus. In Judaism, the Talmud 
was not only attacked from within rabbinism, this period also saw the rise of one of the 
greatest internal threats to the authority of the rabbis. The Karaitic tradition was an 
emerging form of Judaism that distinguished itself from rabbinism by virtue of its 
categorical opposition to the Talmud’s authority.     
 
3.2.3 Karaites against the Talmud   
The Karaitic golden age between the tenth and eleventh centuries can be seen as a 
central component in the crisis in Judaism.375 During the Geonic period, the Karaitic 
challenge was so real that Saadia dedicated a major part of his career to vehement anti-
Karaitic polemic, a trend that continued with thinkers such as Judah Halevi and 
Maimonides. By the time of Saadia, Karaism was a force to be reckoned with; one 
scholar estimates that up to forty percent of world Jewry disclosed Karaitic affiliations 
                                            
374 The sixteenth-century Kabbalist, Meir Ibn Gabai, wrote: "He who deals only with the garment 
and the body of Torah and claims that there is nothing but these, expels the soul and denies the 
essence of the Torah ... and it would have been better for him had he never been created.” 
Halbertal, People of the Book, p. 119. Halbertal further notes that the anonymous fifteenth-
century author of Sefer ha-Qanah ve ha-Plia'ah held a similar view. Sefer ha-Qanah (Cracow, 
1854), pp. 7b-8a. Sefer ha-Pliah, Karetz (1744), p. 4a. See Halbertal, ibid., pp. 105-119. For more 
on this topic see Jacob Katz, "Halakhah ve-Kabbalah ke-Nosei Limud Mitcharim," in his 
Halakhah ve-Kabbalah (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1984), pp. 82-83. 
375 One of the most systematic assaults against the Talmud began with the Karaite Anan Ben-
David around the mid eighth century, long before Karaism reached it apex. 
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and that heated debates between rabbis and Karaites were extremely common.376 The 
Karaitic attack was not confined to theological matters but also disclosed social 
dimensions that reflect the great changes and the increasing social stratification that 
Judaism was going through at the time. Many Karaites were concerned with the rabbinic 
monopoly over religious discourse, as well as its recurrent abuse of power.377 Socially, 
the Karaites were representatives of a wealthy and educated class, a fact that might 
explain their general attraction to rationalism. The Karaitic movement also led to an 
escalating individualism in matters of religious exegesis. This was perhaps a result of 
their principle to “search well in the Torah,” which legitimized different interpretations of 
scripture and led to what Salo W. Baron saw as a process of fragmentation similar to that 
experienced by Protestantism, in which “no two Karaites agreed with each other.”378 As 
an example, Halevi blamed the Karaites for relying on individual opinions rather than the 
communal voice of the Talmud. He argued that one of the merits of the Talmudic model 
was its transmission of knowledge from “many to many” instead of trusting the 
unreliable and distorted transmission from individual to individual.379  
                                            
376 On Karaite and Rabbinic polemics see Daniel Lasker, Form Judah Hadassi to Elijah 
Bashyatchi: Studies in Later Maedieval Karaite Philosophy (Leiden: Brill, 2008), p. 7. Some 
scholars believe that the Kuzari was written as a polemical book against Karaism. The final 
version contains a long refutation of Karaism. See Lasker, ibid., p. 12. 
377 Salo Baron, A Social and Religious History of the Jews vol. 1, pp. 343-352. In one instance an 
influential Karaite attacked the “students of the Talmud” who “permitted themselves to take 
advantage of money belonging to an Am ha-Ares,” The Karaites also disclosed a more ascetic 
and world-negating disposition that was fairly alien to the Rabbinic tradition but became 
increasingly popular among different strands of Jewish rationalism and mysticism. 
378 Ibid. 
379 Shilat Ben ha-Kuzari la Rmabam, pp. 208-219. Halevi was also clearly opposed to Karaitic 
tendencies towards spiritual seclusion; other signs of individualistic tendencies among Karaites 
was their belief that a prayer quorum was not essential. See more on attacks against Karaitic 
asceticism, Lasker, Form Judah Hadassi, pp. 151-157. 
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Germane to my argument is the fact that the Karaites were to a great extent part of 
the rationalistic attack against rabbinical Judaism. Central Karaitic figures were strongly 
influenced by Mutazilite rationalism and represented some of the most prominent figures 
in the school of Jewish Kalam.380 As rationalists, the Karaites were staunch critics of 
rabbinic anthropomorphism, and myth. Their attack was one of the central wake-up calls 
for many rabbis who sought to downplay the mythological features of the Talmud. For 
the rabbis, the Karaites represented the growing dangers that new forms of exegesis and 
transmission posed to the tradition. In his Mekor Hamitzvot ha’Shamaiyot Saadia 
attacked the Karaitic exaggerated focus on logical analogy (שקה, hekesh). Whereas the 
Karaites believed that all the commandments should be interpreted rationally, Saadia was 
more conservative; he argued that some commandments were impressed upon our 
rational mind by God while others eluded rational explication. It is crucial to understand 
the cultural ramifications of the rise of new forms of exegesis during this period. One of 
the results of the Talmudic crisis was expressed by the growing need to explore more 
creative and flexible methods towards interpreting Judaism’s central religious corpus. 
Hekesh, therefore, freed believers from the exposition of law in the Talmud and offered a 
new opportunity for different people to reach diverging conclusions regarding the 
meaning and function of the commandments. The method of hekesh (Arabic: Qiyas), 
                                            
380 Liebes, Studies in Jewish Myth, pp. 22-23. Also see Lasker ibid., pp. 6. Al-basir was the most 
important figure in shifting Karaism into a Kalamic mode of discourse. Later (fl. 1149) Judah 
Haddasi’s “Eshkol Ha Kofer” was a Kalamic work and summary of Karaitic law. 
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became one of the central features of Karaism and was attacked by rabbinical authorities 
as a highly problematic and at times heretical mode of interpretation.381  
Unlike Jewish philosophers that were speaking from within the rabbinic tradition, 
the Karaites represented a rationalist threat aimed at the very essence of orthodox 
Judaism and its legitimizing literature, the Talmud.382 In the minds of many rabbism the 
Karaites came to represent the rational method in its worst manifestation. According to 
this view, instead of trying to harmonize rationalism with the Talmudic tradition, the 
Karaites used rationalism to repudiate it. This must have been a clear warning signal 
against the potential devastating implications of rationalism. The Karaitic phenomenon 
can therefore be seen as a reflection of the new reality that Jewish communities were 
experiencing. The rise of non-orthodox intellectual currents within Judaism, together with 
the increase in individualistic trends during this age were all showing their signs in 
Karaism, which to a great extent represented many of the features of an analytic mode of 
operation.  
                
3.2.4 Rationalists against the Talmud 
An important point to bear in mind is that the discomfort with the Talmudic 
tradition was directly related to the emergence of rational thought and the introduction of 
                                            
381 Lasker, Form Judah Hadassi, p. 133. Saadia, for instance, blamed this problematic trend on 
the Karaitic adoption of methods that were foreign to the Jewish tradition. See Robert Brody, 
“Rav Se’adya Gaon,” pp. 164-166. See more on Saadya’s and Halevi’s anti-Qiyas approach in 
Diana Lobel, Between Mysticism and Philosophy: Sufi Language of Religious Experience in 
Judah Ha-Levi’s Kuzari (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2000), pp. 55-87. 
382 Lasker, op. cit., pp. 137. Ironically, Karaism was attacked for using a similar type of Kalamic 
rationalism that was practiced by the Geonim, the difference being that the rabbis of Bagdad and 
Basra never attempted to undermine the Talmud. 
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the analytic worldview into Judaism. This can explain why the Talmudic tradition 
remained strong and vibrant in places where philosophy was unknown, such as in 
Provençe before the mid-twelfth century. Similarly, the northern French Tosafists, who 
were ignorant of philosophical rationalism, remained committed to conservative 
Talmudic studies untroubled by the dramatic changes that were taking place in the 
intellectually progressive communities of Spain.383 Another point to bear in mind is that 
rationalism was not confined to schools of thought that were strictly philosophical; 
Abraham Abulafia promoted a form of mysticism with rational tendencies that was 
directly influenced by Maimonides’ Guide, to which he wrote three separate 
commentaries. Abulafia claimed that those who are occupied with the Talmud “were 
seized by an incurable disease” and “were far inferior to those skilled in the higher 
Kabbala.”384 Therefore, rationalism, whether expressed through philosophy or mysticism 
was antagonistic to the traditional Talmudic paradigm that was founded upon the basic 
temperament of the synthetic worldviews.   
One of the most characteristics implications of rationalism was the rise of public 
debates. Muslims, Jews, and Christians were confronting each other on various 
theological matters that frequently took place in royal courts with a large audience. The 
                                            
383 As Bernard Septimus noted the French Tosafists didn’t really ‘get’ what the early 
Maimonidean controversy was about, it was only when they began to comprehend the full 
implications of the philosophical position that they moved from indifference to belligerence. 
Initially the Tosafists thought the first Maimonidean controversy was a minor halakhic dispute. In 
the second controversy, after being exposed to the full implications of Rationalism’s increasing 
popularity they became the staunchest torch bearers of the conservative anti-Maimonidean camp. 
Septimus, Hispano-Jewish Culture, p. 49. 
384 Heinrich Graetz and Bella Lowry, History of the Jews: From the Earliest Times to the Present 
Day. Vol. 4, (London: David Nutt, 1891), p. 8. 
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classical Jewish worldview was attacked by Christian and Muslim polemicists who 
pointed out the lack of rational coherence in the Talmud. These lively debates were not 
strictly a matter of amusement; the stakes were extremely high for the losers, especially 
when they lacked political power as Jews often did. Losing debates could result in severe 
punishment to individuals and whole communities, and could even result in exile and 
death sentences. This can help us understand how urgent it must have been for the 
rabbinic tradition to defend itself using the efficient argumentative tools of philosophy. 
As an example, philosophical interpretations enabled rabbis to claim that the highly 
unpopular anthropomorphic portions of the Talmud were merely allegories for the more 
profound meaning of the text. On a more general level, philosophy enabled Jews to 
present their tradition in a way that was accepted by the progressive intellectual 
mainstream of the time. But just as philosophy was helpful it also had the power to pierce 
through the façade on traditional societies and reveal their conventionality and 
vulnerabilities. It became clear that the Talmud, the heart of Judaism, was in need of 
protection, and many believed that philosophical argumentation was the only legitimate 
way to defend it. The paradox was that while Jews were defending their tradition against 
rational tendencies they were also forced to adopt the tools of the analytic modality that 
was undermining their tradition. 
Philosophers may have been the staunchest critics of the Talmud but it was 
becoming apparent to conservatives that the Talmud was ill-equipped to deal with the 
cultural crisis that Judaism was facing. Even in Provençe where Talmudic studies 
remained strong after the introduction of philosophy, we witness the emergence of 
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mystics who began to exclusively dedicate their careers to non-Talmudic themes. In other 
words, in order to protect traditional Judaism even the emerging conservative school of 
Kabbalah began to marginalize Talmudic studies in favor of a new mystical theology. In 
what follows, I will provide a short account of the historical context of the rise of 
Kabbalah. I will attempt to emphasize the frequently neglected social dimensions of this 
story, and to stress the unique dynamic of how relatively stable cultural entities are 
destabilized, enter a period of crisis and adaptation (morphogenesis) and finally return to 
a new updated period of stability (homeostasis).   
 
3.3 THE EMERGENCE OF KABBALAHA AND THE RISE OF NEW ELITES 
The analytic worldview was destabilizing Judaism in profound ways. It was 
undermining the legitimacy of its traditional narrative and sacred corpus. As a 
consequence, Judaism fragmented into contending camps that sought a solution to this 
crisis. Although many different schools of thought emerged, there was a rough division 
between progressives, represented by philosophers, and conservatives represented by old 
authorities and the emerging school of Kabbalah. Appreciating the acute internal and 
external pressures Judaism was undergoing during this age can help us understand the 
reasons for the meteoric emergence of the school of Kabbalah, a fact that troubled and 
intrigued generations of scholars of Judaism. According to Gershom Scholem this 
question “is indisputably one of the most difficult in the history of the Jewish religion 
after the destruction of the Second Temple. Just as indisputably, it is one of the most 
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important.”385 In historical terms, it is hard to overemphasis the astonishing speed in 
which the school of theurgic Kabbalah, represented by the Zohar, managed to consolidate 
its position in Judaism. As mentioned earlier, this change represents nothing less than a 
paradigm shift and the restructuring of the traditional canon, in which the Zohar was 
institutionalized as one of the three pillars of Judaism alongside the Bible and the 
Talmud. It is no wonder that Scholem presents Kabbalah as the most important 
phenomenon since the destruction of the Second Temple. Other scholars have reiterated 
this view, thereby revealing a general consensus regarding the transformation that swept 
over the Jewish world during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.  
Naturally, the emergence of Kabbalah cannot be detached from the political and 
sociological realities of the age. History demonstrates time and again that major cultural 
changes are often accommodated by the weakening of central control, the subsequent rise 
of new elites, and the growing democratization of knowledge. All these factors were 
clearly discernible in medieval Judaism between the tenth and thirteenth centuries. 
Generally speaking, many prominent philosophers and mystics were towering halakhic 
authorities and representatives of the rabbinic tradition; in philosophy, the most obvious 
examples are Saadia and Maimonides, while in Kabbalah we have figures such as the 
Rabad, Nahmanides, R’ Yonah Gerondi, and the Rashba (R’ Shelomo ben Adret). 
Common to both rationally inclined and mystically inclined rabbis was their growing 
interest in cosmological and speculative questions that were non-halakhic in nature. 
These rabbinic authorities to which Idel refers to as the first elite, were crucial for the 
                                            
385 Scholem, Origins of the Kabbalah (Princeton: The Jewish Publication Society Princeton 
University Press, 1962), p. 3. 
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acceptance of philosophy and Kabbalah as legitimate worldviews. But the main carriers 
and creative power behind the dissemination of Kabbalah and philosophy were what Idel 
terms secondary elites, namely, “those authors who did not contribute in a significant 
manner to the communal Jewish life as leading figures, nor did they play a major role in 
the Halakhic literature, which shaped the religious life of the ordinary Jew.”386 Free from 
the time-consuming engagement in halakhic studies and communal affairs, these 
emerging secondary elites, for reasons I will elaborate shortly, had the unprecedented 
opportunity to dedicate themselves to a more specialized study of philosophy and 
mysticism. The fact that these secondary elites became the central representatives of the 
Kabbalah and Philosophy also led to a substantial rise in their social status and power-
base.  
For the sake of clarity, it helps to roughly divide the period in question into three 
general phases. In order to better understand this three-phase periodization it is important 
to point attention to a few major historical facts that had a lasting impact upon the Jewish 
world. Of major importance was that as a result of the invasion of southern Spain by the 
Almohades in the mid-twelfth century the progressive Geonic-Andalusian tradition 
suffered a critical blow. This event led to the historical relocation of the prosperous 
Arabic speaking Andalusian community to northern Spain and southern France. It was 
also the first time that the philosophically inclined Arab-Hispanic community of 
Andalusia came into intense contact with Jewish communities in northern Spain and 
southern France. This meeting of substantially different Jewish cultures led to an acute 
                                            
386 Idel, “Kabbalah and Elites in Thirteenth-century Spain,” p. 6. 
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tension between the philosophically vibrant south and the more conservative Talmudic 
legacy of the north. The first phase in my periodization will therefore begin with Saadia 
and the introduction of rational thought into Judaism, and end with the invasion of the 
Almohads in 1147-8. This phase can be seen as the golden age of the Geonic-Andalusian 
tradition. The second phase stretches from the Almohads invasion to the end of the 
second Maimonidean controversy at approximately 1235, a highly polemical stage that 
symbolizes the apex of a rift between the conservative and progressive camps in the 
rabbinic tradition. And finally, the third phase will stretch from 1235 to the end of the 
thirteenth century with the appearance of the Zohar.387 This stage represents the 
beginning of the consolidation of power by the conservative camp and the gradual 
decline of philosophy over the next two centuries. For the sake of convenience we can 
say that the first phase was approximately between 930-1150, the second phase between 
1150-1235, and the third between 1235-1300. In what follows I will try to explain why I 
believe this periodization is helpful in understanding the shift from a state of homeostasis 
during the classical period, to a stage of morphogenesis, and back to homeostasis. The 
three phases I am suggesting all took place within the period of morphogenesis and 
therefore help us understand the peculiar dynamic of the process of adaptation of cultural 
systems to external environmental pressures. 
 
 
 
                                            
387 The three phases I am suggesting: a) 930-1150, b) 1150-1235, and c) 1235-1300. 
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3.3.1 First Phase: 930-1150 
The growing rationalistic currents within the rabbinical tradition were a natural, 
indeed an inevitable, reaction to the challenge of Greek philosophy. When Jews were 
confronted with the powerful Muslim interpretations of Greek thought, their best and 
most natural course of action was to introduce the same rational tools into their own 
religious discourse. The only alternative option was to remain entrenched in Talmudic 
dogmatism, a choice that was clearly untenable for those who understood the possibly 
devastating ramifications of ignoring the new intellectual trends of the age. Beyond the 
necessity to engage with philosophy, the powerful and highly attractive intellectual 
formats it introduced were bound to resonate with a certain strand of progressive rabbis, 
as well as an emerging educated middle class. The adoption of various forms of 
rationalism by rabbinic authorities legitimized philosophy, which was by its very nature a 
polemical discourse frequently carried by individuals. It is in this stage that we see the 
emergence of new progressive intellectual elites in Babylonia and southern Spain that 
enthusiastically embraced the rational worldview. The decline of central authority 
prompted by periods of crisis, opened a new space for young, sophisticated, and fairly 
wealthy intellectuals to promote their more universalistic and progressive lifestyles. As 
carriers of a new and highly attractive ideology these new elites could further climb up 
the social ladder both within the Jewish tradition and within the advanced Muslim milieu 
in which they operated.   
Philosophy’s escalation from the tempered Geonic model towards the more 
radical Maimonidean worldview underscored its potential harmful effects and led to 
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increasing concerns among traditionalists.388 Although clear signs of suspicion towards 
rationalism were already apparent during this first phase, the Geonic-Andalusian tradition 
generally embraced the rational worldview, which became its hallmark and source of 
pride.389 The social, intellectual, and economic prosperity of the Babylonian, and later the 
Andalusian Jewish community, must have reassured the rationally inclined elites that 
their ideological position was advantageous. At a time of cultural affluence there was 
very little reason for concern, especially since philosophers were ultimately 
demonstrating that Judaism was in conformity with reason, and therefore a relevant and 
respectable system of belief. Another reason for the scant opposition towards philosophy 
among conservatives at this early stage was that Talmudic Judaism lacked the internal 
resources to adequately confront the questions raised by philosophy. Therefore, even if 
conservatives felt a discomfort towards philosophy during this early stage, they had no 
real alternative to offer as a counter argument.  
It was only towards the end of this phase that we witness the first systematic 
critique of rationalism and Andalusian culture in general. Halevi’s influential Kuzari was 
a philosophically informed attack against extreme forms of rationalism and a defense of 
the traditional Jewish worldview. Halevi claimed that arguments based on reason were 
inferior to the traditional Jewish reliance on historical transmission, communal 
                                            
388 The motto of Saadia’s conservative rationalism was: “to establish the principle of the Torah in 
our hearts by way of proofs and refutations of our opponents” (Book of Beliefs and Opinions). 
Septimus, Hispano-Jewish Culture, p. 61. 
389 First attacks go back to the Neoplatonic work of Solomon ibn Gabirol in the early eleventh-
century, in which the latter was accused of departing from Saadia’s qualified rationalism towards 
a more radical form of rationalism. See Septimus, ibid., p. 61. 
  
220 
experience, and revelation.390 Halevi’s attack came from within the Andalusian milieu; it 
sought to highlight the possible dangers of leaning too strongly on the spurious 
intellectual foundations of Greek culture. Halevi was a man of words but also deeds; he 
ended up abandoning the comfort of the prosperous Al-Andalus for the harsh and remote 
land of Palestine where he believed Jews would find redemption. The subsequent 
collapse of Andalusian Jewry can be seen as a confirmation of his critique of rationalism 
and the dangers of its universalistic ethos. 
It is worth noting that the first Geonic-Andalusian phase was one in which 
philosophical discourse was conducted in Arabic, and therefore inaccessible to large 
portions of the Jewish world. Outside this Muslim sphere of influence, Jewish 
communities were generally unaware of the tensions that were beginning to form 
between progressive and conservative voices in the Geonic-Andalusian tradition. The 
spread of these tensions to the rest of European Jewry led to an even greater conflict 
between conservatives and rationalists; this began with the Andalusian Jewry’s relocation 
to the north.   
 
3.3.2 Second Phase: 1150-1235 
 In the second phase, Halevi’s almost solitary resistance escalated towards a more 
concerted attack against philosophy, facilitated by an increase in important translations of 
philosophical works to Hebrew. Also known as the ‘translation movement,’ the 
beginning of this process is usually dated at 1150, and coincided with the Almohads 
                                            
390 Ibid., p. 62. 
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invasion and the relocation to the north. The Almohads’ invasion led to the escape of the 
great translators, best represented by the famous Tibbon family from the philosophically 
active Grenada in southern Spain to Lunel, one of greatest Talmudic centers in the Jewish 
world.  The first great translator of the Tibbon  family was  Yehuda ben  Shaul ibn Tibbon . 
 Among his important translations were ibn Paquda’s  Duties of the Hearts ( 1161 ), 
 Halevi’s  Kuzari ( 1167 ),  followed by Saadia’s  Book of Beliefs and Opinions ,  as well as 
 psychological works by the Neoplatonist ibn Gabirol .  Yehuda’s  son ,  Samuel ibn Tibbon , 
 most likely born in Lunel ,  translated the most important works of Maimonides ,  including 
the  Mishneh Torah ,  the  Guide ,  his  commentary on the Mishnah ,  and the Letter on the 
Resurrection of the Dead .  As  Colette  Sirat  notes ,  together with works by Jewish thinkers , 
 the Tibbonite project  went on to transmit almost the entire body of Greek science that 
came from the Arabs .391  Therefore the beginning of the second phase is marked by the 
dramatic shift of Jewish culture from Muslim  to Christian lands in which the Tibbonite 
translations  played a  crucial  role  in the transmission of accurate scientific and 
philosophical information  to Hebrew .  From the point of view of Jewish communities that 
were not in command of Arabic this transmission of ideas was an essential prerequisite 
for  a more thorough  understanding of the new Greek formats that were infiltrating 
Judaism .  
While the former part of the second phase was dominated by  translation , 
 transmission ,  and internalization of rational thought ,  the latter part was defined  by an 
                                            
391  Colette Sirat, A History of Jewish Philosophy in the Middle Ages (Cambridge; New York 
Paris: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 209-218. 
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escalating antagonism towards philosophy marked by the eruption of  the Maimonidean 
controversies .  It is in this period that we witness the growing rift between the rational and 
anti-rational wings of Judaism .  In the eyes of the more conservatively inclined the 
implications of philosophy’s growing popularity were worrisome for a host of reasons. 
But I think that the short answer to this complicated question is that rationalism had a 
conventionalizing impact upon Judaism. The scrutiny of objective reason revealed the 
precarious grounds on which many central Jewish assumptions were based. In other 
words, philosophy led to an internal tension between those who sought to preserve the 
superior and indisputable normative status of Judaism and those who were satisfied with 
rationally proving its validity and advantages without emphasizing any kind of 
ontological superiority.  
This tension is most discernible in the contrasting approaches promoted by Halevi 
and Maimonides. In his Kuzari, Halevi presents the Jewish tradition as superior on 
metaphysical grounds: the Jewish nation, the Hebrew language, and the land of Israel are 
all ontologically superior to the people, the languages, and the lands of other cultures. 
The Jewish people are infused with the Inyan Elohi (divine attribute), the Hebrew 
language is the sacred and eternal code of existence, and the land of Israel is the unique 
and holy location to which Jews should ideally return in order to resume Temple sacrifice 
and hasten the advent of the messiah.392 Maimonidean rationalism completely transforms 
this picture: Hebrew becomes a better language rather than the ultimate sacred 
                                            
392 Menachem Kellner, Maimonides’ Confrontation With Mysticism (Oxford [England]; Portland, 
Or.: Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2006), p. 132. 
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language,393 and the Jewish people are sanctified by their deeds rather than their inherent 
biological or ethnic holiness. According to Maimonides, Jews represent a great 
community (Kibbutz Me’ule) not due to anything inherent but because of their 
exceptional potential for intellectual contemplation.394 The land of Israel is emotionally 
and historically important but Judaism can be practiced and implemented in Spain, Egypt 
or anywhere else in the world. As Menachem Kellner points out, the Maimonidean 
interpretation of the Bible “scandalized generations of readers.” Purity is no longer a 
metaphysical state but rather a moral one, food is Kosher mainly because it was healthier, 
and Temple sacrifice in Jerusalem is the outcome of contingent historical 
circumstances.395 The rational perspective was dangerously conventionalizing Judaism; 
traditional legitimacy could no longer rest upon the mere conviction or piety of its 
adherents. Although Halevi was certainly not a Kabbalist, his discomfort with the 
conventionalization of Judaism captured the essence of the tensions between rationalists 
                                            
393 Maimonides audaciously conventionalizes the Hebrew language when he claims that if God 
were to impose the commandments on different people the language of the bible could have very 
well been different. 
394 Shilat, Ben ha’Kuzari la Rambam, p. 45. On the goi see pp. 76-84. For Halevi the Inyan Sichli 
reflects matters of the intellect which are shared by all humans, while the Inyan elohi (divine 
matters or as it is usually translated divine order) is exclusive to Israel, making the Jews an 
ontologically distinct group. In contrast, Maimonides sees the events at Sinai as an act of 
conversion. He therefore believed that the gentile could go through a similar conversion that all 
Jews went through. Maimonides’ perception was far more inclusive than Halevi’s, according to 
him not only can gentiles join the Jewish nation they can potentially become prophets. 
395 Menachem Kellner, Maimonides’ Confrontation With Mysticism, pp. 128; 144; 158. The 
temple sacrifices were instituted against God’s will because of the weakness of the Israelites 
coming out of Egypt. According to Maimonides without this “compromise” of allowing the Jews 
to practice what they were accustomed to in Egypt, they would have been unable to accept the 
Torah. 
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and conservatives.396 The former group sees holiness as an intellectual transformative 
process, while conservatives perceive Judaism as an eternal and superior metaphysical 
reality. Looking at the tensions in Judaism from this perspective can help us understand 
the Kabbalistic reaction as a mission to restore Judaism’s ontological, normative status 
and to anchor its indisputability in a more advanced metaphysics.  
It was  during this highly contentious second phase that support seemed to 
gradually shift in favor of the anti-rationalist camp .  This trend was reflected by the 
disproportionate condemnation of philosophy  and the widespread  acceptance of  the 
 equally  revolutionary Kabbalah .397  Philosophers therefore lacked the same type of 
authoritative support that kabbalists enjoyed. Although Maimonides was admired 
throughout the Jewish world, philosophy failed to rally the institutional support of large 
groups of rabbis, as in the case of mysticism.398 With a growing portion of the rabbinic 
                                            
396 For more about the Kuzari’s popularity among Kabbalists see Adam Shear, The Kuzari and the 
Shaping of Jewish Identity, 1167-1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
Especially chapter 2 “The Image and Function of the Kuzari in the Late Middle Ages.” pp. 55-94. 
397  Idel, “Rabbinism versus Kabbalism: On G. Scholem’s Phenomenology of Judaism.” Modern 
Judaism 11, no. 3 (1991): 289; Joseph Dan and Ronald C. Kiener, The Early Kabbalah (New 
York: Paulist Press, 1986), p. 9; Scholem: Ha Kabbalah bi Provence, p. 86. Scholem talks about 
several attacks against Kabbalah in Provence. See Scholem’s Teuda Hadasha le Toldot ha 
Kabbalah, p. 88. In Milchemet Mitzvah, R’ Meir ben Shimon’s “war” is against Christianity but 
he takes the opportunity to attack Kabbalah as well. Rabbi Meir ben Shimon of Narbonne 
famously criticized Kabbalists for their polytheistic forms of prayer in which they “direct the 
day's prayer to one God and the night's to another God.” Joseph Dan notes that “During the next 
two centuries, when the Kabbalah became better known among Jewish intellectuals, we hardly 
find a second opposing voice to join that of Rabbi Meir's.” See “Gershom Scholem’s 
Reconstruction of Early Kabbalah,” Modern Judaism 5, no. 1, (1985): 58. 
398 As Idel notes “…the first elite's adherence to Kabbalah was crucial for the aura of 
respectability and credibility this lore enjoyed…” Idel ”Window of Opportunities,” p. 19. 
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institution’s backing, anti-rational voices with a mystical bent were now able to carve a 
growing space for the promotion of their political, social, and spiritual interests.399   
Following the Almohad invasion, Provençe became the nexus of the dramatic 
shift of Judaism’s vitality from the Muslim world to the Christian world. The relocation 
of Andalusian Jewry to northern Spain was a traumatic event in Jewish history and 
represents the beginning of a process of the reconstruction of the Andalusian 
communities and their damaged halakhic traditions.400 The important point for our story 
is that as opposed to what many Provençal Jews assumed, the Andalusian community, far 
from being a unified entity, was now experiencing unprecedented internal tensions. It 
seems plausible that the growing skepticism within the Andalusian tradition towards its 
own rationalistic legacy was to a great extent spurred by its dramatic fall from glory. 
Early warnings against the growing laxity of Geonic-Andalusian Judaism, embodied in 
the Kuzari, were now supported by concrete proof. The Hispano-Jewish culture failed to 
persevere; and it was its progressive and increasingly secular lifestyle that was seen as the 
                                            
399 In many ways Provençe, the cradle of Kabbalah, occupied a crucial position in this story since 
it was caught in between two central trajectories in the Jewish world: the largely progressive and 
rationalist Geonic-Andalusian tradition on the one hand, and the more conservative Franco-
Germanic tradition on the other. Interestingly the Provençal intellectuals, especially after the 
generation of the conservative Rabad (approx.1125-1198), became devout rationalists and saw 
themselves as defenders and continuation of the Geonic-Andalusian tradition. It was this 
Provençal community that to a great extent instigated the second Maimonidean controversy when 
they sought to excommunicate Rabbi Solomon ben Abraham of Montpellier and his anti-
rationalist circle of followers. 
400 Two main forces explain the rapidity of the transition: firstly, the Christian re-conquest of 
Spain pushing the Muslims to the south. The second is the invasion of Muslim Spain by northern 
African Berber tribes that led Jews to flee to Christian lands in the north. The Berbers and the 
Christians come from both sides and even clash until Christianity takes over. The specific Berber 
tribes that invaded from the south were first the Almoravides a Moroccan and Southern Spanish 
dynasty and later the more violent Almohads who banned the practice of other religions. 
Septimus, Hispano-Jewish Culture, pp. 1-3. 
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main culprit for this failure. The Ramah in Castile, a descendent of the Andalusian 
aristocracy is only one example of a leading Halakhic authority that turned his back 
against radical forms of rationalism.401 Therefore, together with the the growing attacks 
against rationalism from conservatives in northern Spain and France, the trauma suffered 
by the Hispano-Jewish tradition also led to an internal backlash from Andalusian Jews 
against their own rational heritage.  
The internal tensions within the dislocated Andalusian tradition had social 
dimensions that should be considered in addition to Idel’s distinction between the first 
and secondary elite. With the Andalusian relocation to the north, we see a growing rift 
between the aristocratic Nesi’im (Presidents) who represented a continuation of the 
“political style of Moslem Spain… literate and rationalistic, worldly and somewhat 
decadent” and the more conservative but highly influential groups of northern Catalonian 
rabbis especially in Barcelona. This anti-rationalist and mystically inclined wing was 
represented by prominent figures such as Nahmanides and R. Yonah Gerondi, who 
frequently attacked the growing corruption of the nepotistic lineages of the Nesi’im.402 
According to Shlomo Pick, this emerging conservative class was eager to climb up the 
social ladder and gain the kind of political influence that corresponded with their growing 
economic and political power. The influence of the Nesi’im was slowly deteriorating and 
                                            
401 The Provençal rationalists were astonished when the Ramah refused to support their Campaign 
against R’ Abraham of Montpellier. They assumed that since the Ramah belonged to the rational 
legacy of Spain he would automatically support their anti-rationalists efforts. 
402 The opponents of the Nesi’im were often characterized as “merchants, perhaps nouveaux 
riches, Talmudists and mystics, energetic, striving for spirituality.” See Septimus  “piety and 
power in thirteenth-Century Catalonia,” Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature, ed. I. 
Twersky (Cambridge, Mass. and London, England: Harvard University Press, 1979), pp. 197-
230. 
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after the second Maimonidean controversy they were fully eclipsed by their conservative 
opponents who quickly became a new aristocracy.403 Pertinent to our discussion is that 
the decline of the Nesi’im reflects the dwindling power of the rationalist camp and the 
consolidation of power by a new and more mystically-inclined, albeit somewhat 
conservative elite led by Nahmanides and later by the Rashba. The rising authority of the 
rabbis of Barcelona now further supported the emergence of a growing secondary elite of 
mystics, whereas the already deteriorating power base of rationalists was further 
weakened by the decline of the Andalusian Nesi’im.  
As mentioned, the two Maimonidean controversies between 1200-1235 
represented the escalating discomfort with philosophy and a growing effort to articulate 
an alternative mystical worldview.404 A certain period of ‘incubation’ was necessary 
before Judaism could possibly devise an effective native reaction to the philosophical 
challenge. Once Judaism became more familiar with rationalism, a more efficient and 
concerted reaction to philosophy could take shape. In other words, once philosophy was 
systematically articulated and transported into a Jewish medium, it provided anti-
rationalists with a new and formerly unavailable course of action. Understood in native 
terms, the Jewish philosophical tradition could now be more fully understood and 
therefore countered internally and within a familiar and exclusively Jewish context. 
                                            
403 Shlomo H. Pick, “Jewish Aristocracy in Southern France,” Revue des Etudes juives, 16 no. 1-2 
(2002): 97-121. The Spanish Nesi’im were wealthy leaders whose power base like all medieval 
aristocracy was landownership. These were exclusively nepotistic lineages that derived their 
authority through rightful succession rather than by any form of election, ibid., pp. 103-4. See 
more on the Nesi’im in Elka Klein, Jews, Christian Society, & Royal Power in Medieval 
Barcelona (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 2006). 
404 The first controversy is generally dated 1200-1204, the second 1230-1235. 
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Among various contending factions, theurgic Kabbalah consolidated itself as the most 
efficient alternative to rationalism and provided conservatives with the speculative tools 
that the Talmudic tradition lacked.  
This can perhaps explain why an anti-rationalist secondary elite took time to 
emerge. As I have argued, when philosophy was the only intellectual alternative to 
Talmudic studies, progressive intellectuals were bound to become attracted to it, whereas 
conservative voices lacked the tools to confront it. But as the mystical reaction gained 
maturity a growing number of secondary elite intellectuals could now choose to 
participate in an equally stimulating discourse. Metaphysical speculation and the search 
for a more personal and introspective form of religiosity were no longer the monopoly of 
philosophy. As time went on the new accessibility of an increasingly mature mystical 
theology was also reflected by the way many advocates of philosophy shifted towards 
Kabbalah and even became its leading proponents.405 Although Kabbalah, was still 
practiced by first elite conservatives who were mainly halakhic authorities and 
community leaders, towards the end of the second phase we begin to see the first signs of 
thinkers such a Isaac the Blind and his followers who were fully dedicated to mysticism 
and were beginning to adopt more pro-active forms of transmission. Isaac the Blind, 
perhaps the first representative of this new elite, died at the end of the second phase in 
1235, but the new secondary elites that followed were gaining momentum, a trend that 
became most apparent during the third phase between 1235 and the appearance of the 
Zohar.  
                                            
405 Two notable examples are Joseph Gikatilla and Moshe de Leon. 
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 In conclusion,  the  second period between 1150-1235 ,  can be  characterized by 
three major factors :  a )  the introduction of Maimonidean/Aristotelian forms of philosophy 
to non-Hispanic Judaism which coincided with the shift of Judaism  form the Geonic-
Andalusian sphere to Christian Europe ,  b )  the internalization of rational thought and the 
beginning of a more systematic and confident condemnation of philosophy ,  and c )  the 
growing support for Kabbalah on behalf the conservative rabbinical elites  and the initial 
signs of the emergence of an energetic and creative secondary elite of mystics .     
 
3.3.3 The Third  Phase :  1235-1300 
Finally ,  the  third and last phase  of our story  was characterized by the ascendency 
of  highly creative forms of  mysticism and a clear proliferation of Kabbalistic works .  This 
phase ,  especially  towards its end ,  represents  the  mature reaction of a  systematic 
mysticism that was tailored to replace philosophy as an alternative  theological discourse . 
 During this stage the relatively conservative mysticism of halakhic figures such as 
Nahmanides and his followers was picked up and intensified by mystics who were no 
longer attempting to conceal their esoteric impulse. The type of experimental enthusiasm 
with which these intellectuals promoted the message of Kabbalah led to signs of concern 
among certain rabbis as well as more conservative mystics. Indeed, even Isaac the Blind, 
the early prototype of the secondary elite mystic, found it necessary to criticize those who 
“speak openly in marketplaces and in the streets as agitated and confused people.”406 But 
                                            
406 Scholem argued that the critique was pointed at his students R. Ezra and R. Azriel and was a 
response to R. Meir ben Shimon of Narbonne’s attack against Kabbalistic heresy. Scholem, and 
Dan maintained that the instructions of Isaac the Blind are what engendered the esoteric style of 
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in spite of his reservations, R’ Isaac represented the beginning of a more relaxed form of 
transmission. As opposed to his forefathers such as R’ Abraham ben Isaac and the Rabad, 
who worked in exclusive circles, Isaac the Blind began to disseminate Kabbalah outside 
his family sphere,407 and went as far as teaching mystical lore to students who were 
geographically distant and therefore not completely under his control. It is in this sense 
that Isaac the Blind can be seen as a middle stage between the first elite’s conservative 
oral dissemination during the second phase (1150-1235), and the more bold and pro-
active attitude of secondary elite Kabbalists during the third phase, beginning in Gerona 
and later more intensely in Castile. 
As in other instances in which written formats replace orality, the new modes of 
transmission that were adopted by secondary elite mystics must have substantially 
changed Kabbalistic discourse such that texts could now both be duplicated and 
transmitted on a larger scale, as well as analyzed publicly and refined under a broader 
communal examination.408 Indeed, as scholars have argued, written formats must have 
                                                                                                                                  
Nahmanides. See Halbertal Concealment and Revelation, p.180 n. 2. The letter was published and 
discussed by Gershom Scholem in Moshe Idel and Yosef Ben-Shelomo ed., Mehkere Kabalah 
[Studies In Kabbalah, Hebrew] (Tel-Aviv: Am Oved, 1998), pp. 9–10. Idel is of the opinion that 
in this letter Rabbi Isaac the Blind attempts to defend himself against Nahmanides’ criticism. See 
Idel, “Nahmanides: Kabbalah, Halakha and Spiritual Leadership,” in Moshe Idel and Mortimer 
Ostow, Jewish Mystical Leaders and Leadership in the Thirteenth Century (Northvale, N.J.: 
Jason Aron- son, 1998), pp. 15–96. 
407 Idel, “Window of Opportunities,” p. 11. The escalation in the audacity of Kabbalistic 
dissemination was reflected in the new elites’ departure from traditional forms of oral 
transmission characteristic of first elite Rabbis towards written forms of transmission. As Isaac 
the Blind himself testifies in his famous letter to Nahmanides and R. Yona Gerondi: “for my 
fathers were the nobles of the land and disseminators of the Torah among many, and no such 
thing [mystical lore] ever departed from their lips.” [my brackets]. See Gershom Scholem in 
Studies in Kabbalah, pp. 9–10. 
408 As R’ Isaac himself claimed in his letter to Nahmanides “what is written abides in no cabinet.” 
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facilitated a more concerted procedure of experimentation,409 which was conducive to the 
synthesis of different strand of thought that eventually made their way into the Zohar. 
Finally, the shift towards the much more efficient and transmittable written formats also 
reflected a more general trend towards the democratization of knowledge that was 
characteristic of the age. Such modes of transmission enabled people to engage in 
speculative mysticism without necessarily having a close teacher or being admitted to 
exclusive circles. In Sefer ha-Shem (Book of the Divine Name) the author states that he 
created this work as a guide for beginners to become familiar with Kabbalistic wisdom, a 
service “to all of Israel, according to their capacity… to enlighten the eyes of one who is 
beginning to learn Kabbalah.”410 Hundreds of Kabbalistic manuscripts were in circulation 
during this period, the overwhelming number of which were commentaries on the sefirot; 
these works served as symbolic codes for deciphering the Bible and other mystical 
texts.411 The anonymous author of Milano Hebrew Manuscript 57 states that he wrote his 
commentary for: 
                                            
409 Merlin Donald, A Mind So Rare: The Evolution of Human Consciousness (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 2001); Jack Goody, The Logic of Writing and the Organization of Society. (Cambridge 
[Cambridgeshire]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986); idem., The Interface Between 
the Written and the Oral (Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1987). 
410 Michal Oron, Sefer ha-Shem Attributed to R. Moses de Leon [ןואיל יד השמ יברל סחוימה םשה רפס]. 
(Los Angeles: Cherub Press, 2010), p. 54. 
411 Scholem identified 134 such commentaries on the Sefirot. See Scholem, “Mafteah Le-
Peirushei ‘Eser Sefirot [Hebrew],” in Kitbei Gershom Scholem, Bibliographical Writings, Vol. 1, 
(N.Y.; Brooklyn: Publisher Unknown, 1954). For a more recent study of this important genre of 
Kabbalistic literature, see Daniel Abrams “A Commentary to the Ten Sefirot From Early 
Thirteenth-Century Catalonia Synoptic Edition Translation and Detailed Commentary.” 
Kabbalah Journal for the Study of Jewish Mystical Texts 30 (2013): 7-63. Hundreds of 
manuscripts and many more have been discovered since Scholem, See Hartley Lachter, 
Kabbalistic Revolution: Reimagining Judaism in Medieval Spain, (New Jersey: Rutgers 
University Press), and Oron, Sefer ha shem pp. 11; 17. 
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one who desires [to comprehend] the wisdom of the Kabbalah in its entirety… once one 
knows this, it will be possible for him when he reads a biblical verse or dictum of the 
Rabbis of blessed memory, or a matter described in a kabbalistic composition, that he 
will understand the intention of that verse or dictum, and to what matter it alludes. It is 
for this purpose that I composed this text.412 
                  
As Hartley Lachter notes, such comments could be found in plenty of Kabbalistic texts 
composed in thirteenth century Castile, suggesting that the common idea that Kabbalah 
was a carefully guarded occupation of a small elite is in need of revision.413 The name of 
the game during this third phase was not concealment, but rather the dissemination and 
popularization of allegedly concealed ancient secrets. We see a clear effort to make 
Kabbalistic lore more accessible and “user friendly” in an attempt to reach the widest 
audience possible.   
The people behind this last phase in Castile were an educated secondary elite with 
a mystical bent; they were the main creative force behind the systematic articulation and 
dissemination of Kabbalah in the final stages before the appearance of the Zohar. This 
elite’s bold experimentation with ideas together with the lack of central authority to 
restrain their discourse, led to the proliferation of ideas so characteristic of periods of 
crisis and adaptation.414 Secondary elites of both mystics and philosophers were free to 
                                            
412 Milano Hebrew Manuscript 57, 11a. 
413 Lachter, “Kabbalah for the Masses: Reconsidering the Elitism of Medieval Jewish Mysticism,” 
American Academy of Religion conference, San Francisco, November, 2011. 
414 Idel argues that the passing away of Nahmanides and Rabbeinu Yonah meant that the 
secondary elite could promote their mystical ideas more freely: “In the span of one generation 
there were no great Halachic figures in Spain who were able to inhibit, explicitly or tacitly, the 
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engage in a more confrontational polemic and mutual attacks that were not as common 
among first elite rabbis.415 Such a dynamic environment of polemics and experimentation 
is exactly the type of social Darwinian background that facilitates the emergence of new 
paradigms and the construction of new identities. The Zohar became the encapsulation of 
this new worldview; far from being a normal book, it functioned as a literary platform 
and symbolic repository for a new religious discourse, one that reflected a newly 
constructed Jewish identity.    
 A few more comments about the social conditions that characterized the age can 
help us understand the historical dynamic that led to the victory of Kabbalah over 
philosophy. Beginning with the decline of the Talmudic paradigm during the Geonic 
period, first elite rabbis seemed to gradually lose the power to restrain the emergence of 
new intellectual discourses and alternative modes of transmission. As demonstrated 
above, the rabbinic institution was increasingly united in its anti-rationalistic stance, and 
although it frowned upon the untamed dissemination of mystical works by secondary 
elites, conservative rabbis were certainly aware that Kabbalah was preferable to the 
ascendency of rationalism. The conspicuous lack of criticism of Kabbalah may very well 
reflect the sense of urgency that anti-rationalists felt at this time of crisis. As Lachter 
points out “if a particular kind of discourse emerges abruptly at a specific time and place, 
                                                                                                                                  
freer creativity which produced huge and very imaginative forms of Kabbalistic literature.” See 
“Kabbalah and Elites,” p. 17. However, it also seems that the first elites lacked the power to 
restrict the dissemination of mystical lore, since it continued despite clear concerns on behalf of 
Nahmanides and Gerondi during their lifetime. 
415 Idel., p. 16. Instead of attacking Maimonides directly Ya’akov Ben-Sheshet in his Meshiv 
Devarim Nekhohim attacks Maimonides’ faithful follower, the translator and rationalist Samuel 
ibn Tibbon. Therefore, attacks against first elite rabbis could now be circumvented and expressed 
within a more polemical confrontation between second elites of mystics and philosophers. 
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it is reasonable to regard this as evidence that such discourse is serving an important 
strategic purpose for those involved in its production and dissemination, and that the 
cultural context is one in which an opening for such discourse exists.”416 In the case of 
Judaism’s confrontation with Greek thought, both the dire need and the favorable social 
conditions were in place. Although the conservative wing of the tradition seemed to 
emerge from the Maimonidean controversies with the upper hand, Jewish philosophy 
remained a substantial cultural force for at least two more centuries. The lingering danger 
of philosophy must have contributed to the sense of urgency among conservative rabbis 
to devise an alternative native response to philosophical discourse, even at the expense of 
yielding power to an intellectual elite that was diverging from traditional practices. It also 
stands to reason that institutional support for Kabbalists was strengthened by the fact that 
mystics were clearly representatives of a conservative sensibility that resonated with first 
elite rabbis.   
 Beyond conditions internal to the rabbinic tradition, there were several external 
reason for the relative freedom that the secondary elite of mystics was enjoying. As I 
mentioned earlier, the unprecedented influx in interfaith public disputations in thirteenth 
century Spain was certainly a cause for concern. Jews were in need of systematic tools 
for defending their tradition against the constant scholastic attacks they were facing.417 
                                            
416 Lachter, “The Politics of secrets,” p. 503. 
417 See more on the growing polemical attacks against Judaism in Theodore Steinberg, Jews and 
Judaism in the Middle Ages (Westport, CT ; London: Praeger Publishers, 2008), pp. 61- 69. The 
Mendicant order was strongly supported by the papacy in attacking Jews. Lachter contends that if 
“we take the social and political context of late thirteenth-century Castile into account, the 
kabbalists’ choice to construct their esotericism in this manner reflects an engagement with the 
contemporary political and intellectual climate. Among the challenges facing traditional Judaism 
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Such acute pressures can further explain why the period between 1235-1300 (third phase) 
in Castile represented one of the greatest outbursts of speculative creativity in Jewish 
history. The upsurge in the production of Jewish mystical treatises is not surprising if we 
consider the simultaneous rise in the appearance of revealed Christian esoteric texts. 
Latcher points out that the escalating interest in esoteric literature in late thirteenth-
century Spain can be explained by:  
[The] shift in the intellectual and cultural landscape in which revealed secret traditions 
from antiquity were attributed prestige and regarded as a reliable source of truth. By 
presenting their conception of Judaism in terms of the esoteric, kabbalists may have been 
seeking to tap into an existing modality within the broader culture whereby claims for 
legitimacy could be authorized.418 
 
Certainly, the production of Kabbalistic texts served an internal Jewish goal of 
confronting rationalism, but it seems that Castilian Jewish mystics took advantage of the 
favorable cultural conditions of both their Jewish and non-Jewish environment to gain 
power both within and outside their native communities.  
Attacks against the rabbinic tradition were both internal and external, but as 
opposed to earlier stages, Judaism was now equipped with an increasingly mature 
mystical theology. This was supported from within by the first rabbinic elite and 
externally by favorable social and economic conditions. An age of prosperity and cultural 
advancement in the areas in which Kabbalah and philosophy emerged was a central 
factor in the profound socio-economic changes Judaism was undergoing. In Provençe, 
                                                                                                                                  
in this period were Aristotelian rationalism and the scholastic anti-Jewish argumentation of the 
mendicant friars.” see “The Politics of Secrets,” p. 506. 
418 Lachter, ibid., p. 508. 
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Catalonia, and Castile, the material well being of Jews was indispensable for the 
flourishing of new forms of knowledge. As Sirat notes, the existence of towns, economic 
ease, and relatively relaxed social relations were all crucial ingredients in this cultural 
renaissance and the unprecedented expansion of a new middle class that was 
enthusiastically immersed in the most advanced sciences of the time.419 The Muslim 
golden age from as early as Saadia’s time was well known for its relative tolerance 
towards Jews, but even after the transition to the Christian domination of Europe, 
affluence and relatively positive social relations between Jews and Christians endured. 
This was especially apparent in Castile where Jewish intellectuals occupied central 
positions in the court of Alfonso X (r. 1252-1284). The Castilian town of Toledo became 
a center for the fleeing Andalusian aristocracy in which Jews prospered in diverse fields 
such as education, medicine, and finance. Alfonso’s renaissance gave rise to the famous 
‘Toledo school of translators’ in which Jews, Muslim, and Christian were engaged in a 
systematic translation of works from Arabic to Latin and later to Castilian.420 Thanks to 
their outstanding command of languages, Jews occupied a central position in the 
translation project of Castile; Alfonso was so impressed with their accomplishments that 
he went on to employ them for other services as well. Of relevance to the emergence of 
Kabbalah is the fact that some of the most important works of the day, both mystical and 
philosophical, were being systematically translated at Alfonso’s court. This cultural 
                                            
419 Colette Sirat, op. cit., pp. 212-213. 
420 In addition to the possible need to stress one’s local identity, Alfonso’s insistence on 
translations to the vernacular Castilian rather than the scholastic Latin can be seen as an 
indication of the democratizing effects of the age in which the pressure of new educated elites to 
participate in a cultural dialogue were evident across traditions. 
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project led to the emergence of a “pastiche of Neoplatonic, Gnostic, Hermetic, and 
Pythagorean ideas and formulations” that must have been a critical factor in the cultural 
creativity that ensued during what Idel terms the “window of opportunities” between 
1270 – 1290.421 The favorable cultural conditions provided the creative minds of the 
secondary elite with the final momentum they needed to refine and systemize their ideas 
prior to their final incorporation into the Zohar.  
 
3.3.4 Homeostasis to Morphogenesis and back to Homeostasis   
The three-phase progression of the emergence of Kabbalah I have delineated 
stresses the internal dynamic of a cultural system that found itself in a state of crisis. 
Before I proceed to look at the changes Judaism underwent in terms of its morphology, I 
will conclude with a summary of this process, beginning with the late Geonic period and 
ending with the appearance of the Zohar. The pressures exerted on Judaism by the 
introduction of analytic thought in the tenth century led to the decline of the Talmudic 
paradigm and the power of traditional rabbinical authority. This is the beginning of 
Judaism’s shift from a state of homeostasis to a state of destabilization and crisis. The 
synthetic mode of operation in its current state was unable to cope with Greek forms of 
thought and was therefore forced to adjust. Saadia’s adoption of Kalamic theology is an 
example of how information from a tradition’s external environment was introduced 
internally. This initial interaction with analytical forms of thought led to a long 
succession of philosophical works, including ibn Gabirol’s Meqor Hayyim (Fons Vitae), 
                                            
421 For more on the interaction of Jewish translators with the external philosophical and mystical 
knowledge see Lachter, op. cit., p. 507. 
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Bahya ibn Paquda’s Duties of the Heart, Abraham ibn Daud’s Exalted Faith (Emunah 
Ramah), and Maimonides’ Guide. These philosophical publications reflect the escalation 
of analytic tendencies in Judaism and the profound impact Greek philosophical formats 
had on medieval Jewish thought. The translations of philosophical works from Arabic to 
Hebrew beginning in the mid twelfth-century and the eruption of the Maimonidean 
controversies represent a phase in which the introduction of external information into the 
body of Judaism reached a climax. Once this inflow of analytic tendencies began to raise 
concerns among conservatives, a counter reaction formed and gained momentum. In 
other words, the escalation of analytic tendencies led to the real danger of Judaism losing 
its most fundamental characteristics. Such danger became most obvious in the growing 
conventionalization Judaism was undergoing and the increase in conversion and 
assimilation among rationally inclined Jews. Individualism, universalism, allegorical 
exegesis, and the trivialization of the commandments were all undermining Judaism’s 
ability to protect its traditional sources of meaning. This led to the Kabbalistic counter-
attack. One which assimilated ideas from philosophy but interpreted them in a 
conservative way that safeguarded the particularistic and ontological distinctiveness of 
Judaism. Instead of conventionalization we see a process in which traditional Judaism is 
supported by a highly advanced metaphysics that provides it with a powerful normative 
foundation.  
 As a cultural system, the Jewish tradition was profoundly destabilized by the 
emergence of the analytic worldview during the late middle ages. It reacted to this 
perturbation by a protracted phase of adaptation and “restructuration,” or what I refer to 
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as cultural morphogenesis. The consolidation of theurgic Kabbalah as orthodoxy 
symbolizes the completion of this adaptive stage and the successful incorporation of 
elements form the analytic worldview together with their subordination to an updated 
theology that bears all the marks of a highly synthetic tradition.    
  It has long been observed that Kabbalah was grappling with problems that were 
almost identical to those raised by rationalists. Echoing the position of early scholars, 
Eitan Fishbane notes: 
For the historian of ideas, it is indeed strangely paradoxical that many of the same 
kabbalists who so vigorously attacked the philosophical way and who often defined 
themselves within the bitter antagonism of that polemic were simultaneously shaped by 
the philosophy they rejected, and that a great many ideas characteristic of medieval 
philosophical trends were integrated into the theological systems espoused by the 
mystics… At the same time that they denounced philosophers as ignorant of true 
metaphysical wisdom, and labeled them the forerunners of antinomianism within Jewish 
society, the Kabbalists wrote in terms that clearly echoed philosophical theology.422  
 
Some, following Scholem, have referred to this process as the philosophization of Jewish 
mysticism. Kabbalah can be seen as a mode of speculation that sought to replace the 
analytic interpretations of reality with a mode of thought that protected the boundaries of 
the Jewish tradition. This mystical alternative should be understood in a broad 
perspective; I suggest that instead of restricting our discussion to theological content, a 
more comprehensive understanding of the Kabbalistic phenomenon should consider 
multiple levels of analysis; cognitive, linguistic, social, political, and cultural. In other 
                                            
422 Eitan Fishbane, “Mystical Contemplation and the Limits of the Mind: The Case of “Shequl 
Ha-Qodesh” The Jewish Quarterly Review 93, no. 1/2 (2002): 1. 
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words, Kabbalah is not merely a theology in the narrow sense; beyond its contents, it also 
reflects a peculiar social structure, and a distinct attitude towards authority, scripture, 
language, and the human body. The conflict between the synthetic and analytic modes of 
operation is a conflict between two forms of world-making — two divergent and highly 
efficient ways for the construction of order. 
In the following three sections will explore the cognitive, social, and cultural 
aspects of the conflict between the analytic and synthetic worldviews within medieval 
Judaism. I will begin by looking at how changes in these domains initially appeared in 
the works of Jewish philosophers and then proceed to look at the way Kabbalists reacted 
to the analytical challenge by incorporating many of its methodologies and themes while 
simultaneously presenting them in a reinforced and updated synthetic framework.    
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3.4 THE COGNITIVE LEVEL 
As discussed in earlier chapters, the synthetic and analytic modes of operation 
employ substantially different types of cognitive skills in their interpretation of reality. 
Beginning in the mid-tenth century, the analytic atomization of data and more linear and 
logically structured systems were becoming central to the thought processes of the first 
Jewish philosophers. I would like to stress this dramatic shift in methodology and how 
new cognitive procedures led to the emergence of the first systematic Jewish theologies, 
this time presented in formats that disclosed clear marks of the analytic paradigm. These 
new intellectual tendencies did not appear ex-nihilo; the emergence of analytical 
approaches in Judaism were directly linked to the new accessibility of Greek philosophy 
translated by Muslims. As mentioned earlier, in Provençe, one of the most vibrant 
intellectual centers in Europe, there were no signs of a systematic theology prior to the 
Tibbonite translations of philosophical works to Hebrew.423 This suggests that only after a 
contact with Greek philosophical methodologies on a new and unprecedented scale, did 
Jews begin to articulate their tradition in increasingly analytic terms. Prior to this contact, 
so it seems, the pressure for change was simply not in place.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
423 Scholem, Ha Kabblaah bi Provence, p. 4. 
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3.4.1 Atomization of Data: The Rational Phase  
As I have demonstrated in earlier chapters, the classical rabbinic tradition lacked 
the type of logical organization that characterized analytical modes of discourse.424 This 
situation drastically changed with the emergence of Jewish philosophy. The new analytic 
trends that began to infiltrate Judaism during the tenth century represent the gradual 
decline of the Talmudic paradigm and the emergence of a radically new intellectual 
temperament. With Saadia we begin witnessing the characteristic analytic fragmentation 
of knowledge into clear isolated units that could relate to each other logically. His 
philosophical works disclosed an “obsessive fondness for numbered lists” which became 
one of his central trademark.425 Sarah Stroumsa points out that Saadia’s inclinations 
towards the presentation of ideas in a systematic and logically ordered format even 
surpassed the Kalamic tradition that nurtured him.426 Indeed, Saadia’s methodical and 
orderly codification of law became a model for future thinkers; he represented the first 
instance in Judaism since Philo where we witness such an exegetical lucidity and clarity 
of organization.427 Unsurprisingly, in both the cases of Philo and Saadia such logical 
formalism was undeniably instigated by the rise of philosophical rationalism.  
The atomization of data in Judaism was reflected by a new attention to the 
demarcation of speculative categories and specialized terminology. This led to the fine-
tuning of the philosophy’s linguistic tools so that specialized concepts began to refer to a 
more confined and focused meaning. The emergence of specialized fields of linguistics 
                                            
424 Shatz, “The biblical and rabbinic background to medieval Jewish philosophy,” p. 29. 
425 Stroumsa, “Saadya and Jewish Kalam,” p. 82. 
426 Ibid. 
427 Judah Goldin. “The Period of the Talmud,” p. 199. 
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and philology during this period represented an important shift from the multi-layered 
semantic range and ambiguous language of Midrashic and Talmudic discourse, towards a 
philosophically refined terminology. In other words, the atomization of data meant that 
linguistic terminology was more tightly compartmentalized to designate specific and non-
alterable meaning conducive for clarity and inter-religious dialogue. It is for this reason 
that some of the most influential philosophical works such as Maimonides’ Guide of the 
Perplexed begin with a detailed clarification and definition of terms. This period also saw 
the proliferation of dictionaries and works on Hebrew grammar, a trend that was to a 
great extent an outcome of the need to hone and refine language to suit philosophical 
discourse and adjust Jewish discourse to a more precise and scientific mindset.428  
On a more general level, analytic atomization led to a greater division of labor 
within Judaism and the emergence of new forms of religious discourse. David 
Blumenthal argues that one of the distinguishing characteristics of the Geonic period was 
that new literary genres appeared and that intellectuals began to deal with religious issues 
topically. Saadia himself pioneered several areas of specialization such as philosophy, 
linguistics, poetics, exegesis and law. As opposed to the synthetic and narrative nature of 
Talmudic discourse, we suddenly witness independent fields of expertise that are 
thematically differentiated. This was certainly a revolutionary change in the treatment of 
information among Jewish intellectuals. Blumenthal claims that this new reality 
“generated new structures of thinking, new questions, and new sets of problems.”429 The 
                                            
428 Ibid., p. 125. 
429 Blumenthal, “Religion and the Religious Intellectuals,” p. 121. 
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traditional rabbinic worldview was reformulated according to analytic methodologies 
which radically changed the face of classical Judaism. 
The neat differentiation of information and the more explicit definition of terms 
made Judaism more decipherable and accessible to those who were not trained in the 
exclusive procedures of Talmudic discourse. The formal clarity of philosophy was more 
accessible to the intellectual novice such that young educated Jews could now begin to 
participate in a new and intellectually stimulating discourse. Another clear advantage of 
the analytic mindset was that for the first time Judaism could be presented to Muslims 
and Christians through a universally accessible format. 
3.4.2 Systemization: The Rational Phase 
 Philosophy is relentless in its demand for organization; in the increasingly rational 
intellectual milieu of the times, failing to communicate beliefs methodically became a 
sign of inferiority. In addition, the advent of rationalism represented a new age in which 
apologetics, disputation, and argumentation took a central stage. Believers were expected 
to defend their worldviews in a coherent and communicable fashion, frequently in the 
presence of an audience and judges. In order to compete in this harsh and competitive 
environment, Jewish authorities had to reify their tradition and articulate it as a concrete 
‘something.’ The lack of a well-defined Jewish dogma became increasingly alarming as it 
made Judaism highly vulnerable to external attacks.430 Maimonides rose to this challenge 
and successfully articulated the main articles of belief in his famous thirteen principles of 
                                            
430 Wilfred Cantwell Smith shows that it was the typical Greek proclivity towards reification that 
conceived Judaism as a distinct religion, not something that emerged from within Judaism. See 
his The Meaning and End of Religion (London: S.P.C.K., 1978), p. 72. 
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faith. In his commentary on the Mishnah, Maimonides refers to his methodical 
formulation of Judaism as the “fundamental truths of our religion and its very 
foundations."431 Such a statement would have seemed extremely bizarre prior to the tenth 
century, since from a classical Talmudic point of view the need to condense Judaism into 
a few central statements would have seemed absurd, if not problematic. Why would one 
endeavor to conclusively articulate the Jewish faith, if life as we experience it, was ever 
changing, non-conclusive, and open-ended? According to this traditional view a static 
and unalterable dogma neglects the nature of reality as a dynamic process in which 
history plays a crucial position, it also reflects the non-systematic nature of pre-
philosophical Judaism. Unfortunately for conservatives, the open-ended and meandering 
Talmudic style was no longer capable of dealing with the demand for an accessible and 
ordered exposition of knowledge. This new mindset is beautifully captured in Halevi’s 
Kuzari, which unsurprisingly takes place in a court dispute between representatives of 
philosophy and different religions. After the Jewish protagonist, the Haver, defends his 
faith in detail, the disappointed king of the Khazars claims that his argument was 
unsystematic and therefore inferior and simplistic. 
The analytic clarity of philosophy gave Judaism the necessary tools to defend 
itself systematically, and was the first step in moving from a narrative discourse towards 
a rational/speculative one. In other words, beginning with Saadia, the Talmudic 
associative, and open-ended model gave way to a new trend of systematic theology.432 
                                            
431 Moshe Idel, introduction to Kellner, Maimonides Confrontation with Mysticism, p. vii. Quoted 
from Maimonides, Commentary on the Mishnah, Sanhedrin, chap. 10. 
432 Blumenthal, “Religion and Religious Intellectuals,” p. 119. 
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Although the increasing systemization of Judaism may seems like a methodological 
change, it actually went far beyond mere alterations in presentation. In order to articulate 
their beliefs systematically, Jewish philosophers were forced to respond to a set of 
questions that came to the fore as a result of a more analytical disposition. Theodore 
,Steinberg reminds us that the Talmud and Mishnah attempt to explain how to implement 
the law rather than to examine the system of beliefs that forms the basis for these laws.433 
As a result of the emergence of a more skeptical frame of mind, Jewish thinkers, 
following their Muslim counterparts, began to question their traditions by asking a new 
set of questions framed in a substantially new mode. Rabbis were no longer in their 
secluded orbit of discourse, they were forced to explain why they believe rather than 
simply insist that they do. Once the why questions were raised, a reassessment of the 
entire tradition became inevitable. Apologetics and argumentation began to replace 
systems that were taken for granted due to the sheer charisma of traditional institutions.434 
 Some of the new topics that came to the fore were related to creation and 
cosmology, God’s existence, His attributes, the nature of language, free will, the role of 
Scripture, the nature of prophecy and revelation, the problem of evil, the problem of 
divine retribution, God’s unity, eschatology, and the nature and meaning of miracles. 
Blumenthal notes that all the books of theology that emerge after Saadia dealt with these 
central dilemmas, exhibiting a new systematic approach to knowledge.435 Therefore, the 
                                            
433 Theodore Steinberg, Jews and Judaism in the Middle Ages, pp. 222-3. 
434 Although Halevi’s argument is philosophically informed, his prioritization of historical 
experience over logical proof deviated from the intellectual demands of his age. See Itzhak Shilat, 
Ben hakuzari la’rambam, p. 13. 
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increasing dependence on reason led to the conscious articulation of a new set of 
interrelated questions that begged an organized and methodical response. These new 
questions were ordered systematically from the most central to the most subtle, offering a 
comprehensive investigation of a sui-generis worldview. Such systematicity entailed a 
peculiar ordering of topics such that tackling central themes became a prerequisite for 
dealing with more subtle ones. This rational organization evoked a sense of logical 
linearity and a hierarchical attitude towards the exposition of data. Jewish philosophers 
from Saadia to Maimonides began to follow these causative formats in which one 
question led to the next, aiming towards a set of clear and indisputable conclusions. As an 
example, in addition to the type of questions Maimonides raised, one of his greatest 
contributions was the way he managed to present those questions in a well-ordered and 
interrelated manner. Maimonides Guide “moves from logic and language to physics (and 
cosmology) to metaphysics and philosophical psychology to, finally, legal, moral, and 
political philosophy. This progression, which maps on to the ancient ordering of the 
Aristotelian corpus, is to be seen as culminating in the practical sciences.”436 These new 
hierarchically stratified methods were a far cry from the rabbinical tradition in which: 
No halakhic dictum, exegesis, or idea (or document, for that matter) dominates all others. 
None is subordinate, none formally set off as the epitome of all wisdom and truth. Rather, 
all stand, as it were, next to one another in a relation of mutuality and exquisite tension. 
For this reason rabbinic documents read as if suspended in space, moving towards no 
                                            
436 Daniel Frank, “Maimonides and Medieval Jewish Aristotelianism,” pp. 164-7. 
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literary or cognitive conclusion. Many of them even lack formal beginnings and 
endings.437 
The differences between classical Judaism and the thought processes introduced by 
philosophers were indeed dramatic. During what I refer to as the period between the 
emergence of philosophy and the appearance of the Zohar, there was a clear departure 
from the associative, non-linear and open-ended methods of the Talmud towards a 
logically organized systematic theology.   
3.4.3 De-Contextualization: The Rational Phase  
In the second chapter I argued that synthetic systems show an interest in 
contextualized historical analysis and ethics. The new rational discourse that was 
introduced into Judaism led to a shift from a narrative discourse to an increasingly a-
historical articulation of cosmology and dogma. Jewish philosophers were less inclined to 
incorporate particularistic and narrative-based elements into their polemical arguments. 
The cross-cultural applicability of philosophical discourse entailed an inevitable de-
contextualization of information. As Oliver Leaman argues, “instead of linking 
information together in terms of weak connectors such as allusion, analogy, and 
propinquity between passages…” philosophy focused on “the logical relationship 
between terms. It was this conceptual strength of philosophy that made it so significant in 
various cultures…”438  
                                            
437 William Scott Green, “Storytelling and Holy Man: The Case of Ancient Israel,” p. 33 
438 Oliver Leaman, “Introduction to the Study of Medieval Jewish Philosophy,” in Cambridge 
Companion, p. 10. Leaman continues: “…Like Pandora’s box, once the ideas are out in the open, 
it is difficult if not impossible to put them back again, and this happened with philosophy.” Ibid. 
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Jewish philosophers initiated a transformation from the Talmudic paradigm 
founded upon relatively ambiguous terminology, open-endedness, and contextualized 
historical narratives, towards strategies of interpretation that highlighted conceptual 
accuracy, linear and logical organization, and an increasingly de-contextualized, 
objective presentation of information. Methodologically this new type of formalism was 
apparent in the integration of discrete units of information using content-free relations, 
which provided philosophical discourse with a convenient linearity that was relatively 
free of particularistic cultural considerations. In terms of content, the shift from a 
narrative theology concerned with ethics and historical analysis towards a more 
objectified form of speculation was reflected by an unprecedented interest in 
metaphysics. As opposed to the fairly rudimentary creation story in Genesis, medieval 
Jewish thinkers turned towards a more sophisticated explanation of the structure of the 
cosmos and its relationship to human activity. By its very nature, the field of 
metaphysics, inspired by Aristotelianism, sought to present a trans-cultural universe that 
transcended the particularities of any specific religion or culture. Here again we see an 
objectified and de-contextualized approach that came to replace the typical archaic and 
local narratives anchored in a specific cultural ethos.      
 The emergence of Jewish philosophy profoundly changed that Judaism. The 
peculiar cognitive strategies of rational thought were dramatically different from anything 
Jews were accustomed to prior to the tenth century. Gradually, a native and 
philosophically informed backlash to rationalism emerged among conservatives, best 
represented by various schools of medieval mysticism. The following section will look at 
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how the school of theurgic Kabbalah both adopted the new analytic cognitive strategies 
of Greece, but also managed to incorporate them into an alternative intellectual discourse 
that was based on the synthetic foundations of traditional Judaism.   
  
3.4.4 Atomization and Conceptualization: The Kabbalistic Reaction 
The conservative wing of the rabbinic tradition could not ignore the new powerful 
methodologies of the analytic paradigm. This led to the emulation of rational strategies 
and a tendency towards the atomization of data and the construction of clear and distinct 
metaphysical categories among medieval Jewish mystics. It therefore makes perfect sense 
that Sefer Yetzirah (The Book of Creation) played a central role in this process. For 
Jewish thinkers, philosophers and mystics alike, this unique text was a testimony to the 
existence of an original and native Jewish speculative tradition that offered an intricate 
cosmology and cosmogony of its own.439 In Halevi’s Kuzari, for instance, Sefer Yetzirah 
is often quoted and presented as a work of science superior to the Aristotelian worldview. 
The first commentaries on Sefer Yetzirah were philosophical and disclose no knowledge 
or acquaintance with Kabbalistic ideas. The two most noteworthy philosophical 
commentaries were written by Saadia and Judah b. Barzillai, both of which had an 
enduring influence on the development of medieval Jewish mysticism. Barzillai was one 
of the most prominent figures in Provençal Jewry at the beginning of the twelfth century 
where theurgic Kabbalah first emerged. It therefore makes sense that the first Kabbalistic 
commentary on Sefer Yetzirah in Provençe was influenced by Barzillai’s philosophical 
                                            
439 According to Scholem Yetzirah can be seen as the first speculative text in the Jewish tradition. 
Scholem, ha Kabbalah Bi Provence, p. 49. 
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commentary.440 Therefore the first Kabbalists were clearly following philosophers in 
adopting Sefer Yetzirah as a platform for the construction of their alternative cosmology. 
The fact that both medieval Jewish philosophers and mystics used Sefer Yetzirah as an 
early foundation for their speculative cosmologies turned this slim text into a kind of 
battleground for articulating different ideologies and opposing perceptions of reality. 
Both groups were adamant in arguing that Sefer Yetzirah was an ancient text that could 
be traced back to the first patriarchs, thereby presenting their new theologies as ancient 
wisdom. Modern scholarship, however, is in general agreement that Sefer Yetzirah is a 
fairly late text, which discloses clear Neo-pythagorean and other Greek influences.441  
This is a good example of how complex traditions are able to tap into their 
resources at times of need. Although dating Sefer Yetzirah remains an extremely 
controversial issue, one thing is clear; beginning with Saadia, it became one of the most 
frequently quoted texts in medieval Judaism between the tenth and thirteenth centuries.442 
This is an example of the sudden focus on a previously peripheral text by practically all 
contending ideologies in the Jewish milieu. The new attention that formerly marginalized 
texts enjoy can be seen as one of the most common phenomena in the way traditions 
adapt to new realities. This will be discussed in the Chinese case as well, where the Yijing 
                                            
440 Ibid., Earlier mystical commentaries to Yetzirah were composed by the German Pietists prior 
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(Book of Changes) experienced a similar commentarial revival during the Song Dynasty. 
Both texts were metaphysical in nature and therefore provided rabbis and literati with 
material for responding to the analytic challenge.   
Of interest to our discussion, is the fact that one of main characteristics of Sefer 
Yetzirah is its neat categorization of data. Indeed it is the most intricate work of typology 
and classification in the Jewish tradition prior to the emergence of philosophy and 
Kabbalah. Ithamar Gruenwald notes that Sefer Yetzirah presents the world through well-
defined structural categories and systematic terminology that disclose many of the 
characteristics of a well-written medieval scientific treatise.443 One of Sefer Yetzirah’s 
main goals was the creation of a correlative relationship between nature, the human body, 
different human attributes, the Hebrew alphabet, and the ‘ten numbers’ that were destined 
to become the ten sefirot or hypostases of the Kabbalah. Indeed, Sefer Yetzirah’s 
typological complexity is a unique instance in Jewish literature; it offered a conceptual 
foundation for a more systematic and speculative worldview that was perceived through 
an objective fragmentation of reality into ontological entities.444 
                                            
443 Ithamar Gruenwald, “Ha-Mistika Ha-Yehudit Bama’Avar Mi-Sefer Yetzirah Le-Sefer Bahir.” 
In Divrei Ha-Kenes Ha-Ben Leumiha-Sheni Le Toldot Ha-Mistika Ha-Yehudit be-Eropa, edited 
by Joseph Dan, (Jerusalem, 1987), pp. 15-16. R’ Shabtai Donnolo a famous Italian doctor and 
scientist of the tenth century wrote a commentary on Yetzirah known as Chakmoni that discloses 
clear scientific interests. His book shows a clear attempt of supporting his scientific project with 
Jewish sources. 
444 At the beginning we are introduced to the ‘ten numbers’ that are ‘unspoken,’ ‘unknown’ or 
‘formed from nothingness’ (המילב תוריפס רשע), together with the Hebrew alphabet we get the 
‘thirty-two foundational letters;’ the letters are further divided into the ‘three mothers,’ the ‘seven 
doubles,’ and ‘twelve elementals.’Later the texts goes on to classify the relationship between the 
sexes, bodily organs, the natural elements (which conform to the Greek air, water, and fire), the 
progression of time and space, the constellations, the twelve directions, human senses and 
emotions, and so forth. 
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The atomization of data begins with Sefer Yetzirah but is later extended to the 
whole Kabbalistic project. Medieval Jewish mystics began to define terms with 
unprecedented precision and attention to the interrelationship between concepts. The 
sefirotic tree, one of the defining features of Kabbalah, is itself a central example of 
analytical differentiation, represented by the conceptualizations and hypostatization of the 
divine attributes. Kabbalists audaciously dissected the godhead into separate entities, 
expressing a disposition towards the fragmentation of information characteristic of the 
analytic mind. Moreover, beginning with Sefer Yetzirah but clearly present in the Bahir 
and in subsequent Kabbalistic texts, important notions such a devekut (clinging), and 
kavvanah (intention), took on new and more explicit meanings that clearly diverged form 
their more ambiguous use in Midrashic and Talmudic literature. In other words, like 
philosophers, early Kabbalists began to conceptualize their classical terminology such 
that it pointed to a more precise and focused meaning. Terms were reified so that their 
flexible classical undertones were transformed to denote discrete metaphysical 
substances. For example, reality was divided into four distinct levels of existence, the 
soul was stratified into five layers, and as mentioned, the godhead was divided into clear 
entities that could be addressed separately in prayer and manipulated according to one’s 
intentions.445 Language is of particular importance here: although both philosophers and 
mystics clearly sought to systemize their respective worldviews, their diverging 
approaches towards language led to utterly different intellectual orientations. The 
different linguistic approaches of medieval philosophers and theurgic kabbalists have 
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been widely commented upon by modern scholarship and could be generally summarized 
as the distinction between philosophical conceptualism and mystical symbolism.446 
Conceptual language refers to terms that have one restricted and confined significance, 
while mystical symbolism can possibly denote a wide range of meanings. As I argued, 
following philosophers, mystics began to conceptualize their speculative terminology but 
in spite of these clear analytical tendencies, important differences between mystics and 
philosophers remained substantial. 447 Although both groups constructed a much more 
specialized terminology, rationalists were much more concerned with the elimination of 
ambiguity and the establishment of a well-ordered correlation between term and referent. 
The nature of mystical symbolism, on the other hand, was much more broad and elusive. 
The ‘diffused’ semantic range of Kabbalistic symbols meant they overlapped and 
therefore interacted in a more dynamic and nonlinear fashion. The boundaries of the 
mystical symbol were less discrete thereby endowing the Kabbalistic system with a more 
synthetic and integrative nature that resonated with conservative Rabbinical models of 
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discourse. According to Scholem and Tishby, the mystical symbol is paradoxical in that it 
uses language to point to that which language cannot communicate.448 In other words, 
instead of explicitly pointing towards a narrow and confined meaning, the mystical 
symbol is pregnant with significance, one that attempts to lead the mystic as close as 
possible to that which cannot be expressed discursively. The atomization of data in 
Kabbalah was therefore different than that of philosophy, it left space, so to speak, for 
exegetical diversity that avoided the rigidity of philosophical conceptualism.     
I will return to these important distinctions in the section on language, here I want 
to stress the contrary ways philosophers and mystics approached the task of atomizing 
information. As opposed to the economical approach of philosophy, Kabbalistic 
symbolism was multi-layered and opaque, but its lack of referential exactitude was 
compensated for by its ability to point the mystic towards profound intuitive and 
experiential insights. Although Jewish theurgists followed Greek philosophical formats in 
                                            
448 Moshe Idel offers three scholarly approaches to the rise of Kabbalistic symbolism. He terms 
the approach espoused by Scholem and Tishby “Neotic Insufficiency.” According to him 
although this approach is partially correct, its exclusive focus on the referential features of 
symbolism leads to the unfortunate marginalization of its performative aspects: “While the 
referential approaches can in some cases define the initial phase of the theosophical-theurgical 
path, they cannot exhaust a fundamental aspect of some Kabbalistic theories of language: their 
performative, or manipulative, or effective understandings… the symbol as the divine presence 
within the lower world is not only the feeble reflection of the supernal into the mundane but also 
the beginning of an ontological chain that facilitates the transmission of the human influence on 
high.” See idel, Absorbing Perfection, pp. 276. The other two approaches see Kabbalistic 
symbolism as, a)  a reaction to a crisis of meaning in the biblical text and, b) Scholem’s idea of 
Kabbalistic symbolism as a reflection of the historical experience of the Jewish people: “Here we 
have an interesting attempt to propose a correlation between the Kabbalistic symbol and the 
cumulative historical experiences of the people of Israel… a fusion between the personal and the 
collective experience.” More on this approach towards symbolism see Tishby, Paths of Faith and 
Heresy, p. 13; idem., The Wisdom of the Zohar, 1:284; Scholem, On the Kabbalah, p. 36; p. 22: 
‘‘Symbols, by their very nature, are a means of expressing an experience that is in itself 
expressionless’’; idem., On Jews and Judaism, p. 48; idem, Major Trends, pp. 27-28. Joseph Dan, 
The Early Kabbalah, pp. 9–13. 
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their establishment of specialized terminology, the fact that their basic unit of meaning 
was the symbol rather than the philosophical concept endowed Kabbalah with a much 
more flexible and dynamic interpretive nature. That Kabbalists resorted to an 
emanationist theology is yet another factor that reflects their unique approach towards the 
atomization of data. Idel calls this a “conjunctive theology” which he contrasts with the 
Maimonidean dualist distinction between the divine and the material world.449 The 
emanative progression from the highly abstract and hidden domain of Ein-Sof towards the 
increasingly concrete lower worlds of Azilut (emanation - intellect), Briyah (sphere of 
angels), Yetzirah (creation), and Asiyah (action) is such that these different spheres of 
existence interact and relate to each other through a fluid process of emanation in which 
the shift from one sphere to another avoids the typical abrupt differentiation between 
categories in analytic systems. Of relevance is that although kabbalists display a clear 
tendency towards an analytic construction of categories and specialized terminology, they 
chose a distinctly anti-Aristotelian, emanationist approach that downplayed conceptual 
rigidity in favor of a more dynamic, process-based, and fluid progression between 
metaphysical categories.      
In conclusion, like philosophers, Kabbalists, too, moved towards a more analytic 
approach towards data, one that sought to distinguish between units of information and 
metaphysical entities. What made Kabbalah distinct was its use of symbolism and 
emanationist strategies, which lent its theology a peculiar synthetic flavor. The dynamic I 
want to stress in all the subsequent sections on Kabbalah and Neo-Confucianism is that 
                                            
449 Idel, “Kabbalah and Elites,” p. 9. 
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both these defense-theologies appropriate analytic features and subordinate them to 
native synthetic sensibilities. In this specific case we see the Kabbalistic emulation of the 
analytic atomization of data, which was executed in a quintessentially synthetic manner 
such that there was a fluid movement between concepts and the use of a more multi-
layered and flexible symbolic theology.          
                             
3.4.5 Systemization: The Kabbalistic Reaction 
Following philosophical models, medieval Jewish mysticism represents an 
escalation in systematic thought.450 Both mystics and philosophers came to believe that 
the cosmos as a whole worked according to a hierarchy of laws and “a law-like 
necessity.”451 Contradictions that were never problematic during the classical Talmudic 
age made way for a more unified worldview typical of medieval thought.452 Just like 
philosophers, mystical schools such as the German pietists, the Iyyun Circle, theurgists, 
and the school of ecstatic Kabbalah all adopted analytical strategies of presenting 
knowledge systematically.453 In the case of theurgic Kabbalah, the sefirotic tree 
                                            
450 Dan, Toldot Torat ha-Sod, Vol. 1, pp. 48-9. 
451 Septimus, Hispano-Jewish Culture, pp. 110-111. In this example the Kabbalist Ibn Gabbai 
sees the Kabbalistic necessity as superior and more tightly knit than that of philosophy. 
452 Examples of the way the Zohar systemized “discrepancies” in the Talmud are numerous. 
Moshe Idel points our attention to one such instance in which the Zohar synthesizes two 
perceptions of the notion of the ‘pillar’ in Rabbinic literature, one which believes the world is 
sustained by seven pillars, the other that the world stands on a single pillar. According to the 
theosophical code the single pillar is that of sefirat yesod while the six others are related to the six 
lower sefirot, which are grounded in yesod. Idel refers to this as the ‘luminous pillar’ of the 
Zohar. Ascension on High, pp. 88-90.  
453 The first indications of this Greek trend can possibly be traced back the book Sha’arei 
Hokhmah (Gates of wisdom) of the Kalonimus family in Germany but the increase in 
systematization is apparent in all schools of medieval mysticism and most clearly in the 
Kabbalistic schools. ⁠ See Dan, Toldot Torat ha Sod, vol.5. p. 190. 
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functioned as an infrastructure for the construction of a systematic theology concerned 
with reality as whole. This organized structure provided kabbalists with a conceptual 
foundation to probe into the nature of existence, the inner qualities of the godhead, 
human psychology, and the performance and meaning of the commandments in a 
coherent and unified fashion. The shift towards systematic thought among mystics can be 
seen in the way Kabbalistic manuals and commentaries disclosed an unprecedented order 
and progression of ideas. Almost all of these kabbalistic texts introduce a neat and 
methodical explication of the sefirot beginning with the lowest Malchut or the highest 
Ein-Sof and proceeding through the whole Kabbalistic structure.   
In her analysis of the early Zoharic ‘Midrash of Rabbi Isaac,’ Ronit Meroz 
highlights the clear escalation of systematic thought from early Jewish Heikhalot 
mysticism to that of the middle ages:  
Compared to the angelology with its conceptions and characteristics of the first 
millennium C.E., the salient innovation in this passage is its systematization. Unlike the 
texts of the first millennium in which we find an enormous and chaotic list of angelic 
names, here we are presented with a systematic discussion of angels based on abstract 
categories – upper and lower, Din and Rahamim (Judgment and Compassion), male and 
female, etc. Furthermore, fixing the number 10 of the inner angels as a typological 
number also shows an effort at systematization. Based on the evidence thus far, it would 
seem that our unit represents a transitional stage between the angelology of the first 
millennium and the Kabbalah of the 2nd millennium.454 
 
                                            
454 Ronit Meroz, “The Middle Eastern Origins of Kabbalah,” Journal for the Study of Sephardic 
and Mizrahi Jewry, 1 (2007): 44. Also see Jonathan Dauber, Knowledge of God and the 
Development of Early Kabbalah (Leiden ; Boston: Brill, 2012), p. 192. 
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Kabbalists were clearly following philosophers in presenting information and thinking 
more systematically, but they did this is a way that retained many of the intellectual 
dispositions of the synthetic modality. One obvious characteristic of Kabbalistic 
systematization was the insistence on preserving old layers of the tradition. Aggadah, 
Midrash, and ancient Heikhalot and Merkavah mysticism were all synthesized into a 
coherent whole with an internal logic. Indeed, every device available in Jewish discourse 
was tapped into, intensified or re-articulated in an attempt to give Kabbalistic theology an 
internal coherence that integrated themes with a new systematic cosmology.455 
Kabbalists, as opposed to philosophers, refused to delegitimize old layers of the tradition; 
as opposed to philosophers who abandoned layers of the tradition that they saw as 
illegitimate and outdated, kabbalists skillfully tapped into these earlier strata and 
reinterpreted them in a new and systematic fashion.  
 This unique approach can be seen in Kabbalah’s adoption of the aggadic portions 
of the tradition - the same parts that were seen as outdated and problematic in the eyes of 
Jewish rationalists.456 While Aggadah was an embarrassment for many rationalists it 
                                            
455 Idel makes this point clear in his review of Scholem’s understanding of the emergence of 
Kabbalah: “Rabbinism was not an homogeneous religiosity; it incorporates diverging views on 
many issues, including the preference, or the rejection of mythical types of expression. It is 
therefore quite strange that Scholem implicitly identified Rabbinism exclusively with Halakhah, 
whereas the Aggadah was not included as part of the discussion of the dichotomy Rabbinism- 
Kabbalism. As he himself has several times remarked, the continuity between the Kabbalistic and 
the Aggadic literature seems to be obvious…” see “Rabbanism vs. Kabbalism,” p. 289.  Scholem 
even explicitly acknowledges that "the whole of Aggadah can in a way be regarded as a popular 
mythology of the Jewish universe. Now, this mythical element which is deeply rooted in the 
creative forms of Aggadic production, operates on different planes in the old Aggadah and in 
Kabbalism." Scholem, Major Trends, pp. 30-32. 
456 Beginning with the Geonim, two general attitudes towards Aggadah became prevalent: 
rejection or reinterpretation. The philosophers generally gravitated towards different degrees of 
the former, and Kabbalists to different degrees of the latter. ⁠See David Shatz, “The biblical and 
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became a central tool for conservatives in restructuring their tradition. Not only was the 
speculative nature of aggadah a natural candidate to confront philosophical speculation, 
but it also helped thinkers such R. Ezra and R. Azriel create a seamless continuity with 
the rabbinic tradition.457 Both these important Gerona kabbalists claimed that the aggadot 
of the Talmud were actually a code that can be deciphered in mystical terms. Rabbi 
Azriel’s commentary on the aggdot represents a milestone in the institutionalization and 
legitimation of aggadic literature within mysticism. This important treatise became a 
manifesto of Kabbalah and the earliest and most explicit declaration of Kabbalah’s 
inherent relationship with the tradition that preceded it.458 Relevant to our story is the fact 
that R’ Azriel’s commentary represented a transformation of Aggadah from a narrative 
discourse towards a conceptual tool for systematic speculation in which different symbols 
take of a more reified and stable meaning. This is a classical example of how Kabbalah 
managed to strike a balance between conservatism and change. Kabbalists preserved the 
portions of aggadic Judaism that philosophers denied, but they nevertheless reorganized 
and utilized Aggadah in a completely non-literal and systematic manner. This balancing 
                                                                                                                                  
rabbinic background to medieval Jewish philosophy,” pp. 31-33. “Nonliteral interpretations of the 
Aggadah were a major point of contention in the Maimonidean controversy.” Medieval 
approaches towards aggadic literature were diverse. Whereas dogmatic conservatives such as the 
French Tosafists advocated a literal interpretation, and philosophers preferred to disregard 
aggadah, Kabbalists resorted to creative and mystical reinterpretations. Yet another position was 
represented by “old school” Talmudists such as the Ramah who occupied a midpoint between the 
Tosafists and philosophers. Refusing to accept its imaginative contents, the Ramah believed that 
the Aggadah lacked final authority which was normal among those educated in the Spanish 
Talmudic tradition. See Septimus, Hispano-Jewish Culture, pp. 39-103, especially pp. 75-8; 109. 
Nevertheless, even Kabbalists such as Nahmanides showed reluctance towards aggadic literature 
and saw it as unbinding. 
457 Hyan Maccoby, The Philosophy of the Talmud (Richmond, Surrey; New York: Curzon, 2002), 
pp. 17-18. 
458 Joseph Dan, Jewish Mysticism: General Characteristics and Comparative Studies, Vol. 4. 
(Jerusalem: Jason Aronson, Inc., 1999), pp. xv-xxxi. 
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act can help us understand their historical success. The theurgic School positioned itself 
between radical rationalists who marginalized the role and truth-value of Aggadah on the 
one hand, and ultra-conservative talmudists such as the French Tosafists who remained 
rigidly entrenched in its literal interpretation. Countering rationalists, Kabbalists managed 
to protect this central feature of Jewish discourse, which contained a wealth of native 
symbols that were emotionally dear to the hearts of many Jews. One the other hand, they 
also differed from extreme traditionalists by tapping into aggadah’s non-literal meaning 
and speculative symbolic potential.  
 The Kabbalistic sefirotic structure functioned as a foundation for a systematic 
philosophy that deciphered existence according to a coherent psycho-cosmological 
framework. Mystics constructed a clear and methodic worldview in which everything in 
life could be expressed and understood according to the sefirot. The creation of the world 
from the Ein-Sof, the structure of the universe, the inner workings of the godhead, the 
different layers of existence, the evolution of the human soul and its relation to the body, 
the goal Israel in the world, the object of prayer, the process of hastening the advent of 
the messiah, the relationship between good and evil, male and female, and matter and 
spirit could all be understood according to a systematic framework. Due to this 
consistency and coherence, Kabbalah, just like philosophy, became much more 
accessible than rabbinic thought. Once the Kabbalistic “code” was understood it gave 
believers a common key for understanding scripture and deciphering the world.  
 Here again I want to stress the dynamic of ‘appropriation and subordination.’ 
Although mystics show a clear tendency towards systematization in the early period of 
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Kabbalah, the final expression of the theurgic worldview in the Zohar returned to a 
traditional Midrashic discourse that avoided the strict linear approach of analytical 
systems. The narrative features of the Zohar have long been commented upon by scholars 
of Kabbalah; Scholem’s characterization of this work as a mystical novel is one notable 
example.459 More recently, influenced by the romantic interpretation of the Zohar paved 
by Yehuda Liebes and his students, Eitan Fishbane has noted that:  
…the Zohar is distinguished by its use of fictionality and storytelling—features that are 
highly unusual in the broader context of kabbalistic theology and systematic metaphysics. 
Indeed, it is precisely in the adaptation of midrashic modalities (of narrative and 
exegesis) that the authors of the Zohar sought to achieve their pseudepigraphical goal; the 
deliberate avoidance of medieval conventions is central to the aesthetic texture of the 
work.460  
There are two points that merit our attentions in this short passage. The first is that the 
Zohar’s adoption of a literary format represents a clear departure form Greek formats of 
speculation to a mode of presentation that is familiar to the traditional Jewish emphasis 
                                            
459 Scholem, Major Trends, p. 157. 
460 Eitan p. Fishbane, “The Scent of the Rose: Drama, Fiction, and Narrative Form in the Zohar.” 
In Prooftexts 29, no. 3 (Fall 2009): 326. Among the works that stress the literary and narrative 
aspects of the Zohar see Yehudah Liebes’ “The Messiah of the Zohar” in Studies in the Zohar, 
pp. 1–84; Idem., “Zohar Ve Eros.” Alpayym 9 (1994): 67-119; Ronit Meroz, “Zoharic Narratives 
and their Adaptations,” Hispania Judaica Bulletin 3 (2000): 3–63; Idem. “Reqimato shel mitos: 
Diyun be-shnei sippurim ba-Zohar,” in Study and Knowledge in Jewish Thought, vol. 2, ed. 
Howard Kreisel (Beer Sheva: Ben Gurion University of the Negev Press, 2006), pp. 167–205; 
Eitan Fishbane, “Tears of Disclosure: The Role of Weeping in Zoharic Narrative,” Journal of 
Jewish Thought and Philosophy 11, no. 1 (2002): 25–47; Elliot Wolfson, Language, Eros, Being: 
Kabbalistic Hermeneutics and Poetic Imagination (New York, NY: Fordham University Press, 
2005), pp. 1–45; 190–260 passim.; Boaz Huss, “Ÿakham ‘adif mi-navi: R. Shimon bar Yoÿai u-
Moshe Rabbeinu ba-Zohar,” Kabbalah: Journal for the Study of Jewish Mystical Texts 4 (1999): 
103–39; Michal Oron, “Motiv ha-yanuka ve-mashma‘uto be-sefer ha-Zohar,” Meroz, Ronit, (ed.) 
Hidushei Zohar: Mechkarim Hadashim be Sifrut Ha-Zohar (Tel-Aviv: Tel-Aviv University, 
2007), pp. 129–164; Nathan Wolski, “Mystical Poetics: Narrative, Time, and Exegesis in the 
Zohar,” Prooftexts 28, no. 2 (2008): 101–28. 
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on narratives. The second point is that the narrative fiction of the Zohar is “unusual in the 
broader context of Kabbalistic theology.” In other words, the early mystics of Gerona 
articulate their worldviews in close conformity to philosophical models but once 
Kabbalistic theology reaches greater maturity it slowly shifted towards an increasingly 
synthetic presentation of information. This dynamic is reflected in the turn from the 
highly conceptual language mystics employed at the beginning of the twelfth century 
towards the increasingly “diffused” symbolism of the Zohar, as well as in the more 
systematic nature of Kabbalah in Gerona as opposed to its more organic and narrative 
structure in the Zohar. The return to Midrashic and aggadic formats of presentation in the 
Zohar did not, however, mean that the systematic nature of Kabbalah was abandoned. A 
new and indeed revolutionary systematic theology lurks behind the zoharic narrative. The 
narrative and Midrashic characteristics of zoharic theology gave it a sense of continuity 
with the past, thereby cloaking its systematic and innovative character. This double-sided 
nature of the Zohar equipped Judaism with the analytic resources to answer the same 
questions raised by philosophy, while at the same time it preserved indigenous rabbinic 
modes of presenting information. The fact that the Zohar returned to a discourse that was 
irrefutable by the restricted mechanisms of the intellect, enabled mystics to present the 
Kabbalistic worldview as metaphysically superior to philosophy.461    
                                            
461 To a certain extent, medieval mystics were following the course paved by Halevi who 
marginalized proof by reason in favor of revelation and experience. According to Halevi the 
philosophical method is incapable of dealing with the sheer facts of history and the undeniable 
testimony of collective experience. Halevi’s defense of Judaism in face of philosophical thought 
was therefore a precursor to many of the anti-rational sensibilities harbored by Kabbalists and 
conservative rabbis. See more on the acceptance of the Kuzari in Adam Shear, The Kuzari and 
the Shaping of Jewish Identity, 1167-1900. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
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3.4.6 De-Contextualization: The Kabbalistic Reaction  
Finally, the decontextualization of information is another feature that Kabbalists 
clearly adopted from analytic formats. This can be seen in the way Kabbalah constructed 
a relatively objective and trans-cultural cosmology. I will look at this phenomenon in 
greater detail in section 3.7.2 (Universalism vs. Particularism), here I will only note that 
such decontextualization meant that more than ever before, Kabbalah proposed a Jewish 
cosmology that could be transported to foreign cultural environments. As I will show 
later, Kabbalah exercised a substantial influence on non-Jewish European culture, where 
Christian thinkers integrated its sefirotic architectonic with their own symbolic world. In 
other words, Kabbalah’s attempt to construct a speculative theology to counter 
philosophy, led it to shift from the rabbinic concern with Israel’s historical relationship 
with God and the analysis of specific ethical situations to a more objectified metaphysical 
discourse. This tendency towards the objectification of information can be traced back to 
mystical interest in Sefer Yetzirah, which states matters in complete detachment from any 
specific cultural experience. As Gruenwald notes this work “doesn’t divulge, not even 
with the slightest hint, what we are supposed to make of the information it presents us 
with…. The knowledge the book supplies is predominantly static.”462 Sefer Yetzirah does 
not mention Israel, the commandments, or Jerusalem; the objective metaphysical picture 
it presented helped Kabbalists lay the foundations for their theology, but unlike 
philosophers who went on to adopt increasingly radical forms of analytical objectivity, 
                                            
462 Gruenwald. op. cit., pp. 29-30 (my translation): “Jewish mysticism in its Transition from the 
Book of creation to the Bahir” [Hebrew]. 
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kabbalists reacted by contextualizing their worldview with particularistic and 
anthropomorphic features that were anti-rational par-excellence.463   
A good example of this recurrent process of appropriation of analytic elements 
and their subordination to synthetic sensibilities can be seen in the sefirotic structure. It is 
in Sefer Yetzirah that we first come across the notion of the sefirot which eventually came 
to function as the conceptual framework for Kabbalistic theology. The difference is that 
in Sefer Yetzirah, the sefirot represent the primordial numbers that constitute the world 
(together with the twenty four letters of the Hebrew alphabet). Therefore the sefirot of 
Sefer Yetzirah are objective substances with no additional symbolic significance. Slowly 
the sefirot begin to accumulate symbolic layers that cloak their initial objectivity with an 
increasingly particularistic symbolism. By the time of the Zohar, each sefirah had come 
to represent a dense cluster of symbols and meanings. Of interest is the fact that the 
gradual masking of the conceptual objectivity of Yetzirah’s sefirot meant that the sefirot 
of Kabbalah were far more mythic and symbolic while simultaneously retaining some of 
the objective qualities of the analytical modality. In other words, behind the mythic 
character of the Kabbalistic sefirot, we see metaphysical entities that relate to each other 
according to constant rules that are relatively transparent and predictable. The sefirotic 
                                            
463 Dan. Toldot, vol. 2, p. 557. Although both philosophers and mystics alike could use this text to 
promote opposing ideologies, around the middle of the twelfth century we witness a decrease in 
philosophical commentaries on Yetzirah and a clear escalation in mystical commentaries. This is 
a period in which most rationalists who were increasingly sympathetic to Aristotelianism in its 
Maimonidean version began to find the creation narrative of Yetzirah distasteful. In contrast, the 
mystics between the mid-twelfth and early thirteenth century, embraced Yetzirah and turned it 
into one of the foundational texts of medieval mysticism. Dan, ibid., pp. 568-9. Dan notes that 
Yetzirah “was appropriated by the mystics from the hands of philosophers.” This is an adequate 
example of how information that was initially tapped into by rationalists was co-opted by 
Kabbalists. 
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tree, in spite of its fluctuating nature, is nevertheless stable and un-changing; it is 
constructed of ten hypostases that relate to each other in a hierarchical manner that 
represents the eternal and objective physiognomy of the divine realm.  
Other indications of the decontextualization of information can be seen in the 
notion of Ein-Sof in which God is stripped from His biblical qualities and presented as a 
boundless source of energy that emanates through the sefirot to the created world. As 
opposed to the worldview of the anthropomorphic Biblical picture, the Kabbalistic God is 
represented by an eternal structure. The Ein-Sof is to a great extent an intersection of an 
Aristotelean and Neoplatonic God, both of which were never associated with a specific 
nation or historical experience, and certainly not characterized by human attributes. The 
Ein-Sof is eternal and static like Aristotle’s unmoved mover but it also operated 
according to a typically Neoplatonic emanative process. In spite of these clear efforts to 
towards objectification, kabbalists skillfully qualify their analytic borrowings with a 
theology that returned to a conservative and historically-informed mindset. Here, too, 
initially mystics remained close to philosophy but once they managed to formulate the 
basic foundations of their system they began to return to a more exclusive form of 
speculation that barred accessibility to foreign participation. As an example, while 
philosophical works such as Ibn Gabirol’s Fons Vitae could be used by Christian 
scholastics and even misunderstood as a Christian work, the Kabbalah, in spite of its 
trans-cultural transportability was clearly a Jewish theology that had to go through 
substantial alterations in order to suit itself to a non-Jewish environment.464 Put 
                                            
464 Scholem, Ha Kabbalah Bi Provence, pp. 20-1. 
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differently, it can be said that both Kabbalah and philosophy adopted the analytic 
tendency to decontextualize information, but philosophers never felt compelled to mask 
this tendency with a mythic or symbolic language; Jewish philosophy borrowed but never 
seemed to qualify those borrowings with a conservative mindset.   
A look at Abulafia’s ecstatic Kabbalah can help us understand why the theurgic 
school managed to consolidate its positions in the Jewish tradition and outstrip other 
mystical approaches. Ecstatic Kabbalah, with its analytical qualities was far more 
conducive to a cross-cultural reception. Its highly decontextualized method stripped the 
biblical text and the Hebrew language from their intrinsic meaning and their relationship 
with the specific experience of the Jews. Symbolism, and any form of culturally-specific 
information, was seen as an obstacle to one’s unification with ultimate reality. Abulafia 
believed that the path towards a unity with the divine must be direct and unmediated by 
symbols.465 It is no wonder that he didn’t only accept non-Jewish students, who were 
among his favorites, but also became the most influential Jewish mystic in the non-
Jewish world. His mysticism was applicable to mystics of other traditions since it focused 
on an individual contemplative experience rather than on the unique function of a nation. 
The effective transportability of Abulafia’s mystical system was actually a disadvantage 
within Judaism. Its analytic tendency towards radical objectification gave it a universal 
character that many saw as a real threat to Jewish exclusivism. It is exactly here that the 
theurgic school’s conservative use of native symbols and a more historically oriented 
narrative managed to win the hearts of conservatives. Although some of the objective 
                                            
465 Idel, New Perspectives, pp. 201-205. 
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features of theurgic Kabbalah lent it an unprecedented ability to cross cultural boarders, it 
was not as transportable as the rational mysticism of the ecstatic school.466 Theurgic 
Kabbalah’s ability to appropriate analytic tools and at the same time subordinate them to 
native Jewish sensibilities meant that Jewish practitioners were not exposed to the 
dangers of a universalistic ethos - a cultural position that could easily lead to conversion 
and mass assimilation. Indeed, theurgic Kabbalah, especially in its zoharic manifestation, 
embellished its objective metaphysics with a narrative that was exclusive and extremely 
difficult to penetrate without a deep familiarity with Jewish symbolism.  
Another important feature of theurgic Kabbalah was that there existed a continuous 
dialectical interaction between the divine sphere and human action in the form of ritual. 
This theurgic-ritualistic feature meant that Kabbalistic theology was practiced within the 
particular context of Jewish law, in which both communal and individual behavior 
directly impinged upon the Godhead. This was another way of departing from the 
objectivity and universalistic metaphysical structures of the Greeks towards a dynamic 
theology in which context, historical events, and the specific behavior of the Jewish 
people were of crucial importance. The ontological exclusivism of Kabbalah endowed it 
with a temporal, diachronic aspect in which both humans and the divine were deeply 
embedded in particularistic historical narrative that was somewhat irrelevant to non-Jews. 
                                            
466 The idea of “philosophical mysticism” has mainly been popularized by George Vajda, see his  
“Un chapitre de l’histoire du conflict entre la Kabbale et la philosophie: la polémiqueanti-
intellectualiste  de Josephb Shalom Ashkenazi.” in Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du 
Moyen Age, vol. XXXI, 1956, pp. 45-127. Also see Idel “Abulafia’s Secrets of the Guide: A 
Linguistic Turn.” Revue de Metaphysique ey de Morale, 4 (1998): 497-498. 
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Although the Kabbalistic structure discloses an unprecedented objectivity it was 
nevertheless manipulatable by a specific people rather than equally relevant to all people 
by virtue of their shared humanity. The delicate balancing of a de-contextualized 
metaphysics with Jewish narratives endowed the theurgic school with the necessary 
qualities to outstrip mystical systems that gravitated too heavily towards the analytic 
worldview.     
                                                 
3.4.7 Conclusion 
In this section I have examined tensions between the analytical and synthetic 
mindsets in respect to cognition. Theurgic Kabbalists succeeded where other schools 
failed; they successfully embedded the cognitive strategies of the analytic mode of 
operation in a restrictive and exclusive symbolic world that was more semantically 
diffused, historically informed, and open-ended. They follow philosophers in 
differentiating data into distinct categories but they also returned to a more symbolic and 
ambiguous mysticism; like philosophers they systemized Jewish theology but formulated 
the Zohar according to a Midrashic format with strong narrative features; and in common 
with philosophers they constructed an objectified cosmology but nevertheless returned to 
a contextualized theology that unfolds in respect to the exclusive behavior and context of 
the Jewish people. In addition to the Kabbalistic prioritization of synthetic features over 
analytic borrowings, its adoption of symbolism taken from the heart of the world of 
aggadah lent Kabbalah its apparently seamless continuity with the legacy of rabbinic 
Judaism. Theurgic Kabbalists equipped Judaism with the powerful speculative tools of 
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the analytic modality, while reinforcing the synthetic, conservative foundations of their 
classical tradition.  
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3.5 THE SOCIAL LEVEL 
3.5.1 Individualism: Specialization and Signed Works   
The shift towards increasingly analytic patterns of thought in Judaism was 
contemporaneous with dramatic social changes. I am not arguing for a causative 
description in which the adoption of analytic strategies of meaning led to greater 
individualism nor am I arguing for a Durkheimian stance that reduces culture and 
psychology to social realities. Instead I will merely note that these changes occur in 
relative synchrony and that there exists a constant symbiotic relationship between 
personality, society, culture, and the environment. The period under examination saw a 
growing tendency towards individualism in the Jewish tradition. This can be discerned in 
the emergence of alternative literary formats to the communally oriented Talmudic and 
Midrashic literature. As mentioned earlier, it was Saadia who initiated this new trend of 
specialized works in diverse fields of knowledge such as theology, science, grammar, 
literature, law, and poetry.467 Saadia was “the first author in the Rabbinic tradition; his 
works are not mere compilations, arrangements, or rearrangements of older sources; they 
are products of original reflection and expression.”468 Blumenthal notes that the common 
trait of the host of specialized books that ensued was that they were all authored and 
signed by individuals.469 For the first time, the private person was appreciated as a 
legitimate purveyor of knowledge; for the first time, one was relatively free to choose 
                                            
467 Blumenthal “Religion and Religious Intellectuals,” in Neusner, Take Judaism for Example, p. 
119. 
468 Judah Goldin. “The Period of the Talmud,” p. 198. 
469 Blumenthal, op. cit. 
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what to discuss and whom to quote. The proliferation of such books stood in stark 
contrast to the traditional Talmudic communal format that was written, and most 
probably edited, over a long period of time.470 During the Geonic period, Judaism began 
to move towards a more polemical and individualistic form of discourse that reflected an 
undeniably Greek temperament. The new freedom from the classical Talmudic model 
beginning in the tenth century was an indication of the decline of central control and the 
opening of a growing space for individuals to interpret religion in a more creative and 
independent manner. 
As discussed earlier, the rational mind dissects and differentiates; it breaks the 
fluid and analogue formats of traditional thought and creates distinct boundaries that 
clearly delineate territories of specialization. The traditional pretense of religious leaders 
to be authorities in all aspects of life was now shifting towards a more specialized focus 
on restricted and well-defined areas of expertise. In other words, the traditional well-
rounded sage was challenged by the growing importance of the liberal intellectual or 
technocratic expert. Until the tenth century, Talmudic and Midrashic literature 
represented an all-inclusive body of knowledge dealing with life in its entirety. The 
appearance of signed books can be seen as a new indication of the empowerment of the 
individual vis-à-vis traditional forms of social embeddedness. Saadia’s Beliefs and 
                                            
470 As discussed earlier, the traditional Talmudic model does not disclose a specific author or a 
single authority responsible for shaping the tradition according to his own understanding; even 
the most honored sage was forever dependent upon, and supported by his contemporaries and 
past generations. In Christianity for instance, we witness the authorship of private works from the 
very inception of the traditions: Tertullian’s prolific work, Origen’s On First Principles, 
Augustine’s Confessions and City of God, are only a few examples of a tradition that was 
immersed in Hellenism and comfortable with the intellectual autonomy of individual thinkers. 
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Opinions, Bahya ibn Paquda’s Duties of the Hearts, Solomon ibn Gabirol’s Fons Vitae, 
Halevi’s Kuzari, Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed, and later Joseph Albo’s Ikkarim 
are some of the better-known examples, but there existed hundreds of others signed 
books that emerged as part of this new influx of individual creativity.  
The medium of discourse in the Middle Ages was therefore characterized by a 
proliferation of books dealing with various topics. Blumenthal is aware of the 
sociological implications of these changes when he notes that “these genres became the 
marketplace for ideas. They were the sociological reality of medieval Jewish 
intellectuality. And, interestingly, almost all these books are signed, a procedure not 
common in late antiquity.”471 It is apparent that Jewish thinkers, beginning in the Geonic 
period, found themselves in a new reality where modes of communication and knowledge 
were rapidly changing. On the social level we witness a structural shift towards the 
growing autonomy of the individual. Rather than a univocal and communal rabbinical 
voice, the main representatives of this new cultural ambience were individual 
intellectuals who promoted diverging and contending philosophical and theological 
perspectives. A characteristic of these intellectuals was that they were ”isolated 
individuals” most of them were autodidacts operating independently from rabbinic 
institutions or communal restrictions. They could have been rabbis but also doctors or 
merchants who were immersed in secular non-religious knowledge such as logic, science, 
poetry, polemics, grammar, as well as theology.472  
                                            
471 Blumenthal, “Religion and the Religious Intellectuals: The Case of Judaism in Medieval 
Times,” p. 119. 
472 Ibid. 
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3.5.2 Allegorical and Mystical Hermeneutics 
I have already mentioned the differing hermeneutical inclinations, allegorical and 
symbolic, of rationalists and mystics respectively. Here I will briefly mention the social 
implications of these exegetical approaches. The Talmudic dictum “the Torah speaks in 
the language of humans,” which was originally meant to restrict the role of interpretation, 
was appropriated by philosophers as a tool for legitimizing an allegorical elucidation of 
scripture. Saadia represents an initial phase in which figurative interpretations were 
applied to “problematic” parts of Jewish scripture. But as Judaism began to endorse 
increasingly rationalist approaches to religious exegesis, more radical non-literal 
approaches came to the fore.473 These new hermeneutical methods became most apparent 
in the allegorical interpretations of medieval philosophers, most importantly Maimonides. 
The allegorical approach functioned as a potent strategy for eliminating literalism; crude 
anthropomorphic features in the bible could now be explained as having an alternative 
meaning - only one alternative meaning. It is important to stress the hermeneutic rigidity 
of the allegorical method, which offers very little place for disagreement. Although the 
allegorical perspective advocated by philosophers did not prevent a communal dialogue, 
it certainly turned intellectual discourse into a more confrontational and polemical 
                                            
473 David Shatz, “The biblical and rabbinic background to medieval Jewish philosophy,” p. 21; 
pp. 25-26. The Philosophers begin to construct methodologies for how and when figurative 
interpretations are legitimate. Saadia offered four parameters: a) contradiction with reason, b) 
opposition to experience, c) contravenes with accepted tradition, and d) contradiction with other 
verses. In all these cases a non-literal interpretation was legitimate. Maimonides constructs more 
lenient parameters. The figurative interpretation of Jewish scripture can be traced back to Philo of 
Alexandria. 
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domain in which each philosopher offers a ‘monosemic’ interpretation.474 Idel claims that 
“What is quintessential for Maimonides’ allegorical mode is the belief that it is possible 
to find out the one ‘‘correct’’ allegorical meaning, a presupposition anchored in 
Aristotelian noetics.”475 Such a hermeneutic undermined the typically communal 
discourse of the Talmudic paradigm since it made it almost impossible to harmonize 
diverging opinions and reach wide consensus. In other words, the traditional flexibility 
and suggestiveness of classical Judaism was replaced by an uncompromising search for 
conclusive truths.     
The conservative Jewish authorities who were nurtured by the multi-vocal and 
inclusive methodologies of the Talmud, soon became aware of the inherent dangers that 
allegory presented. The analytic stress on individual opinion was potentially detrimental 
to communal cohesion. Disagreements among members of the same community exposed 
the contingent and arbitrary nature of truth and encouraged individuals to explore 
scripture on the basis of intellectual integrity and rational suspicion. This led to the 
worrisome marginalization of traditional values in favor of objectivity and reason. This is 
where Kabbalists managed to offer a creative solution. The symbolic hermeneutic they 
introduced was efficient for two reasons; it both managed to offer a more suggestive and 
less rigid interpretation of scripture, while simultaneously providing Judaism with an 
effective exegetical tool for the reinterpretation of the outdated rabbinic paradigm. 
Medieval mystics were very much part of the new individualistic trends of the age; they 
authored books, treatises, and argued with their opponents about the true meaning of 
                                            
474 Idel. Absorbing Perfection, pp. 280-281. 
475 Ibid. 
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scripture. They also broke into contending factions and offered solutions that clearly 
diverged from the traditional Jewish worldview. But as Kabbalah developed and matured 
mystics managed to reach a growing consensus regarding the general meaning of the 
sefirot. They offered a communally accepted symbolic hermeneutic that invited 
participation and mitigated the probability of irresolvable disputes. Therefore, we witness 
an initial and inevitable phase of creative individualism that was followed by the 
emergence of the zoharic paradigm, which returned to a more traditional and inclusive 
ethos. Here again, we see dynamic of appropriation and subordination; kabbalists 
followed the analytic inclination towards individual creativity and polemics on the one 
hand, and the subordination of those borrowings to a communal discourse that resonated 
with traditional norms on the other.  
                 
3.5.3 Methodological Changes and the Democratization of Knowledge 
The dangers of rationalism became apparent when many philosophical works of 
the Geonic period were written with almost no allusions to traditional Jewish sources.476 
These were the first indications of the disturbing independence of philosophy from the 
communally oriented body of tradition. The ability to do philosophy without taking past 
authority into account pointed to the unique and threatening features of the Greek 
tradition. The first signs of disregarding traditional methodologies in Geonic writings 
reached an ever-disturbing level in Maimonides’ work. One of the harshest critiques ever 
leveled at Maimonides was directly targeting his disregard for traditional authority and 
                                            
476 Dan, Toldot Torat Ha’sod, vol. 4, p. 23. 
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the neglect of precedent in advancing new arguments. The Rabad, one of the greatest 
talmudists of the age, the head of the first circle of Provençal Kabbalist, and the most 
important critic of Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah, was appalled by the latter’s scholarly 
conceit. 477 Important Talmudists such as Rabbi Moses ha-Kohen, Rabbi Moses of Coucy, 
Rabbi Asher b. Yehiel, and Hasdai Crescas all supported the Rabad in this condemnation 
and leveled their own dissatisfaction with the way philosophers failed to reference their 
sources. Maimonides’ divergence from traditional models of citation was both an attempt 
to present knowledge as a clean slate and a way to simplify theology and make it more 
accessible to readers. The Rabad’s famous response to Maimonides’ rational 
methodology was vehement:  
He intended to improve but did not improve, for he forsook the way of all authors who 
preceded him. They always adduced proof for their statements and cited the proper 
authority for each statement…. Now, therefore, I do not know why I should reverse my 
tradition or my corroborative views because of the compendium of this author…. 
Moreover, there are matters concerning which the Geonim disagree and this author has 
selected the opinion of one and incorporated it in his compendium. Why should I rely 
upon his choice when it is not acceptable to me and I do not know whether the 
contending authority is competent to differ or not. It can only be that overbearing spirit of 
his.478 
                                            
477 In spite of his extensive scholarship the Rabad is best known as Ba’al ha’Hassagot, ‘the author 
of the critiques to Maimonides Mishneh Torah. The Rabad’s critique became an indispensible 
part of the Mishneh Torah and since the 1509 edition the two have been printed together. See 
Twersky, Rabad of Posquieres, p. 126. 
478 Last hassagah by the Rabad in the introduction to Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah. See Isadore 
Twersky, Rabad of Posquieres, p. 131. It is significant that in a historical perspective, the 
Rabad’s critique proved successful; he managed to initiate a commentarial tradition that 
supplemented the Mishneh Torah, beginning with his own hassagot (critiques), thereby 
functioning as a corrective to its anti-communal tendencies. In other words, while Maimonides’ 
codification sought to downplay the necessity of tedious Talmudic dialectics, ironically, the 
Mishneh Torah itself “became the focus of endless dialectics and debates over halakhic problems 
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Maimonides’ radical deviation from conventional formats of scholarship was offensive to 
a tradition that prided itself on uninterrupted historical continuity. Reading the 
introduction to the Mishneh Torah, however, it seems that Maimonides, at least initially, 
was doing exactly the contrary; the first pages of the work are dedicated to an almost 
obsessive recording of traditional Jewish genealogies of transmission. What soon 
becomes apparent, however, is that this genealogical section is somewhat of a lip service 
since it was immediately succeeded by an audacious step in a radically anti-traditionalist 
direction. Maimonides state:  
Therefore, I have called this text, Mishneh Torah ["the second to the Torah," with the 
intent that] a person should first study the Written Law, and then study this text and 
comprehend the entire Oral Law from it, without having to study any other text between 
the two.479 
 
 Not only did he refrain from alluding to past authorities Maimonides went as far as 
claiming that the whole tradition between the Mishnah and his own Mishneh Torah was 
no longer essential. It is not surprising that Jewish authorities of the time found this 
extremely disturbing. They were further angered by the presumptuousness of the title 
Mishneh Torah, literally the ‘second Torah.’ Even today the names Yad Ha Chazaka (The 
Strong Hand), or Simply Ha Rambam (Maimonides’ Hebrew acronym) are preferred.480  
                                                                                                                                  
- on what sources Maimonides based his decision, on how he interpreted a sugiya, whether he 
interpreted it correctly, and so on.” Instead of diminishing the attention given to pilpul and long 
halakhic debates, the Mishneh Torah only intensified the convoluted scholasticism that 
Maimonides sought to eliminate. Halbertal, People of the Book, p. 108. 
479 Maimonides. Mishneh Torah, p. 39. 
480 The ‘Yad’ in Yad Ha Chazaka stands for the numerical value of fourteen, the number of 
chapters in the Mishneh Torah. 
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Maimonides followed a typically rationalist approach; he decontextualized Jewish 
law from the inaccessible, obscure, and highly specialized format of Talmudic pilpul. His 
detachment of conclusions from their long argumentative processes and his presentation 
of conclusions in a clear, decisive language signified a far-reaching democratization of 
Jewish law, considered by many as the most revolutionary feature of the Mishneh 
Torah.481 The democratization of Talmudic rulings can be seen as a groundbreaking shift 
from a communal format of scholarship, deeply embedded in the minutiae of past 
knowledge and almost always mediated by rabbinical authorities, towards a model that 
was available to the common individual. Thanks to the Mishneh Torah ordinary Jews no 
longer needed religious specialists to guide them in every action; Maimonides 
empowered the individual and simultaneously challenged the power base of traditional 
authority. As Halbertal notes that “paradoxically, anchoring the Talmud with an orderly 
and decisive code like the Mishneh Torah opens the way for its [Talmud] decline as a text 
to be studied.”482 Maimonides did not merely make Judaism more accessible by 
presenting it in the form of clear, concise, and readable conclusions, but he was also 
adamant in writing the Mishneh Torah in Hebrew, a decision that seemed strange to 
                                            
481 The Mishneh Torah became a model for Joseph Karo’s classic Shulchan Aruch; in both cases 
the authors offer common people a text that is clear, concise, and systematic. The tradition of 
simplifying the Talmud can be traced back to R’ Isaac Alfasi’s (1013-1103) Sefer Ha’Halakhot, 
also known as Talmud Katan (Small Talmud). As in the Guide, R’ Alfasi focused on Halakhic 
conclusions without the surrounding pilpul, he also got rid of all the Aggadic portions and non-
legal elements. 
482 Halbertal, People of the Book, p. 104. See pp. 104-106 for more on Maimonides’ radical view 
regarding the future abandonment of the Talmud and the adoption of his Mishneh Torah. 
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many of his contemporaries.483 This act of translation from the original mix of Aramaic 
and Hebrew was yet another devise that helped Maimonides reinterpret the Talmud on 
his own terms. The Rabad, was unhappy with this divergence from the traditional model; 
he claimed that Maimonides “speaks to the people in a different tongue and he changes 
the language of our sages.” The Rabad, advocated a return to the original combination of 
Hebrew and Aramaic, and warned that Maimonides, in translating the Aramaic to 
Hebrew, distorted the original meaning of the sages.484  
There is yet an even more important aspect to the elimination of Aramaic from the 
Mishneh Torah. The Hebrew text made Jewish law more accessible to readers who were 
not versed in Aramaic, a language that was by then exclusively literary and no longer in 
oral use. Getting rid of exclusive scholarly features reflects another example of the 
tension between those who offered to open the traditional body of knowledge to a wider 
audience, and conservative talmudists who sought to deny its accessibility to the rank and 
file. I think it would be wrong to assume that conservatives such as the Rabad represented 
nothing but the selfish interests of a jealous elite. Instead, I would argue that the 
antagonistic orthodox reaction reflected a genuine concern for Judaism’s ability to protect 
itself in the highly progressive, cosmopolitan, and heretical atmosphere of twelfth and 
thirteenth-century Europe. 
And finally beyond the Mishneh Torah per-se Maimonides invested the individual 
with an intellectual autonomy, and freedom of judgment that was unprecedented in 
                                            
483 Twersky, The Rabad, p. 171. Twersky refers to Maimonides’ language as a perfected and 
admirable “pure Hebrew idiom.” 
484 From the Rabad’s Hassagot, Twersky, Rabad, p. 171. 
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Jewish history. His radical demand that the individual use his own intellect to scrutinize 
the sacred texts and reach conclusions based on reason is astonishing, even form a 
modern perspective:  
At each point the student must ask whether a sacred text is to be taken literally or 
figuratively, whether it complies with reason or whether it does not. If it does not, he 
must revise his interpretation to bring the text back into line with what is known to be 
true.485   
                
Such intellectual autonomy did not stop in matters pertaining to interpretation and 
exegesis; it became especially obvious in the domain of contemplation and spiritual 
perfection.  
 
3.5.4 Cognitive Individualism  
 The shift towards greater individualism became apparent in several ways. The 
disregard for past scholarship represented a break with communal modes of discourse; 
the simplification and democratization of knowledge reflected the empowerment of the 
individual; and the emergence of signed and specialized books represented the 
development of new forms of intellectual authority. These methodological 
transformations were indeed groundbreaking, but the shift towards a new form of 
individualism was equally apparent in the contents of rational philosophy. In the Guide of 
the Perplexed Maimonides promoted a form of individualism that was supported by an 
elaborate and highly advanced Neo-Aristotelian cosmology. Although Maimonides’ 
prioritization of the secluded individual over the social sphere troubled Jews long before 
                                            
485 Kenneth Seeskin, Autonomy in Jewish Philosophy, pp. 96-97. 
  
282 
the publication of the Guide in 1191, this work represented the culmination of the 
tensions between rabbinic orthodoxy and the Greek analytic paradigm. 
How exactly Maimonides diverged from traditional norms can be understood by 
contrasting him with the conservative voice of Judah Halevi. In stark opposition to the 
rationalistic stance, Halevi located the resilience of the Judaism in its prioritization of the 
group over the individual. Yitzhak Shilat notes that Halevi’s ‘organism metaphor,’ 
continually reminds us that the individual, like an organ of a body, has no movement or 
freedom that is detached from the body which guides and controls it.486 Halevi’s Inyan 
Elohi or ‘divine order’ is seen as the fundamental characteristic of the divine body of 
Israel, a robust and eternal entity composed of replaceable and ephemeral individual 
components. This ‘organism’ maintains and preserves its sanctity in spite of sporadic 
misdeeds on behalf of individual members.487  
Halevi’s communally oriented theology is reversed in the Guide to a substantially 
different paradigm that sees the social entity as a platform for the perfection of the 
                                            
486 Shilat, Ben ha’Kuzari la Rambam, p. 211. 
487 Halevi actually believed that prior to Sinai the inyan elohi was an attribute of individuals 
beginning with Adam, through exceptional figures such as Noah, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. 
Starting with the sons of Jacob, the twelve tribes, this formerly individualistic ‘divine spark’ 
turned into a social attribute of the Jews as a whole. See Kuzari, ch. 1, p. 47. Halevi attacked the 
unreliable transmission of information form individual to individual, claiming that the Talmud 
provides a more robust mechanism of communal transmission where information is safely 
communicated from ‘many to many.’ This is an important distinction between the Greek and the 
Hebraic worlds. The former sees the evolution of knowledge in individualistic terms: Homer, 
Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle are put on the pedestal rather than a certain group of people let 
alone a generation. The Jewish paradigm, on the other hand, sees this evolution as preceding 
through a communal lineage: from the elders to the prophets and from the prophets on to the 
Great Assembly, the Tannaim, the Amoraim, the Geonim, the Rishonim, and all the way to the 
present. 
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individual.488 In Maimonides’ eyes society serves one’s basic needs and therefore 
facilitates a life that is not preoccupied with survival, but oriented towards spiritual 
fulfillment and individual self-cultivation.489 In spite of the fact that the community 
remained central, Maimonidean thought was undermining a highly communal worldview 
that orthodox Jewish authorities saw as the foundation for national and ethnic self-
preservation. The individualistic theology of Maimonides led to what is known as the 
first Maimonidean controversy, a dispute that was focused on the nature of resurrection. 
In his Mishneh Torah, Maimonides advanced a quintessentially Greek perspective in 
which the soul, rather than the body, is the human aspect that survives death. The 
Maimonidean soul was a rational soul that was nourished and enriched by the perfection 
of the intellect. The soteriological ramifications of such a theory were devastating; the 
traditional Jewish perspective perceived resurrection in physical terms, thereby avoiding 
the rationalistic aversion towards the body and matter. Maimonides challenged this 
deeply ingrained sensitivity by detaching the Jew from her familiar genetic heritage. This 
severing of our mental faculties from our biological origins and the prioritization of the 
former over the latter was a cause for concern. Before Maimonides, Jewish believers 
could rest assured that they would be resurrected by virtue of being members of a holy 
group, regardless of their intellectual competence. Maimonides’ theory of resurrection, as 
well as his theory of prophecy, diverts one’s attention towards the thinking subject, and 
                                            
488 Shilat, Ben ha’Kuzari la Rambam, p. 208. 
489 Ibid., pp. 211-212. 
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the perfection of one’s rational faculties.490 As Halbertal notes “What remains in the 
afterlife is the impersonal body of knowledge a person gained in his life on earth; In 
Aristotelian terminology, what remains is the person’s active Intellect.”491 Attacking 
Maimonides’ mentalistic-intellectualist stance of resurrection the famous Rashba asked 
“are the pious men of Israel without philosophy not worthy of an afterlife?”492  
The almost solipsistic privacy involved in human self-realization becomes clear in 
Maimonides’ description of man’s four perfections. After explaining the perfection of 
wealth (property, shelter, clothing etc.), bodily perfection (health, strength etc.), and 
moral perfection, Maimonides goes on to describe the final and highest level of 
accomplishment:  
The fourth kind is the true human perfection; that is the attainment of rational virtues. By 
this I mean, of course, the conception of ideas which lead to correct opinions on 
metaphysical matters. This is the ultimate purpose, and this is the one which bestows 
upon man true perfection, being peculiar to him alone. It brings him eternal life, and by it 
man is man… this last perfection, however, belongs to yourself exclusively, and no one 
else has any share in it.493 
          
Maimonides’ individualism is therefore rooted in a larger metaphysical picture that 
perceives the cosmos as an intelligible domain accessible to individuals by virtue of their 
                                            
490 In the Essay (Epistle) on Resurrection (Igeret tehi’yat ha’metim, 1173) Maimonides changes 
his view but he nevertheless insists that after a period in which the body and soul unite there will 
be an additional separation of the two in which the soul will remain alone. 
491 Halbertal, op. cit., 109. [my italics]. 
492 In Minhat Kenaot (Jealous Offerings), which includes a compilation of a series of epistles 
attributed to the Rashba. The Rashba’s attack was directed at Samuel the Sulami the author of 
Livnat Chen. For more see Halbertal People of the Book, pp. 109-124 and p. 176 n. 77. 
493 Maimonides, The Guide of the perplexed, Haim Rabin tr., (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett 
Publishing Company, Inc., 1995), p. 199 [my italics]. 
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intellectual capacities. This is a classical example of cognitive-individualism in which 
self-realization involves the harmonization of the epistemic microcosm with a 
metaphysical macrocosm. This quote from the Guide highlights the fact that it is only 
through the perfection of rational virtue that the human being can win eternal life and 
truly realize her or his humanity. Indeed, the ability to enter the next world was 
predominantly an individual endeavor rather than a consequence of ethnic or national 
affiliation. The construction of private channels for self-realization in Judaism, so 
characteristic of analytic paradigms, represented the emergence of a new potential for 
religious expression in relative isolation from the community. As Kenneth Seeskin notes, 
“the reason rational virtue is the highest perfection is that it pertains to us not as animals 
or as social beings but as individuals.”494 
In many fundamental issues, the Kuzari and the Guide have come to represent two 
opposing sensibilities in the medieval Jewish world. Their contrasting standpoints 
regarding the individual and society is a clear representation of the internal tensions 
Judaism was experiencing during this age of crisis. As Shilat puts it: 
in the Kuzari the main weight is invested in the community, the whole of Israel, in which 
the ‘divine order’ (inyan elohi), after a long hereditary process, was made manifest and 
never ceased ever since. This is the topic that occupied the Kuzari. The importance of the 
individuals, even “the virtuous of the virtuous”, is secondary. In Maimonides this picture 
is reversed: the main point of interest is the perfection of the individual. The stress on the 
“Nation that knows G-d and worships him” is secondary. The Kuzari deals with history 
and this world. Maimonides deals with the individual’s connection to a spiritual world, 
the next world.495  
                                            
494 Seeskin, Autonomy in Jewish Philosophy, p. 95 [my italics]. 
495 Shilat, op. cit., p. 219. 
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Therefore, while Halevi would contend that the only way to reach perfection is to operate 
within the organism of a holy nation, Maimonides provides us with a worldview that 
located perfection and self-fulfillment in the intellect of the individual agent. For the first 
time in Jewish history a form of cognitive individualism emerged in which the perfection 
of the intellect is perceived as the highest human virtue; according to Maimonides this is 
a human potential that “reaches its climax in the knowledge of God, and this knowledge 
is private, not social.”496  
 
3.6 THE KABBALISTIC REACTION  
One of the most unique features of medieval Jewish mysticism was its ability to 
construct mentalistic and meditational techniques for individual exploration while 
simultaneously integrating these private procedures into a form of communal mysticism. 
Since I will dedicate a separate section to the introspective features of Kabbalah, here I 
will simply give a few examples of the type of cognitive-individualism that emerged in 
Kabbalah. I will then move to examine the unique communal features of this mysticism 
and the ways in which it managed to curtail the individualistic tendencies of philosophy.   
               
3.6.1 Cognitive Individualism in Kabbalah         
Growing individualistic trends in Judaism between the tenth and thirteenth-
centuries meant that any successful theology had to provide its members with advanced 
channels for individual exploration. The ability of new elites to distance themselves from 
                                            
496 Ibid., p. 212 [my translation and italics.] 
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centers of power entailed the emergence of a greater demand to satisfy one’s private 
spiritual needs. Since Muslims and Christians had already successfully introduced many 
Neoplatonic and Aristotelian features to the monotheistic worldview, Jewish philosophers 
had a fairly clear model for operation; rationalists therefore led the way in constructing 
individual modes of contemplation.497 Kabbalists built their own models upon “the 
insights, categories, and structures” of rational philosophy, in which features such as 
prophecy were internalized and conceived in mentalistic and introspective terms. 
Philosophical techniques of deep concentration later developed into the Kabbalistic 
notion of kavannah (intention).498 The practice of Kavannah infused Jewish traditional 
liturgy with a contemplative dimension that allowed a person to explore both the recesses 
of his own soul, and the inner structure of the divine realm.499 Such practices would 
                                            
497 Judaism entered the High Middle Ages in Europe in a disadvantage compared to Christianity 
and Islam, which preceded it in adopting and accommodating their spiritual world to the 
teachings of Greek philosophy. See Dan, Kabbalah: A Very Short Introduction, p. 53. 
498 Adam Afterman. “Letter Permutation Techiniques, Kavannah and Prayer in Jewish Kabbalah,” 
in Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies 6, no. 18 (Winter 2007): 52-78. “Using 
philosophical insights, categories and structures, the Jewish esoteric tradition was reconstructed 
in a creative outburst that lasted for centuries. The absorption of psychological and 
epistemological concepts led to an internalization of the institutions of prophecy and visionary 
mysticism and of parts of halakhic practice;” For more on Kavannah, see Idel, Ascensions on 
High, pp. 28-36; Ron Margolin, The interiorization of religious life and thought at the beginning 
of Hasidism: its sources and epistemological basis., (1999, Dissertation), pp. 80-210; Daniel 
Abrams ed. R’ Asher ben David His Complete Works and Studies in his Kabbalistic Thought (Los 
Angeles: Cherub Press. 1996), [Hebrew], p. 80; Tishby ed. Commentary on Talmudic Aggadoth 
by Rabbi Azriel of Gerona (Jerusalem: Mekitzei Nirdamin. 1982 [Hebrew]), p. 20. 
499 On the transformation of prayer in Kabbalah see Scholem, Ha Kabbalah bi Provence, p. 78.  
More on introspection and Kabbalah see idem., The Origin of the Kabbalah, pp. 247-253, and Ha 
Kabbalah bi Provence, pp. 73-85. On the relationship between prayer and early Jewish mysticism 
see, Alexander Altmann, Panim shel Yahadut (Faces of Judaism: Selected Essays, Tel Aviv: Am 
Oved, 1983), pp. 44-67 [Hebrew]; Michael Swartz, Mystical Prayer in Ancient Judaism 
(Teubingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1992); Gershom Scholem, Jewish Gnosticism, Merkabah Mysticism, 
and Talmudic Tradition (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1965), pp. 9-30; 
101-117; Peter Schafer, The Hidden and Manifest God: Some Major Themes in Early Jewish 
Mysticism (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1992), p. 165; Adam Afterman, 
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ideally lead to a state of devekuth (cleaving, clinging) in which the mystic would reach a 
highly intimate relationship with God. 
The concepts of the soul that emerged among theurgic Kabbalists provides 
another example of new analytic dispositions that entered the Zohar and were devised in 
response to Maimonidean philosophy. While the body as a vehicle for the performance of 
the commandments remained central for medieval mystics, the Zohar adopted new 
Platonic and Gnostic analytic tendencies that glorified the mental aspects of existence. 
Kabbalists believed the soul was superior to the polluted body; they saw the soul as an 
“eternal substance that preexists the body… capable of surviving the death of the body, 
provided the embodied person manages his or her affairs correctly throughout life.” The 
soul’s function is to control the body’s inherent proclivity towards sin; but humans can 
purify their souls through the bodily performance of the commandments. This process of 
purification is reminiscent of Maimonides’ theory, with the important difference that it 
was not achieved through intellectual cognition but rather through the physical 
performance of the commandments.500 These new approaches among Kabbalists gave 
growing attention to the mental aspects of the individual represented by a typically 
analytic distinction between the body and the soul, but they did this by anchoring the 
perfection of the abstract soul in an embodied behavioral procedure that safeguarded the 
role of the body and ritual in religious life.  
                                                                                                                                  
“Ma’aseh Merkava in Rabbinic Literature: Prayer and Envisioning the Chariot,” Kabbalah 13 
(2005): 253-255; Rachel Elior, ‘Mysticism, Magic and Angelology - The Perception of Angels in 
Hekhalot Literature’, JSQ 1 (1993\1994): 43- 51. 
500 Tirosh-Samuelson, Philosophy and Kabbalah, p. 230. 
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Kabbalah therefore provided Jews with an unprecedented opportunity to engage 
in a highly complex form of spirituality with private dimensions, which included 
meditational techniques and the use of one’s cognitive resources. As opposed to the 
highly somatic and scholastic practices of traditional rabbinism, a more intimate and 
mentalistic relationship between man and God emerged in Kabbalah.501 Perhaps the most 
important point for our topic is that instead of the philosophical trivialization of the 
commandments, Kabbalists reinforced traditional rabbinic practices such that the central 
position of liturgy and the following of the commandments remained unchanged.502 
Pertinent to the morphological divide between social autonomy and social embeddedness 
is that the new introspective practices introduced by Kabbalists did not encourage 
detaching oneself from the communal body; on the contrary, theurgy, kavannah, and 
devekuth were all embedded in a highly restrictive and communal mystical practice. 
Although phenomenologically a new introspective horizon opened before the mystic, 
                                            
501 The Notion of kavannah features in Rabbinic literature but it seems to lack the contemplative 
aspects of the Kabbalistic kavannah. The Talmud’s Masechet Berachot discusses Kavannah 
where it is perceived as a state of sincerity in following the commandments. Scholem Ha 
Kabbalah bi Provence, p. 78. Scholem argues that in the classical Rabbinical tradition and the 
great works of Talmud and midrash there are no contemplative elements. Midrash and Talmud, 
he argues, are sources anchored in an “active life” (vita activa) and not a contemplative life which 
seek to understand higher concepts and ideals. ibid., pp. 75. As opposed to the ascent of the 
Heikhalot mystic who physically found himself in the celestial realm, in Kabbalah we see a 
psychological ascent. Scholem, ibid., pp. 14-5. Although rabbinical forms of theurgy were not 
related to introspective techniques there did seem to exist a form of physical theurgy based on the 
performance of the commandments. This was transported in Kabbalah to the mental sphere. See 
Idel, New Perspectives, pp. 156-199; Idem, Enchanted Chains, pp. 165-168; Jonathan Garb. 
Hofaotav Shel Ha-Koah Ba-Mistikah Ha-Yehudit: Mi-Sifrut Hazal Ad Kabalat Tsefat (Jerusalem: 
Magnes, 2004), pp. 28-46; Idem, ‘Kinds of Power: Rabbinic texts and the Kabbalah’, Kabbalah 6 
(2001), pp. 45-71, (29); Yair Lorberbaum, Image of God: Halakhah and Aggadah [Hebrew] (Tel 
Aviv: Schoken Publishing House, 2004).  
502 Scholem was struck by the fact that Kabbalists did not devise prayers of their own. This is 
another indication of the deep conservative streak of Kabbalah. 
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behaviorally the communal features of Judaism endured and were even intensified. The 
new spiritual practices mystics devised did not create a gap between the kabbalist and 
common Jews in respect to the actual implementation of the commandments and the 
participation in communal activity. From this perspective, although mystics were doing 
much more than mechanically performing the commandments, there was nothing about 
their behavior that made them seem distinct from the community. Yosef ben Shlomo adds 
that unlike the elitist perspectives harbored by philosophers, Kabbalistic theology could 
be interpreted on many different levels of sophistication, which enabled Kabbalah to be 
disseminated among intellectual elites as well as on a very popular level.503 Similarly, 
according to Idel, Kabbalah’s “conjunctive” theology in which Ein-Sof is linked to the 
realm of matter through a process of emanation was reflected socially in the way mystics 
seemed to forge a more intimate and unmediated relationship with commoners.504  
While mysticism is usually associated with the secluded individual such as the 
Christian and Buddhist monk, or the Hindu ascetic, here we see a very uncommon 
perspective in which practices such a kavannah were exercised in the name of the 
community as a whole. Although individual intentions were important, the restoration of 
the divine realm was first and foremost a communal effort of groups of Kabbalists who 
prayed in concert. Not only did Kabbalistic circles ideally operated in groups but they 
saw themselves as representing the yearnings and metaphysical role of a whole nation. 
This communal perspective meant that the position of the Shaliach Tzibur, the person 
                                            
503 Joseph ben-Avraham Gikatilla, Sha’arei Orah, Yosef Ben-Shelomo ed., (Jerusalem: Mosad 
Bialik, 1980), p. 23. 
504 Idel, “Window of Opportunities,” pp. 7-8. 
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leading the prayer and the kavannot (intentions) of other members, became of central 
importance.505 Similarly establishing a quorum for prayer became all the more important 
for kabbalists since the concerted exercise of communal intentions was seen as far 
superior to the practice of kavannah in solitude. It is this peculiar communal dimension 
that gave Kabbalah its unique character among the mystical traditions of other world 
religions.            
                                           
3.6.2 Literary Formats  
I argued above that the in spite of its incorporation of many analytical features, 
the Zohar returned to a narrative and Midrashic formulation characteristic of traditional 
rabbinic discourse. Here I would like to highlight how the communal ethos promoted by 
kabbalists is reflected in the Zohar’s returned to a form of discourse open to various 
interpretations rather than one uncompromising truth. Scholem’s original reconstruction 
of the Zohar as a “book” authored by a single person (Moshe de Leon) has been 
challenged by his student Yehuda Liebes and more recently by scholars such as Ronit 
Meroz, Daniel Abrams, and Boaz Huss.506 Abrams, for instance, contends that far from 
                                            
505 Scholem, Ha Kabbalah bi Provence, pp. 76-79. 
506 Scholem and Tishby argued for a single author (R’ Moshe de-Leon). See Scholem Major 
Trends in Jewish Mysticism, pp. 156-243 and Isaiah Tishby, The wisdom of the Zohar: An 
anthology of Texts. Trans. David Goldstein, 3 Vols. (Oxford, 1989), pp. 1-126. Both Scholem and 
Tishby excluded the Raya Meheimna and Tikunim from de Leon’s authorship. Liebes suggested a 
circle of Castilian authors. Ronit Meroz pushed this argument further claiming that there were 
multiple circles during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries while Daniel Abrams and Boaz 
Huss suggests that the text fluctuated at least until the first 1558 Mantua publication. Yehuda 
Liebes, Studies in the Zohar (Albany, NY, 1993), pp. 85-138. idem., Zohar as Renaissance 
[Hebrew], Da’at 46 (2001): 5-11. Ronit Meroz, ‘Zoharic Narratives and Their Adaptations,’ pp. 
3–63. Idem. “The Chariot of Ezekiel—An Unknown Zoharic Commentary” [Hebrew], Te’udah 
16/17 (2001): 567–616; “The Weaving of a Myth: An Analysis of Two Stories in the Zohar” 
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being a book, the Zohar should be seen as a literary phenomenon or even a series of 
literary phenomena.507 Instead of looking at the Zohar as a distinct and well-defined 
work, we should treat it as a general discourse or worldview that was gradually 
institutionalized beginning at the end of the thirteenth century. Indeed, Lurianic 
Kabbalah, Sabbateanism, the Hasidic movement, and more recently the influential 
Kabbalah of R’ Yehuda Ashlag are only some examples of how the Zohar as a ‘literary 
phenomenon’ continues to operate as a general discourse that allowed divergent 
interpretations. Even the first 1558 Mantua publication did not lead to its finality; zoharic 
discourse with its symbolic ambiguity persevered as a platform for varying ideas and 
approaches; a pluralism that enabled Jewish thinkers to update their ideas in respect to 
changing circumstance. While the Zohar represents a fairly distinct vision of the universe 
and man’s relation to God, it also invites participation and re-interpretation. Elliot 
Wolfson notes that “recognition of plurivocality does not undermine the soundness of 
                                                                                                                                  
[Hebrew], in Howard Kreisel ed., Study and Knowledge in Jewish Thought, vol. ii (Be’er Sheva, 
2006), pp. 167–205; idem., ‘The Path of Silence: An Unknown Story from a Zohar Manuscript’, 
European Journal of Jewish Studies, 1 (2008): 319–42. Daniel Abrams, ‘Critical and Post-
Critical Textual Scholarship of Jewish Mystical Literature: Notes on the History and 
Development of Modern Editing Techniques’, Kabbalah: Journal for the Study of Jewish 
Mystical Texts, 1 (1996): 17–71; idem., ‘The Invention of the Zohar as a Book: On the 
Assumptions and Expectations of the Kabbalists and Modern Scholars’, Kabbalah: Journal for 
the Study of Jewish Mystical Texts, 19 (2009): 7–142; idem., Kabbalistic Manuscripts and 
Textual Theory: Methodologies of Textual Scholarship and Editorial Practice in the Study of 
Jewish Mysticism (Los Angeles: Magnes Press, 2010), pp. 17–117; 224–428; Boaz Huss,‘“Sefer 
ha-Zohar” as a Canonical, Sacred and Holy Text:Changing Perspectives of the Book of Splendor 
between the Thirteenth and Eighteenth Centuries’, Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy, 7 
(1997): 257–307. 
507 Abrams notes that the Zohar is a literary phenomenon “which, depending on the definition, 
could include numerous authors or contributors to its literary creation… The Zohar could also 
just as easily be considered a literary phenomenon whose chronological boundaries cannot be 
limited to the Castilian kabbalists…” Abrams, Kabbalistic Manuscripts and Textual Theory, p. 
424. 
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positing a uniform world-view; on the contrary, heterogeneity may itself be 
demonstrative of a shared perspective…one can posit several authors of a treatise—even 
straddling centuries—and continue to speak of a unifying factor; indeed, one might make 
the case on hermeneutical grounds that it is precisely the unifying factor that allows for 
diversity.”508 
The prevalence of alternative hermeneutic techniques that emerged between the 
tenth and thirteenth-centuries reflect the Jewish tradition’s urgent need to furnish 
scripture with new interpretations. As opposed to the allegoric stance of the philosophers, 
kabbalists chose a symbolic discourse that provided “loose” parameters of meaning and 
interpretation. Idel contends that “by the intermediacy of its symbolism theosophical 
[theurgic] Kabbalah operates as a unifying ideology,” he opposes this to ecstatic 
Kabbalah, which was oriented towards the isolated individual and neglected the social 
structure.509 Again, as mentioned earlier, Idel argues that the key to the Zohar’s ability to 
revitalize Judaism was that as opposed to the elitist perspective of philosophers and the 
school of ecstatic Kabbalah, the Zohar “was intended from the outset for a double 
audience” the ordinary Jew as well as confined circles of mystics.510 Here again, as in the 
case of prayer and the commandments, the zoharic text permits a more broad 
participation, one that invites both mystics and commoners to engage the text.  
                                            
508 Elliot Wolfson, “Zoharic Literature and Midrashic Temporality,” in Michael Fishbane and 
Joanna Weinberg ed. Midrash Unbound: Transformations and Innovations, pp. 324-5; idem., 
‘Structure, Innovation, and Diremptive Temporality: The Use of Models to Study Continuity and 
Discontinuity in Kabbalistic Tradition,’ Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies, 6 
(2007): 153–6. See also idem., Language, Eros, Being, pp. 47–8. 
509 Idel, New Perspectives, p. 206 [my brackets]. Theosophical Kabbalah is another name for the 
school of the theurgical Kabbalah. 
510 Ibid., p. 209. 
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The groundbreaking changes introduced by Kabbalists represent the emergence of 
a radically innovative discourse, indeed a new worldview, but in no way did these 
changes encourage members to depart from the communal body or from the traditional 
family structure. On the contrary, ritual within the family, marital relations, and 
procreation were reinforced with a new theological foundation. Beginning with the Bahir, 
Kabbalistic theology introduced to Judaism the notion of transmigration, in which “a man 
or a woman who voluntarily decides to be childless may suffer transmigration for not 
having fulfilled the biblical injunction to “be fruitful and multiply.”511 The Kabbalah 
became replete with family-related symbolism in which “the organic structure of the 
sefirot is often described symbolically as a family composed of Father, a Mother, a Son, 
and a Daughter, Bride, and Bridegroom, Husband and Wife.512 In Tiqqunei Zohar, 
creation is supported by the union of the sefirot, which are symbolized by family 
members.513 The goal of unity in the sefirotic realm symbolized by family members 
suggests that the unity and integrity of the traditional Jewish family remains central and is 
even intensified in Kabbalistic theology. Cosmic harmony is directly associated with the 
family unit, sexual activity, and procreation. Kabbalah, through its successful synthesis of 
personal and communal features, managed to absorb both analytic and synthetic 
elements. Kabbalists adopted Greek forms of introspection while simultaneously 
                                            
511 David Ariel, Kabbalah: The Mystic Quest in Judaism (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2006), p. 148. 
512 Dan, The Early Kabbalah, p. 13. 
513 The son is an outcome of the union of father and mother, while the union of mother and 
daughter represented by the sefirot Binah and Malchut represent the coming together of two 
letters (H -heh) in the Tetragrammaton (YHWH). The union of these two letters is facilitated by 
the letter ‘vav’ (W) which represents the son. Tiqqunei Zohar, Tiqqun 69, 99a. See Idel, 
Ascensions on High, p. 89. 
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constructing a social mysticism that highlighted the centrality of the community and 
family life. They thereby carved a new space for spiritual autonomy while safeguarding 
and reinforcing their traditional forms of social embeddedness.   
The unique balancing of radicalism and conservatism was what enabled 
Kabbalists to outstrip both philosophical and mystical strands with a rationalist bent such 
as ecstatic Kabbalah. They revolutionized prayer by infusing it with a new mental 
procedure, while they simultaneously preserved prayer's communal orientation. The 
ability of theurgists to devise new forms of “cognitive individualism” while at the same 
time insisting that prayer and the commandments remain ‘externally’ unchanged was a 
typical example of the appropriation of tools from analytic modes of operation and their 
subordination to those of the synthetic modality. While philosophical allegory was 
undermining the physical commandments and their function as a unifying mode of 
action, theurgists presented the commandments as having an unprecedentedly central 
cosmological function thereby preserving ritual as an inalienable factor of Jewish 
communal life. Kabbalists believed that the common Jew could continue following the 
commandments without any change in behavior or old habits; mere performance, 
although somewhat inferior, was sufficient and entailed cosmic ramifications of which 
the simple-minded person was not even aware.514 And finally, the Zohar, due to its unique 
literary characteristics and symbolic approach avoided a finalized dogmatic theology and 
invited communal participation.  
                                            
514 Ibn Bahya Paquda’s Duties of the Hearts was the main influence on Maimonides’ stress on 
belief in the following of the commandments. See Seeskin, Autonomy in Jewish Philosophy, p. 
90. 
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3.7 THE CULTURAL LEVEL 
3.7.1 Contemplation vs. Praxis  
In the last section I looked at the relationship between sociality and the new 
contemplative features promoted by medieval Jewish philosophers and mystics. I argued 
that the emergence of new forms of cognitive-individualism equipped Jews with 
unprecedented channels for personal fulfillment. Such changes were a reflection of a 
move from the typical communalism of classical Judaism to a more individualistic 
approach. Here I will look at the conflict between these growing spiritualistic trends and 
the synthetic modality’s emphasis on ritual performance or orthopraxy.  
 As argued in the second chapter, classical Judaism was mainly a tradition of deeds 
and action; the main religious activity was not oriented towards introspection or the 
construction of abstract cosmological notions, but rather biologically expressed through 
concrete behavioral patterns and the meticulous following of the commandments. In the 
rabbinic view the mitzvot were seen as a reflection of God’s will such that they were a 
goal in and of themselves, rather than a means to an end, as medieval philosophers 
argued.515 The commandments were taken for granted such that rabbis never felt 
compelled to provide a systematic explanation for why Jews had to follow them. Under 
the influence of Greek philosophy, this old paradigm changed and led to the emergence 
of an influential literature known as Ta’amei ha Mitzvot (reasons for the 
commandments). The fact that this new body of literature dedicated to exploring the 
                                            
515 Lenn Goodman, “The Individual and Community in the Normative Tradition of Judaism,” In 
Autonomy and Judaism, Daniel H. Frank ed., (Albany: State University of New York, 1992), p. 
98. 
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underlying meaning of the commandments came to the fore reflects the historical changes 
that Judaism was undergoing during this period. Bahya ibn Paquda’s highly influential 
Duties of the Heart (1080) began to shift the tradition towards a stronger emphasis on the 
mental facets of ritual in which the ‘intentions of the heart’ were seen as superior to 
external physical deeds.516  
Bahya’s Neoplatonic stance reflected an escalating conflict between body and 
spirit in medieval Judaism. Greek philosophy, especially in its Platonic versions, 
promoted a worldview in which there was a progression from the lower and problematic 
world of material towards the sublime spiritual sphere of the divine. This fundamental 
logic reflects the typical Greek prioritization of the mental over the material aspects of 
existence.517 One of the central dilemmas medieval Jews faced was the following 
question: if religious perfection was measured according to one’s distance from the world 
of material, how can one remain committed to the performance of physical deeds? Early 
Neoplatonic philosophers dealt with this dilemma by claiming that deeds were secondary 
to sincerity, a perspective that challenged the rote performance of prescribed physical 
acts. The stance of Aristotelian philosophers was similar in that, they too, saw the 
physical act as a means to an end rather than a goal. Maimonides, for instance, was a 
strict opponent of the traditional view that saw divine will (the will that we follow the 
                                            
516 Some interpreters claim that Paquda went as far as suggesting that the physical act can be 
discarded. The common interpretation, however, is that his main goal was to bring together the 
inner and outer “duties;” the external duties of the body and the inner duties of the heart. The fact 
that Paquda’s spiritualistic approach was hardly criticized is a testimony of the strong anti-
materialistic currents of the age. 
517 Dan argues that “the concept of God as infinite and purely spiritual demanded that religious 
life emphasize the spiritual aspects rather than the practical and material ones.” A very Short 
Introduction, p. 53. 
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commandments) as superior to the commandments as vehicles of meaning. Since God 
operates according to order and reason, Maimonides argued, the commandments were 
certain to contain an intelligible meaning. In the rationalistic view the mitzvot were 
channels for improving welfare by promoting health, morality, and positive social habits, 
as well as a platform for intellectual self-realization.518 This compelled Jewish 
philosophers to attribute a specific meaning to each commandment, thereby leading 
Judaism down a slippery slope. As an example, if the commandments associated with 
keeping the Sabbath were merely a way to strengthen one’s belief in the biblical creation 
story, what would happen once one’s belief in creation became firm and unshakable? 
Would this not entail the redundancy of the physical act? As discussed earlier, the 
conventionalizing effects of philosophy were worrisome; conservatives were particularly 
concerned with the possible trivialization of the commandment.519 As Moshe Halbertal 
notes, “The line between allegorizing the biblical narrative and allegorizing the 
commandments is a fine one, and the allegorizers were accused of harboring a secret 
intention to cross that line.”520 The spiritualistic tendencies that entered Judaism were 
therefore presenting a real challenge to its deed-based theology. This conflict meant that 
                                            
518 Moshe Halbertal, Ha Rambam (Jerusalem: Merkaz Zalman Shazar, 2009), pp. 289-90. 
[Hebrew]. See ch. 8 for Maimonides’ perception of the commandments; Also see Kenneth 
Seeskin, Autonomy in Jewish Philosophy, p. 92. 
519 Examples of philosophical allegory: philosophers believed that the Song of Songs was an 
allegory of the contact between the human rational soul and the active intellect and that Abraham 
and Sarah represented the Greek distinction between Form and Matter. They also argued that the 
Talmudic ma’aseh bereshit (work of creation) and ma’aseh merkabah (work of the chariot) really 
pointed to the study of physics and metaphysics, 
520 Halbertal, People of the Book, p. 112. 
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the commandments occupied a central point of contention between competing schools of 
thought in medieval Judaism.   
Following philosophers, once mystics constructed a more mature response to 
rationalism, they also began proposing their own unique interpretations to the mitzvot. As 
in the case of philosophers, a new suspicion towards carnality became very apparent in 
Kabbalah. Clear Gnostic influences as seen in the work of the Kohen brothers in Castile 
made it into the Zohar, which related the human body to the demonic other-side (sitra 
achra). Elliot Wolfson notes that under the influence of philosophy Kabbalists began to 
adopt “a negative view towards the corporeal body;” such inclinations meant that Jewish 
mystics “considered the contemplative life as a way to escape the bonds of carnality. This 
explains the adoption of ascetic forms of piety on the part of Kabbalists with special 
emphasis placed on sexual abstinence.”521 Hava Tirosh-Samuelson notes that according to 
many Kabbalists the soul was in charge of controlling the corporeal body’s proclivity 
towards sin, a perspective that saw the body as inferior to the divine origin of the soul.522 
Therefore, just like philosophers, mystic had to provide solutions for why physical deeds 
still mattered. In order to understand these contrasting solutions, we must examine the 
new contemplative techniques philosophers and mystics devised.   
Medieval thinkers, strongly influenced by the Greek paradigm, sought to 
construct a more sophisticated form of religiosity that gave the individual a more central 
position in religious life. Many of them wanted to shift the tradition from tedious 
                                            
521 Elliot Wolfson, “The Body in the Text: A Kabbalistic Theory of Embodiment,” Jewish 
Quarterly Review 95, no. 3, (Summer 2005): 490. 
522 Tirosh-Samuelson, “Philosophy and Kabbalah,” pp. 218-257. 
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orthopraxy towards a more spiritualized theology. In their search to embed contemplative 
techniques in a monotheistic vision, philosophers began to redefine the phenomenon of 
prophecy, which was interpreted in terms of one’s intellectual capacities.523 Like his 
Muslim predecessors, Maimonides regarded the prophetic experience as a potential 
equivalent to Greek forms of spiritual realization. For the first time a systematic method 
based on the individual was formulated in which prophecy was stripped from its 
supernatural implications and presented as an event governed by a logical procedure. 
Although divine providence (hashgaha) remained important, prophecy was nevertheless 
seen as an outcome of a concordance between the human intellect and the the part of the 
divine that was accessible to humans – the active intellect.524 To a great extent, the very 
fact that the attainment of prophecy involved a decipherable process rather than a sudden 
miraculous event was in itself a striking innovation. The individual could now engage in 
a spiritual exploration of the inner self, based on the refinement of one’s intellect. The 
problem with the philosophical stance was that it trivialized the uniqueness of the Jewish 
people by claiming that prophecy was a phenomenon accessible to all humans by virtue 
of their common cognitive apparatus. This rational approach diminished the role of 
divine will in the prophetic process. Even worse, although the commandments could 
certainly contribute to the process of intellectual refinement, they did not seem to occupy 
                                            
523 Ben-Ami Scharfstein, A Comparative History of World Philosophy: From the Upanishads to 
Kant (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998). What the different philosophers, 
namely, Maimonides, Aquinas, Al-Farabi, Avicenna “conceive of prophecy is critical to their 
synthesis of reason and faith. It represents a strategy for distinguishing between the prophet and 
the philosopher.” pp. 327. 
524 Itzhak Shilat, Ben ha Kuzari la Rambam, p. 45. 
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an indispensable role in reaching a prophetic level. It is this sense that philosophers saw 
the commandments means rather than a goal.  
In their reaction to philosophical theories of prophecy, Kabbalists sought to devise 
their own contemplative techniques. As mentioned earlier, their solution was a unique 
theory of mystical intentions (kavannah). This new approach meant that through the 
practice of intense mental concentration, the Jewish mystic could facilitate a more fluid 
flow of divine energy (shefa) from the Ein-Sof, through the ten sefirot, and towards the 
human sphere. Meditative prayer could therefore lead to the rectification of reality by 
harmonizing the inner recesses of the Godhead. This brings us back to ritual; the genius 
of the introspective approach advanced by kabbalists was that it was anchored in the 
performance of the commandments and therefore represented a shift from dry orthopraxy 
towards a more sophisticated meditative enactment of the mitzvot. The individual was no 
longer performing the commandments because he was told to, but rather because their 
performance was crucial for the preservation of the world. Just as philosophers 
empowered the private person by offering introspective channels towards the attainment 
of prophecy, so did Kabbalists empower believers by making them sustainers of cosmic 
harmony. In both cases we see the emergence of contemplative techniques that were 
centered upon the private person; the central difference being that the Kabbalistic stance 
did not have a conventionalizing effect upon the commandments.     
 Owing to the ontological importance of the commandments, the Jewish body 
remained indispensable in Kabbalistic theology. Although we saw that both philosophers 
and mystics downgraded the position of physicality vis-à-vis the soul, unlike 
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philosophers, kabbalists proposed a process-oriented theology in which the body was 
implicated in a metaphysics of mutual resonance with the divine realm. Wolfson notes 
that for kabbalists “the separation from sensual matters is not seen as a way to obliterate 
the body—commitment to rabbinic ritual precluded such an unmitigated renunciation of 
the natural world…”525 Therefore together with the escalation of mentalism among 
kabbalists, we see an adamant protection of the classical rabbinic commitment to the 
body and ritual performance.  
 The Kabbalistic approach represented an extremely conservative understanding of 
the commandments. The starting point of mystics was that Jewish ritual must remain 
behaviorally unchanged. Kabbalists managed to strike a balance between adding a 
contemplative dimension to Jewish praxis while at the same time preserving the 
indisputable importance of rigorously following the commandments. In fact, the 
meticulous implementation of the commandments became more important than ever; the 
body of the Jew became an earthly channel to the attainment of divine harmony in the 
upper worlds. The resonance between the material body and the world of the sefirot gave 
the commandments an ontological significance and a resilience against the allegorizing 
tendencies of rationalists. The fact that the mitzvot were beyond human comprehension 
meant that they could not be changed in the slightest degree. This interpretation was so 
powerful and impervious to historical change that it still dominates the understanding of 
                                            
525 Wolfson, “The Body in the Text,” p. 493; The philosophical spiritualized interpretation of the 
afterlife finds a counterpart in the Kabbalah of R. Azriel where the body is perceived in terms of a 
punishment which leads to Gilgul. See more in Bernard Septimus, Hispano-Jewish Culture in 
Transition, p. 112. 
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the commandments by many orthodox communities today.526 Instead of the philosophical 
belief that an act points to a specific meaning, the genius of theurgic Kabbalah was that 
the commandments could not be interpreted according to human reason. While nothing 
changed on the mundane, behavioral level, the same commandments that were 
traditionally followed by Jews had far reaching cosmological implications. This meant 
that common Jews did not have to worry about the elitist preoccupation with moral 
perfection or the refinement of the intellect; following the commandments in a literal way 
was sufficient as a religious duty.   
 Other indications of a favorable approach towards the body among kabbalists can 
be seen in the importance of the image of the divine anthropos, or Adam Kadmon 
(primordial man). As opposed to philosophers who launched a war against any sign of 
carnality and anthropomorphism in Jewish scripture, Kabbalists re-engaged the early 
mystical text of Shiur Koma (the divine dimensions), the same tradition that Maimonides 
so opposed. Although kabbalists abandoned the interest of early Jewish mystics in the 
awesome physical dimensions of God or in the possibility of visualizing God on his 
divine throne, they nevertheless integrated the image of the divine anthropos into their 
theology by interpreting it in a more symbolic and spiritualistic way. The centrality of 
God’s anthropomorphic features invested the human body with an ontological 
significance.527 Mystics understood this image as containing some of the most profound 
                                            
526 Dan, Joseph, and Ronald C. Kiener. The Early Kabbalah, p. 12. 
527 A critique of traditional anthropomorphism was one of the main goals of philosophers, 
especially Maimonides who dedicated large parts of his work, notably the beginning of the Guide 
to the allegorical reinterpretation of anthropomorphic and anthropopathic biblical passages. 
Kabbalists, on the other hand, interpreted anthropomorphism symbolically. In his introduction to 
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metaphysical insights regarding the nature of the divine, predicated upon a mysterious 
homology between the human body and the heavenly non-carnal “body” of God. David 
Ariel notes that “when the mystics speak of man as being created in the image of God, 
they literally mean that man is created as a microcosm and embodiment of the sefirot.528 
The correlation between the divine structure and the human body resonated with the 
biblical idea that man (adam) was created in the image (tzelem) of God. This informed 
the basic Kabbalistic belief that the primordial anthropos created a link between the 
mundane and the divine realms. Far from being conventionalized, the body of the Jew 
suddenly takes on a metaphysical/ontological role that had a direct impact on the divine 
“limbs.” The well-known Kabbalistic dictum ‘evar machzik evar’ (limb supports limb) 
represents a theurgic notion that stipulated a direct correlation between the human and 
divine limbs in which the former, through ritual action, supports the latter.529 Gershom 
Scholem noted that “Kabbalists were not embarrassed by their discourse on Shiur Koma, 
on the contrary, they were honored by it, they frequently declare the relationship between 
their mystical theology and the Shiur Koma tradition, and they did so with an air of pride 
                                                                                                                                  
Sha’arei Orah Joseph Gikatilla state:”… all those instances in the Torah where we come across 
words such as hand and foot, ear and eye and so forth, what do they mean? Know and believe that 
all those matters although indicating His greatness and reality, there is no living thing that can 
comprehend or see such a hand and foot and ear and so on… do not assume, that an eye is in the 
shape of a real eye, or hand in the shape of a hand, these are internal matters, and the profoundest 
of the profound in discovering the reality of God’s existence blessed be He. Know that there is no 
relationship between our and His substance and image, but that the meaning of the shape of the 
limbs is that they are symbols, sublime matters, incomprehensible to human knowledge except 
through the imagination.” Sha’arei Orah, p. 49 [my translation].  
528 Ariel, The Mystic Quest, p. 140. 
529 Idel, New Perspectives, p. 185; רביא קיזחמ רביא. Also see Wolfson, “The Body in the Text,” p. 
490; and idem., “Mystical Rationalization of the Commandments in Sefer ha-Rimmon,” Hebrew 
Union College Annual 59 (1988): 231–35. See also Yair Loberbaum Image of God: Halakhah 
and Aggadah, (2004) [Hebrew]; and Adam Afterman “Letter Permutation Techniques,” p. 54. 
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that mocked [philosophical] apologetics.”530 The point I would like to stress is that in 
spite of the clear contemplative techniques Kabbalists devised, features such as carnality, 
the body, and literal ritual performance were preserved and even intensified.  
 Kabbalah’s positive attitudes towards the body may also be discerned in the 
famous Iggeret ha Kodesh (The Holy Epistle) which criticized the negative Maimonidean 
stance towards corporeality and man’s sexual nature.531 In conformity with Judaism’s 
positive view towards procreation and the body, the author of the Iggeret presents sexual 
relations as a sacred, even mystical activity that has implications for the nature of one’s 
offsprings. The Greek discomfort with carnality, reflected in the Maimonidean position 
(following Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics), in which our tactile senses associated with 
drinking, eating, and sexual intercourse were seen as disgraceful, was harshly attacked by 
conservative rabbis.532 This short text treats the sexual act by using a typical Kabbalistic 
                                            
530 Scholem, Pirkei Yesod behavanat hakabbalah ve simlei’ha (Jerusalem: Mosad Bialik, 1980), 
p. 174 [my translation]. 
531 The authorship of the iggeret ha-kodesh has been a subject of much debate. Scholem and 
Charles Mopsik believed it was written by Josheph Gikatilla, see Scholem, “Did the Ramban 
Write Iggeret ha-Kodesh?” (Hebrew). In Mechkarei ha Kabbalah (Tel Aviv: 1998). Scholem later 
changed his opinion and attributed it to R. Joseph Shoshan. Others scholars attributed it to 
Nahmanides following the opinion of the 14th century Rabbi Yisrael Elnekaveh’s Menorat ha-
Meor. Idel contends that the iggeret was written by an anonymous late thirteenth century 
kabbalist, see Idel, “Sexual Metaphors and Praxis in the Kabbalah.” The Jewish Family: 
Metaphor and Memory, David Kraemer ed., (New York and Oxford: 1989). Shraga Abramson 
attributed the text to R. Ezra of Gerona: “Iggeret ha-Kodesh Attributed to the Ramban” (Hebrew). 
Sinai 90, no. 5/6 (1982): 232–234; idem., “Iggeret ha-Kodesh” In The Writings of the Ramban 
(Hebrew), edited by R. Hayyim Dov Chavel. (Jerusalem: 1963). More on the Iggeret, David 
Biale, Eros and the Jews (California: University of California Press, 1992); Guberman, K. “The 
Language of Love in Spanish Kabbalah: An Examination of the Iggeret ha-Kodesh.” In 
Approaches to Judaism in Medieval Times, vol. 1, edited by David R. Blumenthal (Chico, CA: 
1984), pp. 53–105; Harris, M. “Marriage as Metaphysics: A Study of the Iggereth ha-Kodesh.” 
Hebrew Union College Annual 33 (1962): 197–220. 
532 Guide of the Perplexed part 2 Ch. 36. see Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics book 3 ch. 10. 
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symbolic dynamism between the male (hokmah - intellect) and the female (tvunah - 
wisdom) whose dialectical interaction is resolved in the unity of knowledge (da’at). 
Instead of the common analytical distinction between the sublime soul and inferior body, 
the Iggeret’s author contends that everything about the human body was created in God’s 
exquisite wisdom “but being ignorant man attaches repulsiveness to that which is not 
repulsive.”533 Finally, the Ramah, in the resurrection debate, was angered by 
Maimonides’ sharp distinction between body and soul, and the interpretation of the 
former as an impure impediment to perfection. In a response to Sheshet ben Isaac he 
states “in what way is the soul of righteous man superior to his body?… both have an 
equal share in his righteousness.”534  
 As conservative defenders of the synthetic mindset, Kabbalists were determined 
to both spiritualize Judaism and to simultaneously safeguard the behavioral and ritualistic 
features of the rabbinic worldview. Indeed, one of the greatest tools Judaism ever had 
against assimilation was its peculiar way of action. As Roy Rappaport has taught us, the 
physical participation in ritual is one of the most unambiguous ways to affirm one’s 
commitment to a group. The Kabbalistic protection of physical deeds together with its 
new mentalistic approaches towards following the commandments is a fascinating 
                                            
533 Iggeret ha-Kodesh 
534 Septimus, Hispano-Jewish Culture, pp. 58-59. Sheshet ben Isaac was a radical rationalist who 
defended the Maimonidean view of the afterlife in the first controversy of 1202. See the analysis 
of this phenomenon in Daniel Matt, "The Mystic and the Mizvot," in Jewish Spirituality: From 
the Bible Through the Middle Ages, Arthur Green ed., pp. 372-382. Matt gathers together the 
polemical remarks of Joseph ben Todros Abulafia, Jacob ben Sheshet, Joseph ben Shalom 
Ashkenazi and Moses de Leon, all of whom denounced the philosophical-rationalist approach to 
the commandments, and who feared the negative implications of this approach for normative 
Jewish practices. 
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example of the delicate balance of conservative synthetic and revolutionary analytic 
tendencies.  
 
3.7.2 Particularism vs. Universalism 
 In earlier chapters I have discussed the way analytic traditions are more prone 
towards a universalistic worldview. Following Jewish philosophers, Kabbalists began 
adopting many analytic features that gave their theology a more universal characteristic. 
From a structural point of view, due to its Neoplatonic and Gnostic undertones, medieval 
Jewish mysticism constructed a relatively objectified metaphysics, reflected by a 
systematic and hierarchical progression from the mundane world towards the divine. 
Such structural qualities were more conducive to the transportability of the sefirotic 
architectonic to other cultures. The fact that Christians could borrow Kabbalistic theology 
and metaphysics is a testimony of this cross-cultural applicability. Clearly, such 
transportability would be impossible with Talmudic material, which was embedded in a 
dense particularistic history and operated according to inaccessible methodologies. As an 
example, the sefirotic structure could be used by philosopher Raymond Lull (1232-1316) 
as a tool for the conversion of Jews and Muslims to Christianity.535 The fact that 
Kabbalah caught Lull’s attention is significant since his intellectual project sought to 
                                            
535 Ramon Llull’s Ars Magna (1305). See Paolo Rossi, Logic and the Art of Memory: The Quest 
for a Universal Language, translated with an introduction by Stephen Clucas (London: Athlone, 
2000); J. N. Hilgarth, Raymond Lull and Lullism in Fourteenth-Century France (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1972). More on Christian Kabbalah see Allison P. Coudert “Christian 
Kabbalah” in Jewish Mysticism and Kabbalah: New Insights and Scholarship (New York and 
London: New York University Press. 2011), ch. 7 pp. 159-174; Allison P. Coudert and Jeffrey S. 
Shoulson, eds., Hebraica Veritas? Christian Hebraists, Jews, and the Study of Judaism in Early 
Modern Europe (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004). 
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introduce more universalizable and logical models for the exposition of knowledge. 
Slightly later, during the Renaissance, Christian Kabbalah enjoyed considerable 
popularity using the same sefirotic structure devised by Jews while replacing Jewish 
symbols with Christian ones, notably those of the trinity. In other words, although the 
symbolic world of Kabbalah was highly particularistic, the objective structure of 
Kabbalistic theology and the kind of logical dynamic that governed its operation was 
easily transported to foreign cultural settings.   
 Beyond these structural considerations, there are also matters of content that gave 
medieval Jewish mysticism its universalistic undertones. The Kabbalistic notion of an 
impersonal emanating divine source, the Ein-Sof (lit. without end) stripped the God of 
Israel of his traditional historical underpinnings; mythological features were now 
replaced by a pure divine entity that was understood through a characteristic 
philosophical ‘negative theology.’536 Similarly, the Aristotelian hierarchy of Separate 
Intellects was replaced by the nine higher sefirot, with the tenth hypostasis of Malchut 
(Kingliness) serving as a substitute for the Active Intellect. Again, such an impersonal 
interpretation of the divine gave Kabbalah its indisputable universalistic thrust. It is also 
worth noting that the very shift from the Talmudic domains of law, ethics, and historical 
analysis to the domain of metaphysics had universalizing influence upon Jewish 
                                            
536 Scholem, Ha’Kabala Bi Provence, pp. 169-170. The philosophical source for ‘via negativa’ 
was Job 38:12. Saadya was the first to see this passage as hinting at the foundations of the world 
in his first ma’amar in Emunot ve De’ot. p. 171: For Saadya the Yesodot (foundations) are 
indivisible elements of creation (Schoelm hints at atomistic influences that were popular among 
the arabs). Risan was the first to comment on this passage, which led to Ein and then Hochmah 
and then Binah. The whole chapter is seen as symbolizing a cosmogony. Idel contends that 
Kabbalists were actually much less concerned with negative theology than the school of Scholem 
assumed. Ascensions on High, p. 15. 
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theology. This was especially clear in the early phase of Kabbalah in which very little is 
said about “every-day life, ethical behavior and reasons for the ritualistic 
commandments.”537 Only in the following generation (in the second half of the thirteenth 
century), after mystics constructed a general consensus regarding the structural 
characteristics of their theology did they return to traditional areas of interest: ethics, the 
commandments, and Israel’s historical experience. The mystics of Gerona, especially R. 
Azriel, interpreted the sefirot in highly conceptual, philosophical language. The objective 
introduction of information meant that mystical manuals became more accessible to 
Jewish readers as well as to Christians.538 Therefore, as opposed to the inaccessible 
Talmud, Kabbalah, both in terms of structure and in certain feature related to content, 
represented a revolutionary theology that disclosed a more objectified picture of reality 
that could be applied universally.  
 But in spite of these universal aspects, Jewish mystics made certain to return to a 
highly particularistic worldview that countered the conventionalizing effects of 
philosophical decontextualization. As in the case of all the morphological distinctions 
made in this study, Kabbalists took followed the pattern of appropriation and 
subordination. In this specific case, they showed a tendency towards the universal 
metaphysics of the analytic modality, but they presented it in a highly exclusive narrative 
that was quintessentially particularistic; indeed, Kabbalistic theology represents an 
                                            
537 Dan, Kabbalah: A Very Short Introduction, p. 55. 
538 As an example one of the most influential treatises on the Kabbalah of Johann Reuchlin was 
Joseph Gikatila’s Sha’arei Orah. See Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann, “Christian Kabbala: Joseph 
Gikatilla (1247-1305), Johannes Reuchlin (1455-1522), Paulus Ricius (D. 1541), and Jacob 
Böhme (1575-1624),” In Allison E. Coudert ed. The Language of Adam/Die Sparche Adams 
(Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1999), pp. 81–121. 
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unprecedented climax in the reinstitution of Judaism’s exclusivity and sacred ontological 
status. One example of this radical particularism is reflected in the zoharic idea of the 
“Ministers of the Nations” (Sarei Umot ha-Olam) who represented celestial ambassadors 
of the earthly nations. According to this thesis, interactions among nation in the worldly 
sphere are a reflection of a higher cosmological drama between the angelic ministers 
above. As opposed to other nations that are wholly dependent on the energy emanated 
from God, Jews are directly connected to the divine source, especially to the sefirah of 
Tiferet, their personal God. That Israel is constantly provoked and castigated by other 
nations is an outcome of its sinful behavior, but this misery will come to an end with the 
advent of the Messiah, a time in which God and Israel (Knesset Israel) will finally re-
unite (the unification of Malchut and Tiferet) and Israel will rise to glory. While in many 
pre-zoharic works the nations are clearly antagonistic to Israel, this is taken to new 
extremes in the Zohar in which the nations are associated with the dark ’other side’ (Sitra 
Achra) that will eventually be annihilated.539 The particularistic stance of the Zohar is 
further reflected in endless metaphors that created a sharp ontological divide between 
Jews and non-Jews. One such recurring metaphor is the portrayal of the “nations” as 
bodily organs that are sustained and nourished by Israel, symbolized by the heart. Joseph 
Hamadan in his commentary on the commandments states: “The people of Israel are the 
                                            
539 For example, Zohar 1 p. 287, זפר מע א תנשמ רהוזה. 
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essence of the universe, for they allude to the pure and the holy supernal form.”540 In 
agreement, David Ariel contends that:  
Kabbalah reflects the nativistic stream in Judaism which subscribes to an essentialist 
view of Jewishness. The Kabbalistic view that the neshamah [the highest part of the soul] 
is an emanation of God’s essence and comes to reside in us because of our connection 
with torah leads to the restrictive idea that only Jews can acquire neshamah. Judaism, in 
this view, is the only path of ascent to God.541 
 
 Here to we see the Kabbalistic insistence on the exclusive superiority of being Jewish. 
The choice of Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai as the central protagonist of the Zohar is of 
relevance as well. Bar Yohai was a well-known figure in the conservative, nationalistic 
camp of R. Aqiva during the rebellion against Rome in the first century CE. This 
certainly provided the Zohar with a strong particularistic atmosphere in the eyes of Jews 
who were well aware of Bar Yohai’s anti-foreign inclinations.542   
 As opposed to the unprecedented universalism of works such as Maimonides 
Mishneh Torah and Guide, the institutionalization of Kabbalah in the zoharic text 
returned to a highly inaccessible mode of discourse, replete with symbols and a difficult 
Hebrew/Aramaic hybrid. The exclusive history of Israel returns to the main stage with a 
dense mythological language that embellishes and conceals the objective sefirotic 
structure with a particularistic garment. As an example, while philosophical allegory 
transformed Abraham into the Greek notion of Form, the Abraham of the Kabbalah 
                                            
540 See in Hartley Lachter Kabbalistic Revolution n.16, pp. 508: Menahem Meier, “A Critical 
Edition of Sefer Ta’amey ha-Mitzwoth Attributed to Isaac ibn Farhi” (Ph.D. dissertation, 
Brandeis University, 1974), p. 30. 
541 Ariel, The Mystic Quest, p. 139-140. [my italics]. 
542 Liebes, Studies in the Zohar, p. 4. 
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remains both the historical first patriarch while simultaneously representing more 
profound cosmic powers such as the attribute of Mercy. This theology preserved the 
literal meaning of the text and therefore functioned as a type of protection against the 
excessive universalism and text-destroying hermeneutic of philosophy. In regards to the 
danger of philosophical universalism, Halbertal notes:  
the irony was that by elevating the concrete particular to the universal and the conceptual 
through allegory, the philosophers undermined not only the importance of the particulars 
in the biblical narrative but also the very idea of the particularity of the People of Israel. 
Sarah and Abraham, their flesh-and-blood forefathers, received the status of mere 
allegories. At this point the interpretative assimilation of the Torah to the Aristotelian 
realm becomes an act of assimilating the concrete people of Israel into the universal 
realm.543 
Unlike the untamed universalism of the philosophers, the universal characteristics of 
Kabbalistic metaphysics were masked in a particularistic narrative as well as by a 
hermeneutic that preserved the literal, historical meaning of the biblical text as 
understood by common people. Most importantly, as we have seen, Jewish ritual played a 
central role in the maintenance of cosmic harmony. Only Jews could theurgically 
manipulate the divine realm through the meditative process of kavannah and the 
performance of the mitzvot. Such particularism was substantially different form the 
philosophical idea that religious activity depends on one’s intellectual potential. While 
philosophical universalism was predicated upon a pan-human intellectual apparatus 
                                            
543 Halbertal, People of the Book, p. 112. 
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shared by people from different traditions, the Kabbalistic notion of theurgy was based on 
the exclusive role of Jewish prayer and the following of the commandment.  
 All of the above examples disclose a Judeo-centric vision of reality in which the 
Hebrew language and liturgy, Jewish ritual, the Jewish soul, the nation of Israel, and its 
unique history were ontologically irreplaceable. Kabbalists offered a systematic and 
theologically coherent metaphysical vision in which Judaism represents the very 
foundations of cosmic order. The dynamic of appropriating universalistic tendencies 
while subordinating them to a particularistic worldview remained a fascinating 
characteristic of medieval Jewish mysticism. This inner paradox is beautifully reflected in 
the way Kabbalah managed to both counter philosophical universalism by constructing 
its own universal metaphysics, while simultaneously attacking the philosophical 
conventionalization of their tradition by presenting Judaism through a highly 
particularistic and ontologically superior perspective. In present times, Kabbalah’s 
combination of universal and particularistic features is reflected in its ability to serve as a 
tool for both Ultra-Orthodox xenophobia, and universalistic new-age trends in 
Hollywood.544 Here again forms of analytical mysticism such as Abulafia’s ecstatic 
Kabbalah were too similar to the philosophical position. The fact that ecstatic Kabbalah 
failed to supplement its universalism with the ontological particularism such as one we 
                                            
544 On this phenomenon see Boaz Huss, “The New Age of Kabbalah: Contemporary Kabbalah, 
the New Age and postmodern spirituality.” Journal of Modern Jewish Studies 6, no. 2 (2007): 
107-125; idem., “All You Need is LAV: Madonna and Postmodern Kabbalah.” Jewish Quarterly 
Review 95, no. 4 (2005): 611-624; and Boaz Huss, Marco Pasi, and Kocku von Stuckrad eds. 
Kabbalah and Modernity: Interpretations, Transformations, Adaptations (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 
2010). See also Jody Myers “Kabbalah at the Turn of the 21st Century, in Jewish Mysticism and 
Kabbalah: New Insights and Scholarship (New York and London: New York University Press, 
2011). 
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see in the Zohar, can be seen as a major reason for its failure to consolidate its position in 
the Jewish tradition.  
 
3.7.3 This-Worldliness vs. Other-Worldliness 
 
 Thus far, our discussion of the cultural level has focused on the two 
morphological distinctions: contemplation vs. orthopraxy and universalism vs. 
particularism. In both cases, I have argued that Kabbalists managed to equip Jewish 
theology with analytic features such as contemplative techniques and a more 
universalistic cosmology, while simultaneously prioritizing opposing synthetic 
sensibilities, such as the stress on ritual performance and a highly particularistic, 
exclusionist worldview. In both these examples the distinctions between the analytic and 
synthetic modes of operation are directly or indirectly related to approaches towards the 
body and soul. The example of the analytic prioritization of spirit entailed the 
marginalization of ritual in favor of introspective techniques (cognitive individualism), 
while the tendency towards mentalistic procedures based on a universal cognitive 
apparatus naturally downplayed particularistic tendencies. With respect to the distinction 
between world-affirming and world-negating traditions, attitudes towards matter and 
spirit were similarly central.  
 As I argued in the second chapter, the analytic prioritization of soul over matter 
meant that the material world was treated with suspicion, an attitude that led to a growing 
interest in other-worldly spheres of existence. Menachem Kellner notes that Maimonides 
promoted Judaism’s shift from a tradition that was preoccupied with Halakhic matters 
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and specific deeds to the realm of thought.545 This typical philosophical move is one that 
subordinated the world of matter and action to a spiritualized existence in the afterworld. 
Indeed, the famous resurrection debate in Judaism touched at the heart of these opposing 
attitudes. Maimonides’ docetic approach towards resurrection was predicated upon the 
immortality of the rational soul, which outlives the body. This perspective pointed 
towards a realm of existence that was free from the encumbering effects of matter; a 
place in which the rational soul reaches immortality.546 This typically Greek 
understanding of immortality angered conservatives, not only due to its elitist 
intellectualism but also because it undermined the traditional Jewish view of physical 
resurrection as an event that reflects a change in this world. Oliver Leaman argues that as 
opposed to Christianity in which the temporal state is “a prelude to the next life, and so 
the arrangements in this world are of no great salvific significance,” Judaism “never 
made a sharp demarcation between the theological and the political…”547 Kabbalists 
generally followed this traditional political perspective, in which the messianic age was 
seen as the reinstitution of the Davidic monarchy and the restoration of the nation of 
Israel to its homeland. This meant that redemption did not involve transcending the world 
but rather its rectification on the mundane sphere.  
                                            
545 Kellner, Maimonides’ Confrontation With Mysticism, pp. viii-ix. 
546 Luois Jacobs, A Concise Companion to the Jewish Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999), pp. 421. Jacobs points out that even after Maimonides defended himself in his Essay on 
the Resurrection of the Dead, he refused to believe that the body could live forever - only the 
soul. 
547 Oliver Leaman, “Introduction to the Study of Jewish Medieval Philosophy,” in The Cambridge 
Companion, pp. 13-14. 
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 In spite of this more affirmative attitude towards the world Kabbalah became 
distinctly more other-worldly. Yehuda Liebes argues that although national-historical 
redemption is not excluded from the zoharic perspective it is nevertheless relegated “to 
an instrumental level, where it is seen as a means for achieving the mystical-cognitive 
objective” very similar to the Maimonidean position.548 Therefore, together with 
misgivings towards the world-negating stance of philosophers, Kabbalists began to 
introduce an increasingly other-worldly theology as well. In Provençe during the end of 
the twelfth and beginning of the thirteenth-centuries we begin to come across religious 
figures with ascetic titles such as Perushim (recluses) and Nezirim (nazarites). These new 
trends which disclosed Greco-Christian influences, suggest that other-worldly 
approached began to be viewed favorably. This is attested by the fact that many 
pseudepigraphic texts were attributed to religious figures with titles such as nazir and 
parush as a sign of prestige.549 Jacob the Nazarite, a figure that was related to the first 
mystical circle of Provençe, is one of several representatives of these new ascetic 
inclinations. In another instance we have the famous testimony of Benjamin of Tudel 
                                            
548 Liebes, Studies in the Zohar, p. 3. 
549 Scholem, Origins of the Kabbalah, pp. 48; 227-248. According to Scholem the Gnostic 
Cathars in southern France and the influx of Neoplatonic translations to Hebrew in Provençe were 
the main influences on these new ascetic trends in Judaism. Also see Haviva Pedaya on 
indications that Ya’acov ha Nazir, R’ Asher beb Shaul of Lunel were sympathetic to the emerging 
Kabbalah of the Risan. Hashem ve ha-Mikdash be-Mishnat Rabbi Itzhak Sagi Nahor (Jerusalem: 
Magnes, 2001), pp. 16-17 [Hebrew]; and Isodore Twersky. Rabad of Posquiere, pp. 26-27. 
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about one “Asher the recluse (ha-parush), who dwells apart from the world; he pores 
over his books day and night, fasts periodically and abstains from all meat.”550  
  Theologically, world-negating inclinations are already apparent in the views of 
the early Kabbalah; the concept of transmigration appeared in the first known Kabbalistic 
work the Bahir, and later features in several early Kabbalistic works in Gerona.551 R. 
Azriel went as far as to hold the uncharacteristically Jewish view in which the body is 
perceived in terms of punishment, which leads to one’s transmigration.552 Similarly, 
eschatological themes occupy a central place in the thought of Nahmanides, especially in 
his Sha’ar ha-Gemul (The Gate of Reward), where he sets to harmonize traditional 
rabbinical approaches to the afterlife with the more sophisticated ones of his time, 
especially those held by philosophers. Nahmanides’ new notion of Olam ha-Neshamot 
(the world of souls) reflects a clear spiritualization of the Talmudic perception of the 
soul, with a special emphasis on the distinctiveness of the soul and its non-material 
existence after death. But Nahmanides also firmly challenged the radical Maimonidean 
                                            
550 The Iteinerary of Benjamin of Tudela: Critical Text, Translation, and Commentary by Marcus 
Nathan Adler (London: Oxford University Press, 1907), p. 3; Also Scholem, Origin of the 
Kabbalah, p. 231. 
551 Different terms have been used for the concept of transmigration, most commonly gilgul, 
which first appears in Sefer Ha-Temunah (1270). Among early Kabbalists, especially the circle of 
Isaac the Blind in Provençe and Gerona, the earlier term Ibbur (sod ha-Ibbur) was used. Ibbur and 
gilgul became differentiated in the 13th and 14th centuries. See Encyclopedia Judaica, Michael 
Berenbaum and Fred Skolnik eds., Vol. 7. 2nd ed., (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2007), 
pp. 602-604. [Gershom Scholem]. The Bahir does not use the term Gilgul but rather explains the 
phenomenon relying on the verse in Ecclesiastes  (1:4): “one generation passeth away and another 
generation cometh; and the world abideth for ever” Ecclesiastes:   
תדמע םלועל ץראהו ךלוה רודו אב רוד. 
552 Septimus, Hispano-Jewish Culture, p. 112. 
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view of resurrection and the afterlife, siding with the more traditional views of the 
Talmudic tradition in which the stark divide between body and soul is avoided.553   
 In the final stages of the institutionalization of Kabbalah, we see a continuation of 
these spiritualistic trends. It wouldn’t be an exaggeration to claim that one of the most 
central concerns of the Zohar, under clear Gnostic influences, was the nature of the soul, 
its origin, and final destiny. Among other things, the Zohar is concerned with the ascents 
of righteous souls from a terrestrial to a heavenly paradise.554 The tripartite division of the 
soul into nefesh, ruah, and nesham,a and the stratification of reality into four increasingly 
transcendent levels of existence: assiyah (action), yetzirah (formation), briyah (creation), 
and atzilut (emanation) all point to the increasingly other-worldly views of medieval 
mystics.555 In his study of Halakah and Kabbalah, Jacob Katz demonstrates that while 
traditionally, rabbis took the position that “the Torah speaks in the language of humans” 
and that it “was not in the heaven,” Kabbalah represented a dramatic turn towards the 
supernal implications of the Torah that go beyond the mundane world.556 Gershom 
                                            
553 Dan, Toldot Torat ha’sod, vol. 8, pp. 371-412. Another relevant book by Nahmanides is Sefer 
ha-Ge’ula (The Book of Redemption). 
554 Idel, Ascensions on High, pp. 101-142. In other Kabbalistic works the olam-haba is sometimes 
associated with the hypostasis of Binah. 
555 The Kabbalistic classification of the soul followed the philosophical theory of the vegetative 
soul (nefesh), the animal soul (ruah), and the Intellectual soul (neshama). This classification was 
followed by philosophers such as Saadia Gaon, Abraham ibn Ezra, Maimonides, and Abraham 
bar Hiyya. Kabbalists later added the higher levels of hayya and yechida which corresponded to 
the five worlds assiyah, yetzirah, beriyah, atzilut, and Adam Kadmon. See Simcha Paull Raphael 
and Zalman Schachter Shlomi, Jewish Views of the Afterlife (Northvale, N.J.: J. Aronson, 1994), 
p. 278. 
556 Ya’akov Katz, Halacha ve Kabbalah, p. 13. “The Torah speaks in the language of man” (Sifre, 
Numbers 112; Bavli, Yevamot 71a) While this verse from the Talmud was interpreted by R’ 
Ishmael in a conservative manner that constrained the exegete’s legitimacy to depart from the 
original text, the philosophers used the same dictum in a progressive way that sees 
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Scholem stressed the more other-worldly vision of Kabbalists, claiming they were not 
concerned with grand messianic narratives as much as they endeavored to “overcome the 
world through the ascent of the ladder towards the sublime chambers located in the divine 
bosom.”557   
 In spite of these clear other-worldly themes, Kabbalah never discloses a radically 
world negating perspective. The mystical correspondence between the divine and the 
human spheres was drastically different from that of the philosophers. While in 
philosophy the correspondence between the individual person and God takes place 
through one’s mental faculties, in Kabbalah the world of matter is infused with the 
divine. As Eitan Fishbane points out:  
the mystic friends [in the Zohar] are portrayed as they are on a perennial journey and 
quest for kabbalistic wisdom. The inner life of divinity may be probed and penetrated 
through the restless search for lower refractions in the earthly realm…the journey through 
the mundane zone is hardly irrelevant to the search for kabbalistic knowledge; the 
encounters with the sounds and sights of nature are nothing short of openings into 
metaphysical discovery.558  
In other words, as opposed to more radical forms of transcendence and other-worldliness 
in analytic paradigms, the Zohar offers a qualified picture in which the lower and upper 
realms interact according to a dynamic reciprocity, without marginalizing either end of 
                                                                                                                                  
anthropomorphic language as a biblical device to communicate profound philosophical truths 
using visual imagery that is accessible to simple people. 
557 Scholem, “The Idea of Redemption in the Kabbalah,” in Devarim be-Go: Explications and 
Implications, Writings on Jewish Heritage and Renaissance [Hebrew], (Tel Aviv: Am-Oved. 
1975), pp. 191-216: [My translation]. On pp.195 Scholem argues that medieval Kabbalah, as 
opposed to sixteenth century Lurianic Kabbalah, promoted a vision of “a personal, mystical 
redemption, which signified the individual’s escape from history to a time before history. 
558 Fishbane, “The Scent of the Rose,” p. 342. 
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the equation. In his discussion of the notions of the pillar in Zoharic literature, Idel 
argues: 
The paradisiacal role of the pillar is in line with the Zoharic absorption of the lower world 
into the supernal one. This means that even a concept like the mundane world has 
meaning as a divine power, which while on high is designated as such. Being 
paradigmatic, the supernal world includes the lower world, and the Platonic opposition 
between them is less stringent in Zoharic Kabbalah. In lieu of a worldview based on strict 
parallelism, the main trends of Kabbalistic approaches assume the active interaction 
between these two worlds—what I propose calling a correlative approach.559  
 
In contrast to allegory in which one level of meaning is substituted with a higher one, the 
correlative approach is characterized by the preservation of both levels - mundane and 
sacred.  
 The centrality of the commandments in the Kabbalistic perspective and the 
political undertones of the traditional rabbinic vision of redemption meant that Jewish 
theology remained strongly anchored in the material world and human activity. In the 
distinction between the analytic world-negating perspective and the synthetic world-
affirming view it can be argued that both philosophers and mystics adopted increasingly 
mentalistic and other-worldly positions but they differed in the way they approached the 
relationship between the transcendent sphere and the sphere of action and matter. While 
in philosophy we see a more radical disjunction between this world and the divine sphere, 
mystics managed to construct a theology in which the two were inextricable interrelated. 
This unique relationship is also reflected within the Kabbalistic Godhead where we 
                                            
559 Idel, Ascension on High, p. 104. See also Idel “Panim—On Facial Re-Presentations in Jewish 
Thought: Some Correlational Instances,” in On Interpretation in the Arts, Nurit Yaari ed., (Tel 
Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 2000), pp. 21–56. 
  
321 
witness a constant tension of attraction and repulsion between the sefirah of Malchut with 
its mundane connotations, and the higher sefirot of Tiferet (the god of Israel) and Binah 
(frequently associated with the next world). Kabbalists insisted on maintaining this 
dialectic interaction between the earthly Israel, its historical experience, its stress on 
earthly sanctity, and its political messianic vision on the one hand, and the sublime realm 
of the sefirot which offered a new and more updated vision of the function of the soul and 
its relation to redemption and the afterlife. Again, the emanationist perspective of 
Kabbalah, or what Idel refers to as a conjunctive theology reflects a structural 
characteristic that was conducive to this more fluid relationship between the worldly and 
other-worldly spheres.  
 Moreover, the this-worldliness of Kabbalah is certainly related to the mystic’s 
insistence on preserving, indeed intensifying the following of the commandments in their 
traditional form. The theurgic features of the Kabbalah meant that the main sphere of 
action and religious activity remained this world. The fusion of this world and the world 
above is beautifully captured in the way that “religious actions produce the ascent of the 
soul. When the soul acts according to the requirements of Jewish religious law, it triggers 
forces in the world that influence the various sefirot.560 The deeds of the body and the 
deeds of the heart were fused such that activity in this world was crucial for the process 
of tikkun, or the ‘repairing of the world.’ The Kabbalah provided its followers with a 
cosmic vision of unprecedented complexity and depth. Together with a new other-
worldly vision, the physical world of the mystics both in the form of trees and land, as 
                                            
560 David Ariel, op. cit., p. 139. 
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well as the human body, remained relevant, indeed crucial for the realization of cosmic 
harmony.    
 
3.7.4 Communication: Restricted and Elaborate Codes   
         
In the second chapter I looked at forms of communication and their relationship to 
the synthetic and analytic modes of operation. I used Basil Bernstein’s code theory to 
argue that whereas traditions that adhere to the synthetic modality rely on condensed or 
‘restricted’ forms of communication, analytical traditions follow a more explicit elaborate 
code. I also associated analytical, elaborate code traditions with the Indo-European 
language family, arguing that there is considerable evidence that the structural qualities 
of Indo-European languages made it more likely for universalistic theologies to emerge. 
Due to these characteristics, Indo-European cultures were less inclined towards 
discourses based on opaque symbolism; in their development over the centuries they 
gradually moved from highly mythological systems to more conceptualized, 
philosophical discourses that were suitable for the cross-cultural dissemination of ideas.  
 The above linguistic distinctions do not mean that the Semitic cultures from 
which Judaism and Islam emerged were unable to construct their own elaborate and 
analytically inclined discourses. In fact, as I have claimed earlier, the adoption of the 
elaborate code, in the form of Kalam theology and later Aristotelian and Neoplatonic 
philosophy, was highly conducive to the expansion of Islam and the transportation of its 
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culture to new geographical domains.561 In the Jewish orbit such inclinations found fertile 
ground among progressive circles that were immersed in the cosmopolitan world of 
Muslim Spain. My goal here is to show that Bernstein’s code theory can be applied to the 
cultural tensions that emerged within Judaism between rationalists and Kabbalists in the 
twelfth and thirteenth-centuries. My main premise is that while philosophers clearly 
adopted elaborate forms of communication, Kabbalists consciously turned to a highly 
restricted symbolic theology, but that their reaction entailed a period of experimentation 
in which they initially operated according to an analytic, elaborate discourse. I will first 
look at the way Jewish philosophers ‘opened’ the traditional Talmudic code, and then 
proceed to discuss the Kabbalistic reaction and its shift from a fairly elaborate code 
towards the restricted code of the Zohar.  
 As a short reminder, the elaborate code is one in which information is 
communicated under the assumption that conversants do not share a common cultural or 
symbolic background. For this reason, explicit communication with a decreased reliance 
on local symbols has a leveling effect such that people from different cultural 
backgrounds can participate in a relatively transparent dialogue. Medieval philosophy 
represents a striking example of how the elaborate code operates on a cross-cultural level. 
With the introduction of Aristotelian formats to monotheism we witness the emergence of 
a pan-monotheistic dialogue that levels the ground between Judaism, Islam, and 
Christianity, and enables these three religions to enter a dialogue that was predicated on 
                                            
561 There are several examples of universalistic traditions functioning as a unifying factor in the 
hands of empires. Christianity in the Roman Empire is a well known example. King Asoka used 
Buddhism as a unifying universal ideology, Alexander the Great used Hellenism, and the 
Universalism of Islam certainly assisted it in advancing beyond local tribal conflicts. 
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the basic characteristics of the analytic mindset: the atomization of terminology to 
explicit and monosemic meaning, the advancement of arguments according to logical 
models based on formal relation, and the exposition of a systematic and coherent 
theology that provides well articulated answers to a set of interrelated questions. It is not 
surprising that philosophers were intensely engaged in the refinement of their linguistic 
tools, such that fairly ambiguous native symbols as well as problematic anthropomorphic 
elements in scripture were re-defined to suit the new cross-cultural dialogue that 
emerged. It also makes sense that the first systematic theories of language in Judaism, 
emerged with Al-Muqammas and Saadia Gaon who were the first Jewish figures to 
engage their Muslim kalamic milieu.562 Saadia’s theory of language already discloses a 
movement towards an elaborate discourse in which we see signs of the Aristotelian idea 
that human languages are conventional. Scores of other works in linguistics, including 
dictionaries, books on grammar, and philology emerged in the following centuries, 
mainly written by philosophically inclined Jew: “Saadia’s Ergon, Menahem Saruq’s 
Mahberet, Ibn Janah’s Book of Roots, and Abraham Ibn Ezra’s Yesod Dibuq, Sefer Sahot, 
and Safah Berura are among the best known.”563 I already mentioned that philosophical 
works frequently began with long explications of terms and their proper types of 
predication. Words were now given a new stable or non-fluctuating meaning that 
departed from the semantic ambiguity of the Talmud and Midrash. The escalating use of 
allegory which reached its climax in Maimonidean philosophy and was taken even 
further by his followers is an example of the hermeneutical devices used by rationalists to 
                                            
562 Sarah Stoumsa, “Saadia and Jewish Kalam,” p. 84. 
563 David Blumenthal, “Religion and Religious Intellectuals,” p. 125. 
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shift from a native symbolic particularism to a more universal, elaborate form of 
communication. Indeed, as Liebes notes, such universalism was intimately related to 
philosophy’s opposition to the mythic language of the Talmud and Midrash.564 The 
sudden interest in grammar, word usage, and the appearance of a genre of books on 
philology reflects the typical analytic curiosity towards the intricacies of language, so 
characteristic in the Greco-European and Indian traditions.   
 One of the interesting aspects of Bernstein’s code theory is its sociological 
implications, in which there is an attempt to link forms of communication to social 
realities. I would like to argue that this connection is clearly manifest in the period under 
examination, where a more progressive, dynamic, and younger generation of Jews 
attracted to their pluralistic cultural surroundings, were simultaneously becoming more 
detached from the coercive social structure of traditional Judaism. In other words, an 
increasingly complex division of labor and relative prosperity inevitably provided 
individuals from formerly closed communities access to a wider and more diverse social 
environment. Greater social mobility was most likely accommodated by the adoption of 
new forms of communication that were conducive to the universal ethos of the Muslim 
golden age. The prosperity and social benefits that such assimilative tendencies entailed 
most likely further reinforced these progressive currents. Referring to the relationship 
between language and sociality in Judaism, Liebes notes that “the abstract, non-mythic 
culture suited [Jewish] circles that were close to royal courts and engaged in the general 
culture of the age, first among Muslims and later in Christian Spain….” After noting the 
                                            
564 Liebes, “Judaism and Myth” [Hebrew], pp. 22-23. 
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advantages of these new progressive tendencies, Liebes also points to what began to 
agonize conservative authorities: “the abstract and rational foundations are universal by 
nature and therefore suitable for those who were inclined towards assimilation. Indeed, 
[during the Spanish inquisition] rationalists represented a major portion of those who 
converted their religion.”565 These quotations supports Bernstein’s idea that the loosening 
of social restrictions entails a change in forms of communication, which in turn further 
promoted the crossing of social and cultural boundaries.566   
 The Jewish philosopher’s ‘opening’ of the previously restricted code of classical 
Judaism was contemporaneous with an escalation in individualistic tendencies. As both 
Bernstein and Mary Douglas argue, the elaborate code’s unique ability to bring disparate 
individuals into a common dialogue was based on the idea that jettisoning one’s cultural 
background is not only possible but desirable. These tendencies led to a more 
confrontational and competitive intellectual environment; the highly polemical 
atmosphere between the tenth and thirteenth centuries was apparent both within Judaism 
and between the Abrahamic religions. Unsurprisingly, “it is primarily with the 
development of the independent essay, the book, that polemics became a genre unto 
                                            
565 Ibid., pp. 13-14. 
566 Perhaps the most obvious example of this change is the fact that Jews living in Muslim 
territories didn’t only speak Arabic, but they saw it as their preferable language for composing 
theological and philosophical works. On the most basic level, the adoption of Arabic as a 
language for intellectual discourse as well as everyday affairs can be seen as an important step 
towards the disintegration of traditional social restrictions. That the Muslims didn’t have a literary 
language such as Latin, meant that the same ‘linguistic assimilation’ was absent among Jews 
living in Christian Europe. This made it easier to more efficiently protect social boundaries and 
remain entrenched in a highly particularistic mode of communication. 
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itself.”567 Here again we see a clear indication that the analytical worldview entails a 
range of interconnected phenomena: the rise of individualism, together with the rise of 
private literary formats such as the authored book and the essay, which were conducive to 
a polemical and confrontational theology, and that this new discourse was based on new 
linguistic dispositions oriented towards objectivity, conceptualism, and logical coherence. 
Therefore, the rise of new elites, the rise of individualism, shifts in a linguistic 
orientations, new polemical and specialized literary formats, and an unprecedented 
exegetical freedom, were all inextricably related such that each supported and validated 
the other.  
 Looking at the Kabbalistic reaction in terms of the emergence of a conscious and 
newly informed restricted code can help us pay closer attention to the relationship 
between language, sociality and the rising tensions between rationalists and conservatives 
in the Jewish world of Provençe, Catalonia, and Castile. The view that a symbolic 
theology was constructed to counter the assimilative and universalistic currents of 
philosophy is not new in Kabbalah scholarship. But while scholars focus on the contrast 
between symbolic and allegorical hermeneutics, I have highlighted the internal dynamic 
between these strategies of exegesis in terms of Bernstein’s code theory. I argued above 
that Jewish philosophers moved from the traditional Midrashic and Talmudic linguistic 
world towards a more elaborate and open discourse. Kabbalists, in their attempt to 
synthesize philosophical ideas went through a process in which they too, perhaps 
inevitably, moved towards a relatively elaborate language before they could return to the 
                                            
567 Blumenthal, “religious intellectuals,” p. 126. 
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restricted language of the mature Kabbalah. The shift towards a more elaborate code in 
the early Kabbalah can therefore be seen as an inevitable initial stage in which mystics 
were exploring possible strategies for making connections between philosophical 
theology and native Jewish symbols. Before I look at how mystics oscillated between 
elaborate and restricted approaches towards language a few comments regarding the 
social and historical background of these changes are in place.   
 The intense period of experimentation, which began with the first Kabbalistic 
circle of Provençe and reached its culmination in the publication of the Zohar, took place 
in a highly polemical and pluralistic atmosphere. Such unprecedented diversity could 
only take place in concordance with a social transformation in which traditional centers 
of authority were incapable of restricting the proliferation of new ideologies within 
Judaism. This dynamic and polemical stage eventually led to the publication of the Zohar 
as a ‘consensus literature’ that synthesized the various mystical and philosophical strands 
of thought that preceded it. Although the Zohar is predominantly associated with the 
theurgic school of Kabbalah, it clearly incorporated themes and influences from early 
Heikhalot mysticism, the Iyyun Circle, and ecstatic Kabbalah. As trivial as it may sound, 
the most efficient way to propagate ideas on a broad popular level is by communicating 
information clearly and efficiently. By creating an accessible framework for transmitting 
their groundbreaking theology to potential enthusiasts, Kabbalists of the theurgic school 
were exceptionally successful in exposing their ideas to a wide audience. In spite of 
efforts on behalf of first elite rabbis to curtail open dissemination of mystical ideas, these 
more exoteric currents persisted and even intensified towards the end of the thirteenth-
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century. This accessibility was certainly one of the factors behind the theurgic school’s 
success; as a counter example, more esoteric schools such as the Iyyun Circle lacked the 
ability or desire to disseminate their ideas effectively. The point I want to stress is that 
within this highly competitive environment, the move towards an elaborate code among 
mystics can be seen both as an inevitable initial stage of assimilating philosophical ideas 
into Kabbalah, as well as an effective method of dissemination. Indeed, one of the most 
apparent characteristics of early theurgic Kabbalists was their adoption of philosophical 
conceptualism as well as their pro-active attitudes towards dissemination.    
  One of the first instances in which we witness the use of a more elaborate 
code among kabbalists can be seen in R. Azriel’s philosophical Explanation of the Ten 
Sefirot. R. Azriel’s work was a kind of prototype for hundreds of similar manuals that 
ensued, all of which were effectively disseminated in writing and sought to provide a 
general foundation for understanding the basic building blocks of Kabbalistic theology - 
the ten sefirot. Of special interest was the conceptual and direct language that R. Azriel 
employed in his clarification of the sefirotic structure, a terminology that was to a great 
extent adopted from philosophical works that were translated by the Tibbon family for 
the Provençal community.568 As opposed to his teacher Isaac the Blind’s extremely 
inaccessible commentary to Sefer Yetzirah, R. Azriel’s explication of the sefirot is 
characterized by unprecedented clarity without any signs of supporting his revolutionary 
position with biblical passages, save a few scant notes at the end of the treatise. His 
description of the sefirot is concise and unambiguous, such that each hypostasis points to 
                                            
568 Dan, Toldot Torat ha-Sod, Vol. 8, p. 11. 
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a focused meaning free of the dense metaphorical terminology of later Kabbalah.569 Even 
more astonishing is R. Azriel’s bold thesis that the layered sefirotic nature of the godhead 
should be accepted on logical grounds rather than on account of mystical revelation or 
reference to sacred scripture.570 As in the case with philosophy at an earlier stage, many 
saw the new independence of mystical works from traditional sources of authority as a 
breaching of accepted restrictions of secrecy.571 
Reminiscent of Bernstein’s description of the elaborate code, Halbertal notes that 
R. Azriel explication of the sefirot represents “a translation of a system of symbols into 
conceptual language,” which created a “clear transparency. The act of disclosure is thus 
linked to the transition from a symbolic language to a conceptual one.”572 Such changes 
are apparent in the way R. Azriel associates each sefirah with a limited number of 
referents, mainly name, color, and general position within the sefirotic structure. This 
concise and accessible treatise can be contrasted with R. Joseph Gikatilla relatively late 
                                            
569 The first part of the treatise is composed of twelve questions raised by a student to which R. 
Azriel provides short answers. It is only after the initial explication of the sefirot that R. Azriel 
proceeds to support his interpretations with verses from scripture in the second half of the treatise. 
Other works by R. Azriel, such as his Epistle to Burgos, are even more direct, disclosing a 
confident and concise presentation of the Kabbalistic worldview as one that does not necessitate a 
justification. Here too R. Azriel’s language is relatively free of mystical undertones. For more of 
R. Azriel’s exoteric dissemination of Kabbalah see Halbertal, ibid., pp. 77-82. 
570 Halbertal, Concealment and Revelation, p. 78 
571 Ibid., R. Azriel’s work was published as part of Derekh Emunah, by Rabbi Meir ben Gabbai 
(Berlin, 1850). The justification for this breach by Azriel and later Kabbalists was that the 
Talmudic demand for secrecy was in regards to the hidden dimension of the godhead, namely, 
that which according to Kabbalists is impossible to reveal in the first place. 
572 Ibid., pp. 77-78. Also see Dan, “Scholem’s reconstruction,” p. 43: “It is not only the external 
appearance of Kabbalistic language and terminology which reveals the influence of Jewish 
philosophy. The mystical symbols themselves reflect this impact, though it is important to note 
the differences as well as the similarities. In contrast to the Book Bahir, the works' of the 
Kabbalists of Gerona may seem like a rejection of, or withdrawal from, mythological and gnostic 
formulations and the construction of a "philosophical" mysticism.” 
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and long Sha’arei Orah in which each sefirah is associated with a striking number of 
symbols and meanings.573 This general trend reflects the way in which early-phase 
Kabbalists sought to establish the ground rules on which the more mature Kabbalah 
based itself. Whereas the Kabbalists of Gerona were behind the initial institutionalization 
and legitimization of the symbolic world that nourished future Kabbalists, the later 
Castilian circles disclosed a more opaque and symbolic mysticism that foreshadowed the 
dense mythic world of the Zohar.574 The twofold process of the appropriation of analytic 
qualities and their subordination to a synthetic ethos is suggested in Idel’s discussion of 
the progression of Kabbalistic symbolism:  
the relationship between a given word and its supernal counterpart is relatively stable in 
earlier Kabbalah. Toward the end of the thirteenth century, however, greater fluctuation 
in this relationship is perceptible. In the very same treatise a word may symbolize more 
than one sefirah. The theoretical possibility thus emerges of decoding the same verse in 
several symbolic directions. Indeed, this possibility is fully exploited in the central 
mystical work of Kabbalah, the Zohar.575  
 
Idel’s description seems to support the idea that a) early Kabbalah adopted analytical 
strategies of thought towards the atomization and conceptualization of data where we see 
a relatively stable relationship between word and referent, and b) that this initial 
analytical disposition gradually shifts towards a greater fluctuation, or greater ambiguity, 
                                            
573 As an illustration some of the symbols and terms sefirat Malchut is associated with are:  
The lower intellect (המכוח הנותחת), Adonai, night, sea, holy temple, Shekhina (הניכש), beloved 
land (ץרא הדמח), moon (הנבל), crown (הרטע), Soul (שפנ), all (לכ), sapphire (ןבא ריפס), Rachel, Great 
Assembly (תסנכ לארשי), me (ינא), holy well (ראב השודק), garden (ןג), the letter ‘yod’ in the name 
Adonai, and many more. 
574 Dan, Toldot Torat ha’sod, Vol.8, p. 10. 
575 Moshe Idel. Absorbing Perfections, p. 92. 
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in the mature and more confident stage of the Zohar.576 This second stage is an indication 
of a return to a more synthetic, fluid, and communal discourse that was familiar to the 
traditional Jewish worldview.577  
 Once the basic symbols of the sefirot were determined using a conceptual 
elaborate approach, later Kabbalists could shift to a bolder interpretation in which a wider 
semantic range is afforded to each sefirah, thereby offering more prolific and flexible 
hermeneutical tools for the interpretation of scripture. The general dynamic is therefore 
one that moves from the ‘opening of the code’ in order to establish the basic Kabbalistic 
lexicon, towards the ‘closing of the code’ in later Kabbalah where terms are intentionally 
cloaked with a wide cluster of symbols.578 It is interesting that the move from an initial 
elaborate code to the later restricted code reflects a shift from a highly polemical phase 
towards the increasingly communal and inclusive discourse of the Zohar. In other words, 
a philosophically oriented work such as R. Azriel’s Explanation of the Ten Sefirot, by 
virtue of its semantic stability, presumes to present an indisputable truth that provides 
very little space for further interpretation. This represents a continuation of the 
                                            
576 Such a process did not take place in Jewish rational theology, on the contrary, Maimonides’ 
Guide of the Perplexed, remained in conformity with Greek formats, showing no “return” to the 
flexibility of traditional Jewish discourse. 
577 In his famous article on the concretization and abstraction of Kabbalistic lore, Isaiah Tishby 
gave an example of the constant historical oscillation between Kabbalists who employ a dense, 
mythic, and personalistic interpretation of the creation narrative, and the more philosophically 
inclined mystics who conceptualized the creation story as an objectified and rational cosmogony. 
In this section I tried to show a similar dialectic within the confines of “early Kabbalah,” while 
stressing the relationship between these fluctuations and sociological changes. Tishby, “Berur 
netivei ha-hagshama ve ha-hafshta ba-Kabbalah,” in Netivei ha-emuna u-minut: masot u-
meh ̣k ̣arim be-sifrut ha-K ̣abalah ve-haShabtaʼut (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1964), pp. 23-29. 
578 The form of Kabbalah that Nahmanides promoted is actually a move in the opposite direction 
towards conservative modes of dissemination and concealment of mystical lore. Therefore, even 
within the confines of the period known as “early Kabbalah” we see an oscillation between 
modes of concealing and revealing information. 
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philosophically oriented culture of polemics and ideological confrontations. The gradual 
move towards a more fluctuating and symbolically rich interpretation entails the opening 
of a discourse to divergent interpretations. Such flexibility was most probably facilitated 
by the fact that a communally accepted interpretation of the sefirot was gradually 
institutionalized, which, in turn, allowed a more relaxed communal discourse to take 
place. Said differently, although the linguistic code becomes more restricted in later 
Kabbalah, such restriction is first and foremost an obstacle to outsiders, while within 
Judaism it enabled a more communal discourse and the easing of exegetical conflicts.   
  Channels of dissemination and attitudes towards innovation are another factor in 
the move towards a more elaborate code among mystics. The Kabbalists of Gerona found 
different ways to justify their bold dissemination of mystical lore; R. Azriel interprets the 
Talmudic dictum “Do not expound what is concealed from you and do not investigate 
what is hidden from you,” creatively as a legitimization of Kabbalah as an open 
discourse. According to Azriel this sentence, far from being a restriction against 
discussing mysticism, was merely an acknowledgement that some things are beyond 
articulation, while what can be said should be said. In his Sha’ar ha-Shama’im (Gate of 
Heaven) another important Gerona mystic, Ya’akov ben Sheshet, states: 
I shall not let the words of holiness be cut off from their hearers, so that the last 
generation of children that be born may know and tell it to their children…and I shall 
render accessible some of the sweet matters of truth, and rebuild its ruins, so that there 
my words may enlighten those to whom I leave it. I shall open doors and break the locks 
and the gates shall no (longer) be closed.  
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Such metaphors of breaking the doors and opening locks are reflective of a dramatic shift 
in language and modes of dissemination. Ben Sheshet explicitly states that the aim of his 
work is to disseminate Kabbalah beyond confined circles of esotericists. He also paved 
the way for later Kabbalists in defining the medieval mystic’s approach towards 
innovation when he claimed that together with what he received (Kabala) he also adds 
and expounds creatively through his “effort of reasoning.”579 In all these instances, we see 
major shifts among early Kabbalists towards a more explicit, exoteric, and individually 
creative elaborate code. Clearly, the kind of conceptual clarity and accessibility that such 
Kabbalistic works disclosed, stands in stark contrast to the dense and opaque nature of 
the Zohar where we see a highly mythological language together with a return to the 
inaccessible Aramaic.     
 In discussing the social environment of the thirteenth century I have followed Idel 
and Lachter in showing that the first elites gave way to a more bold and creative middle 
class of secondary elite. In the following generations these new elites soon replaced the 
old elites as the new representatives of the conservative wing of Judaism.580 This dynamic 
to a great extent reflects a congruous dynamic in attitudes towards language. During the 
early phase of the first elites, we have a restricted code and conservative forms of oral 
transmission; in the second phase with the emergence of secondary elites, we witness a 
move towards linguistic transparency, philosophical conceptualism, and more bold forms 
                                            
579 See Scholem on R. Azriel letter from Gerona to Burgos, Origins of Kabbalah, p. 372. On R’ 
Azriel’s philosophical style and language see pp. 375-6; More on Azriel in Dan, Toldot Torat 
ha’Sod, vol. 8, pp. 141-329. 
580 Old elites, namely those rabbis that were exclusively halakhic figures and community leaders, 
persevered, but mystics gradually became a legitimate part of the tradition. It also became more 
common for important halakhic figures to be versed in mystical lore. 
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of written dissemination; and finally, during the third phase in which the second elites 
consolidate their positions as orthodoxy we see a simultaneous return to a restricted code 
represented by the dense symbolism and mythic language of the Zohar.   
 
3.7.5 Ritual and Restricted Code     
 As I argued earlier, following Bernstein and Douglas, ritual can be seen as the 
most extreme manifestation of the restricted code. Philosophy’s shift towards analytic 
forms of discourse predicated upon an elaborate code offered new horizons for 
communication and sociality, but it simultaneously incapacitated the role of ritual in 
Judaism. The move toward escalating explicitness and individualism is frequently 
accommodated by the decline of more condensed, communally oriented, and embodied 
forms of communication.581 Douglas is aware of this relationship when she argues that the 
move towards the private internalizing of religious experience simultaneously entails the 
decline of ritualism and symbolism.582 The role ritual was given by philosophers was no 
longer a mechanism for establishing differences but rather an educational tool. The 
                                            
581 Daniel Boyarin explores the relationship between forms of hermeneutics and perceptions of 
the body in relation to the Greek and Jewish clash in the early centuries of the Common Era. He 
argues that the rising instrumentality of allegorical interpretations to scripture represents one of 
the dividing features that set early Christians apart from the nascent Rabbinic paradigm. Allegory 
as a hermeneutical device postulated an oppositional dichotomy between language and text. In 
opposition to such Greek approaches so characteristic of Hellenized Jews such as Philo and to a 
great extent Paul as well, the Rabbinic tradition adopted the Midrashic device which completely 
denied this dualism “eschewing the inner-outer, visible-invisible, body-soul dichotomies of 
allegorical reading.” He claims that “Midrash and Platonic allegory are alternate techniques of the 
body” in which the former affirms the physical self while Platonism negates it. See Daniel 
Boyarin, A Radical Jew: Paul and the Politics of Identity (Berkeley; London: University of 
California Press, 1997), p. 14. See also his Intertextuality and the Reading of Midrash 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990). 
582 Douglas, Natural Symbols, pp. 7-9 
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Kabbalistic reaction can be seen as a process in which ritual is supported by a new and 
more sophisticated philosophical and cosmological underpinning; an attempt to anchor 
ritual is a metaphysical necessity. As an efficient medium for the establishment of 
distinctions, ritual, as it was understood by medieval mystics, represented a clear 
departure from the conceptual clarity of early Kabbalah and philosophy, towards a highly 
condensed and local form of communication.  
 This brings me back to the axis of communication I introduced in the second 
chapter in which I argued that conceptual, abstract forms of communication reflect the 
‘elaborate’ extreme of the axis, while embodied, physical communication represent its 
oppositional ‘restricted’ pole. From this point of view, Kabbalah and philosophy can be 
seen as different strategies of communication in which Kabbalah initially adopts an 
elaborate language but then moves towards restricted channels of communication 
represented by a native symbolism, mythical language, and further supported by an 
ontological theory of ritual. In other words, ritual “says” things and therefore needs to be 
understood as a form of communication; it is the most basic way to communicate one’s 
belonging to a certain system of symbols. By supporting ritual with a new theology, 
Kabbalists managed to consolidate Judaism’s most efficient form of communication; a 
communication that had proved to be crucial for traditions that operate in an antagonistic 
environment. Although ritual does not say a lot, what it says is extremely meaningful. In 
the case of Judaism it signaled one’s belonging to the community. Therefore the ongoing 
following of Jewish ritual reflects a firm confirmation of one’s acceptance of a tradition. 
Signaling one’s belonging to a tradition through ritual performance implicates the 
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believer in a complex system of actions, norms, values, and habits such that assimilation 
becomes highly improbable. Just as importantly refusing to adhere to a set of 
communally accepted rituals immediately sends a message that one is no longer 
committed to a group’s shared values.   
 In conclusion, prior to the emergence of Kabbalah, philosophical works were 
successful in engaging a wider audience that was not necessarily trained, nor particularly 
interested, in Talmudic lore. The new language of philosophy was suitable for 
consumption by a new social strata that was more intellectually independent and 
theologically skeptical. As a reaction, a mystically inclined secondary elite with 
conservative and anti-rationalist tendencies began to use pro-active modes of 
dissemination and a more conceptual language to promote a counter theology that was 
accessible to a wider and more popular audience. The secondary elite of mystics, like 
their philosopher counterparts, were younger, energetic, creative, and immersed in the 
non-Jewish culture of Catalonia and Castile. Free from demanding commitment towards 
Talmudic studies and communal leadership, and relatively distant from traditional centers 
of authority, these mystics sought to construct a theology that re-affirmed the boundaries 
between Judaism and its non-Jewish environment. The Zohar represents the culmination 
of these tendencies: symbolism, myth, narrative, ritualism, and the return to a discourse 
that synthesizes divergent approaches into a communally accepted framework, all 
representing the prioritization of synthetic sensibilities over analytic features.          
 In this section I have highlighted two central points: a) that linguistically, 
philosophers represent a historical shift from the traditional restricted code of the Talmud 
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towards an elaborate code typical of analytic traditions, and that b) although Kabbalistic 
theology represents a highly restricted linguistic code, we can detect an internal dynamic 
in the evolution of Kabbalah in which, for practical reasons, there is an initial conceptual 
transparency which is later replaced by the linguistic opacity of the Zohar. Finally, the 
relationship between these linguistic tendencies is related to social changes in which a 
more cosmopolitan and educated elite was ripe for a new form of discourse. As we have 
seen, all the topics I have explored on the cultural level exhibit a dynamic of 
appropriation of analytic tendencies and their subsequent subordination to native 
synthetic sensibilities; appropriation of introspective mentalistic techniques and their 
subordination to ritual praxis; appropriation of universalistic tendencies and their 
subordination to a particularistic worldview; appropriation of other-worldly perspectives, 
while simultaneously preserving the centrality of action and ethical behavior on the 
terrestrial sphere, and finally, the appropriation of an elaborate code and its eventual 
subordination to a restricted code. It is worth reminding ourselves that such a process did 
not take place in Jewish rational theology; on the contrary, Maimonides’ Guide of the 
Perplexed, and the philosophical tradition it spawned remained in conformity with Greek 
formats of discourse, showing no “return” to the flexibility of traditional Jewish discourse 
or the mythic and restricted language of theurgic Kabbalah.      
 Judaism between the tenth and thirteenth-centuries disclosed the dynamic of a 
cultural system that entered a phase of morphogenesis and responded to this crisis with 
conservative measures that sought to preserve its traditional way of life. The upheaval we 
witness during this turbulent period represent a restructuring of traditional features 
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according to new needs and realities. Cognitively, we see a shift to a more analytical, 
objectified, and systematic theology; socially, we see the rise of individualism, greater 
division of labor, and the emergence of a new energetic middle class; and culturally we 
see a shift towards a greater stress on contemplative techniques, universalism, and other-
worldliness together with the adoption of a discourse that was increasingly conceptual. 
Ironically, in order to assimilate these analytical features into its midst, Judaism was 
forced to construct a theology that was unprecedentedly conservative. Such conservatism 
was reflected by theurgic Kabbalah’s construction of an ontological particularism. I think 
that this last point is of particular importance, since it suggests that ‘compromises’ made 
by Judaism as it was forced to concede to an increasingly analytic worldview, were 
compensated, so to speak, by the reinforcement of its native sensibilities using an 
ontology typical of analytic systems. The truth-value of Judaism was no longer presented 
as a fact to be taken for granted; instead, conservatives provided a systematic exposition 
that anchored their tradition in a cosmological framework. The adoption of the analytic 
stress on metaphysics together with the refusal to turn to analytic forms of universalism 
led to an extremely powerful ideology that can explain the historical significance of 
Kabbalah in the Jewish tradition. The Kabbalistic integration of Jewish particularism with 
an analytic normative metaphysics resulted in an ultra-conservative ideology that is still 
the dominant narrative of orthodox communities today.      
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TRADITIONS IN MORPHOGENESIS – NEO-CONFUCIANISM 
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4. CHINA: THE DECLINE OF THE CLASSICAL PARADIGM   
  In the following chapter I will look at the rise of Neo-Confucianism. Since my 
interpretation of the rise of medieval Jewish mysticism has been clarified, I will explore 
Neo-Confucianism with continuous comparative allusions to the Kabbalistic case. As in 
the former chapter I will begin my analysis with a historical overview of the social and 
political background that led to the emergence of Neo-Confucianism and then proceed to 
discuss the three morphological levels and the various morphological features that 
constitute them.  
 Although this dissertation chose to highlight the structural similarities of the 
Chinese and Jewish traditions, it is important that we point out differences as well. One 
such example pertains to the drastically dissimilar environments in which Neo-
Confucians and Kabbalists operated. As opposed to the vulnerable and scattered Jewish 
communities of the Near East and Europe, China represents one of the world’s largest 
and relatively stable political and cultural entities. In contrast to Jews, the Chinese were 
never worried about their possible demise as a people; this meant that these two groups 
were characterized by very different mentalities regarding their status vis-à-vis out-group 
members. Due to these substantially different environments, the synthetic physiognomies 
of the Jewish and Chinese traditions were expressed differently. The way I am using the 
term “expression” here is borrowed from biology, especially from the field of 
epigenetics, where it is argued that a similar DNA structure (in our case analogous to a 
culture’s morphological physiognomy) can become phenotypically expressed in 
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divergent ways. An example can help clarify how the notion of expression can be applied 
to the field of culture.  
 Since Judaism was in a continuous state of vulnerability it was led to relay more 
strongly on certain (synthetic) morphological features rather than others. As a result of its 
hostile environment, particularism (on the cultural level) occupied an extremely 
important position. The opposing analytic tendency towards universalism, increasingly 
discernible in Jewish medieval philosophy, was justifiably perceived as a real threat to 
Jewish continuity. As I have noted earlier, it became apparent that areas in which 
philosophy was a dominant ideology disclosed exceptionally high levels of conversion 
and cultural assimilation. It is no wonder that ritual, the hallmark of particularism, 
became one of the fundamental concerns of conservative Jews in their battle against 
philosophy. In the eyes of traditionalists, the philosophical conventionalization of the 
commandments was a “red line,” so to speak, that was not allowed to be crossed. Jewish 
conservatives were consciously that stressing differences through ritual was a crucial 
defense mechanism for internal cohesion and long-term survival. In light of these unique 
environmental circumstances, other morphological aspects of the synthetic modality, 
although certainly important, were not as crucial for the Kabbalistic project. Consider the 
distinction between this-worldliness and other-worldliness; although it was important for 
conservative Jews to make sure that the physical world remained important as a sphere 
for the enactment of ritual, it seemed less urgent to dwell on this specific feature as a 
strategy to secure the perseverance and survivability of the tradition. As a result we see a 
substantial escalation in other-worldly themes in Kabbalistic theology. Therefore, within 
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the symbiotic relationship between the various morphological features of the synthetic 
mode, particularism and the stress on orthopraxy became a more dominant concern for 
medieval Judaism. This reflects the unique way its synthetic physiognomy was 
“expressed” in the specific environment in which it operated. As in the domain of living 
organisms and biology, environmental conditions have a powerful impact on the way 
inherent genetic proclivities will manifest themselves. Although I am tempted to argue 
that this relationship is more than metaphoric, for now I will simply note that it can help 
us understand the intimate relationship between environment and culture, and how the 
former can impact the unfolding of the latter.  
 As we shall see shortly, the historical conditions that informed the Chinese 
experience were such that although particularism was important, it was much less crucial 
than in the Jewish case. Instead, Neo-Confucians were more intensely concerned with 
highlighting the importance of engaging the mundane world in contradistinction to the 
other-worldliness of Buddhism. From a native Chinese perspective, the disengagement 
from ordinary social commitments represented a burden on society, a very bad model for 
behavior, and a real threat to social stability. Since the Chinese dilemma was very 
different from the type of existential threats Jews were facing, the two groups stressed 
and downplayed different features within their similar synthetic morphologies. Again, it 
is important for me to stress that due to the symbiotic and interlocking dynamic among 
the different morphological components in both the synthetic and analytic modalities, all 
the constituent features of each mode of operation remain important to different degrees. 
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My goal here is to point attention to a certain a-symmetry that can exist within these 
interlocking relationships due to different environmental circumstances.  
  
4.1 THE TANG-SONG TRANSITION 
4.1.1 The Rise of New Elites   
 The changes that overtook China during what has come to be known as the Tang-
Song transition can be traced back to the aftermath of the An Lushan rebellion (安史之亂
) of 755 CE, a protracted period of social and political instability that spanned the reign 
of three emperors and signified the gradual decline of the golden age of the great Tang 
dynasty (618-907 CE). As in the case of Judaism, here too, we are dealing with a 
transition that represents a milestone in the history of China. Mark Halperin claims that 
“During the two millennia from the empire’s unification in 221 BCE to its nineteenth-
century collision with the industrial West, no period saw more drastic change than the 
ninth, tenth, and eleventh centuries, from the late T’ang through the mid-Sung dynasties.” 
This is precisely the period we will be concerned with, a period that represents the 
historical transition from China’s early medieval to late medieval or early modern 
period.583 
 Generally speaking the Tang model was based on the power of the great 
aristocratic clans (shizu - 士族); extended families that boasted impressive genealogies 
                                            
583 Mark Halperin, Out of the Cloister: Literati Perspectives on Buddhism in Sung China, 960-
1279 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2006), pp. 5-6. The historian Qian Mu 
sees the Song as a transition from traditional china (古代中國) to post-traditional China (後代中
國). T.C. Liu sees it as the transition to the “early modern period” see James T. C. Liu, China 
Turning Inward: Intellectual-Political Changes in the Early Twelfth Century, p. 9; 164 n. 9. 
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reflecting their outstanding pedigree.584 The great Tang clans almost completely 
monopolized the ranks of government and they did this by virtue of their ancestry. The 
Tang rulers, who themselves were the leading aristocratic clan, believed that official 
positions should be occupied by a cultivated social strata that could continuously produce 
educated and cultured sons to run the empire. At this stage in history, the imperial 
examination system (科舉考試) was predominantly based on a recommendation system 
and networks of connections in which successful candidates were allowed to secure 
positions for a handful of relatives.585 Once Tang began to show signs of weakness, more 
people started questioning the legitimacy and necessity of the existing model. In 907 CE 
the Tang era came to an end and with it came the end of the great aristocratic clans.  
 After the Tang period, which I will return to shortly, China went into a phase of 
instability before it could get back on its feet. The short-lived Five Dynasty Period (五代
时期, 907-960) was a preview to the more stable Song dynasty that rose to power in 960 
CE.586 Scholars have referred to the Song era as the Chinese renaissance, a period of 
unprecedented cultural sophistication and economic prosperity but also of relative 
military weakness.587 The question I would like to ask is, how were the dramatic changes 
of the Tang-Song transition related to the rise of Neo-Confucianism? One way to begin 
such an analysis is by looking at what came to replace the aristocratic families of the 
Tang. Generally speaking, both the Tang and Song were dominated by an elite of shi (士
                                            
584 Peter Bol, Neo-Confucianism in History, pp. 31-33. 
585 Ibid., p. 30. This was known as the “Protection Privilege System,” more on pp. 34-5. 
586 This period is also referred to the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period (五代十国). 
587 Dieter Kuhn, The Age of Confucian Rule, p. 1. 
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), but while the Tang elites were known as shizu, or aristocratic elites, the Song shi were 
what is generally referred to as the literati class, or shidafu (scholar officials, 士大夫).588 
These new elites were moving away from affiliation related to pedigree and bloodlines 
towards emphasizing their intellectual distinction. The new assumption of the Song 
period was that civilization was not something exclusive or hereditary, but rather a sphere 
to which everyone had potential access. This democratic spirit was extremely attractive to 
a huge emerging middle class that immediately detected the political and social 
opportunities involved in this new model. This growing and relatively prosperous class 
was quick to seize the opportunity by investing resources “in local schools and 
academies, providing intellectuals with careers and students with places to gather…”589 
Meanwhile early political reformers were increasingly in favor of recruiting officials that 
went through the examination system rather than those who entered government through 
family privilege.590 With the decline of the Tang we see a general phenomenon in which 
central authority could no longer fully control the growing power of provincial leaders 
and the private accumulation of wealth. It became increasingly evident that the old 
structural features of Tang political power no longer corresponded to the new 
decentralization of power that China was undergoing.591 The growing democratization of 
                                            
588 The character zu (族), meaning ancestors, highlights the nepotistic connotations of the Tang 
aristocracy, 
589 Bol, op. cit., p. 2; also Bol, This Culture of Ours, ch. 2 passim. 
590 These early reforms were undertaken by Fan Zhongyan (989-1052) and his allies who 
implemented their controversial policies at 1044. See Bol, This Culture of Ours, p. 31; Idem., 
Neo-Confucianism in History, p. 54; Kuhn The Age of Neo-Confucian Rule, p. 39. 
591 Bol, This Culture of Ours, pp. 45-6. 
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the examination systems, and by extension of the political sphere, represents a general 
restructuring of the Song system in light of new social realities.  
 The new phenomena of local initiatives was related to the disproportionate 
increase in a wealthy and educated social strata and the subsequent inability of the central 
government to employ this influx of talented personnel.592 The excess of educated and 
wealthy people led to an unprecedented diversification in the division of labor, which was 
further supported and promoted by the impressive technological advancements of the 
time. New fields of interest and expertise emerged that were beyond the repertoire of the 
traditional government official. This led influential figures such as Cai Xiang (蔡襄, 
1012–1067) to air their dissatisfaction with traditional synthetic approaches to education, 
which emphasized the well-rounded generalist.593 Like Hu Yuan (胡瑗, 993–1059), 
Wang Anshi (王安石, 1021-1086) and other reformers after him, Cai Xiang advocated a 
more technocratic training of civil servants oriented towards more focused and practical 
fields of knowledge.594 As mentioned, the new intellectual elites of the Song were well 
                                            
592 Ibid., pp. 31-35. See more on the changes in the examination system. John Chafee, The Thorny 
Gates of Learning in Sung China (New York: State University of New York Press, 1995), p. 214 
n. 66. Chaffee claims that the fairness of the Song examination system is doubtable but scholars 
tend to agree that it was substantially more egalitarian and democratic than the Tang model. Also 
see Denis Twitchett, “The Fan Clan’s Charitable Estate, 1050-1760,” in Confucianism in Action 
Nivison and Wright eds., pp. 97-133. 
593 A well-rounded and synthetic education was taken so seriously that some Tang scholars such 
as Yan zhitui warned against becoming too proficient in one of the traditional six arts (六藝) 
ritual (禮), music (樂), charioteering (禦), mathematics (數), calligraphy (書), and archery (射). 
see Bol, This Culture of Ours, p.9. 
594 In addition to the jingyi (meaning of the Classics, 經義) section of the examinations, Hu Yuan 
advocated the introduction of a knowledge (知識) section dedicated to the more practical 
questions of how to rule the empire, see Hou Wailu, Qiu Hansheng, and Zhang Kaizhi, Song 
Ming Lixue Shi. Vol.1 (Beijing: Renmin Press, 2005), p. 27; Kuhn The Age of Neo-Confucian 
Rule, p. 53. Carsun Chang discusses how the official categories of the division of labor during the 
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organized in their ability to establish institutions for preparing young men for 
governmental exams, but they were also establishing themselves as an alternative channel 
to governmental careers independent from state financial support. As a result of 
‘unemployed’ literati, private local academies began to emerge all over China, a 
phenomenon that provided young men with new prospects for employment on a local 
level. It also led intellectual communities to broaden their pedagogical programs beyond 
the confined repertoire of examination material.   
 Local academies were less concerned with preparing students for state exams than 
they were with cultivating the individual’s moral integrity.595 Education, in other words, 
was no longer exclusively oriented towards officialdom, but was now seen as a way to 
improve the human condition on a much broader level, beginning with the individual 
person. This included the training of local educators, the establishment of charitable 
granaries, publications, shrines, lineage buildings, and other private enterprises. Perhaps 
most importantly, Carsun Chang notes that the Confucian academies were modeled after 
the Buddhist ashram that was introduced to China from India. Indeed, much like 
Buddhist monasteries, the Confucian academies departed from the elitism of state 
indoctrination and were now open to the general population providing opportunities for 
                                                                                                                                  
Song were diversified from four types of occupations to six. these are very broad categories that 
included a large amount of professions. The Development of Neo-Confucian Thought, p.93; Peter 
Bol demonstrates how during the 12th century we begin to witness a greater division of labor 
which led to the blurring of boundaries between shi and non shi. He also shows how the Tang 
scholars still recommended the ancient arts as a way to remain in power while the Song scholar 
begin to search for greater expertise. See Bol, This Culture of Ours, pp. 9-11. 
595 Neo-Confucians were especially notable in this respect; Zhu Xi’s prototypical White Deer 
Grotto Academy (Bailudong Shuyuan - 白鹿洞書院) served as a model for a pedagogy focused 
on the individual’s moral betterment. 
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literacy and basic education, even for those who could not afford it. This highlights a 
clear shift from strictly political indoctrination to the Neo-Confucian (or should I say 
Buddhist) emphasis on spiritual cultivation and a community of shared values.596 The 
Confucian academies were so successful that before long they began to enjoy 
governmental support and later turned into official government institutions.597 Song 
policy makers were increasingly sympathetic towards local initiatives as they realized 
that they played an important role in the new political and social model that was 
emerging. More broadly, progressive reformers supported the emerging free market and 
came to terms with the growing power of local communities. Therefore, in spite of 
factional disagreements regarding the future of China, most ideological parties, including 
the Neo-Confucians, agreed that private wealth and the growing accessibility of private 
education should be encouraged. Due to the general prosperity of this period, China was 
undergoing a process of intense urbanization and commercialization. For the first time we 
see the emergence of commercial centers that were independent of an administrative 
function. Instead of pre-Song restrictions on free commerce, Song rulers shifted to a 
“win-win” policy of taxing commercial activity without countering it. Before long, 
commercial taxation became the foundation of government revenue; this took place 
together with an unprecedented monetization of the economy and the introduction of 
government bills and paper money that gradually overshadowed the use of silver.598 
                                            
596 Carsun Chang, The Development of Neo-Confucian Thought, p. 65. 
597 The Confucian academies lost their early vitality once they became official governmental 
institutions. This led to another reaction during the Ming in which most academies returned to 
distinguish themselves from central power and thereby managed to regain their original vigor. 
598 Bol, Neo-Confucianism in History, pp. 23-4. 
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 In the chapter on Kabbalah I looked at Idel’s notion of first and secondary elites 
in the Jewish world. It is clear that the circumstances in the Chinese and Jewish 
experiences were radically different but they nevertheless shared several important 
points. In both cases we see the rise of a commercially wealthy and educated social strata 
that was challenging orthodoxy. In both cases we witness the emergence and expansion 
of a new middle class at a time of unprecedented economic prosperity, urbanization, and 
technological advancements. And in both contexts we are dealing with periods of 
growing rationalization and cultural sophistication. In China such rationalization was 
reflected by the historical shift from a rural to a more urban mindset. A point I especially 
want to stress is that in both cases we see the decline in the exclusivity of the religious 
resources of the classical periods. As we saw, in Judaism it was the decline of the 
Talmudic paradigm, while in China we witness the decline of the Five Classics. In both 
cases the classical corpus was outstripped, or supported, by a new body of texts. As 
discussed in earlier chapters, these textual transformations reflect nothing short of a 
paradigm shift in which the traditional locus of information was no longer sufficient as a 
resource for future operation.  
 As these revolutionary changes were taking place another separate but related 
process was in the making. In order to understand how the social and political 
transformation from the Tang to the Song was related to the growing antagonism between 
the synthetic and analytic mindsets we need to go back to the first century CE when what 
seemed as the innocuous Buddhist tradition began its gradual conquest of China.     
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4.1.2 The Rise of Buddhism and the Decline of Confucianism 
 Unlike the relatively late introduction of philosophy into Judaism, Buddhism 
entered China approximately a millennium before the rise of Neo-Confucianism.599 The 
early Indian schools of Buddhism were extremely analytic; in fact, as Peter Berger points 
out, early Buddhism’s analytical approach even managed to stand out in the Indian 
landscape. The incipient Buddhist tradition in India reflected an unprecedented 
rationalization of the Hindu tradition that preceded it; Buddhism did not only universalize 
Indian thought by challenging the ontology of its caste system, but as Berger notes, its 
“rational coolness” rid itself of many of the mythological features of Hinduism.600 It was 
this type of “cool” and rational Buddhism that entered China in the early centuries of the 
Common Era. Since Buddhism was so drastically different from anything the Chinese 
had formerly encountered, its integration into China was very gradual and full of 
obstacles.  
 The exact dates of Buddhism’s entrance into China are not clear but it is generally 
agreed that it occurred sometime between the early and mid first century CE.601 This 
initial phase during the Han Dynasty (206 BCE - 220 CE) was one in which Buddhism 
                                            
599 Clearly Judaism was constantly influenced by Greek, Roman, and European culture but it was 
only during the tenth and eleventh centuries that we see a large scale introduction of Greek 
philosophy into the Jewish tradition. 
600 Peter Berger, The Sacred Canopy, p. 67. 
601 See more on the introduction of Buddhism to China in Kenneth Ch’en, Buddhism in China, a 
Historical Survey (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 29-35. The traditional 
view points to emperor Ming of the Han dynasty (ruled 58-75 a.d.) as the moment when 
Buddhism was officially accepted into China. Emperor Ming’s dream of a golden deity flying 
around the palace was interpreted as representing the Western sage—the Buddha—who was 
known for his body’s golden hue and ability to fly. The emperor allegedly dispatched an envoy to 
explore this new teaching. The envoy returned with the famous Theravadic Forty-Two Section 
Sutra (四十二章經). Due to many inconsistencies scholars were led to believe that Buddhism 
entered China some sixty years earlier to Emperor Ming’s rule. 
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and Daoism intermingled and became all but indistinguishable. This was to a great extent 
a result of their common interests, most of which were superficial rather than real. 
Another reason for the blurring of boundaries between these two systems was the Daoist 
doctrine of ‘converting the barbarians’ (花胡) according to which, upon completing the 
Daodejing, Laozi left to the West (India), converted the barbarians, and became the 
Buddha.602 This strategy legitimized the growing interest in Buddhist doctrines among 
Daoists and further consolidated the strong fusion between the two systems.603 As a 
consequence of this syncretism, the analytical complexity of Buddhist doctrine was 
almost completely ignored. Instead, the Chinese preferred to stress elements that seemed 
to contribute to the traditional Daoist search for immortality; certainly not a central 
concern of the Buddhist tradition. At this early stage the Buddhists themselves were 
cooperating with this syncretism since it assisted their goal of disseminating the dharma 
and helped them gain a hearing among the Chinese people.604 It was around the end of 
second century with Mouzi’s (牟子) famous Treatise on the Settling of Doubts (理惑论) 
that Buddhism began to actively distinguish itself from Daoism. This was further 
supported by the constant influx of new Buddhist material into the Middle Kingdom. The 
growing differentiation between these traditions was reflected by a shift from the fairly 
simplistic geyi (格义) translation in which Buddhist concepts in Sanskrit were somewhat 
                                            
602 E. Zurcher, The Buddhist Conquest of China: The Spread and Adaptation of Buddhism in 
Early Medieval China (Leiden: E.J. Brill. 1972), pp. 288-320. 
603 Kenneth Ch’en op. cit., pp. 50-51. All the different legends about Laozi’s interaction with the 
barbarians were compiled by Wang Fu during the Western Jin dynasty (265-316) in the Hua Hu 
Jing (the Sutra on the Conversion of the Barbarians - 化胡經) 
604 Ibid., p. 49. 
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arbitrarily swapped with Daoist terms, to more sophisticated and systematic forms of 
translation. Such translations were best exemplified by Kumarajiva (鳩摩羅什, 334-413) 
and later more poignantly by Xuan Zang (玄奘, 602-664). Both philosopher/translators 
and their many followers abandoned Daoist terminology and began to translate Buddhist 
sutras on their own terms and with greater analytic nuance.605 Towards the end of the 
period of disunity (221-589 CE) between the Han and Sui\Tang dynasties, Buddhism 
became a major force in China, and the “Chinese began to acquire a systematic 
understanding of its ideas.”606 By this time “The Chinese had come to understand that 
Buddhism represented a completely different worldview, a philosophy that owed nothing 
to the wisdom of the Chinese sages.”607 It is worth pointing out that although Daoism 
developed its worldview in close conformity and in imitation of Buddhist ideas and 
institutions, it nevertheless failed to match Buddhism’s speculative sophistication and 
popularity. Therefore, although Neo-Confucianism is frequently perceived as a reaction 
to both Buddhism and Daoism, most scholars agree that the main antagonism was with 
the former.608 This was reflected quantitatively as well, once Buddhism was accepted on a 
                                            
605 The Chinese meaning of geyi is “matching meanings.” The earliest known critique of this 
dubious method of translation was voiced by the Jin Dynasty monk Dao An (道安) around 349. 
Recently, Victor Mair has argued that the geyi phase was so short lived that it hardly had time to 
consolidate itself as a model for translators. Most scholars are of the opinion that this form of 
translation was extremely central in the first phase of Buddhism’s introduction into China. See 
Victor Mair, “What is Geyi After All?” China Report Vol.48, 1-2 (2012): 29-59. 
606 Fung Yu-lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy. vol. II, Derk Bodde, trans. (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1953), p. 239. 
607 Berthrong, Transformations of the Confucian Way, p. 68. 
608 As an example the chapter in the Jin Silu dedicated to “Sifting the Heterodoxical Doctrines” is 
almost wholly dedicated to attacks against Buddhism with very little attention to Daoism. 
Moreover, many Daoist features that influenced Neo-Confucianism were clearly adaptations of 
Buddhist influences. 
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broader level, the Sangha’s membership far surpassed that of the different Daoist 
denominations. During the Tang Dynasty it is estimated that the Daoist establishment 
was only one tenth the size of the Buddhist establishment. The meteoric rise of Buddhism 
was quite astonishing and by the end of the Sui Dynasty (隋代, 581–618 CE) and 
beginning of the Tang, Buddhist clergymen represented two million out of the estimated 
forty million inhabitants of northern China, a striking number that can probably be 
partially explained by the tax exemption clergymen enjoyed.609 For all these reasons and 
others I will look at shortly, my analysis will focus on the Buddhist challenge, which I 
see as the predominant reason for the rise of Neo-Confucianism.610  
 Once Buddhism asserted its independence we see a period in which it both 
consolidates its position in China and radically transforms itself. Generally speaking, the 
first independent schools of Buddhism in China were marked by the typical analytic 
complexity of Indian thought and were therefore perceived as alien to the Chinese 
worldview. These schools, most notably the Yogacara or Consciousness Only School (唯
識宗) and the Madhyamaka or Three Treatise School (三輪宗) didn’t survive the test of 
time and were replaced by sinicized schools that began to articulate Buddhist thought in 
ways that conformed to the native sensibilities of the Chinese tradition.  
 The next phase, during the Tang dynasty, represents what many see as the climax 
of Buddhist thought in China, or at least its most creative phase. Before looking at the 
                                            
609 Data from Peter Bol, Harvard Lecture. available online as of 05/15/2014 
http://www.extension.harvard.edu/open-learning-initiative/china-history 
610 Judith Berling notes that Daoist were long influenced by Buddhism and continued to invent 
themselves in the [Song] in light of its doctrines. Berling, The Syncretic Religion of Lin Chao-En 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), pp. 39-40. 
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Tang period, let us note another important difference between the Chinese and Jewish 
experiences in terms of their conflict with analytic systems. Although Greek thought 
certainly had an ongoing influence on Judaism, Jews managed to ward off extreme 
Hellenistic influences prior to the tenth century. It was only with the rise of medieval 
philosophy and mysticism that we see an intense crisis that necessitated a comprehensive 
reevaluation of the tradition in light of Greek thought. The Chinese experience was 
substantially different; somewhat ironically, the clash with Buddhism, although initially a 
clash of differences, slowly transformed into a suspicion towards Buddhism’s 
increasingly native character. In other words, Buddhism came so close to articulating 
itself according to Chinese values that native systems found themselves in its shadow. 
Sinicized schools of Buddhism such as Tiantai (天台), Huayan (華嚴), and Chan (單宗, 
better known as Zen in the West) began to gain influence for two central reasons. The 
first was that Buddhism’s indigenization meant that most Chinese no longer perceived it 
as a foreign system of thought. The second reason was that Buddhism tackled existential, 
epistemological, and metaphysical questions that were only superficially dealt with by the 
Chinese tradition, especially Confucianism.611 While Buddhism provided solutions to the 
salvational yearnings of an increasingly sophisticated audience, Confucianism remained 
entrenched in pragmatic concerns related to rulership and the maintenance of political 
stability. Wing-tsit Chan points to this spiritual ossification when he notes that from the 
end of the Han Dynasty until the rise of Neo-Confucianism, the Confucian worldview 
                                            
611 The political and social circumstances of the age meant that something new was bound to 
replace the Tang model. As opposed to other factions, Neo-Confucians were successful in that 
they detected that one of the main issues to confront was Buddhist metaphysics and channels for 
spiritual fulfillment. Hou Wailu et al., Song Ming Lixue Shi. Vol.1, p. 8 [Chinese]. 
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“became synonymous with bureaucracy.”612 Therefore, one of the main differences 
between the Neo-Confucian and Kabbalistic experiences is that the Chinese, in spite of 
reoccurring attacks against Buddhism’s corrupting effects, were unable to get rid of 
Buddhism, which became an integral component of their culture.613  
 
4.1.3 The Ascendency and Consolidation of Chan Buddhism  
By the time of the Tang dynasty and later during the rise of Neo-Confucianism 
during the Song, Buddhism became a force to be reckoned with; it contested the Chinese 
worldview “in every way in which one tradition can engage another culture. No aspect of 
Chinese life escaped what scholars call the Buddhist conquest of China.”614 Considering 
the range and depth of this Buddhist conquest, it is no wonder that Confucians, as early as 
                                            
612 Confucianism’s ‘mundane’ function reflected the traditional Chinese view that Buddhism and 
Daoism were systems that dealt with the interior facets of human life, while Confucianism was in 
charged of “external” matters. Wing-tsit Chan, “Neo-Confucianism and Chinese Scientific 
Thought,” Philosophy East and West Vol. 6, no. 4 (1957): 317-8. 
613 See Kenneth Ch’an Buddhism in China, p. 471 “The indian religion had become so intimate a 
part of the intellectual make-up of the Chinese that it was impossible for the Sung thinkers to give 
up Buddhism,” see also Carsun Chang, The Development of Neo-Confucian Thought, p. 28. 
Such early attacks against Buddhism could be seen in Gu Huan (390-453) who critiqued 
Buddhism’s Indian roots as evil and barbaric. Fan Zhen (c. 480) attacked the Buddhist notion of 
rebirth, while Xun ji (d. 547), criticized Buddhism from a political angle, warning against its 
accumulation of power and “plans” to undermine the emperor. Finally, Fu Yi (555-639) drafted a 
proposal demanding that Buddhism be suppressed and banished from China; his argument 
contained economic, political and nationalistic elements. The fundamental difference with Neo-
Confucianism was that none of these thinkers sought to revive Confucian philosophy. Their 
arguments were mainly political, historical, and nationalistic rather than metaphysical or 
doctrinal.  
In Judaism, by the fifteenth and sixteenth century philosophy all but disappeared. Nevertheless it 
could be argued that philosophical speculation continued within the symbolic framework of 
Kabbalah. This can be seen in the case of philosophically inclined mystics such as Moshe 
Cordovero. 
614 Berthrong, Transformations, p. 63. Berthrong is referring to E. Zurcher’s book The Buddhist 
Conquest of China: The Spread and Adaptation of Buddhism in Early Medieval China (1972). 
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the mid Tang dynasty, began to harbor increasingly anti-Buddhist sentiments. Early 
“proto-Neo-Confucians” such as Han Yu (韩愈, 768-824) and his student Li Ao (李翱, 
772-836) launched an unprecedented attack against Buddhism, reflecting the growing 
sense of crisis that many conservative Confucians were sensing. A watershed moment in 
this crisis was Han Yu’s famous anti-Buddhist rhetoric which to a great extent 
represented a xenophobic sentiment that characterized Neo-Confucians of subsequent 
generations. In his unusually blunt letter to the emperor Han Yu protested the festive and 
official introduction of the Buddha’s alleged bone relic to the imperial court:  
Your servant begs leave to say that Buddhism is no more than a cult of the barbarian 
people, which spread to China in the time of the Latter Han…until old and young alike 
had abandoned their occupations to follow Buddhism… then will our old ways be 
corrupted, our customs violated, and the tale will spread to make us the mockery of the 
world. This is no trifling matter! Now Buddha was a man of the barbarians who did not 
speak the language of China and wore cloths of a different fashion. His sayings did not 
concern the ways of our ancient kings, nor did his manner of dress conform to their laws. 
He understood neither the duties that bind sovereign and subject nor the affection of 
father and son. If he were still alive today and come to our court by order of his ruler, 
Your Majesty might condescend to receive him… he would then be escorted to the 
borders of the state, dismissed, and not allowed to delude the masses. How then, when he 
has long been dead, could his rotten bones, the foul and unlucky remains of his body, be 
rightly admitted to the palace?…Your servant is deeply shamed and begs that this bone 
be given to the proper authorities to be cast into fire.615   
                                            
615 William de Bary and Irene Bloom, Sources of Chinese Tradition (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1964), pp. 583-585. In the same letter we have a description of the popularity of 
the event and the enthusiastic crowds that filled the streets to welcome the relics into the capital. 
Han Yu almost payed with his life for this criticism but ended up being exiled to the south. His 
patriotism became emblematic of Confucian integrity and many Neo-Confucian academies 
celebrated him in a way that was reminiscent of a saint in Catholicism. See  W.T.de Bary, “A 
Reappraisal of Neo-Confucianism,” in Arthur Wright ed., Studies in Chinese Thought (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1953). 
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Eighth-century conservatives such as Han Yu and Li Ao were the first to clearly point 
attention to the “Buddhist problem,” as something to be dealt with systematically.616 Anti-
Buddhist attacks were not confined to individual thinkers; Buddhism experienced several 
violent and non-violent institutional persecutions, the most important of which was the 
persecution of 845, which according to some scholars represented the beginning of the 
decline of Buddhism’s creative phase and its gradual eclipse by Neo-Confucianism.617 It 
is important to bear in mind that in terms membership Buddhism remained highly 
popular and continued to attract followers well into the Song. Wang Xinzhu notes that the 
Song represented a new climax in the development of Buddhism, including a sharp 
increase in its monastic membership, the building of temples, and the translation and 
printing of scripture.618 In fact, as opposed to the formerly common opinion that 
Buddhism reached its climax during the Tang dynasty, an increasing number of scholars 
have come to agree that “if any period deserves the epithet of the ‘golden age’ of 
[Chinese] Buddhism, the Sung is the most likely candidate.”619 This is especially the case 
                                            
616 It is interesting that Han Yu and Judah Halevi, who predated the emergence of Neo-
Confucianism and Kabbalah respectively, became the embodiment of a conservative sentiment 
that characterized later generations of Neo-Confucians and Jewish mystics. Both thinkers lacked 
the developed tools to offer a mature alternative to Buddhism and Greek philosophy but they 
were nevertheless the earliest systematic anti-analytic proponents of their respective tradition. 
Their cultural temperament rather than the specific contents of their thought became emblematic 
of future conservative Confucians and Jews throughout the ages.      
617 Another massive persecution took place during the 950’s. See Halperin Cloisters, p. 8. 
618 Wang Xinzhu [王心竹], Lixue Yu Fojiao [The Lixue School and Buddhism 理學與佛教] 
(Changchun: Changchun Press, 2011), pp. 11-12. 
619 Peter N. Gregory, "The Vitality of Buddhism in the Sung," in Buddhism in the Sung, eds. Peter 
N. Gregory and Daniel A. Gertz, Jr. (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1999), p. 2. See also 
T. Griffith Foulk, "Myth, Ritual, and Monastic Practice in Sung Ch'an Buddhism," in Religion 
and Society in T'ang and Sung China, Patricia Buckley Ebrey and Peter N. Gregory eds., 
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in regards to the highly popular Chan School. During the Song, Chan Buddhism became 
the embodiment of the formerly fragmented Buddhist tradition as well as the main culprit 
in the eyes of many Chinese nationalists who blamed it for its corrosive cultural 
effects.620 Understanding Chan Buddhism as a predominantly Song phenomenon 
highlights the direct confrontation between Confucians and Buddhists during the twelfth 
century and the urgency that conservatives must have felt to articulate a more relevant 
paradigm for the future.621 
 The early and solitary voices of Han Yu and Li Ao during the Tang failed to 
seriously impact the course of events during their own lifetimes. But their call to arms 
began to resonate with an increasing number of early Song conservative who were 
concerned with the decline of Confucianism and the simultaneous ascendency of Chan 
Buddhism. Not only did Chan consolidate its position as the strongest school of 
                                                                                                                                  
(Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1993), pp. 147-197. Kenneth Ch’en is a notable example 
of a scholar that held the very common opinion that Buddhism reached its zenith during the Tang 
and then suffered a decline during subsequent dynasties. See his Buddhism in China, (1964). 
620 Foulk, ibid. Halperin adds that “During the T’ang-Sung transition, Buddhism underwent a 
range of transformations, which rendered its Sung incarnation a markedly different entity than its 
T’ang predecessors. Among the key changes, pride of place must go to the formation of the Ch’an 
“school” and its rise to a dominant position within Chinese Buddhism. Mark Halperin. Out of the 
Cloister, p. 8. 
621 From this perspective the main change that took place after the 845 persecutions was not so 
much the decline of Buddhism but rather a decline in the diversity of its schools and the 
consolidation of the Chan school as its most representative force. The ascendency of the Chan 
school was also related to the sharp decline of the Tiantai and Huayan schools. Due to their strong 
dependence on institutions, monastic discipline, and scripture, the Huayan and Tiantai schools 
suffered the sharpest decline in the aftermath of the 845 persecutions; it was much harder for 
these schools to recover from the destruction and confiscation of their abundant property, land, 
luxurious temples, costly religious paraphernalia, and sutras. In contrast, due to its opposition to 
institutional extravagance, lofty ritualism, and monastic discipline, the Chan school emerged 
relatively unharmed from these events. See more on the confiscation of property and gold to 
support the economy in Kuhn, The Age of Confucian Rule, p. 14. The devotional pure land school 
remained strong as well and was slowly integrated into Chanism. See more in Julia Ching, The 
Religious Thought of Chu Hsi, p. 176. 
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Buddhism, but as mentioned earlier, it became disturbingly Chinese, showing very little 
indication of being a foreign tradition that lacked cultural legitimacy. In referring to the 
increasing similarities between Confucianism and Buddhism, Feng Youlan reminds us 
that the Chan masters came to believe that “in carrying water and chopping firewood 
therein lies the wonderful Tao.”622 Chan Buddhism therefore articulated an unprecedented 
world-affirming vision in which the sphere of quotidian activity was seen as a legitimate 
platform for achieving enlightenment.623 It also advocated reaching “sudden” 
enlightenment, one that was intuitive and therefore recognizably Chinese. Beyond such 
Chinese characteristics, Chan constructed a highly accessible and simplified philosophy 
that did not demand an intellectualist accumulation of knowledge. More importantly, 
Chan’s novel meditational techniques freed individuals from institutional commitments 
and offered them a platform to explore the inner self. This simple introspective 
methodology had a profound impact on commoners, elites, literati, and emperors alike. In 
a famous passage the northern Song philosopher Zhang Zai (张载, 1020-1077) states:  
Since the Buddhist doctrine spread in China like fire, many Confucians, who have not 
been able to look through the gate of the school of the Sage, have already been attracted 
to it and drowned in it together with the Buddhists. They consider Buddhism as the great 
Way. Consequently, its vulgarism has extended throughout the world, so that good and 
                                            
622 運水搬柴皆是神通 or 神通並妙用, 運水及搬柴. The Chan School had other similar world-
affirming mottos such as “Every day is a good day” and “Everyday-mindedness is itself the 
Way.” 
623 For more on the world affirming features of Song Chanism see Griffith Foulk “Myth Ritual 
and Monastic Practice.” in Ebrey, Religion in China, p. 153. 
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bad people, the intelligent and the stupid, men and women, and servants all have become 
accustomed to believing in it.624 
 
As we will see soon, one of the greatest insights of Neo-Confucianism was that change 
should begin with the individual agent rather than with institutional reform; Neo-
Confucians advocated a bottom-up reform characteristic of Buddhism rather than the 
traditional Chinese top-down approach. 
 An analysis of the sinicization of Buddhism in terms of my morphological 
categories shows that on the level of cognition, Chinese Buddhism departed from the 
radical analytical atomization, systematicity, and de-contextualization of information so 
characteristic of earlier Indian schools. Indeed, one striking feature of the Chinese 
adoption of Buddhism was the ability to ignore many of the analytical procedures of 
Buddhist theory and forms of argumentation, while focusing more exclusively on the 
practical ramifications of the dharma. One of the main characteristics of the popular Chan 
sect was its denial of the highly discursive and textual complexity of earlier schools in 
favor of an anti-intellectualist focus on koans (公案) and meditational techniques. On the 
social level Chinese Buddhism departed from the Theravadic focus on individual 
enlightenment so typical of the analytic tendency towards cognitive-individualism. 
Instead, the Chinese adopted the Mahayanic stress on communal and universal salvation 
through the image of the Bodhisattva. On the cultural level the greatest change was in the 
was the aforementioned other-worldly inclinations of Indian Buddhism were replaced by 
                                            
624 Zhang Zai, Correcting Ignorance (Zheng Meng, 正蒙) ch. 17:3, 張子全書 (Zhangzi quanshu 
3:22b).自其說熾傅中國，儒者未容窺聖學門牆，已為引取，淪胥其間，指為大道. [乃] (四) 
其俗達之天下, 至善惡, 知愚, 男女, 臧獲, 人人著信. 
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a metaphysics in which the world of Nirvana interpenetrated the mundane Samsaric 
sphere. As Wing-tsit Chan notes, the “doctrine of illusoriness underwent a radical change 
in China… which gives equal emphasis to the world of reality and the world of 
appearance.”625 Indeed, Buddhism adopted many of the characteristics of native Chinese 
thought, however, for conservative intellectuals this did not mean it became 
unrecognizingly Chinese; behind its indigenous appearance, important differences 
continued to clearly set it apart from the traditional values of the Confucianism. It was 
these differences that conservative literati were eager to stress as they began to 
rehabilitate Confucianism as an alternative to Buddhism.  
 There was yet another important reason for conservative concerns regarding the 
ascendency of the Chan school. Not only was this form of Buddhism increasingly 
attractive spiritually at a time when Confucianism was embroiled in bitter factionalism, 
but it also began to enter the political sphere where Confucianism was traditionally most 
influential. Indeed, Buddhism’s increasingly central position in the imperial court was 
extremely bothersome in the eyes of conservative Confucians. This process was 
supported by what Wang Xinzhu calls the “literati-zation” of Buddhism (僧人文人化), 
where monks became increasingly immersed in classical learning.626 Now that 
Confucianism had very little to offer spiritually, it became clear that if Buddhism became 
stronger politically, the Chinese tradition would be in real danger of coming under the 
full domination of a “barbarian” culture. During the Song dynasty Chan Buddhism 
started attracting patronage from lay elites and the imperial court, leading to a substantial 
                                            
625 W.T. Chan, “Neo-Confucianism and Science,” pp. 310-11. 
626 Wang Xinzhu “Lixue yu Fojiao,” p. 12. 
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intensification of its ties with the state. Not only did emperors refrain from persecuting 
the Chan school, most of them were sponsoring temples and the translation of sutras, 
while local government officials were responsible for selecting abbots for public 
monasteries.627 To the distress of conservative Confucians, many court literati started 
following Buddhism as well, claiming that both traditions had a complementary function 
in court life.628 Even worse, some Confucian literati began to “raise up the rules of the 
barbarians and put them above the teachings of the early kings, thus being not far 
removed from being barbarians themselves.”629 Equally alarming was that many Buddhist 
temples became impressive galleries of emperor portraits, a function that was formerly 
reserved for Confucian ancestral shrines, which were seen as the embodiment of imperial 
order. Furthermore, Buddhism became more dominant in state cult and even managed to 
penetrate the examination system, which was supposed to be exclusively dedicated to the 
Confucian classics.630 Charles Wei-Hsun Fu stresses just how real and palpable the 
Buddhist threat was when he notes that Zhu Xi often “deplored the fact that a great 
number of Confucian students and scholars in his times had been one by one drawn into 
                                            
627 Wang Xinzhu, ibid., and Kuhn, The Age of Confucian Rule, p. 108. 
628 Wang Xinzhu, ibid., p. 14. 
629 From Han Yu’s Yuan Dao (原道, On the Origins of the Truth) see in Fung Yu-Lan and Derk 
Bodde, “The Rise of Neo-Confucianism and Its Borrowings From Buddhism and Taoism.” 
Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Jul., 1942): 95. Although this was written 
centuries before the Song it certainly reflects the state of affairs that led to the Neo-Confucian 
reaction. In fact, Buddhist influences on the imperial court during the 11th and 12th centuries 
were far greater than they were during Han Yu’s lifetime. 
630 Kuhn, op. cit., pp. 100-108 passim.; Halperin op. cit., pp. 23-26. 
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Ch’an Buddhism.”631 The famous historian Qian Mu (钱穆) claims that “to him [Zhu Xi] 
belongs the great credit of keeping China from turning into a Ch’an nation.”632   
 But in spite of the similarities between Chan Buddhism and native Chinese 
thought there remained essential differences. Feng notes that although Chanists 
recognized the spiritual potential in carrying water and chopping wood “they did not push 
this idea to its logical conclusion by saying that in serving one’s family and the State 
therein also lies the wonderful Tao. The reason, of course, is that once they had said this, 
their teaching would have ceased to be Buddhism.633” Such a statement comes to 
highlight two things: the first was how successful Chanists were in integrating Buddhist 
thought into China, and the second is that there remained fundamental differences that 
were impossible to brush aside. It became the goal of many Neo-Confucians to amplify 
these differences in order to highlight the cultural discrepancies between the Indian and 
Chinese worldviews.    
 On a comparative note, the Confucian concern with Buddhism’s attractiveness 
was highly reminiscent of the way Kabbalists continuously warned against the allure of 
Greek thought. In his Reflection on Things at Hand, Zhuxi warns that “A student should 
forthwith get as far away from Buddhist doctrine as form licentious songs and beautiful 
women. Otherwise they will soon infiltrate him.”634 On the Jewish side “Greek wisdom 
was denounced as the alien concubine who leads Jewish youth astray from the legitimate 
                                            
631 Charles Wei-Hsun Fu “Chu Hsi and Buddhism” (quoting Qian Mu) in Chu Hsi and Neo-
Confucianism, pp. 378. 
632 Qian Mu, Zhuzi Xin Xue-an (朱子新学案) Vol. 3, (Beijing: Jiuzhou Chubanshi, 2011), p. 1. 
633 Fung Yu-Lan, A Short History of Chinese Philosophy, p. 271. 
634 Zhu Xi and Lu Zuqian, Reflection on Things at Hand book 13 passage 5, p. 283 W.T. Chan tr. 
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Israelite wife, the Torah…philosophy was thought to be dangerously seductive, like the 
Moabite women who seduced Israel to the sin of idolatry in the Shitim. After tasting the 
charms of philosophy, no young man will be willing to return and devote himself to the 
minutiae of the Talmud.”635 Such sexual allusions in both cases can help us appreciate 
just how attractive analytical paradigms must have seemed to young intellectuals of the 
time. The analytic mode of operation offered an accessible and clear road to individual 
salvation coupled with an inspiring and fresh metaphysical outlook, and a break from 
tedious scholasticism that must have been extremely attractive to the spiritually-inclined.  
 In the above section I have emphasized two contemporaneous processes in China. 
The first was the historical transition from the aristocratic Tang model to the new 
prosperous and educated elites of the Song. The second was the Buddhist conquest of 
China and the simultaneous ossification of Confucianism. Seen together, we see a period 
that gave rise to more intellectual freedom, democratization of knowledge, economic and 
cultural prosperity, together with the ascendency of a unified Buddhist tradition (Chan) 
that spoke to the immediate spiritual and practical needs of growing portions of Chinese 
society. In what follows I will look at the unique intellectual landscape that emerged as a 
result of the social and spiritual changes that China was undergoing. As in the Jewish 
case, the early Song witnessed a striking diversity of contending schools that sought to 
equip China with a new social, political, and spiritual paradigm for the future. 
 
                                            
635 Halbertal, People of the Book, pp. 111-112. In his poem "Devarekha be-Mor Over Rekuḥim,” 
Judah Halevi warned: "Turn aside from mines and pitfalls. Let not Greek wisdom tempt you, for 
it bears flowers only and no fruit…” 
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4.1.4 The Proliferation of Schools  
 As the great Tang declined, rapidly changing social conditions made it clear to 
Chinese intellectuals that change was inevitable. A new cultural atmosphere inspired 
thinkers to understand their position in history in a radically new way. After the events of 
755 “men began to ask not how to restore the pre-rebellion past but what the world ought 
to become.”636 Although the Song managed to unite China after a period of disunity, the 
beginning of its rule was characterized by uncertainty. This led to a heated debate not un-
similar to the famous pre-Qin (221 BCE) philosophical debates of the “Hundred Schools 
of Thought” (諸子百家). Bol notes that “during the second half of the eleventh century, 
literati opinion divided into camps, each with its own ideas, creating one of the great eras 
of debate in China’s history… they were searching for the key to the unity that they 
believed had existed under the sage-kings in antiquity.”637 It is important to bear in mind 
that the split into contending groups was an anomaly in Chinese history, where political 
culture strove towards consensus such that dissident ministers were usually demoted, sent 
to serve far from the capital, forced to leave office, and frequently exiled. Many 
conservatives who were resisted change attacked the new proliferation of ideologies as a 
breaching of custom and an encouragement factionalism (朋黨). According to Dieter 
Kuhn, creating a faction meant challenging orthodox bureaucracy, which was “trained in 
subservience based on personal relations and dependence.”638 But change was inevitable, 
                                            
636 Bol, Neo-Confucianism in History, p. 9 
637 Ibid., p. 57; T.W. de Bary following Robert Hartwell notes that there is a general consensus 
among scholars that the Song period is a time in which intellectual pluralism surpassed any 
previous dynasty. See de Bary, Learning for One’s Self. p. 33. 
638 Kuhn, The Age of Neo-Confucian Rule, p. 53. 
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the famous Ouyang Xiu composed a memorial On Factions (Pengdang lun, 朋黨論) in 
which he argued that “superior men form factions based on principles, whereas inferior 
men come together for selfish interests.”639 Factionalism was therefore supported with an 
ethical and philosophical underpinning and presented as a positive and patriotic 
phenomenon. The following hundred and fifty years represented the ongoing struggle 
between these contending factions to articulate a new vision for China’s future.  
 This is a good place to point out an important difference between Jewish and 
Chinese factionalism. Leaders of Jewish communities were practically devoid of political 
power and were therefore at the mercy of Muslim and Christian political authority. Due 
to their small size they lacked the institutional complexity of highly stratified systems 
with several governmental levels and responsibilities such as maintaining armies, 
allocating land, and practicing diplomacy on a broad regional and international scale. The 
Chinese, on the other hand, boasted one of the most complex and advanced bureaucratic 
systems known to any culture. The main implication for this study is that the cultural 
crisis China was facing became manifest in diverse fields and was most obvious in the 
political sphere where central power was held. In other words, the debate during the early 
Song period was also related to taxation, commerce, farming, military, and many other 
aspects that were not so relevant to Jewish communities. What further complicates this 
picture is the fact that Buddhism, the main factor that Neo-Confucians reacted against, 
was not clearly associated with any of these political factions. Nevertheless, as we shall 
see soon, the more politically progressive factions were more tolerant towards Buddhism 
                                            
639 Ibid. 
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while the conservative Neo-Confucians were adamantly opposed to it. The fact that the 
type of factionalism we see in China took place on a broader political arena than the more 
theologically-based factionalism in Judaism, should not divert us from the similar 
processes that are taking place in both cases. The shift towards a more urban, 
technologically advanced, economically prosperous, and cosmopolitan reality in both the 
Chinese and Jewish environments meant that the necessary conditions for the acceptance 
of analytical systems on a broader level were in place. This was clear in the way 
progressive Jews displayed a greater tolerance towards philosophy and how certain 
factions during the early Song were more accepting towards Chan Buddhism. In both 
cases progressive camps were analytically inclined while conservative camps such as 
Neo-Confucians and Kabbalists perceived the analytical stance and the new cultural 
conditions that emerged as a clear threat to the Confucian and Rabbinic worldviews.  
 In order to understand the position of Neo-Confucians we need to become 
familiar with the different ideological factions with which they were contending. The 
beginning of this factionalism can be traced back to the early reforms of Fan Zhongyan (
范仲淹, 989-1052). The details of these initial unsuccessful reforms are less important 
than the general impact Fan’s policy had on subsequent generations of Confucians. 
Generally speaking, Fan and his followers represented an official acknowledgement that 
the current system, inherited from the Tang, was no longer adequate. More importantly, 
the crux of Fan’s message was a demand to think creatively about the future, this was 
reflected in his attempt to reform the examination system from a model of recitation and 
rote memorization of the Five Classics towards their reinterpretation in light to new 
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realities. Fan’s reformations also made it clear that the central function of government 
was to serve the people rather than the other way around. He called to take active 
measures against corrupt officials and to recruit those who were dedicated to healing their 
nation rather than seeking their own interests.640 During his tenure “Fan and his followers 
bombarded the court with requests for reform of a diverse range of fields in political and 
social life.”641 In 1050, Fan Zhongyan’s faction drafted a protocol that summarized all the 
central points of their reform plans. In spite of their failure, these early efforts symbolized 
a new era of change. Soon after we can detect four major factions in the Chinese political 
and intellectual landscape.  
 The first faction was an extension of Fan’s early ideology represented by Ouyang 
Xiu (歐陽脩, 1007-1072) and later Su Shi (蘇軾, 1037-1101) who stressed the 
importance of culture (wen, 文). These thinkers or the ‘Ancient Prose’ faction (古文) 
advocated a more accessible literary prose that stressed one’s opinions and ideas rather 
than stylistic virtuosity.642 They believed that government should be dynamic and that 
                                            
640 Bol argues that “The spread of the Ancient Style made learning an ideological enterprise. It 
encouraged its proponents to write about the great issues of the day irrespective of their rank …” 
He claims that literary style gave precedent for ideas over culture. In regards to Buddhism, Fan 
Zhongyan denounced its growing influence on the population but especially on the literati class. 
See Bol, This Culture of Ours, pp.55-56; 170. 
641 Berthrong, Transformations, pp. 89-90 
642 It is worth noting that by the time of the Song most intellectuals from all factions were using 
the ancient prose style. Wang Anshi, when still a minor civil servant, used the ancient prose style 
to advocate a revolutionary approach regarding the role of government. The main difference with 
Ouyang Xiu’s faction was that instead of stressing literature and art the Wang Anshi faction 
stressed the Classics while other factions such as the one led by Sima Guang stressed historical 
analysis. The ancient prose style also represented a new form of transparency and a way to 
combat hypocrisy among self-seeking civil servants who could formerly hide their real views 
behind an over-emphasis on the prestige of style and form, a trend that originated with the 
parallel prose style (pian ti wen, 駢體文) that became popular during the Han Dynasty. Once 
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thinkers could only be properly cultivated through the study of literature and art. One of 
the distinguishing characteristics of this factions, perhaps to Fan’s dismay, were its 
Buddhist undertones; some of its members were Buddhist monks, while others, such as 
the illustrious literatus Su Shi, showed strong Buddhist inclinations.643 The next major 
faction was associated with the prominent statesman and historian Sima Guang (司馬光, 
1019-1086) who advocated modest reformation of the bureaucratic system but strongly 
opposed a radical restructuring of society. The conservative inclinations of this camp 
could be discerned in its attempt to reach a stable and static dynastic structure rather than 
a dynamic one that changes to meet new realities. These conservatives also sought to halt 
the democratization of the examination system by reintroducing the old recommendation 
model. This may be a testimony of their attempt to secure the narrow interests of old 
northern elites, in the same areas in which many Neo-Confucians were working.644 The 
conservative Sima Guang was the main opponent of the most dominant faction composed 
of radical reformers led by Wang Anshi (王安石, 1021-1086). Wang’s famous New 
Policies (新法), were probably the most ambitious structural reforms since the Han 
dynasty. Wang and his faction believed that the political, social, and military systems 
required a comprehensive overhaul based on strong governmental intervention in 
                                                                                                                                  
content became a central concern, intellectuals were forced to reveal their positions publicly 
while government could choose officials based their opinions rather than their poetic abilities. 
643 Bol, Neo-Confucianism in History, p. 57. 
644 Ibid., p. 35. More on the northern aristocrats see p. 56.  The elite landowners, especially 
lenders, were doing everything to impede reforms that diminished their influence in politics. The 
dramatic reforms of the Song were mainly launched by southerners from a humble background 
such as Fan Zhongyan, Ouyan Xiu, and Wang Anshi. Unsurprisingly, the conservative Sima 
Guang who was opposed to reforms was a wealthy northerner that sought to secure the interests 
of the Luoyang aristocracy. 
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providing a social safety net for the poor, government loans for farmers, the elimination 
of private monopolies and abuse of power by the rich, the promotion of more efficient 
agriculture, the encouragement of private commerce, and a more specialized and 
professional training of government officials.645 Wang’s reforms were extreme and 
controversial, they promoted a highly progressive approach that sought to get rid of the 
old China in favor of a more open and pluralistic educational, bureaucratic, and social 
system. Under strong attacks form conservatives Wang’s exceptional efforts at reform 
were eventually abolished. One of his main opponents were the fourth faction in our 
story, also known as the ‘School of the Way’ or Daoxue (道學) or better yet, what 
Western scholars have termed Neo-Confucianism.646  
 The Neo-Confucian school later split into various different strands of thought; the 
one we will specifically be concerned with is the School of Principle or what I will 
interchangeably refer to as the Lixue School (理學). The lixue thinkers were politically 
conservative and tended to support the anti-reformist policies of Sima Guang but they 
were also advocating a radically new approach to solving China’s problems. A peculiar 
characteristic of the Neo-Confucian school was that it was the most non-political faction 
                                            
645 Wang Anshi’s faction is sometimes referred to by Chinese scholars as the New School (xinxue, 
新学) or Jinggong Xinxue 荆公新学 after Wang’s honorary name - 王荆公. See Qi Xia, [漆俠]. 
Songxue De Fazhan He Yanbian [宋学的发展和演变] (Beijing: Renmin Press, 2011). [The 
Development and Evolution of Song Studies] pp. 281-303. 
646 For more on the the differentiation between the terms daoxue and Neo-Confucianism see Hoyt 
Tillman, “A New Direction in Confucian Scholarship: Approaches to Examining the Differences 
Between Neo-Confucianism and Tao-Hsueh,” Philosophy East and West 42, no. 3 (1992): 455-
74. And also Wm. Theodore De Bary’s reply “The Uses of Neo-Confucianism: A Response to 
Professor Tillman.” Philosophy East & West 43, no. 3 (1993): 541-55. Tillman’s reply to de Bary 
“The Uses of Neo-Confucianism, Revisited: A Reply to Professor De Bary.” Philosophy East and 
West 44, no. 1 (1994): 135-42. 
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in its highly competitive environment. Its early leaders Zhou Dunyi (周敦颐 1017-1073), 
Zhang Zai (張哉, 1020-1077) and later more prominently Cheng Yi (程頤, 1033-1107) 
were mainly pre-occupied with education, philosophy, personal cultivation, and the 
propagation of the dao.647 They saw the individual, rather than governmental institutions, 
as the primary channel for the betterment of the world. As mentioned earlier, this camp 
was also the most explicitly anti-Buddhist school of thought, a point that is of particular 
importance to this study. As in the case of Kabbalah in its confrontation with philosophy, 
Neo-Confucianism sought to answer a set of questions raised by Buddhism, and thereby 
adopted many of its traits in the process. Influenced by Buddhism, the Lixue School 
argued that reality was founded upon a set of intelligible Principles, or li (理). They 
argued that through the meticulous investigation of things (wu, 物) and affairs (shi, 事) 
one could discover these Principles and thereby penetrate ultimate reality and ultimately 
experience self-transformation. Through the attainment of sagehood, which was a Neo-
Confucian equivalent to Buddhist enlightenment, one could contribute to the greater 
transformation of society and the world. The Neo-Confucian stress on metaphysics gave 
it a universalist and normative characteristic that made it distinct among other faction 
which offered seemingly conventional solutions to China’s problems. A point to bear in 
mind is that all the contending camps in the early Song period sought to dismantle the 
                                            
647 Tillman, Chu Hsi’s Ascendency, p. 18. Benjamin Schwartz notes that the Neo-Confucians 
attacked Wang Anshi’s “emphasis on professional specialization and his reliance on institutional 
machinery, for the most part maintained their dedication to the perfection of society…men like 
the mystical Chou Tun-i, who renounced all public office to devote himself exclusively to a life 
of philosophic meditation and self-cultivation.” See in “Some Polarities in Neo-Confucian 
Thought,” in Confucianism in Action, p. 53. 
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Tang paradigm and its claim to antiquity, and they all argued their positions represent the 
real path of the ancient sages.648 As in the case of Kabbalists, it was the culturally 
conservative but speculatively advanced Neo-Confucians that emerged victorious from 
this cultural factionalism. Neo-Confucians believed that change was to emerge from the 
grassroots by supplying the Chinese person with a new understanding of his position in 
the cosmos, and it was in this sense that they were predominantly concerned with 
spirituality, cosmology, and ethics rather than political reform.   
   
4.1.5 The Decline of the Five Classics 
 The Song dynasty represents a period in which the Five Classics were slowly 
supplemented and over shadowed by the Four Books. The Five Classics were the central 
textual body of classical Confucianism; Gardner claims that “from the Han through the 
T'ang period, the Five Classics maintained unchallenged their authoritative status in the 
tradition; they were, without question, its central texts, the ones thought to convey its 
basic teachings most effectively.”649 In short, the Five Classics represented the sacred and 
highly esteemed literature of traditional China; their position was not unlike that of the 
                                            
648 Bol, Neo-Confucianism in History, p.58. 
649 Gardner, “Confucian Commentary and Chinese Intellectual History,” The Journal of Asian 
Studies 57, no. 2 (1998): 410. Without the guidance of the Classics there was no map for 
understanding reality and the Way (道): “those who learn them will grow; those who do not learn 
them will fall. When in the great enterprise of governing the ruler honors [these texts], he 
completes his imperial virtue; when a common fellow can recite them, he wins the respect of 
nobles.” ⁠ See Wei Zheng (魏徵) and Linghu Defen (令狐德棻), Sui Shu (隋书) (Beijing: Zhong 
hua shuju, 1973), 32.903 [Chinese]; The Chinese believed that the Five Classics “revealed how 
the sage-kings had created civilization, governed the empire, and created an ideal integrated 
social order…” The Classics also had a solid cosmological foundation, the Tang court stated that 
with them one could make “heaven and earth constant [and] regulate yin and yang,” Bol Neo-
Confucianism in History, p. 47. 
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Bible and Talmud in Judaism. They were the indisputable authoritative body of texts that 
spawned one of the greatest commentarial traditions in world history. For the Chinese, 
the Classics were a reflection of an eternal and unalterable truth that generations of 
Confucians investigated and interpreted in an attempt to understand the nature of reality.     
 Conservative Song thinkers were advocating a return to native Chinese resources; 
they warned against the seductiveness of Buddhist philosophy and demanded that people 
“reject the foreign teachings of Buddhism and embrace anew the cherished values of the 
native tradition.”650 According to Gardner this cultural crisis fueled the growing interest 
in classical studies among eleventh century thinkers. Song intelligentsia “turned to the 
classics with an almost missionary commitment… the foremost intellectuals of the early 
centuries of the Song all dedicated much of their lives to studying the classics and writing 
commentaries on them.”651 Through these new commentaries, Song intellectuals 
attempted to reinterpret the Five Classics in a way that conformed to the new post-Tang 
realities. Most thinkers pointed out that simply understanding the Classics, especially 
through the common method of rote memorization was useless. As I have already noted, 
many demanded a more active and creative approach in which the literatus was expected 
to offer his own creative interpretation of the text. The main shift that took place in this 
period was a move away from pre-Song philological exegesis (xungu xue, 訓詁學) to 
methods of ‘meaning through reason’ (liyi, 理義). As we shall see, the character li (理) 
                                            
650 Gardner, The Four Books, pp. xix-xxi; Gardner “Confucian Commentary,” p. 410. More on the 
Changes in the Song commentarial tradition see W.T. Chan, A Source Book of Chinese 
Philosophy, p. 460-653; T.W. de Bary, Sources of Chinese Tradition, pp. 452-513; A.C. Graham, 
Two Chinese Philosophers: The Metaphysics of the Brothers Ch’eng (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 
1992). 
651 Ibid. 
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although often translated as principle or pattern, as in the case of the Neo-Confucian 
school of Principle, frequently represents the idea of rationality (lixing, 理性) or intellect 
(lizhi, 理智). This is a testimony to a the general conceptual shift from the Tang reliance 
on cultural models to the Song concern with underlying principles and the rational, 
unified foundations of knowledge. In regards to this shift, Peter Bol notes that the new 
Song tendency “to develop strategies that could reveal the hitherto unapparent 
significance of the Classics themselves… undermined the authority of the exegetical 
tradition of the Han through Tang, as it liberated the new generation to read the Classics 
for themselves with the aim of developing their own insights.”652 The new elites that 
dominated the early Song court were clearly signaling to prospective students of the 
tradition that they were expecting groundbreaking readings of the Classics rather than the 
regurgitation of past information. This new environment of intellectual freedom led to the 
gradual reformation of the examination system in which the central portions dedicated to 
memorization were supplemented with essays, written in a more colloquial and less 
ornamental language, and oriented towards the “greater significance” (dayi, 大意) of the 
texts.653 
                                            
652 Bol, Neo-Confucianism in History, p. 62. Similarly, de Bary notes that “The Ch’eng-Chu 
school, which became known as the school of reason or principle (li), since it stressed the 
objective reason or principle in all things as the basis of learning and conduct.” see “Common 
Tendencies in Neo-Confucianism,” p. 39. 
653 Bol, ibid., pp. 48-53. The Ancient style faction (Guwen) was inspired by Han Yu (韓愈) 
especially by his The Original Dao (Yuan Dao, 原道). This strand of thought was later associated 
with Fan Zhongyan, Ouyang Xiu, Hu Yuan, and Su Dongpo. This faction believed that 
understanding the sages meant returning to their forms of literary writing. It was only through this 
style, Han Yu argued, that one could comprehend the way of the sages (聖人之道). Bol translates 
it as ‘ancient-stye prose.’ A.C. Graham uses ‘Ancient-Prose.’ 
  
376 
 The problem Song literati faced was that the classics as they were read with their 
accepted Tang commentaries such as the official Correct Meaning of the Five Classics 
(Wujing Zhengyi, 五經正義), were no longer relevant to the new realities of the eleventh 
century. As in the Jewish case, many Chinese intellectuals started to doubt the ability of 
the Classics to provide solutions to the urgent problems of the day. In addition to new 
approaches towards exegesis, Song intellectuals began to problematize the Classics in 
unprecedented ways. Some, like the reformer Wang Anshi, claimed the Classics were 
after-the-fact compilations; Wang’s reformist school was known for its new 
interpretations of the Book of Poetry (詩經), the Book of Documents (書經), and the 
Zhouli (The Rituals of Zhou, 周禮), which gave this school its name the “New School” 
taken from their motto ‘the new meaning of the Three Classics’ (三經新義). Others went 
further by promoting a trend known as “doubting the Classics” in which China’s central 
corpus was seen as a product of different historical layers.654 Su Xun, Su Shi’s father, 
went as far as claiming that the Yijing (The Book of Changes) “was merely a strategy 
aimed at mystification, a means of getting the populace to think that the order being 
imposed on them was not a political construction but somehow a natural one.”655 Such 
claims demonstrate the exceptional rationalization that was taking over intellectual 
discourse in China. As in the case of Jewish philosophy, we see an audacious 
conventionalization of the most fundamental features of the traditions. In China the 
                                            
654 Works such as Wang Boze’s (王柏撰) Doubting the Songs (時疑), and Doubting the Classics (
書疑) emerged at this period. 
655 Su Xun Jiayou ji (嘉祐集) 6.1a-2b. see ibid., p. 63. 
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Classics were suddenly relativized and put into a rational historical context; intellectuals 
of various faction were denying the “connection between Heaven-and-Earth and the 
society sages created…[and] because the Classics mediated the present’s understanding, 
it was not possible to be sure of anything about antiquity.”656  
 All the different factions were wrestling with the Classics, and it was through the 
traditional channel of commentary that they sought to reinvent their tradition. As part of 
the trend of “doubting the classics” some intellectuals started showing signs of more 
radical approaches arguing that the portions of the Classics that did not conform to the 
principle of rationality (理) and therefore to the true meaning of the sages, did not really 
belong to the Confucian tradition.657 But it was only the Neo-Confucians who went a 
crucial step further by thoroughly revolutionizing China’s classical tradition. Zhu Xi, the 
greatest articulator of Neo-Confucian philosophy “brought the skepticism towards 
ancient Classics to new heights.”658 Instead of confining themselves to reinterpretation, 
Neo-Confucians became the architects of a textual transition to the Four Books, which 
gradually replaced the five Classics as the new encapsulation of the timeless dao.659 As in 
                                            
656 Ibid., pp. 62-3. 
657 James T. C. Liu, Ou-Yang Hsiu, an Eleventh-Century Neo-Confucianist (Stanford, Calif.: 
Stanford University Press, 1967), p. 92. One of Ou Yangxiu’s main arguments was that the Ten 
Wings to the Yijing were not composed by Confucius. See Hou Wailu et. al., Song Ming Lixue 
Shi, p. 7. 
658 Wing-tsit Chan, Chu Hsi and Neo-Confucianism (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 
1986), pp. 3-4. 
659 Cheng Yi, the early leader of this Lixue School made it clear that “traditional literary and 
classical studies were no longer adequate to identify a person as being a Confucian,” certainly an 
assertion that would be unthinkable prior to the Song period. See Tillman, Zhu’s Acendency, p. 6. 
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the case of the Talmud, the Five Classic paradigm was weakened and marginalized by a 
new textual layer that became the foundation for a new revolutionary worldview.660  
  
4.2 The Three-Phase Progression of Neo-Confucianism   
 In the chapter on Kabbalah, I divided the tensions between conservatives and 
progressives into roughly three historical phases: the emergence of philosophy, the 
confrontation between philosophy and conservatives during the Maimonidean 
controversies, and the final stage in which conservatives successfully devise a counter-
attack to philosophy in the form of theurgic Kabbalah. Since in China similar 
synthetic/analytic tensions became manifest in both the political sphere and somewhat 
separately on a more popular religious and philosophical level, a neat periodization is 
harder to establish. Nevertheless, I do believe that, here too, we see a general three-phase 
process. In fact, Carsun Chang was aware of this peculiar dynamic when he argued that 
the historical interaction between Neo-Confucianism and Buddhism was one of a) 
reconciliation, b) appropriation, and c) counter proposal.661  
A short historical comment is important in order to better understand the 
underlying logic of my periodization. In stark opposition to the undisputed supremacy of 
the great Han and Tang dynasties, the Song was frequently defeated and forced to pay 
                                            
660 For more on the reformation of the examination system see David S. Nivison, “Protest against 
Conventions and Conventions of Protest,” in The Confucian Persuasion, pp. 176-201. 
661 Carsun Chang, op. cit., p. 130. 
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tribute to hostile non-Chinese powers, especially the strong Liao and Jin dynasties.662 For 
the first time, China was one among other equals, which represented a shift from a 
traditional unified empire towards a multi-state world, a situation that constantly 
disturbed the more conservative and nationalistic factions in Chinese politics.663 As a 
result of this military weakness the Song court was eventually forced to retreat to the 
south and re-establish its capital at Hangzhou. The Song dynasty is therefore traditionally 
divided into two periods: the Northern Song (960-1127) and the Southern Song (1127-
1279).  
 In order to avoid confusion, I will focus on the two central factions in the Chinese 
story, namely, reformers, initially led by Fan Zhongyan and later more prominently by 
Wang Anshi,664 and conservatives, represented by the Neo-Confucians.665 The three 
phases I will highlight in this story are the following: the first phase is represented by the 
ascendency of the analytic threat in the form of Buddhism. The early anti-Buddhist 
voices of the conservative Tang Confucians Han Yu and Li Ao, were to a great extent a 
failed attempt to bolster confidence in a waning Confucian tradition at a time when 
Buddhism was becoming stronger both as a spiritual paradigm as well as a power within 
                                            
662 Although the Song dynasty was culturally and economically advanced, its shift form Tang 
militarism (武) towards a reliance on men of culture (文) led to its relative weakness vis-a-vis 
bellicose barbarian tribes from the north. 
663 Bol, Neo-Confucianism in History, p. 10. 
664 Although Fan and Wang are usually associated with two different factions, both were 
nevertheless countered by the conservative camp that the Lixue School was associated with. 
665 Politically, Neo-Confucians had a tendency to support the Sima Guang camp, but this support 
was never guaranteed, while philosophically they were substantially more creative. One example 
of philosophical differences was that as opposed to the Lixue School, Sima Guang was not 
committed to the Mencian lineage of transmission. See Benjamin Schwartz, “Some Polarities in 
Confucian Thought,” in Confucianism in Action, p. 57. 
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Chinese politics. This first phase approximately stretching from 800 to 1050 CE was one 
in which Confucians lacked the intellectual resources to battle Buddhism’s attractive 
worldview. Readers are reminded that in the Jewish case the first phase was one in which 
philosophy rapidly gained popularity; Judah Halevi was a solitary anti-rationalist voice 
that came to represent a kind of prototype of later conservative mystics. Both Halevi and 
Chinese conservatives such as Han Yu and Li Ao expressed a strong dissatisfaction with 
new foreign trends in their respective intellectual environments but nevertheless lacked 
the speculative tools to confront the sophistication of Greek philosophy and Buddhism. 
Both traditions needed time to gradually devise a mature counter attack to the analytic 
trends in their respective environments.  
 The Second phase ran between 1050 to the end of the Northern Song in 1127. 
This period represents the rise of factionalism with Fan Zhongyan’s early reforms and the 
emergence of a more acute confrontation between progressive political trends and the 
conservative Neo-Confucians. In this stage we witness the continued consolidation of 
Buddhism’s position together with the rise of Wang Anshi’s New Policies; the most 
ambitious attempt at restructuring the Chinese bureaucratic and social system for over a 
millennium. In other words, the intensification of rational/analytic trends became 
apparent both in the form of Buddhism as well as in the form of factions that advocated 
radical reform to the traditional Confucian system. Two points are worth mentioning with 
respect to this period. The first is that the progressive Wang Anshi camp represented the 
increasing rationalization of the bureaucratic system; it was this faction that advocated 
specialization and the abandonment of the traditionally admired well-rounded generalist. 
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C.K. Yang argues that this led to an acute conflict between a tendency towards 
rationalization and specialization on the one hand, and the Chinese traditional reliance on 
social norms based on consensus and ritual on the other.666 Wang’s New Policies relied 
on bureaucratic machinery to achieve social goals, a tendency that was strongly opposed 
by conservatives who associated such practices with the tragic Legalist experience of the 
infamous Qin dynasty (221-207 BCE). Edwin Pulleyblank claims that the re-emergence 
of legalistic trends during the Song disclosed a cold and methodical rationalism, while 
Benjamin Schwartz notes that Wang Anshi’s progressive rationalism “was not the 
Confucian “ordering of society” but rather the Legalist goal of “wealth and power”.”667 
As Schwartz demonstrates, the Wang faction was reminiscent of the rationalism of Xunzi 
(312–230 BCE) and his students Li Si and Han Feizi who placed “a high valuation on the 
coercive force of penal law as supplement to li [ritual] in achieving social order and 
harmony.”668 In discussing the first indications of an escalating rationalism during the 
                                            
666 C.K Yang “Some Characteristics of Chiese Bureaucratic Behavior,” in Confucianism in 
Action, pp. 136-7; 163. 
667 Edwin G. pulleyblank “Neo-Confucianism and Neo-Legalism in T’ang Intellectual life, 755-
805,” in The Confucian Persuasion (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1960), pp. 77-114. 
A notable difference between classical and even Tang legalism and the legalist influences on 
Wang Anshi are that the latter did not seem to share classical legalism’s distaste for the merchant 
class and commercial activity. Benjamin Schwartz “Some Polarities in Confucian Thought,” p. 
54. 
668 Schwartz, op. cit., p. 56. Neo-Confucians chose Mencius over Xunzi as the orthodox 
transmitter of the dao. Xunzi’s rational stance was therefore expelled from the official Neo-
Confucian lineage of transmission. In addition to ritual Xunzi stressed penal law and government 
as supplements to control while Mencius, in line with Neo-Confucianism, focused on one’s inner 
resources and moral value. Much like Wang’s faction, the Legalists “offered themselves as 
experts in the arts of enriching and strengthening the state. They strove to create a “rationalized” 
military and state machine…” Schwartz claims that “Wang was clearly a Legalist; his insistence 
on new laws and institutions put him on the outer side of the outer realm. ⁠” In stark opposition to 
the stress on the specialized bureaucrat and the refinement of political control, the Lixue School 
“opposed further tendencies towards bureaucratization in the form of new laws, institutional 
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Tang dynasty, Pulleyblank notes that these trends culminated in the reform movement of 
the Northern Sung, best represented by the Wang Anshi camp and its New Policies.669 
The progressives endorsed dramatic change, greater equality, and the growing power of 
the new middle class. They advocated a radical restructuring of traditional models, 
greater specialization, and the promotion of external formal law as a corrective to the 
over-reliance on traditional social conventions. Therefore, the tensions between Wang 
Anshi’s ideology and the Neo-Confucian camp can be seen as a conflict between a 
progressive rationalism that was very much in tune with the analytic mindset, and a 
conservative traditionalism reflective of the synthetic worldview. 
 The anti-conservatisms of the Wang Anshi camp was also expressed in its 
sympathetic, or at the very least, lack of antagonism towards Buddhism. Wang’s faction 
did not see Buddhism as a pressing threat; instead, many of its members advocated a 
form of syncretism with strong Buddhist undertones. This must have been very disturbing 
for conservative Neo-Confucians who saw the foreign Buddhist tradition as a major 
danger to the Chinese way of life. It can be said that while progressive factions 
downplayed the alien origins of Buddhism, conservatives, especially the Neo-Confucian 
school of Principle, were adamant in drawing a clear line between the Chinese and Indian 
                                                                                                                                  
reform, and further intervention of the state in the economy, positively, they did their utmost to 
increase the influence of self-cultivation as a force in government. In their view of self-
cultivation, they tended to emphasize the resources of the inner realm.” Ibid., p. 57. 
669 History shows that these nationalistic sentiments were not misplaced; throughout the Northern 
Song the Liao managed to annex substantial parts of northern China, or what came to be known 
as the lost sixteen prefectures. When the Chinese made an alliance with the Jin to win back the 
lost prefectures, the Jin ended up turning against the Song, which led to the tragic fall of the 
dynasty in the north and its subsequent humiliating retreat to the south. Pullyblank, op, cit., p. 
114. 
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worldviews. This xenophobic position was echoed politically as well; one of the most 
apparent characteristics of Neo-Confucian ideology was its hawkish position towards 
foreign powers in the north.670 Wang and his followers were blamed for the dynasty’s 
weakness, humiliating surrender to the Jin Dynasty, and the retreat to the south. The 
second phase between 1050-1127 therefore represents the coming together of several 
features that led to the intensification of analytic trends in China: Buddhism became a 
major cultural force at the same time that Wang’s progressive camp was promoting an 
unprecedented form of political rationalism together with a relative tolerance towards 
Buddhism, and a weak and pacifying policy towards foreign encroachment. The tragic 
fall of the Northern Song represented the decisive termination of the progressive camp 
and the ascendency of conservative politics during the Southern Song period.  
 The second point to stress during the second phase was that during the northern 
Song we witness the gradual emergence of a conservative reaction to the progressive and 
rational tendencies of the age. While progressives were forcefully promoting Wang’s 
New Policies, the five Neo-Confucian philosophers of the Northern Song were diligently 
laying the foundations for a mature and systematic Neo-Confucian paradigm.671 This is a 
phase in which Confucian thinkers, all of whom were very familiar with Buddhism, were 
beginning to articulate a more mature counter-attack to Buddhist thought. Therefore the 
second phase is one in which all the threats with which Neo-Confucians were concerned 
gained the upper hand; Chan Buddhism was threatening to conquer both the hearts of the 
                                            
670 The Liao (907-1119) were Mongolian Khitan people. The Jin were Jurchen people (1115-
1234) the predecessors of the Manchus who established the Qing Dynasty in 1644. 
671 The five Northern Song philosophers are Zhou Dunyi, Zhang Zai, Shao Yong, Cheng Hao and 
Cheng Yi. 
  
384 
people as well as the hearts of emperors and many Confucian literati. The radical reforms 
of Wang Anshi were threatening to replace traditional Confucian conventions with a 
more specialized and rational bureaucratic system. And barbarian dynasties were 
humiliating China on the battlefield. The second phase, as in the Jewish case, represents 
the climax of analytic tendencies together with the gradual ascendency of a more mature 
conservative position that countered the exaggerated universalism of Buddhism and 
political reforms.     
 The third phase was during the Southern Song from 1127 to death of the towering 
Neo-Confucian Zhuxi (朱熹) in 1200. Zhu Xi was the leader and final articulator of the 
school of Principle; he successfully systemized the thought of the Northern Song 
philosophers into a coherent worldview that outstripped all other contending political 
factions, including Buddhism in the sphere of religion. As in Kabbalah’s reaction to 
philosophy, this phase is one in which Neo-Confucians offer a well articulated and 
mature counter attack to the analytic worldview. The third phase is therefore one in 
which confidence in an updated conservatism reached fruition. Zhuxi himself claimed 
that “as for Buddhist doctrines, it is all the more necessary to be cautious at all times. 
[But] after we have come to our own and gained self-confidence, they cannot confuse us 
anymore.”672 In stark contrast to the initial phase in which Han Yu deplored the loss of 
faith in Confucianism and the turn of literati to the foreign Buddhism, in the third phase, 
attacks against Buddhism became systematic and increased in quantity. Zhuxi represents 
                                            
672 Reflections on Things as Hand, book 13 passage 5 [My translation] based on Chan: 釋氏之學, 
更不消言常戒, 到自家自信候, 便不能亂德. Chan trans., pp. 283-4. 
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the culmination and completion of the Neo-Confucian project and its reaction to the 
threats of Buddhism. Like Averroes, Maimonides, and Aquinas, he was behind the 
important medieval project of integrating analytic thought into systems that were based 
on a predominantly synthetic worldview.       
 In conclusion, the three-phase progression I am proposing is as follows; the first 
phase between 800-1050, represents the beginning of a period of crisis when 
Confucianism lacked the resources to confront the ascendency of Buddhism. The second 
phase, between 1050-1127, saw an acute cultural crisis, the proliferation of contending 
ideologies, the escalation of progressive and rationally inclined political factions, and the 
beginning of the articulation of Neo-Confucian philosophy in light of Buddhist ideas. 
Finally, in the third phase during the Southern Song, from 1127 to Zhu Xi death in 1200, 
we see the counter-attack of a mature Neo-Confucian philosophy that consolidates itself 
as a new orthodoxy that outstripped progressive factions politically, and Buddhism 
spiritually.    
 
4.3 THE NEO-CONFUCIAN SCHOOL OF PRINCIPLE (LI XUE) 
 From a comparative perspective, it is important to stress the direct relationship 
between the emergence of Neo-Confucianism and the Buddhist challenge, and the similar 
connection between the rise of Kabbalah and Greek philosophy. Keeneth Ch’en notes 
that “the Neo-Confucian system would be incomprehensible to one not familiar with the 
prevailing Buddhist ideas of the age,” while Carsun Chang notes that “the twin motives 
of a return to Confucianism and the struggle against Buddhism spurred the founders of 
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Neo-Confucianism to build a philosophical system which was, in a sense a counter-
argument against the Buddhist doctrines”673 Such statements could easily apply to the 
relationship between medieval Jewish mysticism and philosophy. Scholars agree that the 
Neo-Confucian and Kabbalistic reactions to analytic philosophical systems took the form 
of appropriation, in which Confucianism and Judaism absorbed Buddhist and Greek ideas 
respectively. Neo-Confucianism and Kabbalah were ultimately oriented towards 
equipping the synthetic Chinese and Jewish worldviews with analytic tools that were 
crucial for preserving their relevance in a rapidly changing world. It is perhaps for this 
reason that the characterization these “defense theologies” by scholars often sounds 
strikingly similar. Xiang Shilin notes that the Neo-Confucian school of Principle (lixue) 
was predominantly a “philosophization of Confucianism” (理學是哲學化的儒學). This 
echoes Gershom Scholem’s claim that the confrontation between medieval philosophy 
and mysticism led to the “philosophization of Kabbalah.”674  
Conservative Neo-Confucians attacked those who preferred different forms of 
syncretism between Confucianism and Buddhism.675 They were especially opposed to 
                                            
673 Kenneth Ch’en, Buddhism in China, p. 471; Carsun Chang, Neo-Confucian Thought, p. 43. 
Dieter Kuhn claims that the main goal of Neo-Confucianism was the reestablishment of the 
superiority of Confucianism over Buddhism and Daoism, while in the process it absorbed many 
of their influences.” The Age of Confucian Rule, p. 99. For more on the direct reaction of Neo-
Confucianism to Buddhism see Halperin, Out of the Cloister, p. 7; Xiang Shiling, In between 
Principle, Qi, Nature, and the Mind. p. 7; Yao Xinzhong, Introduction to Confucianism, p. 97. 
674 Hou Wailu et. al., Song Ming Lixue Shi, p. 27; David Biale, Gershom Scholem: Kabbalah and 
Counter-History (Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press, 1979), p. 49. Also see 
Casung chang, Development of Neo-Confucian Thought, p. 28. 
675 Intellectuals such as Liu Tongyuan and Liu Yuxi called to “harmonize Confucianism and 
Buddhism” (統合儒佛), while similar calls from Buddhists such as master Qisong (契崧) 
advocated treating “Confucianism and Buddhism as one thread” (儒釋一貫), see Wang Xinzhu, 
Lixue yu Fo Jiao, p. 27. 
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Confucian intellectuals, such as the influential literatus Huang Tingjian (黄庭坚, 1045-
1105) who continuously stressed the merits of Buddhism and advocated a policy of 
accommodation rather than confrontation.676 Other central Confucian intellectuals such as 
Su Shi and Wang Anshi were fond of Buddhism to different degrees, and generally failed 
to address its rising position in Chinese culture. Not so with the lixue thinkers, whose 
solution to the Buddhist conquest was confrontation through appropriation and synthesis; 
as Carsun Chang notes, the Neo-Confucian project “was not a cross-breeding with 
Buddhism but rather a declaration of independence form it.”677 Much like conservative 
Kabbalists who were familiar with Greek philosophical ideas, most conservative Neo-
Confucians went through a Buddhist phase before they returned to passionately defend 
their native traditions.678 In both the Jewish and Chinese contexts we see that it is 
precisely those thinker who were familiar with the challenging systems of philosophy and 
Buddhism, who became instrumental in articulating a native counter-attack to the 
analytical paradigm. Here I want to focus on the Neo-Confucian School of Principle as an 
outcome of direct reaction to the Buddhist system.  
                                            
676 Also see Edwin G Pulleyblank, “Neo-Confucianism and Neo-Legalism in T’ang Intellectual 
life,” where a Confucian Literati praises the Tiantai Buddhist Liang Su and one of the forerunners 
of the Guwen movement: “who but this man could move great Confucians?” Pulleyblank uses 
this as an illustration of how little conflict was felt between Confucianism and Buddhism prior to 
Han Yu’s “intransigent attitude.” p. 95. 
677 Carsun Chang, op. cit., p. 43 
678 Even the staunchest critics of Buddhism such as Han Yu forged very close relationships with 
prominent Buddhist monks. See Judith Berling claims that Confucian intellectuals publicly 
attacked Buddhists but privately admired many of their teachings. Indeed, almost all of the most 
prominent Neo-Confucians were well versed in Buddhism and were very much aware of its 
intellectual allure and cultural merits. The Syncretic Religion, p. 31; 133. 
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 A few historical details are necessary in order to understand Song Neo-
Confucianism in a broader context. During the Han dynasty (206BCE - 220CE) when 
Confucianism was declared as state orthodoxy under the influence of the famous official 
Dong Zhongshu (董仲舒, 179-104 BCE), we witness a successful integration of 
Confucius’ political and social philosophy with Yin Yang and Five Element cosmology. 
Inspired by Dong’s commentary on the Spring and Autumn Classic (Chun-Qiu Fanlu, 春
秋繁露), Han dynasty Confucianism provided a coherent and comprehensive worldview 
that established a crucial link between the mundane and trans-mundane spheres such that 
political and social activities resonated with transcendent realities.679 It provided 
Confucianism with a crucial metaphysical legitimacy that managed to persevere for the 
four centuries of Han rule. By the end of the Han, however, this model fell from grace 
followed by a period of disunity and social chaos of over three centuries, known as the 
Wei-Jin Period ( 222–589, 魏晉南北朝).680 It was during this period, when Confucianism 
was pushed to the background, that Buddhism and Daoism went through one of their 
most creative phases. Although Confucianism reemerged as state orthodoxy during the 
Tang period, it failed to support itself with a convincing and updated metaphysical 
underpinning. It fell into a dogmatic slumber at the same time that Buddhism was making 
inroads into every possible enclave of Chinese society.  
                                            
679 Dong Zhongshu’s commentary is usually referred to as the Luxuriant Dew of the Spring and 
Autumn Annals. Dong helped further develop what A.C Graham called a ‘correlative philosophy.’ 
Beyond the cosmologization of Confucianism the new Han ideology perceived Confucius in 
spiritual terms as China’s greatest sage king, rather than a mere teacher or transmitter of culture (
文). This is another indication of the normative and religious undertones of the Han model. 
680 More accurately, the “Wei-Jin Southern and Northern Dynasties Period,” sometimes referred 
to as the Six Dynasties Period. 
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 Among the contending factions during the early Song, it was the School of 
Principle that stressed the urgency of establishing a relevant metaphysical foundation for 
the Confucian tradition. It is for this reason that Neo-Confucianism saw countering 
Buddhism as such a pressing task. They also understood that the construction of a new 
cosmological foundation went hand in hand with providing individuals with private 
channels for spiritual cultivation. One of the greatest achievements of the conservative 
school of Principles was its ability to re-equip Confucianism with the cosmological and 
spiritual foundation it lacked since the Han dynasty. The painstaking work of lixue 
thinkers provided a viable alternative to the new needs of a population that was 
increasingly attracted to Buddhism. The Neo-Confucian project successfully integrated 
the individual, social, political and metaphysical aspects of reality into a unified and 
comprehensive native ideology. This synthesis integrated the powerful tools of the Indian 
analytic worldview with local synthetic sensibilities thereby offering an alternative to the 
attractive Buddhist model. Consequently, Buddhism gradually lost its vigor while Neo-
Confucianism came to dominate the Chinese religio-philosophical landscape until the 
modern age. In the following pages I will look as how the school of Principle managed to 
accomplish this successful synthesis, and most importantly, how lixue thinkers 
successfully outstripped other contending Confucian schools in their highly polemical 
intellectual landscape.   
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4.3.1 The Four Books    
 In discussing the decline of the Five Classics, I showed that early Song thinkers 
began doubting their traditional canon. However, in spite of doubts regarding the 
normative status of the Five Classics, this period was characterized by a clear 
intensification of commentarial activity and a simultaneous move from philology towards 
a more probing examination of the meaning of the texts. As Gardner notes, the increase 
in commentarial activity “arises often in the Confucian tradition as a response to the 
presence of cultural or religious tension and discontinuity.”681 Being aware of the striking 
similarities between the Confucian and Rabbinic commentarial traditions, Gardner claims 
that just like Confucian commentary reacts to “cultural and intellectual pressures that 
must be addressed… Midrash comes into play as a way of resolving crisis and 
reaffirming the traditions of the past.”682 As Gardner states, in both traditions the strong 
reliance of commentary meant that thinkers resorted to commentarial reinterpretation as a 
means for dealing with changing environments and cultural pressures. In Judaism, this 
intensification was apparent in the multiple commentaries written on Sefer Yetzirah 
(Book of Creation) as well as the publication of the Zohar, which was formatted as a 
Midrashic commentary on the Torah. Both traditions focused on interlinear commentary, 
                                            
681 Gardner, “Confucian Commentary,” p. 411. 
682 Gardner quotes Barry Holtz’ “Midrash” in Back to the Sources: Reading the Classic Jewish 
Texts, Barry W. Holtz ed., (New York: Summit Books, 1984). In Gardner ibid., pp. 411-412. 
Ithamar Gruenwald argues that "A scriptural text calls for interpretive attention when it appears to 
have lost its significative function among a certain group of people. From this perspective 
interpretive attention helps to regain its meaning, relevance, and applicability. Such moments are 
indicative of historical or intellectual crisis; and so contend, interpretation not only helps resolve 
such crises but enables the scriptural text to maintain its meaningfulness until the next cognitive 
break." Gruenwald “Midrashic Hermeneutics: Some Conceptual and Comparative 
considerations,” in Michael Fishbane ed., The Midrashic Imagination: Jewish Exegesis, Thought, 
and History (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), p. 14. 
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a literary genre “that gives interpretive elasticity… permitting the tradition to reshape 
itself in response to changing times and audiences, to meet the intellectual and cultural 
challenges it confronts.”683 
 But by the Song period, even such creative commentaries were no longer 
sufficient. As in the Talmudic case towards the tenth century, the Five Classics seemed to 
lack the internal resources for articulating a potent alternative to the spiritual and social 
yearnings of a population that was increasingly finding answers in Buddhism.684 As part 
of this grand reappraisal of the classical tradition Confucians started searching beyond the 
Five Classics; the natural place to begin was in the wider corpus known as the Thirteen 
Classics (shisan jing, 十三經).685 Through a long process of selection that can be traced 
back to Tang Confucians, a new group of texts came to the fore. By the time of the great 
synthesizer Zhu Xi during the Southern Song, these texts were printed together and 
known as the Four Books (四書).686 The Analects (論語), The Mencius (孟子), The Great 
Learning (Daxue, 大學), and The Doctrine of the Mean (Zhong Yong, 中庸) were singled 
out as the new classical corpus of the Chinese tradition and were expected to be mastered 
                                            
683 Gardner, “Confucian Commentary,” p. 416. 
684 Gardner, Four Books, p. xxi. As Gardner notes this was especially the case with the Chan sect 
that attracted many literati who were supposed to be the defenders of Confucianism. 
685 The Thirteen Classics consisted of the Five Classics including the further division of the 
Classic of Ritual into three parts (the Liji, Zhouli (周禮), and Yili (儀禮)), the three commentaries 
on the Spring and Autumn Annals (the Zuo Zhuan (左傳), the Gongyang (公羊傳), and Guiliang (
穀梁傳), the Analects of Confucius, the Mencius, the Xiaojing (Classic of Fliial Piety - 孝經), 
and the Erya (Dictionary for ancient characters － 爾雅). 
686 Sometimes referred to as the Four Masters (四子書). 
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before the traditional Five Classics.687 In 1315 the Yuan dynasty institutionalized them as 
the central learning material for the imperial exams, a trend that continued until the fall of 
the imperial order in the early twentieth century.  
 The prioritization of the Four Books over the Five Classics represents a thorough 
reorientation of Chinese thought. While non-dramatic changes could have been dealt with 
through commentary, the new realities of the Song required a bold step towards a 
reappraisal of the literary corpus. As opposed to the contingent status of historical 
analysis advocated by Sima Guang or the new commentaries on the Classics proposed by 
Wang Anshi, lixue thinkers offered a radically innovative ontology to support their new 
views. Like Buddhists, they presented their ideas in the form of the “really real” or the 
“things in themselves.” The new informational locus of the Confucian tradition was now 
the Four Books, which constituted a coherent religio-philosophical system. Most 
importantly, these books were accompanied by Zhu Xi’s meticulous interlinear 
commentary, which interpreted them in light of Neo-Confucian philosophy. From a 
comparative perspective, the point to stress here is that in both the Chinese and Jewish 
traditions we see a cultural crisis in which the central textual corpus of the tradition is 
found to be unsatisfactory for a new age. In both cases, old classics are not jettisoned but 
rather supplemented by a new corpus that is presented as the true meaning of the sages. 
According to both groups, these new texts penetrated deeper metaphysical layers of 
reality that were not made explicit in the older texts. As I have shown earlier, medieval 
mystics were never reluctant to stress that rather than the Talmud, it was the Kabbalistic 
                                            
687 The Great Learning and the Doctrine of the Mean were originally two chapters in the Classic 
of Ritual (Book of Rites). 
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interpretation of the Bible that gave access to the deepest truths of Judaism. Neo-
Confucians similarly argued that the Four Books contained the true and more profound 
meaning that the sages sought to transmit.  
 The decline of the Five Classics meant that the whole Chinese pedagogical system 
was transformed as well. All contending factions in the early Song period were arduously 
seeking for inventive ways to reform the examination system, but it was only the Neo-
Confucians, much like the Kabbalists with the Zohar, who managed to supply the 
tradition with a new textual body that successfully synthesized traditional concerns with 
features that derived from the analytic mode of operation. In doing so, both Neo-
Confucians and Kabbalists had to somehow legitimize the radical and abrupt changes 
they introduced into their respective traditions. Both groups labored to prove the 
authenticity of their new textual orientations: the Zohar was attributed to the great second 
century Tannaic figure Shimon Bar-Yohai, while the Four Books were attributed to 
Confucius and his students.688 As mentioned, Neo-Confucians also followed Chan 
Buddhists in creating their orthodox lineage of transmission (daotong, 道統) which 
established the wisdom of the Four Books as originating with the great sages of the 
Shang and Xia, and transmitted to the Duke of Zhou, Confucius, Mencius, and finally the 
Neo-Confucians themselves. I will say more about the specific contents of the Four 
Books later; in this section it was important for me to stress that Neo-Confucianism and 
Kabbalah do not represent mere change but rather the rise of a new paradigm that 
                                            
688 The Great Learning was traditionally attributed to Confucius’ most influential disciple Zengzi, 
while The Doctrine of the Mean was attributed to Confucius’ grandson Zisi. This version of the 
authorship of the Four Books was promoted by Zhu Xi but has been frequently questioned by 
later Chinese intellectuals. 
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necessitated the construction of a brand new textual orientation on which a 
groundbreaking worldview could be established. As in the case of all sacred religious 
texts, the Four Books functioned as an informational kernel from which a complex and 
coherent worldview regarding metaphysical realities, ethics, self-cultivation, and 
education radiated. Together with the official commentaries that supplemented them, the 
Four Books were an encapsulation of the new lixue philosophy, oriented towards all the 
themes that were relatively scarce in classical Confucianism. This was especially clear in 
their focus on a more metaphysical worldview and a greater concern with self-
cultivation.689 As for their structure and language, one of the most obvious characteristics 
of the Four Books was their accessibility and clarity.    
 
4.4 THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF KNOWLEDGE  
 I showed earlier that medieval Jewish thinkers consciously tried to make religious 
discourse more accessible to ordinary people. This was one of the central goals of 
Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah and it was certainly the case in the unprecedented 
dissemination of accessible Kabbalistic manuals in late thirteenth-century Castile. I have 
shown that the new types of theologies that emerged in Judaism were ones that 
downplayed the role of the Talmudic institution with its complex and inaccessible 
methodologies and time consuming training, in favor of systems that could be grasped as 
a coherent unity that was relevant to the needs of a more sophisticated population, 
especially individuals who were not affiliated with any official institution. In other words, 
                                            
689 Julia Ching, Chinese Religions, p. 158. 
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medieval philosophers and mystics started a new page, so to speak, from which the 
ordinary believer could embark. These systems, in spite of their speculative 
sophistication, were more accessible to the participation of an educated audience that had 
very little prospects, and perhaps little interest, in establishing itself in Talmudic studies. I 
also discussed the new forms of transmission that became prevalent in this period 
enabling broader dissemination; this was especially apparent in the shift from 
conservative oral transmission to more easily transportable and concise written 
formats.690 Technologically, the use of paper became more pervasive and much cheaper 
than the earlier parchment. These new conditions facilitated an unprecedentedly broad 
and pluralistic participation in religious discourse.691 Although the Neo-Confucian story 
is substantially different, a very similar dynamic is nevertheless apparent. Both Kabbalah 
and Neo-Confucianism attracted members by presenting coherent and attractive systems 
that offered people an accessible and unified theory of reality. Most importantly, these 
systems democratized knowledge such that their target audiences were not expected to be 
part of the orthodox establishment.  
 In the case of Neo-Confucians the move towards the democratization of 
knowledge could not be more apparent. The most dramatic event with respect to this 
                                            
690 As in the shift from oral transmission among the circle of the Rabad, or Nahmanides’ 
conservative mystical allusions in his commentary to the Torah, to written transmission in 
Castile. 
691 Once Kabbalah managed to popularize itself on a broad scale it “returned” to the restricted and 
highly opaque discourse of the Zohar while Jewish philosophy slowly left the scene, or more 
accurately, was assimilated into the speculative theology of Kabbalah. Isaiah Tishby shows that 
there was a constant oscillation between mystically inclined and philosophically inclined thinkers 
among Kabbalists. See Tishby, “Berur Netivei Ha-Hagshama ve Ha-Hafshta Ba-Kabbalah,” in 
Netivei Ha-Emuna U-Minut: Masot U-Meh ̣k ̣arim be-Sifrut Ha-K ̣abalah Ve-Hashabtaʼut 
(Jerusalem: Magnes, 1964). 
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growing accessibility of information was first and foremost the shift from the Five 
Classics to the Four Books. According to Zhu Xi, the Four Books were characterized by 
“ease, immediacy, and brevity” that ensured the essential teachings of the Neo-Confucian 
traditions would reach the widest audience possible.”692 Gardner argues that “to restore 
the Way (dao 道)— socially, politically, and intellectually—the Way had to be made 
accessible… the original Five Classics were too lengthy, linguistically archaic and 
challenging, and, in places, almost incomprehensible. Over and over again in writings 
and in conversations, Zhu Xi encourages students to begin their study of the Way with 
the Four Books…”693 Not only were the Four Books short, clear, and accessible, they 
were also traditionally printed with Zhu Xi’s “user-friendly” interlinear commentary that 
further helped students understand the meaning of the texts. Of special relevance is that 
the style in which people were writing during the Song dynasty, including Zhu Xi, was 
much more accessible than the language of the Five Classics. Today it is customary to 
differentiate between the archaic and complex ‘classical’ Chinese and the more 
accessible ‘literary’ Chinese of the Song. In his overview of the evolution of written 
Chinese, A.C Graham specifically highlights Chan Buddhists and Neo-Confucians as a 
new phase in which information was communicated in a highly colloquial form.694 
Coupling these schools together is not a coincidence; as scholars have pointed out, the 
new accessibility of Neo-Confucian works was to a great extent modeled upon the new 
                                            
692 Zhuzi Yulei (朱子語類, The Conversations of Master Zhu Arranged Topically) Li Jingde (黎靖
德) ed. (Neijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1986), Ch. 14 p. 249. See also Daniel Gardner, The Four 
Books, p. xxiv. 
693 Gardner, Four Books p. xxiv; Bol, Neo-Confucianism in History, p. 8. 
694 Graham, Disputers, p. 390. 
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and highly popular literary genres of the Chan school. Halperin and Gardner claim that 
Neo-Confucians were influenced by Chan Buddhism’s Lamp Histories (denglu, 燈錄) 
and Recorded Conversations (yulu, 語錄); the former was used by Chanists to establish 
their lineages of patriarchal succession which were later emulated by Neo-Confucians, 
while the latter genre, the Recorded Conversations, was the origin of important Neo-
Confucian texts such as the Recorded Conversations of the Cheng Brothers (Er Cheng 
Yulu, 二程語錄). Instead of archaic classical language, scholasticism, and commentary, 
Chanists and later Neo-Confucian works, focused on an accessible pedagogy, lectures, 
and stories in a semi-vernacular language that presented information directly to the 
individual without assuming a direct contact with a master or a prior understanding of the 
classical tradition.695 So clear and accessible were these new genres that the Song literatus 
Huang Tingjian was worried lest individuals reach enlightenment without the supervision 
of a teacher.696 According to Gardner, the new accessibility of Chan literature “played a 
major role in how Sung literati learned about the [Chan] religion.” Neo-Confucians came 
to appreciate the instrumentality and efficiency of Chan methodologies and went on to 
emulate these literary formats in their own writings. As opposed to the Tang dynasty, 
these new formats “had a wider and more popular audience in mind.”697 The abundance 
of these accessible Chan genres “permitted Sung clergy to create a new discursive space, 
releasing them in part from the weight of scriptures and commentaries inherited from the 
                                            
695 Halperin, Out of the Cloister, pp. 10-11. Fung Youlan contends that the conversations of the 
Chanists were recorded for those who didn’t have a direct master, a custom that was later taken 
up by Neo-Confucians. Short History, p. 257. 
696 Halperin, ibid., p. 11. 
697 Ibid., p. 11-12. 
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past…[they] presented Buddhism in a novel way and could well have prompted the laity 
to approach Buddhism from new perspectives.”698 This characterization of Chanism could 
not be more appropriate in describing the essence of the Neo-Confucian project, which 
offered initiates an unprecedentedly accessible platform to enter the tradition while 
avoiding the informational burden of the old Classics.  
Meng Peiyuan notes that Neo-Confucianism reflects an unprecedented 
rationalization and popularization of what he calls literati religion (人文宗教), stressing 
the new spiritualistic tendencies of Confucianism.699 Beyond the borrowing of literary 
genres it has also been convincingly argued that the famous Neo-Confucian academies (
書院) were themselves modeled upon Buddhist monasteries that specialized in preparing 
monks for the Confucian examination system.700 Linda Watson shows clear parallels 
between the institutions both in physical architecture as well an in religious and social 
function. She also claims that there was a clear “element of competition between the 
Buddhist community and the supporters of the academies for both material and human 
resources as well as territorial claims.”701 More importantly, Watson notes that the 
popularity of Buddhist institutions “created the perception of need for a Confucian—and 
distinctly elite—counterpart, the academy, which contributed both to the construction of 
                                            
698 Ibid. [my brackets] 
699 Meng Peiyuan, Zhuxi Zhexue Shilun (Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin Daxue chuban shi, 2010), p. 
101. 
700 John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman, China: A New History, p. 79. See more on striking 
similarities between academies and monasteries in Linda Walton, Academies and Society in 
Southern Sung China (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1999), pp. 15-16; Griffith Flouk 
“Myth, Ritual, and Monastic Practices in Sung Ch’an Buddhism”; Peter N. Gregory. Religion and 
Society in T’ang and Sung China (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1993); Denis Twitchett 
“The Fan Clan’s Charitable Estate, 1050-1760.”  
701 Linda Walton, Academies and Society, p. 17. 
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a new social and cultural identity for the shih [literati] and to the “transformation through 
education” (chiao-hua) of local society.”702 Finally, the Neo-Confucian academies that 
emerged all over China functioned as a network of local institutions that facilitated the 
efficient transmission of information among those who were distant from centers of 
power. 
 Beyond the language used and the clarity of the newly selected textual nexus of 
Neo-Confucianism, lixue thinkers authored introductory works to the Four Books, the 
most famous of which was the Jin Si Lu (Reflections on Things at Hand, 進思路), co-
authored by Zhu Xi and Lu Zuqian (1137–81). This influential work introduced the most 
central ideas of Neo-Confucian thought selected from the philosophies of the four early 
masters of the Northern Song that preceded Zhu Xi.703 The highly popular Jin Si Lu 
functioned as a gateway to Neo-Confucian philosophy and was successful in luring in 
some of its most gifted thinkers. The important Neo-Confucian Chen Chun (陳淳, 1153-
1217), author of the famous Beixi Ziyi (Neo-Confucian Terms Explained, 北溪字義) 
became a passionate advocate of Neo-Confucianism after reading the Jin Si Lu. This is 
only one famous example of how the new literary accessibility of Song works attracted 
young intellectuals to Neo-Confucianism. Chen Chun’s Beixi Ziyi, being a glossary or 
basic Neo-Confucian terms, was itself an example of how Song intellectuals sought to 
make their philosophy more accessible to a rapidly growing pool of educated people.  
                                            
702 Ibid. [my square brackets]. 
703 These were, Zhou Dunyi, Zhang Zai, Cheng Yi and Cheng Hao. There were five masters of the 
Northern Song but Zhu Xi did not include Shao Yong in the Reflections since he found his 
thought was too Daoist.  
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 Technological advancements were another important factor in the growing 
accessibility of information. In spite of continuous complaints by thinkers such as Su Shi 
and Zhu Xi regarding the negative consequences of mass printing, it is clear that printing 
technology was one of the major factors behind the meteoric dissemination of Neo-
Confucian thought.704 As Bol notes “Neo-Confucianism was spreading at precisely the 
moment when commercial printing was becoming common, and many counties had a 
printer or two, thus ensuring that more texts were put into circulation and more 
survived…private wealth was increasing, making it possible for Neo-Confucians to raise 
the money necessary to print their books… ”705 Dieter Kuhn, draws a parallel between 
advancements in printing technology during the Song and the appearance of the personal 
computer in the twentieth century; in both cases, he argues, we see complete revolutions 
in the way people conceive of information, its availability, and channels for its 
dissemination.706  
 This section has provided a general background of the political, social, and 
economic conditions that gave rise to the Neo-Confucian School of Principle (lixue). In 
spite of many differences with the story of Kabbalah, we can detect general processes 
that are common to both the Jewish and Chinese experiences. In both contexts, we see the 
                                            
704 Kuhn, op. cit., p. 42. Both Zhu Xi and Su Shi were concerned that the quality of scholarship 
will be compromised as a result of the growing accessibility of printed texts. Bol, Neo-
Confucianism in History, pp. 39-41. 
705 Bol, This Culture of Ours, pp. 39-40. Neo-Confucianism in History, pp. 2-3. See also Kuhn, 
The Age of Confucian Rule, pp. 3-4; 41. Interestingly, Buddhists began to use advanced printing 
techniques close to two centuries before they became prevalent among Confucian circles. I think 
this is related to the interest in disseminating information among analytic traditions. 
706 Kuhn.op. cit., p. 43. Both Kuhn and Bol agree that printing became the main channel of 
communication among Confucian circles during the Song. 
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growing influence of analytic systems that were exerting pressures on the native Neo-
Confucian and Rabbinic paradigms. Such analytic worldviews found a fertile ground 
during a period of unprecedented literacy, individualistic thinking, technological 
advancement, and economic prosperity among a new dynamic middle class. In both cases 
we see that analytic pressures were countered by conservative schools of thought that 
sought to protect their native traditions. In both cases, these adaptations necessitated a 
profound reorientation of a traditions’ textual orientation reflected by the abrupt rise of a 
new textual corpus that claimed to contain the authentic meaning of the tradition. In both 
cases, the people behind these revolutions belonged to a second elite of dynamic and well 
educated conservative intellectuals that were destined to replace the old elites that 
preceded them. In the following three sections I will show how Neo-Confucians went 
through a similar process to that of Kabbalists. Both managed to successfully synthesize 
cognitive, social, and cultural elements from the synthetic mode of operation with 
analytical features that originated in the Indo-European traditions they were challenged 
by.  
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4.5 THE COGNITIVE LEVEL 
 
In the following sections, I will explore the changes that Confucianism underwent in 
its attempt to restructure its classical worldview to suit the new realities of the Song 
dynasty. This restructuring of the Confucian way is what we generally refer to as Neo-
Confucianism, which consisted of two central strands: a) the more dominant and 
influential Neo-Confucian School of Principle or the Lixue School with which this study 
concerned, and b) its rival school, the Neo-Confucian School of Mind (or Mind/Heart) 
also known as the Xinxue School (心學). That these schools continuously blamed each 
other for being too Buddhist is a reminder of how profound the Indo-Buddhist impact on 
Neo-Confucianism was.707 Contrasting these schools can be helpful in understanding the 
different strategies traditions use in their confrontation with foreign pressures. As in the 
case of theurgic Kabbalah and ecstatic Kabbalah, understanding why one school managed 
to prevail over the other can give us clues as to what consists of a successful restructuring 
of a tradition.   
Before I proceed to explore the analytic strategies that Neo-Confucians adopted from 
the Indo-Buddhist worldview, it is important to stress an important difference between 
the Chinese and Jewish experiences. In the chapter on Kabbalah, I highlighted a dynamic 
of appropriation of Greek analytic features and their subsequent subordination to 
synthetic sensibilities. This was an effective conservative strategy for safeguarding the 
exclusive nature of Judaism, a defense mechanism against assimilation in a hostile 
                                            
707 Beyond mutual attacks within Neo-Confucianism, the Qing dynasty School of Evidential 
Research (考證) which was dedicated to philology and historical analysis also represented a 
revolt against Neo-Confucian orthodoxy. Scholars of evidential research frequently attacked Neo-
Confucianism as being too Buddhist. 
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environment. Due to the very different historical, sociological, and political conditions of 
China, and especially due to the fact that Chan Buddhism came to adhere to increasingly 
synthetic modalities of operation, the Neo-Confucian reaction to Chan was very different 
from the Jewish reaction to philosophy. As mentioned earlier, Chanists discarded many 
of the analytic features of Indian Buddhism such as the intricate and logically oriented 
discussions of the skandhas, the nidanas (dependent origination), structured forms of 
argumentation, and complex classificatory schemes.708 Unlike the Neo-Confucian School 
of Mind that confronted the Chan school with an approach reminiscent of Chan doctrines, 
the Neo-Confucian School of Principle resorted to many features of the Huayan school 
which was substantially more rational and analytic in nature. In other words, while Chan 
Buddhism was becoming increasingly Chinese, the Neo-Confucian School of Principle 
tapped into some of the most analytical features of Buddhism that Chan sought to 
downplay. To mention only three obvious cases, lixue philosophers adopted Huayan and 
Tiantai’s highly analytic inclination towards interpreting reality in terms of reified 
categories, especially the familiar Indo-European duality between the noumenal and 
phenomenal worlds. They also followed the Huayan notion that “one is all, and all is 
one” or as Neo-Confucians called it “Principle (理) is one, its manifestations are many” (
理一分殊). Finally, the lixue school adhered to a gradualist approach towards the 
attainment of sagehood rather than the intuitive method of Chanists that was distinctly 
Chinese. This influence has been noticed by scholars who have traditionally argued that 
whereas Chan Buddhism was more influential on the Neo-Confucian school of Mind (心
                                            
708 Carsun Chang, Neo-Confucian Thought, p. 118. 
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學), it was the more rational and analytical Huayan and Tiantai schools that had the 
strongest impact on the School of Principles.709  
The result of this strategy was that unlike Kabbalah, in which analytic features were 
guised and eclipsed by synthetic tendencies, in some cases, the Lixue School represents 
an intensification of analytic tendencies in respect to Chan Buddhism. Ironically, it 
confronted the successful “synthetification” of Chan with a Confucian leaning towards 
analytic strategies of meaning. Whereas Buddhism had to assimilate itself to the Chinese 
mindset, Neo-Confucians went in the opposite direction and used the powerful analytic 
features of Buddhism as a potent tool for confronting the Chan school. It is important to 
note that the process of appropriation and subordination is not at all absent in Neo-
Confucianism but it was used more selectively than in the case of Kabbalah. As we shall 
see in the social and cultural levels, in many respects Neo-Confucians borrowed Buddhist 
features and went on to prioritize traditional concerns over those borrowings, just as 
Kabbalists did. The next section however, which will deal with the cognitive level of 
these borrowing is a good example of how the Neo-Confucian School of Principle 
disclosed an escalation in rational tendencies vis-a-vis Chanism.      
                                                                                                  
4.5.1 Atomization of Data  
As demonstrated in the second chapter, classical Confucianism lacked the type of 
stratification of data characteristic of Indian philosophy and early Buddhism. This 
substantially changed during the Song dynasty. The Lixue School can be seen as the first 
                                            
709 Hou Wailu, Qiu Hansheng, Zhang Kaizhi, Song Ming Lixue Shi [The History of the School of 
Principle during the Song and Ming Dynasties]. Vol. 1. (Beijing: Renmin Press, 2005), p. 7. 
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time that the Confucian tradition demonstrates a highly analytic approach towards 
presenting information. As in the case of Jewish philosophy, and later Kabbalah, Neo-
Confucians found it crucial to clearly define their metaphysical, epistemological, and 
ethical concepts. The notion of li (理, Principle) for instance, a fairly marginal term prior 
to Neo-Confucianism, was used as a mechanism to stratify reality into a matrix of 
ordered and interrelated categories.710 Every object and affair in the universe had its 
Principle. Under the influence of the Huayan school, Zhu Xi created a dichotomy 
between li and qi (氣) which became the foundation of Neo-Confucian thought. The 
latter, qi, is fairly well known and represents the material force that constitutes reality.711 
Li represented the most fundamental organizing principle of reality as a whole, as well as 
that which makes distinctions between categories or family resemblances. In other words, 
whereas classical Chinese philosophy understood the world as composed of qi, it never 
provided an explanatory framework for understanding what makes qi form into a tree 
rather than a human or a chair for instance. Following the typical Indo-European 
distinction between form and matter, or phenomena and noumena, Neo-Confucians 
introduced the notion of li as a patterning concept that differentiated qi into different 
                                            
710 Scholars have offered many different translations for the concept of li: Feng Youlan suggested 
“Platonic Form,” see A History of Chinese Philosophy, vol. 2, p. 537; Joseph Needham suggested 
“organization” or “organism,” in Science and Civilization in China (Taipei: Caves Books, 1985), 
Vol. 2, p. 302; A.C. Graham’s translation was “Correlative Pattern,” see “The Ch’eng-Chu 
Theory of Human Nature,” in Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature 
(Singapore: Institute of East Asian Philosophies, 1986), p. 421; Willard Peterson, followed by 
Bol offer “coherence,” see  Peterson “Another Look at Li,” Bulletin of Sung-Yuan Studies 18 
(1986): 14; Anthony Cua translated li as “reasoning” or “reason” in Ethical argumentation: A 
Study in Hsun Tzu’s Moral Epistemology (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985). I follow 
Wing-tsit Chan’s the “Principle.” 
711 The Huayan distinction was between li and shi (事), best exemplified in Fa Zang’s Treatise on 
the Golden Lion. 
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categories of existence. Since qi has no boundaries and no clear laws of operation, li was 
introduced as a notion that patterns qi according to objective rules. Qi manifests itself as a 
tree because it “clings” to the universal Principle or Form of a tree. This same logic was 
applied to all categories of existence, both things, such a the li of a dog, the li of leaf, or 
the li of hand fan, as well as to social affairs, such as the li of filial piety, or the li of 
benevolence. The famous Neo-Confucian dictum li yi fen shu (理一分殊) or “principle is 
one, its manifestations are many” reflects this greater tendency towards the clear 
fragmentation of the phenomenal world in Neo-Confucianism.712 This new interest which 
has been explored in depth by Buddhists, represents a typical Indo-European concern 
with the nature of reality as a collection of ontological categories that are unified under a 
coherent cosmic principle. Such questions had never been of particular interest before the 
advent of Buddhism,713 which introduced into Chinese thought a more nuanced interest in 
the relationship between reality’s presumably fragmentary nature and man’s attempt to 
understand that reality in terms of unity and coherence.    
 Neo-Confucian terminology was derived from the Classics, especially the Yijing 
from which important terms such as shu (數, numbers), xiang (象, Images), wu xing (五
                                            
712 In the Zhuzi Yulei (朱子語類) Zhuxi states: “In terms of the myriad things considered as a 
whole there is only one principle, but in terms of individual things, each thing has its own 
principe.” 合天地萬物而言，只是一個理，及在人則又各自有一個理 (語類, 卷一). A 
frequent metaphor Zhu uses to express the relationship between the one and the many is “The 
moon’s reflects on a thousand rivers” 月印萬川. This metaphor was borrowed from Chan 
discourse. 
713 Most commentators agree that Zhuxi’s ”principle is one its manifestation are many“ (理一分
殊) is derived from Hauyan’s “the one and the many reflect each other” (一多相攝). See for 
example Chen Lai, Zhuzi Zhexue Yanjiu (Shanghai: Haudong Shifan Daxue Chubanshi, 2000), p. 
117. 
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行, five elements), li (理, Principle), taiji (太極, The Supreme Ultimate), sheng sheng bu 
xi (生身不息, ceaseless change), and dao (道, the way) originated.714 Although these 
terms came from Chinese native resources, the way Neo-Confucians used them was 
nothing short of revolutionary; and most importantly, all these terms take on a more 
distinct and focused meaning. Before Neo-Confucianism, one was forced to extract the 
meaning of Confucian philosophy from the narrative of the Classics, there was no explicit 
explication of central terms, only examples or ‘pronouncements.’ With Neo-
Confucianism this dramatically changes; important books such as Cheng Duanmeng’s 
Glosses of Terms for Nature and Principle, and Chen Chun’s Beixi Ziyi (Neo-Confucian 
Terms Explained) were authored in order to give young enthusiasts a clear and accessible 
exposition of the meaning of central Neo-Confucian concepts. A wide range of terms 
such as xin (heart-mind, 心), ming (destiny, 命), cai (capability, 才), qing (emotions, 请), 
xing (nature, 性), yi (will, 意), zhi (purpose, 志) were explicated in detail in an attempt to 
eliminate ambiguity. Neo-Confucianism fragmented existence into clear categories that 
                                            
714 The central concept of li (Principle) is especially important in the Neo-Confucian context. In 
the famous xici or the Great Treatise of the Yijing we see the phrase: 易簡，而天下之理得矣；
天下之理得，而成位乎其中矣 - “once one attains ease he will receive the patterns of Heaven. 
Once the patterns of Heaven are attained one will adequately position himself between Heaven 
and Earth (xici 1:1). Among Confucians the term li is especially common in the rational 
philosophy of Xunzi where it is frequently contrasted with chaos (luan, 亂). e.g. Xunzi 2:3: 少而
理曰治，多而亂曰秏, “Doing little but conforming to principle will lead to order while doing a 
lot but avoiding principle will lead to confusion.” [my translation based on James Legge]. 
Another important terminological dyad 形而上, “the world above things” and 形而下, the “world 
within things” denoting the metaphysical and physical worlds respectively, also originated in the 
Ten Wings of the Yijing. Other concepts were taken from other classics; the important distinctions 
between the Human Mind and the Mind of Heaven originated in the Classic of History in the 
section known as ‘The Plan of Yu the Great (尚書, 大禹謨). Naturally, many important terms 
came from the The Great Learning and The Doctrine of the Mean. Two central examples are the 
former’s 格物, “investigation of things” and the Mean’s 慎獨 “vigilance in solitude.” 
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made it more neat, differentiated, and rationally decipherable. This was a fairly abrupt 
departure from classical modes of analysis. Meng Peiyuan notes that as opposed to the 
past and even in contrast to the Neo-Confucian School of Mind, “the ‘model of 
deconstruction’ reflects one of Zhuxi’s central characteristics where he emphasizes the 
distinct differentiation of concepts.”715 
Carsun Chang stresses Neo-Confucianism’s heightened interest in terminological 
exactitude and logical interpretation when he notes that in Zhuxi’s controversies with Lu 
Jiuyuan, Chen Liang, and others, “hardly a sentence occurs in which there is not 
reference to one logical principle or another, such as definition, law of contradiction, 
universals or particulars, inductive or deductive method, or line of demarcation between 
the metaphysical and physical spheres… Though Chu Hsi [Zhu Xi] wrote nothing 
explicit about logic, there can be no doubt that he was a logical thinker.”716 On the 
cosmological level, Livia Kohn notes that Neo-Confucianism discloses a clear shift 
towards the substance metaphysics of Buddhism. Here again, we see a more analytical 
temperament that strives to pinpoint the ontological foundations of reality in terms of 
discrete substances.717 The analytic inclinations of Neo-Confucianism were also apparent 
in Cheng Yi’s theory of concentration, or jing (敬, seriousness). According to Cheng Yi, 
the student is expected to concentrate the Mind (心) such that it becomes focused on the 
                                            
715 Meng Peiyuan, Zhuxi Zhexue Shilun, p. 96. [my translation]. 
716 Carsun Chang, pp. 274-275. Chang claims that Zhuxi “attached great importance to definition. 
It is known that he weighed every word before he wrote it down, and that he made strenuous 
efforts to determine the precise meaning of every word in the text.” In another instance Chang 
notes that Zhuxi was “remarkably acute, his analytical powers were exceedingly keen…”   ibid. 
pp.281. 
717 In Neville, Ultimate Realities, pp. 20; 22. 
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distinctiveness of its object of investigation. He argued that the “mind cannot be occupied 
with two things …. Ching [jing] means the ‘singleness’ or the ‘being devoted to one 
thing’ of the mind.”718 The new obsession with concentration on specific and secluded 
objects and affairs, represents a dramatically new strategy of analysis and a considerably 
more analytic mode of cognition. These new strategies of analysis were Indo-European 
and analytic par-excellence and far removed from the ambiguity of traditional modes of 
thought and synthetic knowledge. Neo-Confucian strategies of analysis required the 
honing of cognitive skills that were rarely used in native Chinese thought.  
Beyond the analytic differentiation of basic terms, Neo-Confucian literature disclosed 
a substantially new tendency towards topical distinctions. Their approach to philosophy 
was based on a more carful categorization of ideas, which clearly distinguished them 
from what John Passmore called the “piecemeal pronouncements” of classical Confucian 
philosophy.719 A good example is Zhuxi and Lu Zuqian’s Reflections on Things at Hand, 
a central book that was divided into fifteen chapters, each exclusively dedicated to a 
confined and focused topic of discussion. As opposed to the lack of topical distinctions in 
classical Confucian works, there are no digression to discussions not directly related to 
the topic of the chapter. Below, I will examine this approach in relation to the emergence 
of a more systematic thinking among Neo-Confucians; here, I merely want to stress that a 
prerequisite to systematicity, is the clear fragmentation of a data into distinct constituent 
parts that relate to each other logically.   
                                            
718 Carsun Chang, op. cit., p. 223 
719 John Passmore, “Philosophy.” In Paul Edwards, ed., The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 6 
(New York: Macmillan and Free Press, 1967). 
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 Another point to consider is the Neo-Confucian Investigation of Things (格物), in 
which the traditional interest with human affairs (事) was extended to include the nature 
of things (物). Although this did not lead to the emergence Western empiricism, the Song 
dynasty represents a clear escalation in scientific thought and specialization in China.720 
In fact, Neo-Confucianism was so much in tune with the spirit of empiricism that many 
prominent scholars have debated why science never emerged in China during the Song 
dynasty. Most of them agree, however, that Neo-Confucianism represents a more rational 
and scientific mindset, and that this necessitated a more nuanced approach towards 
investigating things as independent phenomena.721 The eminent Joseph Needham has 
noted that “whenever one follows up any specific piece of scientific or technological 
history in Chinese literature, it is always at the Song dynasty that one finds the major 
focal point.”722 Carsun Chang argues that Zhuxi “was fascinated by the immense variety 
in the realm of nature…I have no hesitation in saying that as a student of the phenomenal 
world he was an Aristotelian.”723 Indeed, Neo-Confucianism represents a view that gave 
unprecedented attention to the atomization phenomenal world into distinct categories. 
                                            
720 See good analysis of Zhuxi’s interest in the sciences and the emergence of specialized 
knowledge during the Song in Yung Sik Kim, The Natural Philosophy of Chu Hsi (1130-1200) 
(Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 2000), especially pp. 133-326 passim. Although a 
Western empirical method never emerged in traditional China, Neo-Confucianism was showing 
signs of a greater reliance on real empirical data. Zhuxi criticized Su Shi who “did not see the 
condition of the southeastern waters himself, [but] merely thought [about them] and insisted on 
his sayings.” He continued to argue that those who verified things with their eyes established 
reliable theories that can still be studied today. See Zhuzi Yulei 79.2b2 
721 For an overview of this interesting debate see Wing-tsit Chan, “Neo-Confucianism and 
Chinese Scientific Thought,” Philosophy East and West 6, no. 4 (1957): 309-32. 
722 Joseph Needham, Science and Civilization in China. Vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1954), p. 134. 
723 Carsun Chang, Neo-Confucian Thought, p. 254. 
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This more analytic spirit is beautifully expressed in the charters of the Neo-Confucian 
academies that emerged during the Song era. One section of the charter demanded that 
students "study extensively, inquire accurately, think carefully, analyze clearly, and put 
into practice earnestly.” This is emblematic of the more analytic approach of the Song era 
in which precision, analysis, and accuracy become central concerns.724  
                                                                                                                                              
4.5.2 De-Contextualization  
The de-contextualization of data is yet another apparent characteristic of Neo-
Confucian philosophy. As in the case of Judaism, Neo-Confucianism represents the 
“cosmologization” of Chinese thought. This was a clear adoption of the analytic stress on 
metaphysical speculation. The fact that this new tendency represents a shift from the field 
of ethics to the field of cosmology meant that context and the analysis of specific 
situations were marginalized in relation to the classical period. When a central ethical 
term such as ren (仁, humanity) is transformed into a cosmological category, it comes to 
denote an ethical cosmos that is beyond the particulars of a specific situation or event. 
This is a clear shift from the ren of the Analects in which the reader is forced to reach 
conclusions based on examples of behavioral situations, to the overarching capital “R” 
Ren of Neo-Confucianism.725 This shift from the world of things (xing er xia) to the world 
above things (xing er shang) is a shift from the domain of action and history to a kind of 
Platonic realm of decontextualized Forms. In other words, while the ren of the Analects 
                                            
724 Ibid., p. 67. 
725 Wang Guoliang, “Shilun Zhuxi Lixue De Fachou Tixi (a Discussion of Zhuxi’s System of 
Categories),” In Ru Lin (Confucian Literati), p. 223. 
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is discussed in terms of function (用), Neo-Confucians almost exclusively discuss it in 
terms of substance (體), especially the substance of the Mind.726 The rationalization and 
de-contextualization of Chinese thought is similarly apparent when terms such as gui-
shen (ghosts and spirits, 鬼神), are stripped from their somewhat superstitious 
connotations and understood as positive and negative cosmic forces that operate 
according to the expansion and contraction of material force (qi). This process of 
objectification takes place with a wide range of Neo-Confucian terms that take on a 
substantially new meaning divorced from time and context.  
The de-contextualization of information is fairly apparent in the famous Neo-
Confucian Taiji Diagram (太极图), which was the equivalent to the Kabbalistic tree of 
life. In both cases we see cosmological architectonics that were unknown to the 
Confucian and Jewish traditions prior to the rise Neo-Confucianism and Kabbalah. 
 
 
 
 
                                            
726 An important Neo-Confucian work on this new conceptualization of ren is the Zhu Xi’s 
Treatise on Humanity (仁說). While Cheng Yi drew a stark distinction between ren as substance 
as opposed to function, with Zhuxi we witness a more synthetic understanding in which ren as 
substance is the “the character of the Mind” while as function it is “the principle of love.” 
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The Taiji Diagram, came to represent the foundational structure of lixue cosmology.727 It 
is the first time that Confucianism presents a metaphysical worldview that is composed of 
cosmic entities that relate to each other hierarchically and according to a linear 
progression based on formal relations. Like the Kabbalistic Tree of Life, the Taiji 
Diagram represents an eternal and static cosmological structure that remains unchanged 
in face of fluctuations in the human sphere. Although a certain dynamic can take place 
within and between the different components of this metaphysical reality, the structure 
                                            
727 This Diagram was borrowed from an earlier Daoist diagram by the Neo-Confucian philosopher 
Zhou Dunyi. See more in Julia Ching The Religious Thought of Chu Hsi.  
 The Neo-Confucian Taiji Diagram   The Kabbalistic Tree of Life 
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itself is changeless, thereby transcending the world of context. The progression from the 
highest Wuji (Boundless) and Taiji (symbolized by the uppermost circle), towards yin and 
yang, through the five elements, down to the hexagrams of Qian (male) and Kun 
(female), and finally to the “world of myriad things,” is presented in the form of constant 
and logical relations. This is very different from the traditional Chinese and Jewish 
understanding of reality in which history, human relations, and a certain narrative were 
central. Indeed, both the Taiji Diagram and the sefirotic tree reflect a higher, objective 
sphere of existence that is changeless and therefore highly reminiscent of Greek and 
Buddhist cosmological structures. In fact, as in many other areas, where we see Buddhist 
influences, it has been suggested that the Daoist diagram on which Neo-Confucians based 
their own diagram, was a re-working of the Buddhist “Storehouse of Consciousness 
Diagram” (Alaya Vijnana); and that the central similarity between the two diagrams was 
the distinction between the world of action and change and the eternal, decontextualized 
world “above shapes.”728  
Beyond objectified cosmological structures, Neo-Confucians advanced revolutionary 
methodologies for gaining knowledge. The aforementioned Investigation of Things is 
especially relevant here. Beginning with Cheng Yi, the formerly ethical notion of li as 
used by Mencius was transformed into a law of nature.729 The investigation of things was 
oriented towards penetrating the internal essence of the Principle of one’s object of 
inquiry. Like others, Meng Peiyuan notes that although the investigation of things was 
                                            
728 Julia Ching, The Religious Thought of Chu Hsi, pp.18-19. Robin Wang, “Zhou Dunyi’s 
Diagram of the Supreme Ultimate (“Taijitu shuo”): A Construction of the Confucian 
Metaphysics,” Journal of the History of Ideas. 66 (Jul.,2005). 
729 Kuhn, The Age of Confucian Rule, pp. 102. 
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predominantly concerns with human affairs, the fact that the Chinese turned an objective 
gaze towards the world of natural phenomena was an unprecedented development in 
Chinese history.730 The search for eternal and constant Principles meant that there was a 
concern with the features of reality that transcended change and context. There is a 
famous story about Wang Yangming who decided to follow the instructions of earlier 
Neo-Confucian masters, and sit in front of a bamboo in an attempt to discover its 
underlying Principle. Of relevance is that instead of knowing any particular bamboo, the 
Neo-Confucians were after the essence of “bambooness.” Therefore, the dualistic 
approach of the Lixue School in which the intangible li is “without smell and without 
shape” created a stark distinction between abstract trans-mundane pattern and the world 
of action and context. It is for this reason that Lu Jiuyuan,, Zhuxi’s main opponent from 
the School of Mind argued that “Zhu's ontological dualism between li and qi, even if 
made only for heuristic purposes, was an impossible position, for it separated li as 
patterns of order from the tangible particulars that humans experienced.”731  
The de-contextualization of information was also apparent in the Four books, which 
were qualitatively different in content from the Five Classics that preceded them. As 
Gardner notes the Four Books were much less historical and “considerably more 
discursive and abstract than the Five Classics.”732 As in the case of Sefer Yetzirah in 
Judaism, the new texts that Neo-Confucians brought to the fore disclosed an objectivity 
that made them likely candidates to confront the a-temporal cosmologies of the analytic 
                                            
730 Meng Peiyuan, Zhuzi zhexue shilun, p. 98. 
731 Anne Birdwhistell, “Social Reality and Lu Jiuyuan (1139-1193),” Philosophy East & West 47, 
no. 1 (1997): 63. 
732 Gardner, The Four Books, p. xxii. 
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paradigm. Neo-Confucians introduced the world of noumena into native Chinese thought; 
they believed that the only way to give their ethical, social, and political system a greater 
significance was by creating a connection between the mundane and super-mundane 
spheres. This is one of the most important features that Chinese thought appropriated 
from the Indo-European worldview, namely, the introduction of a pure realm that 
transcends, as well as informs, the world of affairs. As opposed to the correlative stance 
of earlier philosophical systems, Neo-Confucianism created a more stark distinction 
between the physical and metaphysical, in which the latter was superior by virtue of 
being changeless and eternal.  
The de-contextualization of Chinese thought by Neo-Confucians was not always well 
received. The more utilitarian factions of Confucianism such as the one headed by Chen 
Liang, continuously blamed Zhuxi’s School of Principle for its “empty talk.” They 
argued that Zhuxi’s dao was detached from the flow of events, while what was right and 
wrong was divorced from everyday utility.733 As a reaction to the Li Xue School, Chen 
Liang’s pragmatic faction sought to change many examination themes from the type of 
detached speculative topics that were advocated by the School of Principle towards more 
practical domains that had an immediate impact on state affairs.734 The misgivings many 
intellectuals had with regard to Neo-Confucian thought underscore the substantial 
departure of lixue thinkers from the traditional Chinese concern with real life events and 
historical analysis. Although the move towards de-contextualized and metaphysical 
                                            
733 Tillman, Chu Hsi’s Ascendency, p. 137. Chen Liangs faction of utilitarian, or political 
Confucianism, was known as the Zhedong shigong faction, 浙东事功学派. 
734 Kuhn, The Age of Confucian Rule, p. 105. 
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speculation struck many Confucian thinkers as odd and lacking real value, Neo-
Confucians were aware of the importance of supporting traditional Confucian ethics with 
a cosmological underpinning that transcended the particulars of time and space.    
                                                                                  
4.5.3 Systemization   
Neo-Confucianism represents the most systematic exposition of Chinese thought 
since the arrival of Buddhism to China. It was already with the forerunners of the 
movement that we see a relentless striving towards doctrinal unity and coherence. The 
early Northern Song thinkers Shao Yong (1011-1077) and Zhang Zai (1020-1077) show 
the first clear tendency towards a more systematic approach of dealing with knowledge. 
Shao Yong managed to successfully integrate various ancient approached towards the 
study of "images and numbers" (象數) into a coherent and highly influential cosmology. 
Yung Sik Kim notes that it was only with Shao Yong that we see a systematic integration 
of earlier Yijing (Book of Changes) speculation, with the ancient River Diagram (河圖), 
the Luoshu Diagram (洛書圖) and the Pre-Celestial Diagram (先天圖).735 Shao Yong’s 
project was representative of the general tendency among Neo-Confucians as well as 
Kabbalists, to integrate and synthesis former strands of thought into an updated and 
unified system. Zhang Zai, although still limited in terms of the conceptual tools at his 
disposal, represents an escalation in Neo-Confucian systematic thought, especially when 
contrasted with his predecessor Zhou Dunyi (1017-1073). Zhang's important Zheng Meng 
(正蒙, Correcting Ignorance) represented one of the most unified theoretical systems 
                                            
735 Kim Yung Sik, op. cit., p. 267. 
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Confucianism has ever produced prior to the Song period. Zhang tried to express a 
doctrinal and cosmic unity in terms of the pervasiveness of qi. He argued that “existence 
and non-existence, emptiness and substantiality, are all a single thing, not to be able to 
unify is not to realize the nature.”736 Of importance is not only that this is an initial 
attempt to demonstrate the unity that stands behind contradictions, but more importantly, 
that this unity is directly related to human nature (xing, 性). Therefore, the idea of 
coherence and unity became a symbol of perfection and truth, which was reflected both 
in the unity of all Principles, the unity of humans with the cosmos, as well as the aesthetic 
unity evoked by a systematic and well organized philosophy. This is a clear move from 
the fairly fragmented and open-ended classical Confucian philosophy towards a sense of 
systematicity and conceptual coherence.   
These early attempts at systemization continually escalated and reached maturity with 
Zhu Xi, where we witness a structured and methodical linking of human consciousness, 
society, culture, and cosmos. The greatest innovation of Neo-Confucianism can be seen 
in its ability to establish a logical connection between the human mind (xin, 心) and the 
cosmos, thereby producing a self-enclosed system that tries to present itself as an 
indisputable universal truth that transcends cultural particulars. The shift from the 
piecemeal and unsystematic Confucianism of the classical period to the self-enclosed 
systematic thought of the Song was certainly a reflection of the Buddhist impact on 
Chinese thought. The anchoring of ethics in a cosmology that includes a resonance 
                                            
736 Zhang Zai, Zheng Meng, 17 in Zhang Zai ji, p. 63. Also see Bol, Neo-Confucianims in History, 
p. 200. 
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between the structure of the universe and human cognition (or in the Platonic case, the 
soul) is a quintessential characteristic of analytic Indo-European systems.     
 In the Collected Works of the Cheng Brothers (二程集), it is said, “how could one 
understand the way of man but not understand the way of heaven? The Way is 
one…when one realizes his nature, he is able to realize the nature of others. When he is 
able to realize the nature of others, he is able to realize the nature of the myriad things. 
And, when he is able to realize the nature of the myriad things, he is able to participate in 
the transformative and nurturing processes of heaven-and-earth.”737 This weaving of 
Individual nature, the mind, and the cosmos into a coherent metaphysical and 
epistemological doctrine was one of the most compelling achievements of Neo-
Confucianism. Bol claims that the correctness of lixue thought was predicated upon the 
scientific claim “that Neo-Confucians had a correct understanding of how the human as a 
biological being is integrated into the physical universe.”738 He goes on to argue that the 
“Neo-Confucian belief in unity has to do with learning to experience and maintain a 
mental state of unity. This is related to the mental experience of coherence, the moment 
of seeing how everything one understands is connected together in a seamless whole, as 
if of a single thread.”739 The tendency towards the construction of a more systematic and 
consistent worldview had important ramifications that gave Neo-Confucianism its unique 
religious undertones. As in the Buddhist case and other analytic traditions such as 
                                            
737 Wang Xiaoyu (王孝魚), Er Cheng Ji (二程集) (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1981). From Cheng 
Yi’s Yishu 16.182. 
738 Bol, Neo-Confucianism in History, p. 204. 
739 Ibid., p. 211. 
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Neoplatonism and medieval Aristotelianism, Neo-Confucianism gave rise to a cosmos in 
the Greek sense of the word: a universe as a well-ordered and harmonious whole.   
The work of Zhuxi was the undisputed climax of Neo-Confucian systematic thought. 
He managed to integrate a wealth of information; old and new, Confucian, Buddhist, and 
Daoist, into a coherent worldview that disclosed an unprecedented coherence. Carsun 
Chang notes that Zhuxi “envisaged the universe as a unity, and its different aspects as 
coherent parts of that unity… like Aristotle, who first broke knowledge down into its 
various branched of sciences, Chu Hsi [Zhuxi] strove to bring all Chinese learning under 
his scrutiny… [such that it] seemed to be woven into a masterpiece of art. The 
thoroughness of his mind prevents him from omitting anything that was necessary for the 
completeness of his system.”740 In another instance, Chang claims that Zhu Xi "evolved a 
mighty system… his thought was never scattered. Rather it operated with a focal point 
bringing all departments of knowledge into an impressive unity.”741 Gardner offers 
several examples of how Zhu Xi went about at synthesizing different strands of the 
tradition into a cogent whole. Discussing one of the Four Books, the The Doctrine of the 
Mean, he convincingly demonstrates that Zhu Xi’s “commentary seeks more than to 
demonstrate the internal coherence of the Chung-yung text [Doctrine of the Mean]; it 
seeks also to demonstrate that the text of the Chung-yung coheres with the rest of the 
Confucian canon. Indeed, Chu [Zhu] assumes that all the texts in the canon are 
interrelated…” Through equating terms from different texts of the tradition, especially 
terms from the Four Books with those found in the Five Classics Zhu, “legitimizes and 
                                            
740 Carsun Chang, op. cit., p. 253. 
741 Ibid., p. 281. 
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gives deeper meaning to each; at the same time the point is made that the texts of the 
canon are interrelated…[it shows] the community of readers that this canon, for all of its 
variety of parts, is entirely coherent and speaks in a powerfully consistent voice.”742 The 
institutionalization of the Four Books and their presentation as the embodiment of 
classical Confucian thought, required a daunting process of synthesis in which Zhu Xi, 
through carful commentary, gave Neo-Confucian philosophy a seamless continuity with 
the earlier tradition of the Five Classics.     
One of the implications of systemization is a certain rigidity regarding truth-value. 
Hoyt Tillman shows that such rigidity was one of the main characteristics of Neo-
Confucianism. It is interesting that the more systematic Neo-Confucianism became, the 
more jealously it defended its apparent indisputable truth.743 We saw in the Jewish 
context that Maimonides’ rather rigid definition of Jewish dogma raised concerns among 
conservatives who were worried about the lack of flexibility and communal inclusiveness 
that such final definitions entailed. This process was clearly taking place in China where 
Neo-Confucianism began to present its worldview as a complex of interrelated ideas that 
supported and depended upon each other. Such internal coherence and logical hierarchy 
meant that undermining ideas at any given point had destabilizing effects that 
reverberated throughout the system as a whole. Thus, coherence and the elimination of 
contradictions became more important than ever. In the Classified Dialogues of Master 
Zhu (朱子語類) Zhu Xi states: “There is only one single way (dao) under Heaven and the 
student needs to comprehend the one principle of the way. It is only in this manner that he 
                                            
742 Gardner, “Confucian Commentary,” pp. 414-415. 
743 Tillman, Chu Hsi’s Ascendency, p. 21. 
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can gain insight with regard to the dialectical relationship between heavenly principle and 
human desire, righteousness and profit, impartiality and selfishness, good and evil. 
Nothing will be left unknown.”744 This is what Zhuxi referred to as yiguan (一貫) or the 
“single thread” that went through his whole system and connected the “roots and 
branches” into a consistent whole.745 As Metzger notes, Neo-Confucians harbored a type 
of resentment towards modes of learning that disclosed “disconnected details presented 
without a sense for the whole to which they belonged.” 746 
Neo-Confucians gave and published lectures on the systematic nature of their 
thought, they compiled systematic introductions to Neo-Confucianism, and introduced 
several detailed diagrams that were meant to display the interrelatedness of concepts in 
their system.747 Such tendencies were a clear departure from classical Confucianism’s 
unsystematic methodologies. In comparing the shifting perspectives of Confucian literati 
between the Han and Song dynasties Gardner notes that as opposed to the Wei period 
(386-589) in which we see a fairly flexible interpretation of the classics, during the Song 
there was “a tendency towards defining a “correct” body of thought, an intellectual 
orthodoxy that would “save” the Chinese tradition and protect it from foreign 
                                            
744 天下只有一箇道理, 學只要理會得這一箇道理. 這裏纔通, 則凡天理, 人欲, 義利, 公私, 善
惡之辨, 莫不皆通. Zhuzi Yulei 8:18. 
745 The notion of yiguan was initially discussed by Confucius when he told his disciple Zengzi 
“Shen, my doctrine has one single thread running through it,” (Analects 4:15) 
746 Thomas Metzger, Escape From Predicament: Neo-Confucianism and China’s Evolving 
Political Culture (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977). 
747 Bol, Neo-Confucianism in History, pp. 159-160. The use of diagrams is a curious tendency 
shared by Neo-Confucians and Kabbalists. Bol claims that diagrams “focus attention on the 
relations between and among concepts and thus give the student a means of seeing in one glance 
that many different concepts form a system of relationships.” [italics in original]. 
  
423 
influences.”748 Neo-Confucians, for the first time in their tradition’s long evolution, 
constructed a unified and “closed system” that served as a reaction to Buddhism’s 
systematic and “single truth” nature. 
                                                                                         
4.5.4 Conclusion  
The above examples all indicate a more analytic approach towards information, but it 
is important to note that Neo-Confucianism disclosed synthetic features that were clearly 
in tune with traditional Chinese modes of thought. With regard to the atomization of data, 
in spite of a clear tendency towards the differentiation of information, Neo-Confucians 
tended to conflate different terms in a way that is relatively rare in Indian and early 
Buddhist thought. It is for this reason that Neo-Confucian philosophy may be somewhat 
confusing to the Western reader; central terms such as li, taiji, dao, and xing (nature) may 
be equated at one instance but later differentiated and discussed separately. The Chinese 
had a greater tolerance for such terminological overlapping. Their application of the rules 
of logic was not as strict as we would expect from one trained in Western philosophy or 
from the linear and logically structured Abhidharma argumentations of Buddhists. Such 
tendencies notwithstanding, Neo-Confucian philosophy represents a new climax of 
analytical tendencies in Chinese history and this new attitude was instigated by the 
profound impact of the Buddhist tradition.  
At the beginning of this chapter I argued that on the cognitive level, Neo-
Confucianism did not seem to follow the pattern of subordinating analytic borrowings to 
                                            
748 Daniel Gardner, Zhu Xi’s Reading of the Analects, p. 18. 
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synthetic sensibilities as in the case of Kabbalah. That the same process does not take 
place in Neo-Confucianism, at least not to the same extent, should mainly be attributed to 
environmental conditions. Since Confucians were not operating in a foreign and hostile 
surrounding, they were less inclined to resort to defense mechanisms that were absolutely 
essential in the Jewish case. While Jews were dealing with the worrisome prospects of 
conversion and assimilation, the Chinese operated within their own ethnic and linguistic 
sphere, and in the relatively secure confines of their cultural orbit and geographical 
homeland. The way Neo-Confucians dealt with the Buddhist challenge was therefore 
more open to compromise and flexibility. In some cases they masterfully appropriated 
features from the more analytic schools of Huayan and Tiantai Buddhism to combat the 
highly sinicized school of Chan Buddhism. In such cases Neo-Confucianism represents a 
clear escalation in analytic tendencies. In other cases, such as that of the de-
contextualization of information, Neo-Confucians clearly prioritize native approaches of 
anchoring their search for “eternal principles” in the everyday world of ethics and real 
life events. Environmental conditions are therefore fundamentally crucial in our 
understanding of the way cultural systems operate and react to destabilizing effects. 
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4.6 THE SOCIAL LEVEL 
 In the second chapter I explored the fundamental differences between traditions 
that conformed to a model of “social embeddedness” as opposed to those that disclose 
different forms of “social autonomy.” I argued that although analytic traditions of the 
classical period (prior to Kabbalah and Neo-Confucianism) did not yet develop the type 
of individualism we are accustomed to in the modern West, the Greco-Christian and 
Indo-Buddhist traditions were nevertheless based on religious and philosophical 
paradigms that positioned the individual at the heart of spiritual fulfillment. In contrast, 
synthetic traditions, classical Confucianism and Judaism being excellent examples, 
perceived the family, rather than the individual, as the most fundamental social unit and 
the locus of religious life. In the following section I will show how the Lixue School, 
under the direct influence of Buddhism, shifted towards a substantially more 
individualistic worldview, which it nevertheless subordinated to the familial and 
communal ethos of classical Confucianism.  
 
4.6.1 Growing Individualistic Trends   
 In my analysis of the Tang-Song transition I discussed the collapse of the old 
Tang order with its strong aristocratic clans and the subsequent emergence of the literati 
class which rose to prominence through scholarly merit rather than pedigree. One of the 
major changes that took place as a result of this transition was the reformation of the 
examination system. During the Tang, Confucian intellectuals were expected to write 
exams in the spirit of the “correct” or orthodox view of the Confucian classics, or what 
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was jointly compiled as the official Correct Meaning of the Five Classics (五經正義). 
The escalating suspicion towards the official commentaries used in the imperial 
examinations reflected a need among intellectuals to challenge the status quo. As I 
mentioned earlier, for the first time, examinees were encouraged to speak up and actively 
air their opinions regarding state policy and social reform. Edwin Pulleyblank notes that 
“a new critical spirit was abroad which made men seek in the Classics for interpretations 
consonant with reason rather than merely consistent with orthodox commentaries.”749 
This undermining of the tradition required a sense of critical independence and individual 
creativity that became one of the hallmarks of Song intellectual culture. From the 
pioneers of the Tang all the way to the heyday of the Song, these intellectuals were 
characterized by a “cool, detached, and methodical rationality with which they attempted 
to get to the truth.”750 Something new was happening in China that was extremely 
reminiscent of the rise of individualism and critical thought among Jewish philosophers 
between the tenth and thirteenth centuries. As the explanatory power Five Classics and 
the Talmudic paradigms weakened, new form of suspicion towards tradition emerged, 
marking the beginning of a long process of reinterpretation. In both cases this was 
conducive to a new spirit of individualism, critical thought, and creativity that was crucial 
for the construction of a new and relevant cultural paradigm.    
                                            
749 Edwin G. Pulleyblank, “Neo-Confucianism and Neo-Legalism in T’ang intellectual Life,” in 
Arthur F. Wright ed., The Confucian Persuasion (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 
1960), p. 78. 
750 Ibid., p. 90. Pulleyblank further notes that the first signs of this trend during the Tang “stood at 
the very beginning of the critical scholarship which eventually flourished under the Song.” 
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 Another commonality with the Jewish experience is that during the Song we see 
the emergence of authored works that reflect the opinions of individual thinkers. 
Revolutionary commentaries on the classics were now supplemented by privately 
authored books, glossaries of terms, and a striking amount of short treatises. Zhou 
Dunyi’s Interpretation of the Diagram of the Supreme Ultimate, Zhang Zai’s Correcting 
Ignorance, several works by the Cheng Brothers, Chen Chun’s Neo-Confucian Terms 
explained, and Lu Zuqian’s and Zhu Xi’s Reflection on Things at Hand are good 
examples of this new creativity that was based on the thought of independent individuals. 
Similarly, a “shift from official histories towards a growing number of private historical 
accounts gained momentum.”751 This more autonomous intellectual atmosphere explains 
the polemical environment that emerged during this period. Speaking independently in 
relative detachment from the communally sanctioned Classics made it easier for Song 
thinkers to attack each other on an increasingly personal level. A similar reality transpired 
in the highly polemical environment of thirteenth century Castile in which secondary 
elites that were not directly associated with first elite authorities felt free to challenge 
each other on theological issues. In both cases we see how the diminishing power of 
central authority enabled intellectuals to engage in a more confrontational dialogue 
without appearing to undermine tradition. The Chinese custom of relying on coalitions of 
consensus in politics was replaced by a fragmentation of ideas in which different school 
claimed to represent orthodoxy and attacked each other as straying from traditional 
norms.  
                                            
751 T.C. Liu, China Turning Inward, p. 33. 
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 Earlier, I mentioned the new literary forms that started to emerge in Neo-
Confucianism which were modeled after Chan’s Lamp Histories (denglu, 燈錄) and 
Recorded Conversations (yulu, 語錄). These works were clearly diverging from the 
archaic and inaccessible language of the Classics. The knowledge they presented was 
directed towards the individual without assuming any prior knowledge in the classical 
tradition. The private person was seen as the primary audience of these works, and their 
content provoked independent thought rather than being oriented towards scholarly 
elitism. An interesting characteristic of works in the recorded conversation genre was that 
they were associated with the familiar and admired philosophers of very recent times 
rather than the paradigmatic sages of the distant and mythological past. This engagement 
with familiar and recent thinkers such as Cheng Yi and Cheng Hao provided readers with 
the reassurance that the content of such works were truly implementable and realistic. 
This new accessibility of information and its tailoring to the needs and of the secluded 
intellectual were a major liberating factor for young and ambitious thinkers who were in 
search meaning and spirituality rather than political advancement and power.  
 It is also relevant that the five philosophers of the Northern Song represented a 
new type of intellectual. This was especially obvious with important thinkers such as 
Shao Yong and Zhang Zai who refused to hold official positions but were nevertheless 
presented as role models; a testimony to a new appreciation of public intellectuals that 
deliberately chose to avoid government. Zhu Xi dedicated a whole chapter in the his 
Reflections on Things at Hand to a discussion of serving or alternatively not serving in 
government. Similarly, many Confucian academies frequently venerated individuals 
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whose very careers were associated with a critique of the governmental system.752 The 
fact that the possibility of avoiding public office was treated as a legitimate mode of 
behavior is an indication of a substantial change in mentality among Song literati. The 
individual had a new set of considerations that provided him with the legitimacy to 
dedicate his time to his own perfection. This is not to say that in the past Chinese 
intellectuals did not avoid government. Although it is well known that many exemplary 
Confucians refused to serve in corrupt courts well before the rise of Neo-Confucianism, 
the fact that there emerged a new appreciation of the individual’s ability to reform society 
away from, or in reaction to government, and that such a stance was seen as a model for 
intellectual integrity was certainly a new phenomenon. 
 The new academies that emerged all over the country departed from official 
government schools that were strictly dedicated to preparing students for examinations 
and civil service. Instead, the Neo-Confucian academies focused on the self-improvement 
of the individual as a more pressing goal than passing the exams. Much like the custom in 
Buddhist temples in which knowledge was transmitted from master and student, Neo-
Confucians focused on transmission from individual to individual, which included 
writing personal diaries in which students reflected upon their daily routine, insights, 
flaws, and general progress.753 Another factor to consider was that the academies were 
also the result of an influx in talented intellectuals that could not be absorbed by 
                                            
752 Linda Walton, “Academies as Sacred Places,” in Patrecia Ebrey and Peter Gregory eds., 
Religion and Society in T’ang and Sung China, p. 353. 
753 Neo-Confucians saw governmental education as motivated by a selfish desire for position and 
power. They opposed this to their own education, which was motivated by righteousness and 
“depends of teachers who discourse privately.” Bol, Neo-Confucianism in History, p. 223.  
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governmental institutions. This meant that academies were providing jobless intellectuals 
with new channels of employment that were formerly unavailable. Enthusiastic 
individuals could now find ways to lead a life of an intellectual on a more local and non-
governmental level. It is equally important to note that the general affluence and 
economic prosperity of the Song led to a greater division of labor and opportunities for 
those who were not inclined towards learning or spirituality. Wealthy people could invest 
in academies and thereby become part of a communal effort to promote Neo-
Confucianism without committing themselves to a life of scholarship.    
 One of the clearest reflections of this new mentality could be seen in the Lixue 
School’s construction of a systematic procedure for self-cultivation and the attainment of 
sagehood. For the first time, the Mencian ideal that “every person is like a Yao and a 
Shun,” was taken literally and presented as a real option for individuals interested in self-
realization. As Steven Angle has observed, the pre-Song dynasty notion of sagehood was 
an unattainable goal, but under the impact of Buddhist procedures of enlightenment, Neo-
Confucians constructed a clear and relatively accessible method for achieving sagehood 
which was focused on the individual and seen as a native equivalent to Buddhahood (成
佛).754 Neo-Confucianism reversed the traditional worldview; for the first time the 
individual was seen as the fundamental unit of change. As an example, one of the main 
attacks against the progressive school of Wang Anshi was that his institutional reforms 
were futile without rectifying the private self. Neo-Confucians leveled the same kind of 
criticism against negligent emperors and ministers who avoided self-cultivation and were 
                                            
754 Tillman, Chu Hsi’s Ascendancy, p. 16. 
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therefore seen as the central reason behind China’s weakness.755 The Neo-Confucian 
dictum of “learning for one’s self” (為己之學), reflected a reorientation of the tradition 
towards a greater emphasis on the individual in which the previously unattainable ideal of 
sagehood came to represent an achievable goal.756 The accessibility of these new 
procedures was a liberating factor that enabled private people to delve into their own 
spiritual needs without necessarily being versed in the classical commentarial tradition. 
As in the case of Judaism where philosophers and mystics circumvented the inaccessible 
Talmudic tradition, so did Neo-Confucians provide Song intellectuals with a model of 
cultivation that could theoretically be grasped and implemented in independence from 
social institutions and traditional literary formats. Neo-Confucians sought to educate and 
direct “young lads in isolated villages” they appealed to the Great Learning’s “reverence 
of the self” as a guide for “serving the edification of unlearned Shih [literati]” such that 
old class distinctions were challenged in favor of the human potential seen as inherent to 
every person regardless of social background.757 As in the Jewish reaction to Greek 
religio-philosophical forms of self-realization, in which the ancient idea of prophecy was 
reinterpreted as a mental state that could be attained by individuals through a systematic 
procedure, so did Neo-Confucians detect the previously lofty and idealized state of 
sagehood as a counter response to the Buddhist concern with enlightenment. These new 
and radical interpretations of sagehood led to the composition of works such as Cheng 
                                            
755 Judith Berling, The syncretic religion of Lin Chao-en, p. 36. 
756 Theodore de Bary, Learning for One’s Self, p. 37. Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi adopted the notion of 
“learning for one’s self” form the Analects 14:28 where it says "in ancient times, men learned 
with a view to their own improvement [為己]. Nowadays, men learn with a view to the 
approbation of others.” 子曰: 古之學者為己，今之學者為人.  
757 William de Bary, ibid., p. 41. 
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Yi’s “A Treatise on what Yanzi Loved to Learn,” in which Confucius’ most talented 
disciple and paradigmatic model Yan Hui (顏回, 521-490 BCE) is portrayed as one fully 
dedicated to the attainment of sagehood through self-reflection.758 Although in reality 
sagehood was clearly not a central concern during the times of Confucius, portraying Yan 
Hui as dedicated to self-transformation helped Neo-Confucians redefine old conceptions 
of sagehood in a new accessible and practical way.  
 In the next section I will discuss the emergence of the kind of cognitive-
individualism and introspective techniques typical of analytic traditions; here I want to 
stress the fact Neo-Confucianism clearly followed the Buddhist focus on the spiritual 
needs of the individual. Notions such as “getting it by one’s self” (自得), “learning for 
one’s self”, and “self effort” (自力), highlighted the position of the individual as a 
discrete agent and the locus of both personal and social transformation.759 The historical 
socio-economic and political changes during the Song and especially the rise of a more 
confident, nationalistic, and more confrontational attitude towards Buddhism, fostered in 
individuals “a new sense of their own importance, a lively esprit de corps, greatly 
reinforcing their own self-image and self-confidence.”760    
 
                                            
758 顏子所好何學論. This was Cheng Yi’s systematic response to Zhou Dunyi’s call to learn 
from the life and experience of Yan Hui. In this important treatise Yan Hui is portrayed as one 
committed to inward self-reflection and outward conformity to ritual. See Hon Tze-Ki The Yijing 
and Chinese Politics: Classical Commentary and Literati Activism in the Northern Song Period 
960-1127 (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 2005), p. 85.   
759 Learning for one’s self as opposed to “learning for the sake of others” 學者為人, as well as 
self-effort (自力) as opposed to “other’s effort” (他力). 
760 William de Bary, ibid., p. 34. 
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4.6.2 Individualism in the Service of Communalism  
 The above examples are all indications of a clear historical shift towards the 
growing importance of the individual vis-à-vis the community, but it would be a mistake 
to assume that Neo-Confucians transitioned from the family model towards the typically 
analytic mode of social autonomy. Although the greater focus on the individual was 
certainly a Buddhist influence, it was important for Neo-Confucians to stress their 
fundamental differences with Buddhism. One reoccurring critique was that Buddhists 
were motivated by selfish interests oriented towards private salvation. In order to 
accentuate this difference the Lixue School used the traditional distinction between the 
Confucian search for righteousness (義, yi) and the Buddhist focus of profit (利, li). In 
spite of their stress on the individual, Neo-Confucians constantly reiterated that the 
perfection of the private self was first and foremost oriented towards the improvement of 
the human condition on a communal level. Charles Wei-Hsun Fu claims that one of Zhu 
Xi’s central achievements was his ability to expose the failure of the Buddhist theory of 
mind to solve problems on the social sphere. According to Fu, Zhu Xi’s success lies in 
the Neo-Confucian transformation of the Chan Buddhist way of actualizing the original 
mind such that it engaged the “socio-moral” world.761 In other words, Neo-Confucians 
constantly argued that the Buddhist worldview was fundamentally selfish in that it 
neglected the good of society at large. They claimed that even the lofty Buddhist ideal of 
communal salvation through the compassionate effort of Bodhisattvas could not hide the 
self-centered goal of the monk in search of enlightenment. Therefore, the Confucian ideal 
                                            
761 Charles Wei-Hshun Fu “Chu Hsi on Buddhism” in Chu Hsi and Neo-Confucianism, pp. 379-
381. Wei-Hsun Fu refers to this as the relationship between “primordiality” and “actuality.” 
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of sagehood, although certainly influenced by the notion of Buddhahood, was oriented 
towards social engagement and the traditional Confucian stress on familial and social 
relationships.  
 The appropriation of analytic elements from the Indo-Buddhist tradition can 
clearly be discerned in a turn towards individual, but such changes were made in the 
service of traditional concerns that were typical to the synthetic worldview of China. This 
process was very reminiscent of the Kabbalistic experience, in which new procedures for 
self exploration were devised, but only as a way to support a communal, nation-based 
mysticism in which the family unit and the social organism remained stronger than ever. 
Indeed, Neo-Confucians made sure that their new procedures for self-transformation 
created a seamless continuity with the family unit and social life. One of the most famous 
passaged in Neo-Confucian philosophy, taken from the Great Learning states:  
By investigating things one will be able to extend his knowledge to the utmost; once 
knowledge is extended one’s intentions become complete; once intentions are complete 
the mind is rectified; once the mind is rectified one’s personality will become cultivated; 
once the personality becomes cultivated the family is put in order; once the family is 
ordered the empire is well controlled; and once the empire is controlled, peace will 
prevail under Heaven.762   
This passage shows a clear progression from the personal sphere of one's intentions (意), 
mind (心), and personality (身), towards the social level of the household (家), the 
empire (國), and the world at large (天下). In other words, as opposed to the Buddhist 
                                            
762 物格而后知至, 知至而后意誠, 意誠而后心正, 心正而后身脩, 身脩而后家齊, 家齊而后國
治, 國治而后天下平. My translation, based on Gardner, Zhu Xi and the Four Books. 
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belief that individual perfection directly leads one towards ultimacy, Neo-Confucians 
insisted that harmony and heavenly peace must go through the familial and social 
domains. In the Buddhist case, typical of analytic traditions, we see a concordance 
between the structure of consciousness and ultimate reality, while in the Confucianism, as 
in Judaism, the central metaphor is family unity and the social organism rather than the 
individual. Since one of the main Neo-Confucian innovations was the introduction of 
greater individualism, the model that emerged is one in which the individual related to 
ultimate reality but only through the mediation of the family and society. Without an 
ordered family and a stable and harmonious society the ultimate goal of Confucianism 
cannot be achieved; the individual as an independent entity is therefore powerless; he 
must remain a social animal, a father, a husband, a filial son, or a loyal minister. The 
Neo-Confucian individual, in spite of his unprecedented freedom and the new tools at his 
service to explore his interiority, remained deeply embedded in the fabric of society and 
active familial life.   
 I mentioned earlier that one of the central misgivings Confucians raised against 
Buddhism was its advocacy of leaving the family unit in favor of individual liberation. 
Although Chinese Buddhists tried to reduce these tensions by claiming that sons leaving 
the household were actually demonstrating filiality by securing their parents’ souls in the 
afterlife, it was clear that the monastic institution was fundamentally in tension with the 
native Chinese worldview. Zhu Xi claimed that the Buddhists “renounce the family to 
attend to their own virtue in solitude. This shows they are deficient in the substance of the 
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Way.”763 The Buddhist anti-family ethics undermined the Confucian idea that order was 
based on family relationships that were extended to the political sphere.764 The Confucian 
sage was not expected to leave the house, not even temporarily; on the contrary, 
sagehood was a reflection of traditional values such as the establishment of a large 
household, bearing children, remaining filial to one’s parents while they were alive, and 
offering sacrifices when they passed away. More generally, the Confucian sage, like the 
Jewish Rabbi, was expected to take an active and responsible part in communal affairs 
and to function as a role model for those around him. In the political domain, Neo-
Confucians saw the Buddhist undermining of the socio-political world as a devaluation of 
their ideal of serving in government. According to Neo-Confucians the monastic order 
was selfishly involved in its own affairs and operated as a secluded microcosm detached 
from the reality and activities of the “real world.” The Buddhist Sangha’s engagement in 
celibacy was seen as an offensive severing of one’s family lineage. Not only were monks 
not procreating and contributing to the manpower of society, but they also lived off the 
tax money of hard working people that ultimately sustained their unproductive lifestyle. 
And finally, the Buddhist interest in lofty matters that were irrelevant to practical and 
immediate social concerns was seen by Neo-Confucians as a form of escapism that was 
responsible for China’s weakness.765   
 In all these cases we see that the Neo-Confucian idea of self-cultivation, in spite 
of its unprecedented stress on the individual, was oriented towards a communal ethos that 
                                            
763 Zhu Xi and Lu Zuqian, Reflection on Things at Hand, 8:4. W.T. Chan trans. p. 283. 
764 Tillman, Chu Hsi’s Ascendency, p. 16. 
765 Ibid., pp. 13-4. 
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was dramatically differed from the Buddhist worldview. One of the most representative 
examples of this approach can be seen in the way Neo-Confucians believed that the 
emperor, the embodiment of the socio-political world, was expected to dedicate himself 
to the goal of self perfection.766 Just as an ordinary person would be expected to perfect 
himself as a prerequisite for ordering the family, so was the emperor, with the dedicated 
assistance of his ministers, expected to focus on self-cultivation before the predominant 
goal of social harmony could be achieved. In a memorial to the imperial court Zhu Xi 
urged the Son of Heaven to dedicate himself to the rectification of his mind through 
continuous self-effort (zide, 自得). Zhu argued that this was the initial and crucial step in 
the ruler’s responsibility to all under Heaven. Neo-Confucianism represents an ingenious 
harmonization of synthetic and analytic features such that it created a powerful paradigm 
that managed to both pay unprecedented attention to the needs of the individual, while 
simultaneously it linked the self to the family and the social organism by arguing that 
self-transformation represents the root of communal transformation and social and 
political stability.  
  Neo-Confucianism remained in line with the model of social embeddedness in 
which the family and clan played an extremely important role. Although the individual is 
addressed, he never undermines the centrality of the family; on the contrary, in stark 
contrast to Buddhism the role of the Neo-Confucian household was further reinforced. It 
was precisely in this regard that the Neo-Confucian academies that were emerging all 
over China were fundamentally different from the Buddhist monasteries after which they 
                                            
766 William de Bary, op. cit., p. 31. 
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were fashioned.767 In contrast to the Buddhist monastery that was composed of members 
who chose to leave the traditional household, the Neo-Confucian academies found their 
roots in family initiatives. Linda Walton claims that “in many of the cases…an academy 
founded by a particular family was expanded to include members of the local shih 
community, or a family school was transformed into an academy.” Indeed, the family 
schools, or family academies (家書), functioned as the foundation of state education. In 
an inscription to the Guang Ping Academy the Neo-Confucian Wang Yinglin claims that 
the family functions as the basis of the state.768 In other words, familial institutions came 
to play a central role in the social and political sphere, which often resulted in the 
cooperation between elites and government officials in an effort to extend the activities of 
the family towards broader kin networks known as Zong (宗) or Zong Zu (宗族).769 
Although many family academies slowly transformed into local community academies, 
many of them remained confined to specific clans. This is a typical example of what I 
have referred to as the synthetic family-society model, which could be clearly contrast to 
the individual-society model characteristic of analytic traditions. The family-society 
paradigm is where the family functions as an aid to governmental rule such that the two 
institutions work in a complementary fashion in which tensions and conflicts of interest 
are relatively scarce.  
                                            
767 John King Fairbank et al., China: A New History, p. 79. See more on the striking similarities 
between academies and monasteries in Linda Walton, Academies and Society, pp. 15-17; Griffith 
Flouk “Myth, Ritual, and Monastic Practices in Sung Ch’an Buddhism” in Patricia Ebrey, and 
Peter N. Gregory eds., Religion and Society in T’ang and Sung China; Denis Twitchett “The Fan 
Clan’s Charitable Estate, 1050-1760,” David Nivison and Arthur F. Wright, Confucianism in 
Action (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1959). 
768 Walton, Academies and Society, p. 147. 
769 Ibid., p. 148. 
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 Private family institutions frequently admitted relatives and even local literati into 
their ranks and functioned as “one of a range of institutions in the “middle space” 
between the individual chia, or household unit, and the state or “official” (官, guan) 
level.770 There are examples during the early Song where families were “rewarded for 
their efforts with imperial recognition of their adherence to Confucian family ideals.”771 
Therefore, not only did individualistic trends in Neo-Confucianism not undermine the 
family structure, but the family emerged as a fundamental institution in the regulation of 
the Chinese empire. As Denis Twitchett demonstrates, the central institutional role 
families and clans came to play was an innovation that can be traced back to the 
beginning of the eleventh century. He also notes that “the close-knit clan which we tend 
to think of as the norm [in China] is to a very large extent the product of Sung times, just 
as the more extreme expressions of Confucian familism begin with the Neo-
Confucians.”772 The more central role the family came to occupy in society, the more 
important it became in the minds of the people, especially officials who appreciated its 
crucial function in maintaining social stability. Twitchett describes this as a “semi 
religious conception of the family as a continuous organism in which the individual 
member is the product of the accumulated virtue—for good or ill—of his ancestors.”773 
Although this conception was certainly influenced by the Buddhist notion of karma, the 
difference with Buddhism could not be clearer; while karma was the private affair of the 
                                            
770 Ibid., p. 121. 
771 Ibid., p. 125. 
772 Twitchett, “The Fan Clan’s Charitable Estate,” p. 97-98. 
773 Ibid., p. 100. 
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individual monk, in Neo-Confucianism we see it as the accumulated achievements of 
lineages of ancestors.  
 Once the Song examination system shifted from Tang nepotism to selection based 
on merit, the family and family academies became one of the primary institutions that 
supported individuals in their effort to reach scholarly distinction. Family-supported 
schools and “charitable estates” (yizhuang, 義莊) also functioned as an important safety 
net for individuals who failed to enter government, providing them with financial support 
and the promise of alternative career paths such as teaching locally, tutoring prospective 
students preparing for the examinations, managing family charitable estates, or 
supervising printing projects. Simultaneously, family academies that managed to expand 
their activities and accommodate the participation of non-related local literati could 
enhance their position and become more influential socially, economically, and 
politically. The accumulation of power helped families construct more elaborate ancestral 
shrines, which occupied a central space in the academy. This led to the dual goal of 
educating their children as well as enhancing “the cohesion of the kin group by 
commemorating ancestors.”774 The Confucian stress on the veneration of past generations 
and family lineages can be contrasted with the way Buddhist monks who took full vows 
“ceased to figure on the family register.”775 This shows that in spite of the striking 
similarities between Buddhist monasteries and the Neo-Confucian family schools and 
academies, the two institutions were based on opposing social sensibilities. For the 
former, abandoning the family for the greater good of salvation was seen as a merit, 
                                            
774 Walton, Academies and Society, p. 122. 
775 Twitchett, “The Fan Clan’s Charitable Estate,” p. 104. 
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while for Confucians it led to one’s exclusion from the pages of history, and after death, 
to his exemption from the necessary care and veneration provided by his descendants. In 
another instance, Zhu Xi attacked monastic life and urged nuns to return to their homes. 
Zhu argued that “the most important of the three relationships, should not be 
abandoned… Buddhist and demonic perverse teachings… have confused people’s minds, 
leading grown men and women to give up marriage and abandon family life for what is 
called the cultivation of the way, in vain hope for reward in the next life. If the whole 
world should follow such practices, there would be no human being left after only one 
hundred years.”776 The Neo-Confucian reaction to Buddhism appropriated the model of 
the monastery, but instead of basing it on a collection of individuals, it established the 
academy of the foundation of the family, kin relations, and ancestral worship.    
 Neo-Confucians were very much involved in providing the family with an agreed-
upon set of customs that could govern everyday life. This was to a great extent an 
outcome of a growing disorder and confusion regarding ancient rituals and the fact that 
by the eleventh century Buddhist and Daoist ceremonies increasingly infiltrated the daily 
routine of commoners and elites. Beginning in the Northern Song notable figures Such as 
Ouyang Xiu, Zhang Zai, and most notably Sima Guang and Cheng Yi began to redefine 
the ancient rituals of the old classics, especially the important Ceremonies and Rituals 
(Yili, 儀禮), in an attempt to battle foreign influences.777 Although I will return to this 
                                            
776 Zhuzi Da Zhuan 100:4a-b, in Julia Ching, The Religious Thought of Chu Hsi, p. 87. 
777 The famous Classic of Rites consists of three works: the relatively philosophical Classic of 
Rites or Liji (禮記) which contains discussions on the nature of ritual, its role, and its origins but 
also contains rituals form the Zhou era. The Zhouli (周禮) is mostly a collection of rituals 
performed in the Zhou court. Finally the most practical and widely used Yili or Cermonies and 
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topic in my analysis of contemplation vs. orthopraxy in the cultural level, here it is 
important for me to stress the centrality Neo-Confucians attached to the cohesion of the 
family and its role in social affairs. Twitchett argues that “quasi-religious” dimension of 
the family “found its final expression in the Neo-Confucians’ remolding of the family 
rites.”778 This trend reached a climax with Zhu Xi, who wrote the highly influential 
Family Rituals (家禮), which became the defining manual for the organization of the 
family for the remainder of the imperial era. This important guide “expressed and 
reproduced the key principles underlying the family system: the relationships between 
ancestors and descendants, men and women, parents and children, and families linked 
through marriage.”779 Zhu Xi’s Family Rituals reflects how important it was for Neo-
Confucians to reinforce the traditional family relationships and articulate them in a more 
updated manner that was in tune with the new social, political, and religious realities of 
the Song period. Zhu Xi’s Family Rituals provided an alternative to the state mandated 
ritual program that was overwhelmingly focused on official rituals, or ceremonies that 
pertain to families of high ranking officials.780 Zhu and his students made sure that their 
Family Rituals was relevant to families of the middle class and commoners as well, 
thereby establishing the family unit as a central social institution that transcended 
exclusive official circles. Due to the central role the family came to play in Neo-
                                                                                                                                  
Rituals also referred to in English as the Etiquettes and Ceremonials, was a manual for the 
performance of the most common rituals in Chinese life. These three books are also known as the 
Three Rituals (三禮) 
778 Twitchett, op. cit., p. 101. 
779 Ebrey, op. cit., p. xiv. 
780 State ritual was still following the New Policies’ official New Meaning of the Five Categories 
of Rites of the Zhenghe Reign, (Zhenghe wu li xin yi, 政和五禮新儀). 
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Confucian thought, it was important for literati to devise a unified and strictly Confucian 
system of rituals to support it. Theresa Kelleher notes that Zhu Xi, along with other Song 
intellectuals, sought to:  
reassert the family as well as the public realm as the field of action for people as opposed 
to the monastery of the Buddhists. And yet, he does not wish simply to settle for a purely 
“secular” view of the family as many others of the Sung were doing. He wishes to 
champion a vision of it that primarily emphasized its moral and spiritual values rather 
than its social or economic utility. Thus, he argues for a return to a classical model of the 
family, yet it is one that could be adopted by all classes of society… It seems to me that 
Chu Hsi ends up, consciously or unconsciously, trying to imbue the Confucian household 
with some of the spirit of the monastery.781 
 
The standardization of family conduct was further supported by the general preference 
among people to follow normative and universal systems of operation rather than 
conventional and local ones.782 This more universal approach provided the Family Rituals 
with a religiously sanctioned and orthodox aura, one that purported to be the only mode 
of correct behavior. Zhu Xi’s efforts, building on Sima Guang and Cheng Yi’s earlier 
work, proved extremely successful, his Family Rituals became one of the most important 
and widely used books in post-Song China, surpassing the status of governmental 
manuals and especially the traditional Ceremonies and Rituals.    
                                            
781 M. Theresa Kelleher, “Back to Basics: Chu Hsi’s Elementary Learning (Hsiao-Hsueh).” In 
Neo-Confucian Education: The Formative Stage, Theodore de Bary and John W. Chafee eds., 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), p. 250. Kelleher notes that Zhu Xi struck a 
balance between Buddhist discipline away from the family, and secular approaches to the family 
advocated by other Song Confucians. This is yet another testimony of the Li Xue School’s fine 
balancing of opposing approaches.   
782 Ebrey, ibid., p. xxviii. 
  
444 
In conclusion, it is important to bear in mind that although the family remained an 
extremely central institution, the fact that new channels for expression and self-
cultivation were devised meant that one had more leeway, so to speak, to engage in 
practices that were detached from the traditional family and social institutions. This was 
to a great extent related to the fact that new standardized procedures for self-cultivation 
provided Neo-Confucians with ways to evaluate the individual according to newly 
accepted objective parameters. In other words, a new language developed to talk about 
the individual as an independent agent. While the classical positional model, or social 
embeddedness, certainly remained dominant, and to certain extents even strengthened, 
there emerged orthodox ways to appreciate the individual in personal terms that were not 
strictly positional.  
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4.7 THE CULTURAL LEVEL  
 
 The following section will look at the cultural level, or the domain of ideas and 
meaning. Although features on the cultural level certainly overlap with what has been 
discussed on the cognitive and social levels, it is nevertheless important to analytically 
differentiate these domains. One example is that my discussion of the individual on the 
social level should not be confused with my analysis of cognitive-individualism on the 
cultural level. The distinction is subtle but important: individualism on the social level is 
mainly concerned with structural considerations, focusing on the changes in the formal 
relations between the private person, the family, and the social sphere. In contrast, my 
analysis of cognitive-individualism is more phenomenological, focusing on the individual 
as a unit of cognition engaged in a form of self-transformation that involves new 
contemplative techniques.  
 As opposed to the chapter on Kabbalah, the following discussion of culture will 
not include a section on linguistics. The main reason is the highly analytic forms of 
expression that Neo-Confucians adopted. Unlike Kabbalists who initially appropriated an 
analytic conceptual terminology but then guised it in a highly opaque and symbolic 
language, Neo-Confucians never felt compelled to cloak their new language in a 
symbolic vocabulary. On the contrary, one of their greatest advantages was their more 
conceptual and analytic approach; a position that was formerly seen as alien to China, but 
won legitimacy once it was expressed through a native Confucian medium. In what 
follows I will discuss the three morphological distinctions on the cultural level: 
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contemplation vs. ritual, other-worldliness vs. this-worldliness, and universalism vs. 
particularism.  
 
4.7.1 Contemplation vs. Ritual  
 Confucianism was always understood as a tradition that dealt with the practical or 
manifest features of human life. The famous Daoist alchemist Ge Hong (葛洪, 283-343), 
used the common characterization of Daoism and Buddhism as belonging to the “inner 
camp” symbolized by the roots, while portraying Confucianism as representing the “outer 
camp” or the branches.783 One of the most substantial changes the Lixue School 
introduced into Confucianism was an unprecedented focus on the inner, mental aspects of 
individual life. The new lineage of transmission (道統, daotong), which Neo-Confucians 
modeled after the famous Chan lineages, reflected this new mentalistic reorientation. Han 
Yu’s exclusion of Xunzi (荀子, 312–230 BC) from the daotong in favor of Mencius may 
seem natural to the modern reader but it was actually a move away from the mainstream 
of Han Confucianism in which Xunzi occupied a more prominent position than 
Mencius.784 As scholars have observed, this new direction reflected a new urgency to 
stress the spiritual dimensions of the tradition. Mencius offered an introspective mind-
based philosophy of intuition that Neo-Confucians reinterpreted in light of Buddhist 
introspective procedures. The Mencian method of cultivation advocated “nourishing the 
                                            
783 Mario Poceski, Introducing Chinese Religions (London; New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 76. 
784 According to Julia Ching the Neo-Confucians represented the “legacy of the mind and heart 
that we may call spirituality. It was a new development, quite different from the direction of Han 
Confucianism, which oscillated between the rationalism of Hsun-tzu [Xunzi] and the superstitions 
of signs and omens.” Julia Ching, Chinese Religions, pp. 156-7. 
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mind” (養心, yangxin) and “making fewer the desires” (寡欲, guayu), ideas that became 
a foundation for answering dilemmas raised by Buddhism.785 In another instance, 
Mencius famously argued that “all things are complete within us. There is no greater 
delight than to achieve sincerity (誠) through self-examination.”786 Such statements 
caught the attention of Neo-Confucians as a possible native foundation on which they 
could construct a more introspective and contemplative worldview.  
 It is important to bear in mind that although Mencius functioned as a foundation 
for a new introspective approach, it is apparent that the Neo-Confucian interpretation of 
the heart-mind (xin, 心) substantially departed from the Mencian view. During the time 
of Mencius, the Confucian notion of xin was mainly, but not exclusively, concerned with 
the idea of the intuitive heart and emotions, whereas in the hands of Neo-Confucians, 
under clear Buddhist influences, it increasingly becomes associated with one’s cognitive 
faculties and the idea of the mind. In Neo-Confucianism, we have a far greater stress on 
xin as the seat of consciousness that is not only intuitive and emotional as in the Mencian 
case, but also distinctly discursive and rational. When scholar translate the character xin 
as heart-mind it could be generally argued that the Mencian xin was more concerned with 
the heart, or the moral heart, while the Neo-Confucian xin was more of a rational ethical 
mind and the seat of consciousness and intentionality.787  
                                            
785 Fung Yu-Lan and Derk Bodde, “The Rise of Neo-Confucianism and Its Borrowings From 
Buddhism and Taoism,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 7, no. 2 (1942): 96. 
786 Mencius 7a:4: 孟子曰: 萬物皆備於我矣. 反身而誠, 樂莫大焉. 強恕而行, 求仁莫近焉. 
787 There are also clear overlaps between the Mencian Heart and the Neo-Confucian Mind. In both 
cases the notion of xin is both the seat of emotions, or ethical awareness, as well as 
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 The choice of the Four Books is yet another indication of the turn inwards 
towards an increasingly contemplative attitude. Scholars such as Feng Youlan, Julia 
Ching, Judith Berling, and more recently Daniel Gardner have all pointed out that the 
shift from the Five Classics to the Four Books reflected a new interest in the internal 
facets of human existence, which were rather scarce, and some would argue non-existent, 
in classical Confucianism.788 The Four Books were more clearly focused on metaphysics 
and spirituality in which the concern with self-transcendence became more important 
than simply “rising in a bureaucratic ladder through exams.”789 Apart from the book of 
Mencius which provided Confucians with spiritualistic and even mystical conceptual 
tools, the Great Learning, and perhaps most importantly, the Doctrine of the Mean 
played a central role in the Neo-Confucian turn towards a more contemplative 
philosophy. In the Great Learning Neo-Confucians found their procedure for the 
investigation of things in which we see a progression from one’s internal world and the 
rectification of the mind (正心) towards the outer sphere of the family, society and 
politics. As we shall see, the Doctrine of the Mean equipped Neo-Confucians with a 
theory of emotions while emphasizing the idea of introspection in solitude. The Four 
Books and the Neo-Confucian lineage of transmission are therefore typical examples of 
how a tradition radically reorients its ultimate concerns while preserving an appearance 
                                                                                                                                  
consciousness. Although the differences are mainly a matter of stress they nevertheless represent 
an important distinction between classical Confucianism and Neo-Confucianism. 
788 Fung Yu-lan, “The Rise of Neo-Confucianism,” p. 96; Julia Ching, Chinese Religions, p. 158; 
Judith Berling, The Syncretic Religion of Lin Chao-En (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1980), p. 2; Daniel Gardner, Zhu Xi’s Reading of the Analects, p. 21; Hoyt Tillman, Confucian 
Discourse and Chu Hsi’s Ascendancy, p. xxii. 
789 Julia Ching, ibid. 
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of continuity with the past. They were also conducive to a new interest in contemplation, 
which equipped Confucianism with tools to respond to the Buddhist challenge.   
 As I mentioned earlier, one of the central components of the Neo-Confucian 
project was the construction of a systematic procedure for the attainment of sagehood. In 
the social level I looked at the way this entailed an unprecedented focus on the individual 
agent. Here, I would like to highlight the dramatic shift from the classical sage 
characterized by ritualistic acumen, towards the introspective Neo-Confucian sage who 
transcends the human mind (人心, renxin) and attains the original mind of the way (道心, 
daoxin). As Judith Berling has argued, the process of self-cultivation shifted from 
learning from past models, ethics and refinement of the arts, to a deepened Neo-
Confucian concern with spirituality.790 In the important chapter titled “Preserving One’s 
Mind and Nourishing One’s Nature” in the Reflection on Things at Hand, the student is 
urged to resort to a meditative calmness as a means to rectify the mind. Zhu Xi claimed 
that: 
In daily affairs, at all times and in all places, keep the mind-and-heart alert and do not let 
it wander. In this regard always observe principle, discuss what you seek and thoughtfully 
ponder it, deeply immerse yourself in it and go over and over it, and then you will be 
close to the teachings of sages and worthies. Gradually, you will gain a tacit 
understanding of them and naturally come to see the characteristics with which we are 
endowed by the Dao of heaven that are really within us.791  
 
                                            
790 Judith Berling, op. cit., p. 37. 
791 Allen Wittenborn and Zhu Xi, Further Reflections on Things At Hand: A Reader (Lanham: 
University Press of America, 1991), p. 87. [my italics]. 
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Zhu Xi’s words give us an idea of the exceptional focus Neo-Confucians laid on 
“thoughtfully pondering” the mind and the nature of things and affairs. According to the 
Lixue School, preserving the mind is done through different means such as tranquility, 
concentration, attentiveness, immersing oneself in the task of self-cultivation, and 
meditation. The goal was to gain insight into the nature of reality and its underlying 
Principles (li). Such new contemplative concerns were indicative of the unprecedented 
complexity and nuance in which Neo-Confucians came to understand the internal life of 
the individual. Neo-Confucians brought the mind to the center of their system and they 
went on to advance a host of contemplative techniques that equipped the individual with 
ways to refine the mind. In what follows I will look at some of these introspective 
features and their striking relationship with ideas and practices that were central in 
Buddhism.    
 Consider the notion of shendu (慎獨), which appears in the opening passage of 
The Doctrine of the Mean as well as in Zengzi’s commentary to The Great Learning; it is 
sometimes translated as “vigilance in solitude,” “vigilance over one’s mind,” or “self-
inspection.”792 In the hands of Neo-Confucians this relatively unimportant and rather 
scarce term is brought to the fore to reflect a greater concern with the concordance 
between one’s inner mental state and one’s actions. In a sense this reflects a certain 
distaste towards the mechanical nature of traditional Confucian ritual. Indeed, highly 
ritualistic traditions such as Confucianism and Judaism have been well aware of the 
                                            
792 Carsun Chang offered “vigilance in solitude” and “vigilance over one’s mind,” see The 
Development of Neo-Confucian Thought. Vol.2, p. 174; Xie Yu-wei suggests “self-inspection” 
see “The Status of the Individual in Chinese Ethics,” in Charles Moore The Chinese Mind, p. 315. 
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dangers of orthopraxy and its possible decline into hypocrisy and the loss of meaning. As 
a corrective, Neo-Confucians constantly reminded their students that one should be 
watchful and reflect upon his actions, not only in public life but especially in solitude. 
“Caution in one’s actions” (戒慎, jieshen), and “vigilance in solitude” reflect a new 
interest in the state of mind that accommodates one’s deeds, as well as an interest in 
affairs that are taking place away from the public eye. Shendu, reflects a new demand for 
authenticity and sincerity that is fundamental to analytic traditions; it expresses a new 
intellectual disposition that sees dry orthopraxy as insufficient for leading a rich spiritual 
life. The demand for internal authenticity is also suggested in the third step of the process 
of self-cultivation, which tells us to make our intentions sincere (意誠). Zhu Xi claimed 
that “outwardly doing good things but inwardly in fact feeling quite different is ‘self-
deception.’ It may be compared to a piece of copper that is coated with gold on the 
outside — inside it is not true gold.”793 That Zhu uses the symbol of gold to represent a 
person’s internal world brings to mind similar Buddhist metaphors of inner purity and the 
primacy of one’s state of mind.  
 The new interest among Neo-Confucians in man’s inner sphere naturally led a 
grater stress on the nature of desires and beliefs. As an example, Cheng Hao’s student 
was tormented by the endless thoughts that entered his mind. In a very Buddhist manner 
he complained that it “is like resisting robbers in a ruined house. Before you chase away 
the one who had entered from the east, another one comes from the west. They come in 
                                            
793 Daniel Gardner, Chu Hsi and the Ta-Hsueh: Neo-Confucian Reflection on the Confucian 
Canon (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1986), p. 105, n. 106. 
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from all directions and there is no time to chase all of them away.”794 The student’s 
qualms demonstrate a new urge to learn about controlling one’s mental faculties and 
understanding the nature of the mind. In another instance the famous Neo-Confucian 
commentator Ye Cai claimed that “brilliance and intelligence result if the mind is tranquil 
and calm. Still water can reflect, but running water cannot”795 Ye Cai’s words suggest the 
image of the mind as a mirror, a metaphor that was used by Zhu Xi as well, but was 
especially central in Buddhist discourse.796 Neo-Confucians were therefore promoting a 
new method of examining a person’s internal states of consciousness through the “honest 
monitoring of one’s own unique development as one’s humaneness is recovered from 
within.”797 This introspective tendency is clearly analytic in nature. In fact, As Wolfgang 
Bauer convincingly demonstrates, the unique interpretation of the concept of vigilance in 
solitude was an adoption of an interpretation of the same concept by Buddhists.798 Neo-
Confucians modeled most of the contemplative features of their philosophy after 
Buddhist ideas that were gaining popularity in China. The idea of shendu or vigilance in 
solitude introduced a new Confucian person, one with a solitary private life of 
                                            
794 Zhu Xi and Lu Zuqian, Reflections on Things at Hand, iv.10. 
795 Ibid., IV. 69. 
796 In the Platform Sutra the mirror metaphor was a famous point of contention between Shen-Xiu 
and Hui Neng. 
797 Berry Keenan, Neo-Confucian Self-Cultivation (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2011), 
p. 44.. 
798 Wolfgang Bauer has demonstrated that the New Discourses (新論, xinlun), an important sixth 
century text that shows Buddhist influences, pioneered the “reclusive” interpretation of the idea 
of shendu prior to the rise of Neo-Confucianism. The author of the New Discourses detected The 
Doctrine of the Mean and its concept of vigilance in solitude as an instrumental resource for 
speaking about a monastic, and introspective solitary life. This was happening during what Bauer 
calls the “golden age” of eremitism centuries prior to the institutionalization of The Doctrine of 
the Mean as one of the Four Books by Neo-Confucians. See Bauer in Munro, Individualism and 
Holism, p. 178. 
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contemplation and self-reflection, a life with a “focus on what may be called the 
subjectivity of the profound person.”799   
 The notion of jing is even more central than shendu and is frequently used in Neo-
Confucian discourse to denote an intense mental concentration, or heightened form of 
metal effort. It is often translated as seriousness, reverence, or as I shall use it, reverent 
attentiveness. It is yet another example of the Neo-Confucian attempt to build a 
conceptual framework to describe the inner world of the individual. Reverent 
attentiveness was central to the process of self-cultivation; it required the student to reach 
a meditative state of mind in approaching his object of investigation. The practice of 
reverent attentiveness in the correct manner enabled one to unify the mind in order to 
penetrate the inner essence of things. Although this action was directed to the outer world 
it nevertheless originated in an internal manipulation of consciousness that was central to 
one’s transformative potential. When Zhu Xi stated that “abiding in reverence (居敬, ju 
jing) and exhaustive recognition of principle (窮理, qiong li) are the two phases of moral 
self-cultivation,”800 he was highlighting a uniquely Neo-Confucian state on mind that was 
expected to accommodate the student in search of truth. Jing is also related to notions 
such as shoulian (收斂), “collecting oneself” or shoushi (收拾) “collecting the mind,” 
and demonstrates a new demand to hone and refine one’s mental faculties in the process 
of self-cultivation. Cheng Yi who made this term central to Neo-Confucian discourse 
resorted to the Yijing where it is said that “Ching [jing] keeps straightforwardness 
                                            
799 Wei-ming Tu, Centrality and Commonality: An Essay on Chung-Yung (Honolulu: University 
Press of Hawaii, 1976), p. 4. 
800 Wittenborn, op. cit., pp. 200-201. 
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inside… straightforwardness means singleness. No lie, no negligence, no shame… all 
belongs to the work of mental concentration.”801  
 Zhu Xi’s student Chen Chun is helpful in contrasting the Neo-Confucian idea of 
attentiveness with earlier traditional interpretations of the term. he states: 
The word ching [jing] has been talked about in earlier classics quite often, but only in the 
sense of being slow and cautious. The two Ch’eng brothers (Ch’eng Hao and  Ch’eng I) 
were the first to discuss it from the point of view of the student’s effort, from which we 
can see that the principle is exceedingly urgent and of great importance. Originally the 
word ching [jing] was a function word, similar to words like “awe” and “fear”. Now that 
it is taken as concrete effort, its meaning has become very strong, resembling a concrete, 
substantial thing802. 
 
From this description we get a sense that jing which formerly denoted a type of respect of 
caution, becomes a term that designates an active state of mind, a “substantial thing,” a 
“concrete effort,” or what Keenan describes as an “inner mental attentiveness.”803 In a 
different paragraph Chen Chun describes attentiveness as a state on “internal respect,” a 
kind of reverence to what one is engaged in and an acute ability to focus on a certain 
matter with utter intensity. As in so many other instances of Neo-Confucian borrowings, 
the readers will probably recognize the resemblance between the notion of jing and the 
Buddhist idea of mindfulness (正念, zhengnian) or mindful alertness. In both cases there 
is a demand for an intense presence and awareness. This is clearly reflected in Zengzi’s 
commentary to the Great Learning where he states that “if the mind is not present one 
                                            
801 Carsun Chang, op. cit., p. 223. 
802 Chen Chun, Neo-Confucian Terms Explained, p. 100. 
803 Keenan, op. cit., p. 50. 
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looks but does not see, listen but does not hear, eats but does not appreciate the flavor.”804 
Without jing, or mindfulness, we are not aware of the world as it really is. 
 Finally, the Lixue School introduced into Confucianism the practice of meditation, 
which was the hallmark of Chan Buddhism and the clearest indication of what I call 
cognitive-individualism.805 The practice of jingzuo (靜坐), or “quiet sitting” was a clear 
sign of the contemplative aspects of Neo-Confucianism in which the student was 
expected to sit in silent concentration and reflect on the nature of the dao, on principle, 
and on his ongoing spiritual progress.806 Some Neo-Confucians, following a comment by 
Zhu Xi, went as far as advocating a routine in which half a day was dedicated to 
meditation and half a day to studying (半日静坐, 半日讀書).807 The emergence of 
meditation in Neo-Confucianism could already be discerned in the initial stages of the 
tradition when it was advocated as an integral part of the process of self-cultivation by 
the Northern Song philosophers. Zhou Dunyi practiced it as part of his emphasis on the 
centrality of quietude (主靜, zhujing), Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi both practiced and 
taught quiet sitting, and their students Luo Congyan (羅從彥, 1072-1135) and Li Tong (
李侗, 1092-1163) represent a climax in the promotion of meditation in Neo-
                                            
804 Ibid., quoted from Gardner, Zhu Xi and the Daxue, p. 108. 
805 It was the highly analytic Theravadic Buddhism that had the greatest impact on Chinese 
Buddhism in terms of meditative techniques, which were later incorporated into the Mahayanic 
tradition. See Yao Weiqun in Ru Lin (Confucian Literati), Peng Piao ed., (Shandong: Shandong 
Daxue Chubanshi, 2011), pp. 295-6. 
806 Jingzuo was sometimes referred to as dazuo (打坐). 
807 See Zhuzi Yulei 1880 edition 116:20 a-b. Also see Munro, Individualism and Holism, p. 179; 
W.T. Chan, “Chu Hsi and Quiet Sitting,” in Chu Hsi: New Studies (Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii Press, 1989), p. 257; Rodney Taylor, “Chu Hsi and Meditation” in Irene Bloom and 
Joshua Fogel eds., Meeting of Minds: Intellectual and Religious Interaction in East Asian 
Traditions of Thought (New York; Chichester: Columbia University Press, 1997), p. 44. 
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Confucianism.808 Li Tong taught Zhu Xi techniques of meditation which left a lasting 
mark on the young scholar and subsequent generations of literati.  
 Although Zhu Xi ended up departing from Li Tong’s exaggerated stress on 
meditation, there are several indications that he continued to practice quiet-sitting, 
together with many passages in which he teaches and advocated it to his students. When 
the disciple Zhou Shenfu encountered difficulties in studying, Zhu told him: “shut your 
door and begin sitting for half a month. After ten says have passed pick up a book to 
study and you will see the truth of these words.”809 In other instances we see examples of 
quite-sitting being framed in the language of Mencius where it is said that “the way of 
learning is nothing other than seeking the mind that has strayed.”810 In the light of this 
important passage, the Neo-Confucian Chen Lie understood meditation as a way to 
recover the lost mind (放心) “he shut his door and practiced quiet-sitting without reading 
any books at all, after about a hundred days he recovered the mind that had strayed…”811 
Zhu Xi supported this method of meditation as a way to recover the mind, thereby 
allowing many of his students to engage in protracted periods of meditation.812 The 
changes that took place in Confucianism meant that the spiritually inclined were no 
longer confined to Buddhism and Daoism. During the Song period a literatus could both 
be an engaged and socially responsible Confucian as well as a person that practices 
contemplative techniques that were uniquely Confucian. In fact, those who showed an 
                                            
808 Taylor “Chu Hsi and Meditation,” p. 46. 
809 Zhuzi Wenji, 63:37b-38a (Collection of Literary Works by Master Zhu Xi). 
810 Mencius 6a:11: 學問之道無他, 求其放心而已矣 
811 Taylor, “Chu Hsi and Meditation,” p. 57. 
812 Ibid. 
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exaggerated focus on social engagement were frequently criticized. Cheng Hao, for 
instance, used to instruct his students to practice quiet sitting as a corrective to their over-
reliance on study to the exclusion of internal affairs.813   
 Many Neo-Confucians used the notions of yi-fa and wei-fa to construct a uniquely 
Confucian form of meditation. These concepts which appear in the first passage of The 
Doctrine of the Mean refer to the manifest mind (已發, yifa) and unmanifest mind (未發, 
weifa).814 Some Neo-Confucians argued that through a meditative process one could 
reach a state of consciousness that predated the emergence of emotions. They contended 
that by reaching a state of consciousness prior to the arousal of feelings, one could make 
contact with the primal and pure state of the unmanifest mind. Luo Congyan claimed that 
“in quiet-sitting one is capable of seeing pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy while they are 
yet unmanifest (wei-fa) and have not assumed material form.” Li Tong taught Zhu Xi that 
“through the practice of quiet-sitting he would come to see the Principle of Heaven 
within the unmanifest mind.”815 Here again, it is not hard to recognize the strong Buddhist 
characteristics these theories.816 I will soon discuss why the practice of meditation seemed 
too Buddhist in the eyes of many Neo-Confucians and how the more conservatively-
inclined sought to temper these extreme forms of introspection with a more grounded 
                                            
813 Ibid., p. 52. 
814 This can also be referred to as “the mind before the manifestation of emotions” and “the mind 
after the manifestation of emotions.” See Zhong Yong 1:1: 喜怒哀樂之未發, 謂之中; 發而皆中
節, 謂之和. 
815 Huang Tsung-hsi, Sung Yuan Xue An (Philosophical Records of Sung and Yuan Scholars, 
Taipei: shih-chieh shu-chu, 1974), 10:63. Also see Rodney Taylor “Chu Hsi and Meditation” pp. 
46-47. 
816 Wing-tsit Chan notes: “Taoist and Buddhist influence on the Neo-Confucian practice of quiet-
sitting cannot be denied.” See Chan “Chu Hsi and Quiet-Sitting” p. 260. 
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theory of concentration. The point to stress, however, is that meditation became an 
accepted and legitimate part of the Neo-Confucian way of life, a fact that represents a 
striking departure from classical Confucianism which was confined to the external 
features of reality.  
 Although Neo-Confucians were very wary of coming too close to Buddhism, they 
were also well aware of the changing times and the importance of providing their 
students with contemplative channels for self-cultivation. Quiet-sitting represents a clear 
move towards a uniquely Confucian form of cognitive-individualism that was skillfully 
associated with the Mencian notion of mind and other concepts that originated in the 
classics. The central notion of xin (mind), and ideas such as shendu (vigilance in 
solitude), and jing (attentiveness or reverence) are all important examples of how Neo-
Confucians reinvented their tradition using terms that originated in their own native 
repository of meaning. The shift to the inner sphere of the individual represents a striking 
reorientation of Confucianism and a clear departure from Herbert Fingarette’s description 
of classical Confucianism as a tradition in which “the metaphor of an inner psychic life, 
in all its ramifications so familiar to us, simply isn’t present… not even as a rejected 
possibility.”817  
 
 
 
 
                                            
817 Herbert Fingarette, Confucius: The Secular as Sacred (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), p. 
45. 
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4.7.2 Contemplation in the Service of Social Engagement and Ritual   
 In the above discussion I tried to demonstrate the substantial departure of Neo-
Confucianism from traditional themes characteristic of classical Confucianism. One 
important aspect of this historical change was a move towards an analytic stress on 
contemplative techniques tailored for the private benefit of the individual. Such 
innovations notwithstanding, Neo-Confucians refused to lean too heavily on a 
contemplative worldview. They appropriated contemplative features from Buddhism but 
made sure to subordinate them to an active life based on ritual and human relations.  
 In all the examples that I provided above we can detect strong Buddhist and 
Daoist influences on the one hand, as well as a peculiarly Confucian interpretation of 
these borrowings on the other. Consider the idea of reverent attentiveness (jing). Cheng 
Yi was the thinker who brought this term to the fore and in doing so he departed from 
Zhou Dunyi’s suspiciously Buddhist reliance on another jing, namely, tranquility or 
quiescence (静). Instead of the typical Buddhist tendency toward quietude and emptiness, 
the Lixue School, especially after Cheng Yi, put a great emphasis on the idea of 
attentiveness as an intense state of awareness that was strongly implicated in the world of 
action and social engagement. As opposed to the Buddhist notions of tranquility and 
quietude, Cheng and Zhu saw reverent attentiveness as a mental disposition that was 
enacted both in quietude and activity, but especially in the latter. The Neo-Confucian 
motto was that “one is vacuous while tranquil and straightforward in action.”818  In other 
                                            
818 This passage originated in Zhou Dunyi’s Tongshu (統書) Penetrating the Yijing. Feng Youlan 
translates it as “vacuity in quiescence and straightforwardness in movement,” this was later 
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words when the sage was not confronted with affairs his mind remained empty and still, 
but once he became engaged in daily matters his reaction to a situation was resolute and 
guided by the spirit of reverent attentiveness. Therefore, in their notion of attentiveness, 
Neo-Confucians managed to integrate Buddhist and Confucian tendencies; quietude was 
seen as a natural state but attentiveness was first and foremost oriented towards “the 
process of learning and study… [it provided] the groundwork for the investigation of 
things and the exhaustion of principle.”819  
 As I have shown, Neo-Confucians became increasingly concerned with the 
disruptive effects of emotions, an interest that was of central importance in Buddhism. 
Cheng Yi claimed that there were many different ways to avoid such disturbances, but 
whereas Buddhists resorted to the practice of meditation to stop the mind, Confucians 
alone realized that the mind cannot be stopped. Therefore, the solution is for the mind to 
be in “a state of concentration, or, chu-ching [jing], the state of devotion at the time of 
offering sacrifices to heaven or the ancestors.”820 Reverent attentiveness is seen as an 
outcome of eliminating unnecessary desires and reaching a higher level of concentration, 
but it never entailed the elimination of desires. Earlier, I mentioned the way Cheng Hao’s 
student used the idea of robbers entering a house as an analogy for thoughts beclouding 
his mind. The typical Neo-Confucian solution to this problem was to make sure that the 
“house,” or the mind, had a single master: attentiveness. As opposed to Buddhism where 
                                                                                                                                  
paraphrased by Cheng Hao in his “Letter on the Clamness of the Nature” to Zhang Zai, but 
Zhou’s formulation remained the most popular. See more in Feng, A Short History, pp. 271-72; 
287. 
819 Taylor, op. cit., p. 66. 
820 Carsun Chang, op. cit., p. 222. 
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one attempts to eliminate all thoughts, Neo-Confucians taught to confine the mind to one 
object of investigation. By doing so, they made sure that their mental practices did not 
slip into the danger of nihilism and a detachment form the social and political spheres.  
 
4.7.3 Meditation on the Concrete 
 The lixue idea of quiet-sitting, although clearly influenced by Buddhism, offered a 
uniquely Confucian version of introspection. The Buddhist philosophy of meditation 
caused many Confucians to feel uneasy with quietistic and reclusive practices. It is for 
this reason that the topic of quiet-sitting led to opposing views, and was frequently 
attacked as detrimental to one’s development. Cheng Yi who was generally sympathetic 
towards meditation, warned that “once one speaks of quietude, one has fallen into the 
ways of Buddhism.”821 His concerns were not misplaced; as Koichi Shinohara shows, a 
whole generation of Cheng Yi’s most prominent students began to interpret his teachings 
with an emphasis on the subjective mind such that “in their thought the “subject” that 
investigated rather than the “principle” that is investigated through the world of objects is 
emphasized; the focus is in the experience of “penetration” (kuan-t’ung) rather than on 
the cumulative cultivation (chi-hsi).”822 One way of understanding these concerns is by 
looking at the Neo-Confucian debate about the unmanifest mind (wei-fa) and the manifest 
mind (yi-fa) as presented in The Doctrine of the Mean. There were factions among Neo-
Confucians that were strongly opposed to the emphasis on the unmanifest mind, a 
                                            
821 Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi, Er Cheng Yishu (Written Legacy of the Two Chengs) 8:6b. 
822 Koichi Shinohara, “Ta-Hui’s Instructions to Tseng K’Ai: Buddhist “Freedom” in the Neo-
Confucian Context,” In Meeting of Minds: Intellectual and Religious Interaction in East Asian 
Traditions of Thought (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), p. 188. 
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position that was mainly associated with Zhou Dunyi and Li Tong. Such misgivings are 
understandable if we consider just how similar these approaches were to the Chan 
School’s teaching “to get back to the world of the original nature in which mind does not 
arise.”823 Central Neo-Confucian figures such as Hu Anguo, Hu Hong, and Zhang Shi 
expressed their distaste towards such quietistic doctrines, which they saw as nihilistic and 
anti-Confucian to the core. Therefore, although meditation was certainly accepted as a 
legitimate practice, Neo-Confucians insisted on giving it peculiar Confucian 
characteristics. Zhu Xi, for instance, dedicated much effort to highlighting the 
distinctiveness of Confucian quiet-sitting in contrast to Buddhist and Daoist practices. 
Interestingly his solution was taken straight from Chinese Buddhism, especially the 
Tiantai and Huayan Schools. Zhu Xi argued that the unmanifest and manifest minds were 
actually one and the same.824 This enabled him to both incorporate the idea of quietude 
while simultaneously avoiding Buddhist nihilism.  
 Meditation was seen as an integral part of the process of learning and 
investigating things. It was first and foremost a way to become more involved and aware 
of the dao as it was implemented in daily affairs. Julia Ching argues that: 
from 1170 on, Chu [Zhu] concentrated of Ch’eng Yi’s exhortation to abide in reverence 
and extend knowledge, a formula that offers more balance between action and 
contemplation. Meditation is not an end in itself but a means to an end, to achieve an 
                                            
823 Yanagida Seizan “Bukkyo Shushi no shuhen” Zen bunka kenkyujo kiyo (1976) 8:1-30. Quoted 
in Shinohara, “Ta-Hui’s Instructions” p. 189. n. 58; 201. 
824 He also associated this with the interpenetration of the Great Void (wuji) and the Supreme 
Ultimate (taiji) thereby “accepting both transcendence and immanence in a dialectical manner.” 
See Julia Ching, The Religious Thought of Chu His, p. 119. 
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attitude of reverence (ching). Although an interior disposition, maintained in and out of 
meditation, reverence is principally applied to a life of activity.825 
 
The cultivation of reverent attentiveness through meditation was also a way to develop 
one’s ability to practice ritual on a more profound level. As opposed to the Buddhist and 
Daoist elimination of thoughts and indulgence in introspection, Neo-Confucian 
meditation was practiced in order to improve one’s virtue and “the fulfillment of one’s 
responsibilities to the family as well as to society as large.”826 Zhu Xi claimed that “we 
cannot leave everything in order to do quiet-sitting behind closed doors, refusing to 
attend to things and affairs… as human beings, we also need to serve our rulers and 
parents, relate to friends and spouses, govern servants and subordinates.”827 He also 
claimed that his teacher Cheng Yi was “afraid that if people merely seek tranquility they 
will not have anything to do with things and affairs.”828 Meditation helped a person 
collect his mind and act with reverent attentiveness in daily life and in performing rituals. 
Pure contemplative activities detached from action were strongly frowned upon. In a 
famous Neo-Confucian passage a master noted:  
Formerly, seeing that students tended to become wrapped up in intellectual explanations 
and debate, which did them no good, I taught them sitting in meditation. For a time, this 
helped them see the true way and they achieved some results, but they gradually 
                                            
825 Ching, The Religious Thought of Chu Hsi, p. 119. 
826 Ibid., p. 120. 
827 Zhuzi Yulei, 45:11b. 
828 Reflection on Things at Hand, Chan trans. p. 143. 
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developed the defect of fondness for tranquility and disgust with activity, and they 
degenerated into lifelessness like dry wood.829  
 
In another instance, when asked by Zhong Si if he should sit quietly and concentrate like 
the Buddha, Zhu Xi replied: “our learning is precisely the opposite…[in] dealing with 
people and handling affairs, always keep your mind alert. That is the preservation of the 
mind. How can one leave all things alone and merely sit quietly?”830 
 
4.7.4 Ritual in Neo-Confucian Philosophy 
 In spite of the Neo-Confucian emphasis on social activism, many scholars 
preferred to emphasize the Neo-Confucian shift towards an introspective worldview. 
Berry Kennan, for instance, claims that the Lixue School “represented a shift away from 
values derived from ritualized social practice and towards an emphasis on the innate 
sources of human morality…[as well as] a natural focus on the moral and spiritual 
development of a person.”831 As we can see, Kennan’s description assumes a shift away 
from “ritualized social practice.” This is relevant to the distinction I made between the 
synthetic reliance on ritual and the typically analytic emphasis on contemplation and 
personal religious fulfillment. The question that comes to mind is what happened to ritual 
under the impact of Neo-Confucian thought? Did the Lixue School divert Confucianism 
                                            
829 Wang Yangming, Wang Wen-ch'eng Kung ch'uan-shu (Complete Works of Wang Yang-ming, 
Instruction for a Practical Living), 3:25a-b, in Wing-Tsit Chan, Chinese Philosophy, Ch. 35 pp. 
667-691. 
830 Zhuzi Yu Lei, 115:14 (p. 4472) in Chan, “Chu Hsi and Quiet Sitting,” p. 257. In another 
instance Zhu Xi said “quiet sitting is not like Buddhist meditation, cutting off all thoughts,” Zhuzi 
Yulei 12:141 (p. 354-6) in Chan “Quiet Sitting,” p. 263. 
831 Keenan, op. cit., p. 8. 
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from its traditional reliance on ritual? Or in other words, did Neo-Confucians lead to a 
shift from the synthetic body of ritual to the analytic mind? Considering how central 
ritual was in classical Confucianism this question begs an answer.  
 In the chapter on Kabbalah, I showed how medieval mystics infused ritual with 
introspective qualities that elevated the commandments to a new ontological level of 
significance. Such mental approaches in Kabbalah were intimately related with a new 
concern with sincerity or Kavannah (intention). Neo-Confucians, much like Kabbalists, 
succeeded in cementing their traditional reliance on ritual in a more advanced cosmology. 
Indeed, during the Song, under the direct impact of Neo-Confucianism, ritual takes on a 
more normative function. Gardner argues that in Neo-Confucianism ritual in no longer 
“external to man but is merely the external expression of the principle within him. In 
short, ritual is “natural” to man. The place of ritual in the Neo-Confucian system of 
thought of late imperial China is thus deeply affected by the system of metaphysics 
undergirding it.”832  
 Zhu Xi dedicated great effort to explicating and commenting on the field of ritual. 
In terms of breadth, his most notable achievement was the Comprehensive Explanation of 
the Classic of Ceremonials and its Commentaries (儀禮經傳通解), a massive work that 
elaborated on traditional ritual and the relationship between the three classics of ritual, 
the yili (儀禮, The Classic of Ceremonials), liji (禮記, The Classic of Ritual), and zhouli (
                                            
832 Gardner, Zhu Xi’s Reading of the Analects, p. 85. 
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周禮, The Zhou Rituals).833 In popularity, his Family Rituals (文公家禮), became the 
most important manual of ritual in late imperial China. About six centuries after its 
publication French missionaries in China reported that Zhu’s Family Rituals “was second 
in popularity only to the Analects, and that copies of it could be found in almost every 
home in China.”834 In many ways, the Family Rituals was an equivalent to Judaism’s 
popular Shulchan Aruch (ךורע ןחלוש); it was the most authoritative guide for domestic 
rituals until the fall of the dynastic order and a favorite of the literati class. Its influence 
went far beyond China and extended to Japan, Korea, and Vietnam. It became so central 
to the tradition that many Confucians saw it as a guide for self-cultivation and 
supplemented it with detailed and complex commentaries, while others who saw it a 
manual for commoners wrote shorter and more accessible versions of it.835  
 Far from symbolizing the decline of ritual, the Song era represents a watershed 
moment in its development and intensification. Neo-Confucians were conservative 
thinkers who were very much worried about the declining position of ritual in society. 
This led some of the greatest minds of the Neo-Confucian movement such as Zhang Zai, 
Ouyang Xiu, Cheng Yi, Sima Guang, and Zhu Xi to write important works that were 
                                            
833 According to Zhu The Ceremonials was the central text of ritual and the Classic of Ritual was 
to be studied with it, while the Zhou Rituals could be used as a reference book to both. See more 
in Julia Ching, The Religious Thought of Chu His, esp. pp. 72-90 passim. 
834 Patricia Ebrey and Zhu Xi, Chu Hsi’s Family Rituals: A Twelfth-Century Chinese Manual for 
the Performance of Cappings, Weddings, Funerals, and Ancestral Rites (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1991), p. xiii. Taken form Witek, John W. Controversial Ideas in 
China and in Europe: A Biography of Jean-Francois Foucquet, S.J., (1665-1741) (Roma: 
Institutum Historicum S.I., 1982). pp. 285-6 n.90. 
835 Ebrey, Chu Hsi’s Family Rituals, p. xiii. 
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wholly dedicated to ritualism.836 Zhu was so concerned with the subject that he put 
together a group of talented scholars who worked under him in an attempt to provide a 
systematic and comprehensive compilation of classical ritual texts, together with their 
central commentaries. He did not manage to realize this monumental project, but he 
worked on it until his very last days and saw it as one of his most pressing missions.837  
 I will return to the important contributions of Neo-Confucians to the 
establishment of ritual on a popular level, but initially I will focus on the conceptual 
significance of ritual and its cultural and philosophical implications. My goal is to show 
that the growing importance of contemplative techniques and concern with the internal 
sphere did not replace or even detract from the position of ritual behavior. Instead, the 
internal and external were harmonized, such that ritual was seen as an expression of one’s 
state of mind and the Principles of Heaven. Perhaps the most important change that took 
place during the Song was that ritual was conceptualized within the new philosophical 
framework of lixue thought. It was therefore understood as part of a new systematic 
philosophy characterized by a strong metaphysical and epistemological bent. Ritual was 
now understood as an integral part of the philosophy of nature, mind, and principle. Zhu 
Xi claimed that as opposed to Principle, which is pure, “empty”, and abstract, ritual is 
intended for practical application. Using the dyad of ti and yong (體用, form and 
                                            
836 Zhu Xi’s Family Rituals was based on the earlier work of Sima Guang and updated with 
Cheng Yi’s philosophy of Principle. See Kuhn, The Age of Confucian Rule, p. 104. 
837 Zhu Xi wrote to a close friend “I cannot help treasuring my remaining days on earth, especially 
as the work to compile a [collected] commentary on the rituals is beginning to take form but 
cannot be finished in a rush. Should I have more than a year to live and be able to complete the 
task, I shall be able to die in peace.” ⁠ See Julia Ching, The Religious Thought of Chu Hsi, pp. 76-
77. 
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function) Zhu Xi understood ritual as the concrete application (function) of Principle 
(form). Julia Ching notes that rituals were “dynamic expressions of the principle of 
Heaven, which may also be called natural law.”838 This is also related to the notion of 
reverent attentiveness, or jing; according to Neo-Confucians, ritual had to be performed 
with reverent attentiveness, which supplemented it with an intention that helped one turn 
ritual performance into a reflection of Principle. When ritual is enacted with the right 
mental attitude it comes to truly reflect the unity and patterns of Heaven.  
 Zhu Xi’s commentary to analect 12:1 can help us understand the changes that 
Confucianism was undergoing under the Neo-Confucian impact. Confucius famously 
stated that: 
to subdue the self and return to ritual constitutes humanity. If only for a single day, 
someone subdues the self and returns to ritual, all under heaven will recognize this 
humanity. The practice of humanity rests with oneself, not with others… The master said 
if contrary to ritual, do not look; if contrary to ritual, do not listen; if contrary to ritual, do 
not speak; if contrary to ritual, do not act…839 
 
Zhu Xi explains the phrase “contrary to ritual” as selfishness, which he interprets in terms 
of desires. For this he uses Mencius’ famous dictum which states that “to nourish the 
mind there is nothing better than to make the desires few,”840 By associating being 
“contrary to ritual” with selfishness and desires, Zhu Xi creates a conceptual opposition 
                                            
838 Julia Ching, ibid., p. 73. 
839 Analect 12:1: 顏淵問仁. 子曰: 克己復禮為仁. 一日克己復禮, 天下歸仁焉. 為仁由己, 而由
人乎哉? 顏淵曰: 請問其目. 子曰: 非禮勿視, 非禮勿聽, 非禮勿言, 非禮勿動. 顏淵曰: 回雖不
敏, 請事斯語矣. 
840 Mencius, 7B:33. 孟子曰: 養心莫善於寡欲. 其為人也寡欲, 雖有不存焉者, 寡矣; 其為人也
多欲, 雖有存焉者, 寡矣. 
  
469 
between ritual and desires (欲). He then notes that “when the selfish is subdued, one’s 
every movement will be in precise accord with ritual, and so in daily life, heavenly 
principle will be sure to prevail.”841 This is a telling example of the way Zhu Xi managed 
to harmonized Buddhist and Confucian themes, such that the Buddhist language of desire 
becomes relevant to the correct performance of Confucian ritual. At times this logic is 
reversed, such as in the case when Zhu Xi quotes Cheng Yi saying that the performance 
of ritual is a way to nurture what is within.842 In this case ritual behavior is a tool for 
internal refinement. Common to both cases, however, is the fact that the external and 
internal become interrelated such that correct ritual performance is seen as a reflection of 
internal purity, or alternatively, a tool for internal perfection and self-cultivation.  
 This unique interpretation of analect 12:1 is a striking example of the changes that 
took place in Confucianism. As Gardner convincingly demonstrates, in He Yan’s (何晏, 
190-249) early classical commentary on the same analect, “there is no emphasis at all on 
the inner dimensions of the individual.” In stark contrast to Zhu Xi, He Yan’s ritual is 
strictly external to man and discloses no real connection to one’s psychological 
dispositions. During the Song period, He Yan’s idea of restraining the self in terms of 
behavior that is concrete dramatically shifts to Zhu Xi’s subduing of selfish desires.843 In 
Neo-Confucianism ritual becomes the manifestation of one’s mind, his innate nature, and 
original goodness; “with the elimination of selfish desires and the realization of one’s 
endowed nature, one will simultaneously act in perfect accord with the dictates of 
                                            
841 Zhuzi Yulei, 41.1050. Quoted in Gardner, Zhu Xi’s Reading of the Analects, pp. 80-81. 
842 Gardner, ibid., p. 81. 
843 Ibid. pp. 83-84. 
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ritual.”844 Perhaps most relevant to our discussion is the fact that “in Zhu’s view, what 
distinguishes the Confucian from the Buddhist—and a reason to criticize Buddhism—is 
that the Confucian who subdues selfish desires is sure to practice propriety [ritual], 
whereas the Buddhist who does so is certain only to “plunge into emptiness”.”845  
 Fingarette famously argued that the ideal of humanity (ren, 仁) is a reflection of 
correct ritual performance, claiming that “ren develops only so far as li develops…”846 As 
Gardner contends, Fingarette’s position reflects He Yan’s early perception of the 
Analects, but it does not provide a satisfactory explanation of Neo-Confucian thought 
which disclosed a clear turn towards the language of emotions and the mind.847 The point 
of interest is that this contemplative turn actually provided ritual with a more robust and 
normative underpinning. In Neo-Confucianism, man’s psychological and cognitive 
apparatus is integrated with a systematic cosmology that provided an explanatory 
framework for the performance of ritual. As in the Kabbalistic case, contemplation is 
absorbed only to elevate ritual performance to a higher ontological level of meaning. The 
Jewish mystic was asked to perform ritual with intention, rather than mechanistically; 
similarly in Neo-Confucianism “the value of the performance lies not in the performance 
itself but in the spirit invested in the performance by the performer.”848 As opposed to the 
                                            
844 Ibid. p. 84. 
845 Zhuzi Yulei 41;1045. Quoted in Gardner, ibid., pp. 84-85. 
846 Fingarette, Confucius: the Secular as Sacred, p. 48. 
847 Gardner, op. cit., p. 86. 
848 Gardner, Zhu Xi’s Reading of the Analects, p. 95. In one passage Neo-Confucians go as far as 
suggesting that sacrificing to ancestors with “sincerity and reverence… [does] not only make the 
sacrificial ceremony affective and more deeply meaningful for the participants but also confers 
existence on the spirits themselves, guaranteeing that the sacrificial offerings will be accepted.” 
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classical Confucian and Jewish worldview in which the demand for intention was seen as 
a way to avoid mechanical behavior, in Neo-Confucianism and Kabbalah we see a more 
elaborate connection between the internal and external such that one’s mental state had 
concrete metaphysical implications. Again, of special interest is that in spite of the 
greater reliance on man’s interiority, ritual is not compromised to the slightest extent; on 
the contrary, “when properly carried out, everything is ritual and music. The implication 
here is that one ideally is always practicing ritual and music, not only on specifically 
designated occasions.”849 Since li interpenetrates the world in its entirety, it only makes 
sense that ritual, as its reflection, is ubiquitous to life as well. We are constantly engaged 
in ritual; the question is whether we are successful in performing it correctly, with the 
right mental intensity, such that it becomes emblematic of the principles of heaven.850      
 On a more popular level, Neo-Confucians were successful in two central and 
interrelated respects: they manage to create a systematic theory of ritual, and in doing so 
they made ritual more accessible to the common person. As I mentioned above, Zhu Xi’s 
Family Rituals could be found in almost every Chinese household. In it one could find 
detailed instructions for all the rituals, “from cradle to grave” that were meant to be 
                                                                                                                                  
Or as Zhu Xi put it “if you are able to exercise sincerity and reverence to the utmost, there will be 
influence and response. See Gardner, ibid., pp. 99-100. 
849 Gardner ibid., p. 96. Ritual and Music (禮樂) were traditionally discussed in unison. Music 
was an integral part of ritual and was seen as a model for the realization of social harmony. 
850 William De Bary tells a story of a Korean sailor who was shipwrecked on the Chinese coast. In 
trying to convince the Chinese that he was not a Japanese pirate he constantly pointed to his strict 
adherence to Zhu Xi’s Family Rituals, which he viewed as his bible. De Bary notes that this 
Korean person “would seem a wholly implausible or comic figure unless we recognized the 
seriousness with which Neo-Confucianists viewed ritual as one of the most practical and 
constructive of activities as well as the most civilized and refined.” ⁠ De Bary “Some Common 
Tendencies” in Confucianism in Action, p. 38. 
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performed at home.851 While the ancient Classic of Ritual (The Book of Rites) held the 
elitist perspective that “rituals do not reach down to the commoners,”852 Neo-Confucians 
wanted to supply the masses with a unified system of operation and they were extremely 
successful in achieving their goal. They departed from the lofty ritualism of traditional 
Confucianism and provided clear explanations for the performance of popular rites that 
were absent in the Classics, such as rituals of mourning, funerary ceremonies, and 
memorial rites. Such instructions for small-scale household rituals were absolutely 
essential for a society that upheld filial piety and ancestral worship as central virtues.853 
Of special interest is the fact that the traditional lack of a systematic instruction for 
popular rituals “was increasingly filled by Buddhist and Taoist services, which were not 
status related.”854 Indeed, the competition with contending ideologies was a major 
impetus for the Neo-Confucian reassessment of its ritualistic legacy. Lixue thinkers were 
very much alert to this cultural crisis and they saw the world of ritual as a central field 
that was in need of reform in face of a growing Buddhist and Daoist challenge. Prior to 
Neo-Confucianism the world of ritual was in a state of disarray, with people following a 
confusing mixture of Confucian, Buddhist, and Daoist rites. Moreover, the fact that 
classical Confucianism focused on elite and court rituals meant that Buddhism was 
becoming much more pervasive and accessible on the popular level. Neo-Confucians, to 
a great extent managed to halt this trend; they put an end to the un-systematic syncretism 
                                            
851 Kuhn, op. cit., p. 104. 
852 James Legge, Li Ki: Sacred Books of the East, Max Muller ed., Vol. 28 (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1886), p. 90, 3:3b. 
853 Julia Ching, The Religious Thought of Chu Hsi, p. 73. 
854 Ibid., p. 73. 
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of their age by providing a coherent method that “fulfilled the needs of the general 
populace, who found the dynastic state of little relevance to their own lives.”855 Indeed, it 
was through the revival of ritual that Neo-Confucianism had the most profound impact on 
popular culture.856  
 There are many examples of the way Neo-Confucian rituals were a reaction to the 
ascendency of Buddhism. Perhaps the most apparent place to detect this confrontation 
was in the field of funerary services, which was a clear forté of the Buddhist tradition. 
This may very well explain why this topic occupied the largest section of Zhu’s Family 
Rituals. As an example, the Buddhist custom of cremation was seen as offensive to 
Confucians who believed that deceased ancestors’ bodies must remain intact. The 
disrespectful burning of the dead was fundamentally contrary to the logic of filial piety, 
which demanded respect for the body bequeathed to us by our parents. This tension was 
directly related to the distinction between contemplation and ritual. The idea of cremation 
presupposes that what is of primary importance in human life (and the afterlife and 
consecutive lives) is one’s cognitive faculties, one’s soul, or the karmic lot of an 
individual. This is the part of our being that is associated with our mental faculties, our 
ability to contemplate, and meditate; it is an abstract and intangible feature of human life 
that is seen as superior to the material body. In this view, cremation can be seen as a form 
of purification in which we are relieved of the burden of our material nature. Confucians, 
on the other hand, saw the body as sacred both because it was given to us by our 
ancestors, and because it was the medium through which humans express their 
                                            
855 Ibid., p. 78. 
856 William de Bary, “Common Tendencies,” p. 37. 
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relationship to ultimate reality. The Confucian body is the body of ritual; a vessel for the 
expression of the patterns of heaven and social harmony. Therefore, under the guidance 
of Zhu Xi, Neo-Confucians took a belligerent position on the topic of cremation. They 
even prioritized it over submission to our parents. Zhu Xi claimed that the “son should 
oppose the father’s wish even when the latter desired such [Buddhist service] for the 
mother, as cremation was considered demeaning to the parents’ bodies.”857  
 In conclusion, Neo-Confucians preserved the central position of ritual in their 
philosophy. Like Kabbalists, they managed to devise a new doctrine that integrated the 
psychological and contemplative features of analytic modes of operation, and 
simultaneously interpret ritual behavior in light of their new cosmologies. In both 
traditions, the body remains central and the typical analytic degradation of material and 
flesh was avoided. In both cases we see a skillful balancing of contradicting analytic and 
synthetic tendencies with a clear preservation of the basic features of the synthetic 
worldview. 
 
4.7.5 Other-Worldliness vs. This-Worldliness  
 In the second chapter, section 2.3.3, I highlighted the world-affirming 
characteristics of the Chinese and Jewish traditions in contradistinction to analytic 
traditions. It is important to note that in China, the distinction between the world-negating 
Buddhist doctrine and the Confucian stress on worldly affairs represented the most 
central conflict that emerged between the Chinese and Indian minds. This tension became 
                                            
857 Zhuzi Yulei, 89:8b, in Ching, The Religious Thought of Chu Hsi, p. 85. 
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apparent as soon as Buddhism became influential in China during the Wei-Jin Period 
(220-589 AD.), but it reached a screeching crescendo with the emergence of Neo-
Confucianism. In the following pages I will look at the Neo-Confucian borrowing of 
other-worldly qualities from Buddhism and how these borrowings were subordinated to 
the Confucian stress on social and political activism.       
 That Neo-Confucianism shifted to an increasingly other-worldly perspective can 
be attested by many of the themes I explored earlier. To a great extent, the emergence of 
the Four Books and their greater interest in individual introspection and metaphysics 
reflects a simultaneous shift from Confucianism’s traditional concern with the external 
socio-political sphere to an exploration of themes that transcend the quotidian world of 
human affairs. Although Confucians were certainly adamant in remaining involved in the 
“here-and-now” it is important to appreciate the trans-mundane implications of their 
revolutionary metaphysics and theories of mind and human nature. The first indication of 
the emergence of a radically innovative cosmology among Neo-Confucians can be traced 
back to Zhou Dunyi’s Diagram of the Supreme Ultimate. The opening passage of the 
diagram states that “from the Ultimate-less (or Boundless, wuji) arises the Supreme 
Ultimate (taiji)” (以無極而為太極). It is important to note that the notion of Ultimateless 
includes the character for emptiness or nothingness. The Neo-Confucian use of the notion 
of emptiness (wu, 無) so characteristic of both Buddhism and Daoism would be 
unthinkable in pre-Song Confucianism. Especially striking is the fact that wuji is seen as 
the root and source of reality, a position that could easily be interpreted as a form of 
nihilism. In addition to Zhou’s Ultimateless, another Neo-Confucian, Zhang Zai, offered 
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his own notion of emptiness which he called The Great Void (taixu, 太虛). In the cases of 
Zhou Dunyi and Zhang Zai we witness a new interest in the unmanifest or hidden aspects 
of reality; a position that remained prevalent, albeit to a lesser degree, in the thought of 
Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi. This new interest in ideas such as ultimateless and void hint at a 
shift towards a more other-worldly approach that highlights the unmanifest features of 
reality as logically prior to the world of things and affairs. Indeed, one of the most 
characteristic feature of the Neo-Confucian School of Principle was its adoption of the 
Buddhist, and typically Indo-European, dichotomy between the phenomenal and 
noumenal worlds. Conceptual dyads such as form and function (ti-yong, 體－用), 
Principle and material energy (li-qi, 理－氣), the human way and the way of heaven 
(rendao-tiandao, 人道－天道), the human mind and the mind of the way (renxin-tianxin, 
人心－道心), and the manifest mind and the unmanifest mind (yifa-weifa, 以發－未發), 
were all indicative of a new logical priority that was invested in the intangible and 
transcendent “world above shapes” (形而上) over and above the mundane “world within 
shapes” (形而下). For example, many Neo-Confucians argued that the highest 
metaphysical notions of The Supreme Ultimate and Principle preexisted nature and 
creation, thereby suggesting their primacy over the world of affairs.858 It is no wonder that 
many scholars have convincingly argued that the School of Principle subscribed to a 
                                            
858 Carsun Chang, op. cit., p. 258. 
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dualistic philosophy (二元論) reminiscent of the other-worldly Buddhist and Greek 
paradigms.859  
 An example can help us understand this dualistic philosophical framework. The 
most fundamental division Neo-Confucians highlighted was between the sphere of 
abstract Principles (li) and the worldly sphere of material energy (qi). In his famous 
History of Chinese Philosophy, Feng Youlan chose to name the Neo-Confucian School of 
Principle the School of Platonic Forms.860 Although some believed that as a rationalist 
Feng went too far in his “hellenization” of Chinese thought, his association of li with 
Plato’s transcendent forms is informative. Like Platonic forms, the Neo-Confucian idea 
of Principle is highly abstract; according to Zhu Xi Principle is without smell, sound, 
substantiality, and it is beyond decay or temporality. Moreover, Principle is distinct from, 
and logically prior to the world of things, affairs, or qi. Wang Guoliang states that “Zhu 
Xi’s philosophy is a typical Principle-based metaphysics, a philosophy that is not unlike 
the “logo-centric” metaphysical systems of the West… just as in the case of Plato, 
Aquinas, and Descartes, Zhu Xi’s system postulates a realm of concepts that transcends 
and is prioritized over the sensory world.”861 Brook Ziporyn notes that “Neo-
Confucianism is often viewed as the place to look for a decisive rift in the tradition, 
where something much closer to European dualistic metaphysics somehow makes its 
                                            
859 Meng Peiyuan, Zhuxi Zhexue Shilun, p. 23. 
860 Feng Youlan, A History of Chinese Philosophy, vol. 2, p. 537. 
861 Wang Guoliang, “Shilun Zhuxi Lixue De Fachou Tixi (a Discussion of Zhuxi’s System of 
Categories).” p. 238 [my translation]. 
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appearance in China.”862 As we can see, there was something substantially new taking 
place in Neo-Confucianism that was completely absent in the classical tradition; a greater 
gap opened between an ideal transcendent reality and the mundane world of affairs. In 
support of this view, Willard Peterson concludes that as opposed to the classical period, 
the Neo-Confucian notion of Principle takes on a form of unprecedented 
transcendence.863 When Neo-Confucians wanted to stress the transcendent qualities of 
Principle they frequently referred to it as Tianli (Heavenly Principle) or simply associated 
it with the sublime notion of the Supreme Ultimate. 
 Germane to our topic is the fact that the rational and analytic qualities that entered 
Neo-Confucianism originated in Buddhism. Although the notion of li already appears in 
the Classic of Poetry, the Yijing, and other early Chinese texts, the unique way it was 
interpreted by Neo-Confucians in relation to qi bears a clear resemblance to the Huayan 
School’s distinction between the world of Principle and the world of Affairs, or li (理) 
and shi (事).864 This Huayan dualism is a unique Chinese version of the basic Buddhist 
distinction between the world of nirvana and samsara. As some scholars have correctly 
observed, the other-worldliness of Buddhism “infected” Chinese thought, which adopted 
                                            
862 Brook Ziporyn, Beyond Oneness and Difference: Li and Coherence in Chinese Buddhist 
Thought and Its Antecedents (Albany: State University of New York, 2013), p. 321. 
863 Willard Peterson, “Another Look At Li,” Bulletin of Sung-Yuan Studies, 18 (1986): 13-31; and 
“Making Connections: ‘Commentary on the Attached Verbalizations’ of the Book of Changes.” 
Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 42, no. 1 (1982): 67-116. 
864 The earliest appearance of the notion of li was in the Classic of Poetry (the Book of Songs), 
where Principle is associated with “dividing up land into cultivated fields in a way consistent with 
the natural topography,” see Hall and Ames, Anticipating China p. 212. For three comprehensive 
studies of the concept li see; Tang Junyi, Zhongguo Zhexue Yuanlun: Daolunpian [Chinese] 
(Taipei: Taiwan Xuesheng Shuju, 1986), pp. 21-89; Brook Ziporyn, Ironies of Oneness and 
Difference: Coherence in Early Chinese Thought: Prolegomena to the Study of Li; Idem., Beyond 
Oneness and Difference.  
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an analytic distinction, and to a certain extent a prioritization, of an intangible and 
pristine world over the world of materiality. After exploring the world-affirming position 
of classical Chinese thought, Livia Kohn notes:  
[Chinese thought] has yet also a transcendental level, a dimension of other-worldliness. 
This aspect of the big world picture, stimulated by Buddhism and actively taken up by 
religious Daoism in the middle ages (220-960), has become a firm part of mainstream 
Chinese culture, manifesting itself both in Neo-Confucianism and popular religion during 
the Song (960-1260). It proposes an ideal level of pre-being, an ultimate state before 
creation, which represents the ideal state of being. The human predicament in this vision, 
then, means the loss of this pure state of pre-existence. The main task of people is 
accordingly to recover it by reaching out to the higher spheres. The goal is to leave the 
interrelatedness of the realm of harmony behind and find a place at the source of cosmic 
creation and center of life, to become part of something higher, other, and latent, 
something that is present in the world but not identical with it.865  
 
As Kohn’s description suggests, Buddhism introduced into Confucianism a new 
appreciation of another level of existence, one that we strive to reach in our search for 
perfection. Again, although Neo-Confucians constantly stressed that the prioritization of 
the realm of Principle was only logical rather than “real,” it nevertheless reflects an 
interest in an ideal prescriptive realm of “how things should be.”  
 A few examples should suffice to illustrate this idea. According to Neo-
Confucians, one of the central goals in one’s attempt to reach a state of sagehood, is to 
purify his qi. This suggests that spiritual transformation was seen as a process in which 
one attempts to get rid of coarse or “turbid qi” (zhuo qi, 濁氣) in favor of a more refined 
and “clear qi” (qing qi, 清氣). This is a process of purification that attempts to distance 
                                            
865 Livia Kohn, “Chinese Religion,” p. 22. 
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man from desires, muddled thoughts, and other obstacles associated with the world of qi 
in an attempt to bring him closer to a sublime existence that is theoretically prioritized 
over the world of matter. Such theories led some scholars to reach the extreme conclusion 
that “the world of Principle promoted by Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi is the world of truth that 
we make an effort pursue, whereas the unreal and mundane world of qi is one that we 
seek to transform and abolish.”866 Neo-Confucians taught that human nature (性) is the 
Principle endowed to man by Heaven. When in conformance with Principle, human 
nature is understood as an idealized state of being which is associated with goodness. 
Unfortunately, our originally perfected nature is corrupted by the encumbering effects of 
qi, or our physical and genetic constitution. In other words, Principle in its most pristine 
form is ultimately perfect and to a certain extent unattainable. Departing from coarse 
materiality simultaneously entails coming closer to our original nature. 
 The point I want to stress here is an unprecedented shift among Neo-Confucians 
towards an interest in a world of abstracted principles logically distinct and separate from 
the world of affairs. It is for this reason that more than any other time in history, 
Confucians of the Neo-Confucians movement were predisposed towards leading a frugal, 
simple, and ascetic lifestyle, a life that disclosed an unprecedented suspicion towards 
matter and emotions. According to Carsun Chang, many Neo-Confucians “believed that 
the life of a sage should be dignified and ascetic, a type of life which was actually 
practiced by the Song philosophers.”867 Many followers of Neo-Confucianism “openly 
                                            
866 Wang Guo Liang, “shilun Zhuxi lixue de fanchou tixi” (On the Categorical Systems of Zhu 
Xi), in Peng Piao ed., Rulin 儒林, p. 239. 
867 Carsun Chang, op.cit., p. 102. 
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stated their aversion to fiscal duties in the belief that such duties tended to compromise 
their moral integrity.”868 This can explain why many masters in Neo-Confucian 
academies led a simple and dignified life, usually far away from the hustle and bustle of 
city life. 
[They] built a detached house next to their residence or at a short distance from it, usually 
named Ching-She…After the coming of Buddhism from India, the term (Ching she) was 
picked from existing Chinese vocabulary to translate the Sanskrit term vihara, meaning a 
house of religious devotion. In the twelfth century it came back into Confucianism with 
an aura of religion or mysticism, to mean a “house of devoted learning.” Such a house 
was used for meditation, concentrated studies, intensive reading, and serious discussions. 
Its essential characteristic was its solemn atmosphere, imparting a feeling of 
introspection, communion with the ancient sages, and the spirit at one with the way or tao 
of the universe.869 
As this quote suggests, these increasingly other-worldly tendencies were to a great extent 
motivated by Buddhism. Members of Neo-Confucianism that chose to live a life of 
contemplative retirement called themselves ju shi (居士) “lay devotee” or yin jun (隱君) 
“eremite master,” titles that were associated with Buddhism and Daoism respectively.870 
Lixue thinkers, therefore perceived over-indulgence and untamed desires as serious 
obstacles to spiritual fulfillment. Whereas the Neo-Confucian movement adopted a 
unique version of Buddhist other-worldliness, it also insisted on conforming to the 
traditional Confucian emphasis on action and social engagement in the world of affairs.  
 
                                            
868 James T. C. Liu, China Turning Inward: Intellectual-Political Changes in the Early Twelfth 
Century, p. 142. 
869 Ibid., p. 138. 
870 Ibid., p. 142. 
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4.7.6 Qualified Transcendence 
 In the above discussion I have shown that other-worldly themes in Neo-
Confucianism led interpreters of Chinese thought to draw a parallel between this school 
and Platonic metaphysics as well as Western forms of transcendence. But although the 
distinction between the world of phenomena and noumena and the greater transcendence 
of notions such as Heavenly Principle and the Supreme Ultimate certainly lent Neo-
Confucianism a resemblance to analytic paradigms, scholars have justifiably argued that 
such an association is somewhat problematic. Indeed, the Neo-Confucian distinction 
between the ideal realm of Principle and the world of qi was quintessentially Chinese and 
very different from traditional Platonic and Buddhist dualism. In the following pages I 
will examine how the Lixue School successfully qualified the Indian escapist position 
with a typically synthetic and world-affirming perspective. Interestingly, sinicized 
Buddhism provided Neo-Confucians with a good model for how to accomplish such a 
synthesis, as well as ample reasons for attacking the Buddhist model as inferior to their 
own.     
 I have already discussed the fact that Chinese Buddhism, especially the Chan 
school, was far less world-negating than early forms of Indian Buddhism. Ironically, such 
world-affirming tendencies were to a great extent a Confucian influence. I mentioned the 
famous Chan dictum that “in carrying water and chopping firewood, therein lies the 
wonderful Tao.”871 Chinese Buddhism became so world-affirming that the Chan sage was 
all but indistinguishable from an ordinary person; he “lives just as everyone else lives, 
                                            
871 運水搬柴皆是神通 or 神通並妙用, 運水及搬柴. Similar sentences with world-affirming 
connotations were “Every day is a good day” and “Everyday-mindedness is itself the Way.” 
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and does what everyone else does,” he reaches enlightenment, but then he leaves 
sagehood behind to “enter once more into mortal humanity.” This is what Chanists 
described as “rising yet another step over the top of the hundred foot bamboo,” the 
hundred foot bamboo representing enlightenment and “rising yet another step” referring 
to the sage’s last effort to return to ordinary life.872 The monk Nan Quan (南泉, 749-835), 
for instance, taught that “after coming to understand the other side [enlightenment], you 
come back and live on this side.”873 The Southern Chan School of Hui Neng was very 
eager to present its unique form of worldly-Buddhism (佛法在世间), as superior to other 
schools that promoted escapist doctrines. As an example, the ideas of discovering the 
essence of man within the world of affairs and reaching enlightenment in this life were 
major themes in the Chan School’s highly influential Platform Sutra (壇經).874 But 
although Chinese Buddhism became much more world-affirming than early Indian 
schools, there remained something essentially different between the Buddhist and 
Confucian worldview. Indeed, one of the most systematic attacks of Neo-Confucianism 
against Buddhism focused on its nihilistic perspective, which was seen as detrimental to 
social stability and the imperial order.  
 In spite of the great strides that Buddhism took to accommodate itself to Chinese 
sensibilities, other-worldly temperaments that remained in the tradition became a source 
of endless anti-Buddhist rhetoric. Many Confucians argued that Buddhism was a 
                                            
872 Feng Youlan, A Short History of Chinese Philosophy, p. 264. 
873 Guzunsu yulu, 古尊宿語錄 (Recorded Sayings of Ancient Worthies), Juan 12. 
874 Yao Weiqun “Ru yu fo de “ru shi” guannian,” in Pang Piao ed. Ru Lin 儒林 (Confucian 
Literati), p. 295. Frequently referred to as the Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch (六祖壇經). 
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philosophy that “offered no basis for a moral society, and that the idleness and parasitic 
existence of monks and nuns contributed nothing to the material benefit of the nation.”875 
In Confucian eyes, Buddhist monasticism was offensive on many levels; young people 
seeking a selfish form of spirituality abandoned their families and their social duties for 
the benefits of a life that was essentially sponsored by the tax money of hard working 
people. Leaving the world of human relations and ancestral worship in favor of a life of 
seclusion in the confines of the monastery was also seen as the reason for draining the 
imperial treasury. In fact, the 845 anti-Buddhist persecutions were to a great extent an 
attempt on behalf of the Tang court to replenish its treasury by confiscating the vast 
lands, gold, property, and expensive assets owned by the Buddhist establishment. Other 
attacks were directed at Buddhism’s ontology of illusionism and its obsession with the 
emptiness of the universal mind. Therefore Buddhist other-worldliness was attacked on 
social and political grounds as well as on metaphysical grounds.       
 On the metaphysical level, it was only natural that Neo-Confucians would turn to 
the most suspiciously Buddhist quality in their ontology: the world of Principle. Since 
Principle in Buddhism was associated with the notion of emptiness (空) or the Sanskrit 
sunyata, it was important for Neo-Confucians to stress the concreteness of their notion of 
Principle. They therefore created a sharp distinction between the “empty Principle” (xuli 
虛理, or kongli 空理) of Buddhism and their own “concrete Principle” (shili, 實理).876 As 
opposed to the radical emptiness of the Buddhist notion of li, Neo-Confucians insisted on 
                                            
875 Kuhn, The age of Confucian rule, p. 111. 
876 Meng Peiyuan, Zhuxi Zhexue Shilun, p. 89. 
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emphasizing the “substantiality which is in the midst of emptiness” (虛中之實), thereby 
integrating the Buddhist emptiness with the Confucian stress on social activism 
(substantiality). When Zhu Xi was asked what was wrong about Buddhism, he replied 
that “what is decreed by heaven is nature. This is the belief of Confucians. But the 
Buddhists say that essence or reality is emptiness… Li is a reality of which the Buddhists 
are ignorant.”877 Most importantly, Neo-Confucians stressed that the emptiness of 
Buddhism’s Principle and its undermining of the phenomenal world was tantamount to 
the abolition of reality’s inherent moral content. When Zhu Xi stated that “what is 
decreed by heaven is nature” he was referring to the cardinal Neo-Confucian belief that 
nature (性) is actually Principle as it manifests itself in humans. Since human nature in 
Neo-Confucianism is seen as composed of the four Confucian virtues: humanity (仁), 
righteousness (儀), ritual propriety (禮), and wisdom (智), it also entailed that Principle 
had the same concrete moral content.878 Therefore, far from denoting emptiness, Principle 
represents the essence of what makes us human; like human nature in the Mencian view, 
it is inherently good, and as such it is anything but empty.879 This is one of the most 
central examples of the way Neo-Confucians insisted on a metaphysics that supported 
their moral philosophy of social engagement and political activism.   
                                            
877 Zhuzi Yulei, 126 “About Buddhism.” 
878 More specifically, Neo-Confucians believed that their concrete Principle was first and 
foremost humanity (仁), which included the other three virtues. Mencius focused on four of the 
five Confucian virtues, excluding the fifth virtue of truthfulness (xin, 信). 
879 Buddhist might actually argue that emptiness is good, since in their view emptiness is not 
really nothingness but rather ultimate reality. In any case this was the way Neo-Confucians 
distinguished themselves from Buddhism. 
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 According to Neo-Confucians, Principle could only be discerned through the 
concrete and manifest features of life. One of the most famous Neo-Confucian dictums 
was that “as soon as there was principle, there was material force. As material force is 
everywhere, principle penetrates everything.”880 Therefore, it is important to bear in mind 
that Neo-Confucians never attached particular importance to Principle in detachment 
from things and affairs. As opposed to Buddhism, in which li was emptiness, in Neo-
Confucian philosophy li as an abstraction was meaningless; it only became significant 
once it was manifest in the world of qi. 
 The clarification of the term dao in Chen Chun’s Neo-Confucian Terms Explained 
is a good illustration of the differences between the Lixue School and Buddhism.881 It is 
clear from Chen Chun’s explanation that he seeks to highlight the concrete value of the 
Confucian dao and Principle in contradistinction to Daoism and Buddhism:  
The Tao [dao] Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu talked about bears no relation to man and things. 
They both regarded Tao as transcending objects and physical forms throughout heaven 
and earth. Take the saying “Tao  is prior to the Great Ultimate”, That is to say that before 
the beginning of heaven, earth, and the thousand things, there was an empty principle…In 
talking about the Tao the Buddhists have about the same idea. However, while the basic 
doctrine of the Taoists is non-being, that of the Buddhists is emptiness…They want to 
eliminate all human affairs… They don’t realize that Tao is nothing but the principle of 
human affairs.882  
 
                                            
880 Chen Chun, Neo-Confucian Terms Explained, W.T. Chan trans., p. 109. 
881 The title Beixi Ziyi is usually translated according to Chan’s wording “Neo-Confucian Terms 
Explained.” The literal meaning is Bei Xi’s Explanation of Terms. Bei Xi was the literary name 
of Chen Chun, or Chen Beixi. This book was originally called The Detailed Interpretation of 
Terms (字義詳解 – Ziyi Xiangjie), or The Meaning of Terms in the Four Books (四書字義 – Si 
Shu Ziyi). 
882 Chen Chun, Neo-Confucian Terms Explained, W.T. Chan tr. p. 106. 
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Chen Chun goes on to refines this distinction by giving a helpful example from daily life:  
Take righteousness in the relation between ruler and minister. Righteousness is the Way 
[Dao] while ruler and minister are concrete objects. The principle of righteousness must 
be seen in the ruler and the minister. It is impossible that outside of the ruler and minister 
there is something called righteousness.883  
This is a good example of the embodied nature of the dao and the relationship between 
universal Principles on the one hand and concrete human action on the other. Although 
the Principle of righteousness reflects the dao, the notion of dao without its manifestation 
in human behavior is meaningless. What may seem like minor differences between Neo-
Confucians and Buddhists, actually had implications that extended to almost every facets 
of human life. The emptiness of the Buddhist notion of Principle undermined the whole 
Neo-Confucian project and the moral philosophy that functioned as its foundation. The 
weight this supposedly minor dispute carried in the eyes of Neo-Confucians is reflected 
in Zhang Jiucheng’s warning that “the Tao is not Emptiness (hsu) or Non-being (wu), but 
rather nothing more that what functions in daily life. To regard emptiness or non-being as 
the Dao is enough to destroy the country.”884    
 The importance of embodiment within the world of affairs runs like a thread 
through the whole of Neo-Confucian thought. Just as Principle is impossible without qi, 
so is form (ti) meaningless without its function (Yong). The abstract according to Neo-
Confucians always manifests itself in concrete reality. This is the main difference with 
the Greek and Indian worlds, in which we see realms of existence that are detached from 
                                            
883 Ibid., p.107. 
884 Huang Zongxi (黃宗羲) Quan Zuwang (全租望) et al., eds., Records of Song and Yuan 
Confucians (Song-Yuan Xuean, 宋元學安), First printing 1838. 40.1312. Quoted in Hoyt 
Tillman, Confucian Discourse and Chu Hsi’s Ascendancy, p.27. 
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material life and prioritized as the “really real.” In Chinese eyes, the experiential, 
embodied, and concrete features of reality are paramount. As Chen Chun himself states: 
“In the learning of the School of the Sage, there is nothing that is not concrete. However 
the Taoists want purity and vacuity and loathe to do things, and the Buddhists reject 
human affairs”885 Julia Ching notes that one of the reasons Zhu Xi returned to 
Confucianism after a long sojourn in the world of Buddhism was due to a short comment 
made by his teacher Li Tong. When Zhu told Li about his interests in the Chan school the 
latter replied: ”How is it that you understand so much that is abstract, but not the things 
right in front of you? There is nothing mysterious to the Way. You need only to 
understand it in your daily concrete efforts.”886 That Li Tong demanded that Zhu Xi focus 
on the “things in front of him” reflects a typical Confucian insistence to remain “close” to 
reality. It therefore makes perfect sense that Zhu Xi and Lu Zuqian decided to call their 
highly influential anthology of Neo-Confucian philosophy the Reflection on Things at 
Hand.     
 As mentioned earlier, Buddhists associated li with emptiness and the pure 
enlightened mind. Here again, Neo-Confucians who made the notion of the mind one of 
the most central features of their philosophy refused to define the mind in detachment 
from the human sphere. Instead of the abstract and universal mind of Buddhism, they 
argued that the mind had one side that could potentially become a pure reflection of 
Principle, and another, manifest side that was expressed in the form of human 
consciousness, cognition, and emotions. Therefore Neo-Confucians were successful in 
                                            
885 Chen Chun, Neo-Confucian Terms Explained, p. 107. 
886 Julia Ching. The Religious Thought of Chu Hsi, p. 175. 
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associating one side of the mind with abstract notions such as Heavenly Principle and a 
state of being before the manifestation of emotions (weifa), while on the other hand they 
attacked Buddhists for their separation of the mind from matter and human nature.887 This 
unique interpretation of the mind reflects a typical strategy of appropriating an analytic 
feature (the unmanifest mind) and the simultaneous integration of world affirming 
synthetic features in which the mind is seen as being in charge of human intentionality 
and our engagement with things and affairs. Stated more simply, one side of the mind 
was the universal mind associated with li while the other was the mundane and cognitive 
mind associated with qi; the fact that Neo-Confucians believed that li and qi were 
inseparable helped them argue that the mind functioned as a nexus of the world of 
phenomena and noumena.  
 Examples of the appropriation of other-worldly elements and their integration 
with a typically Confucian world-affirming stance can be discerned in other topics I have 
explored in this unit. As we saw in the discussion on meditation, while Buddhists made 
an effort to empty the mind, abandon the world, and forget the self, Neo-Confucians 
made sure that the mind was infused with attentiveness (jing) and oriented towards the 
penetration of Principle in the world of human affairs.888 With regard to ritual, the linking 
of social patterns to the contents of the mind, cemented the importance of embodied 
action in the world but also gave ritual a new metaphysical foundation. Although a new 
philosophy of mind became central to the Neo-Confucian worldview, cultural patterns 
                                            
887 Yao Weiqun (姚卫群), “Participating in the World,” in Piao Pang, ed., Ru Lin 儒林 
(Confucian Literati), p. 291. 
888 Yao Xinzhong, An Introduction to Confucianism, pp. 221-2. 
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expressed through ritual behavior remained central and represented a stark difference 
from the Buddhist attempt to abolish the conventionality of culture in favor of a 
normative and pure universal mind. As we have seen, unlike the reclusive Buddhist 
monastery composed of individuals who abandoned the family unit and retired from 
social life, the Neo-Confucian academy developed upon the foundation of private family 
schools in which ancestral worship and the goal of social engagement played a central 
position. Although the Neo-Confucian academies introduced a new pedagogical program 
focused on self-cultivation, meditational techniques, and a more introspective approach to 
learning, the goal of the academy was to produce moral, socially engaged, and 
responsible individuals who could actively contribute to the transformation of society.  
 As the examples above suggest, as opposed to classical Confucianism, the Lixue 
School disclosed a peculiar philosophical dualism in which a higher sphere of existence 
was logically set above the world of social affairs. The new philosophy of Principle, the 
universal mind (daoxin), and concepts such as the Supreme Ultimate all point to a more 
conscious distinction between the world of noumena and the world of affairs with which 
classical Confucianism was concerned. Scholars agree that this new philosophy of 
Principle and mind was the direct result of Buddhist influence, but it is also clear that the 
other-worldly tendencies of Buddhism were tempered by a unique philosophy of qi, 
ritual, learning, and social engagement that gave Neo-Confucian borrowings a distinctly 
native and world-affirming character.  
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4.7.7 Universalism vs. Particularism  
 In the second unit I showed how the Confucian and Jewish traditions were far 
more particularistic than universal traditions such as Buddhism and Christianity. 
Although the type of particularism the two traditions disclose differed, it is fairly clear 
that both cultures saw their worldviews as confined to an exclusive group of people that 
shared a specific cultural ethos. It is due to such particularism that both traditions never 
felt compelled to engaged in extensive proselytization and that their systems of thought 
never exhibited the kind of cross-cultural transportability characteristic of universal 
traditions. Buddhism is an excellent example of such transportability; it travelled from its 
homeland in India and rapidly became the most dominant religious force in Asia. Zhu Xi 
himself noted: 
Since the Buddhist doctrine spread in China like fire, many Confucianists, who have not 
been able to look through the gate of the school of the Sage, have already been attracted 
to it and drowned in it together with the Buddhists. They consider Buddhism the great 
Way. Consequently, its vulgarism has extended throughout the world, so that good and 
bad people, the intelligent and the stupid, men and women, and servants all have become 
accustomed to believing in it.889  
 
Due to its universal message Buddhism metamorphosed to suite the particular conditions 
of each culture with which it came into contact. Although Chinese culture certainly 
influenced the cultures of Japan, Korea, and Vietnam, it is nevertheless a fact that prior to 
the Song dynasty, Confucianism never managed to take root in neighboring countries. 
                                            
889 Zhu Xi and Lu Zuqian, Reflections on Things at Hand, 8:14. W.T. Chan trans. p. 287. 
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Chinese “cultural particularism” saw the unique civilizational patterns of the Confucian 
sages as the only model for the humanization and acculturation of people. Those who did 
not take part in the particular cultural paradigm bequeathed by the sages and 
implemented, to various degrees, by the Chinese imperial order, were considered 
uncivilized and inferior. Chinese particularism can be traced back to the origins of the 
Confucian tradition. In analect 3.5, Confucius stated that “barbarians [夷狄] with rulers 
are not as good as various Chinese states without them.” This analect reflects the 
traditional distinction between the civilized Chinese who inhabited the center of the 
world, or the Middle Kingdom, and the cultureless tribal people on the periphery (夷夏之
防). According to Confucius, merely having leaders is not sufficient; it is only the 
patterns of culture that can transform humans into an honorable and civilized community.    
 The cultural elitism of Confucianism was challenged by Buddhism, which 
introduced into China a more metaphysically inclusive system applicable to all sentient 
beings. Buddhist universalism was especially attractive to “barbarians” and minorities 
who were often looked down upon by the Chinese Han majority. As noted earlier, 
Buddhist universalism was related to the fact that spiritual realization was seen as a factor 
of humanity’s shared cognitive architecture. This meant that cultural and ethnic 
affiliations were marginalized. Consequently the endorsement of Buddhism provided 
non-Chinese groups, as well as Han Chinese from low social strata, an opportunity to be 
treated as equals. This important leveling effect helped Buddhism win the hearts of 
people who otherwise felt inferior within the exclusive and culturally specific Confucian 
hierarchy. In a well-known passage in the Platform Sutra, the future sixth patriarch of the 
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Chan School Hui Neng (慧能, 638－713) recounts his first encounter with the head abbot 
Hongren. The latter asked Hui Neng:   
Where are you from that you come to this mountain to make obeisance to me? Just what 
is it that you are looking for from me? I [Hui Neng] replied: I am from Ling-nan, a 
commoner from Hsin-chou… I am seeking no particular thing, but only the 
Buddhadharma. The Master then reproved me, saying: If you're from Ling-nan then 
you're a barbarian (獦獠). How can you become a Buddha? I replied: Although people 
from the south and people from the north differ, there is no north and south in Buddha 
nature. Although my barbarian's body and your body are not the same, what difference is 
there in our Buddha nature?890 
 
It is not a surprise that Buddhism’s first phase of consolidation in China took place 
during the Wei-Jin period of disunity, a period of social and political chaos and the 
emergence of non-Han powers that saw Buddhism as conducive to their greater 
integration and acceptance in the Chinese world.891  
 The fact that Neo-Confucianism, especially the School of Principle, represents the 
first time that the Confucian tradition exercised a profound impact on neighboring 
cultures, bears testimony to the new level of universalism it developed. On the most 
fundamental level we see the emergence of a cultural universalism, namely, a belief that 
“civilization was something all could learn and all could share; it did not depend on one’s 
birth.” This had implications on an ethnic level as well, since more than ever before it 
was believed that civilization could theoretically be practiced by non-Chinese people. 
This became especially relevant since during the eleventh century there were thousands 
                                            
890  Philip B. Yampolsky trans., The Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch: The Text of the Tun-
Huang Manuscript (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), section 3 pp. 127-128. 
891 Kenneth Ch’en, Buddhism in China, p. 145. 
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of Han Chinese Confucians employed in the foreign Jin and Liao imperial courts.892 
Therefore, as opposed to the classical Confucian view, culture became more 
democratized and accessible by virtue of one’s intellectual merit rather than ethnicity. 
But Neo-Confucians made the biggest strides towards universalism in the field of 
metaphysics and ethics. One of the goals of the School of Principle was to equip 
Confucianism, especially its axiology, with a new metaphysical foundation. It can be said 
that Neo-Confucianism represent a historical shift from the outdated correlative 
cosmology of the Han dynasty towards a more updated metaphysics that was inspired by 
Buddhism (and Buddhist-influenced Daoism).893 Generally speaking, the cosmology of 
the Han dynasty sought to integrate the complexity of life into correlative typologies 
which included seasons, colors, constellations, directions, bodily organs, and endless 
other features. But in addition to “things,” it also sought to integrated historical change, 
dynastic transitions, environmental catastrophes, and ethical conduct into its 
cosmological scheme. In other words, it was a comprehensive integration of both things 
and events. When unexpected data presented itself, things were reinterpreted in light of 
new events such that they correlated with existing categories. This was a synthetic system 
par-excellence, one that is fundamentally open-ended and shows an internal flexibility 
that enables it to constantly integrate and harmonize new information. Such a system can 
be contrasted with the philosophical nominalism of Neo-Confucianism, which attempted 
                                            
892 Bol, Neo-Confucianism in History, p. 14. 
893 For a detailed analysis of correlative thought in China see A.C. Graham, Reason and 
Spontaneity (London Totowa, N.J.: Curzon Press Barnes & Noble Books, 1985), pp. 57-60; 
section 1.5 passim. The term ‘correlative’ did not originate with Graham; for more on the 
evolution of the notion of correlative thought in scholarship see Hall and Ames, Anticipating 
China p. 295 n.22. 
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to reach simplicity of structure based on a de-contextualized and static metaphysics that 
remained generally unchanged in face of new data. It is important to stress that the idea 
of process and dynamism (生生不息) remained central to Neo-Confucian thought, but 
was expressed within a metaphysical framework that was far more stable than the Han 
model.  
 As suggested earlier, Zhou Dunyi’s Diagram of the Supreme Ultimate represents 
such a static, conclusive, and decontextualized metaphysical architectonic. Germane to 
our discussion is that such qualities lent Neo-Confucian cosmology its universal 
applicability, a metaphysics that could theoretically be accepted by people who did not 
subscribe to the particularities of a specific political, cultural, or ethnic ideology. Hajime 
Nakamura has pointed out the relationship between static metaphysics and universalism. 
According to him the tendency towards universalism “generally draws more attention to 
nature or essence of things than to their manifestation which are always changing, and 
again this tendency stresses the static aspect of things more strongly than their dynamic 
function.”894 In contrast to the cosmology of the Han dynasty, the brushing aside of 
cultural and historical particulars in Neo-Confucian metaphysics helped this system 
convey a greater cross-cultural appeal. Generally speaking, we see a move from a fairly 
simplistic correlation of events and things to a more causal and linear progression, as 
seen in the Diagram of the Supreme Ultimate. As I will show soon, Neo-Confucian 
universalism was qualified with many particularistic features, but the fact that we see a 
                                            
894 Hajime Nakamura, Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples: India, China, Tibet, Japan (London; 
New York: Kegan Paul International: Distributed by Columbia University Press, 1997), p. 73. 
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shift from a correlative perspective towards a more static cosmology based on formal 
relations is a point worth noting with respect to universalism.895  
 The universal applicability of Neo-Confucianism was directly related to its 
philosophy of Principle. As discussed earlier, the relative de-contextualized status of the 
sphere of Principle meant that it was not necessarily associated with a specific cultural 
paradigm. Wing-tsit Chan argued that the universality of li cannot be overstated, and 
although Principle was constantly related to the world of affairs it is beyond doubt that a 
new horizon for a trans-cultural noumenal world has opened.896 While the central channel 
for creating order in classical Confucianism was ritual, in Neo-Confucianism we see a 
shift to the organizing patterns of li or Principle. This reflects a move from the 
conventionality of culture to the normativity of a more transcendent and metaphysically 
inclusive vision. The Cheng brothers were very much aware of this universality when 
they stated that “there is only one li in the world. You may extend it over the four seas, 
and it is everywhere true.”897 Li is therefore just as real for the barbarians as it is for the 
Chinese. The idea that it “extends over the four seas” could hardly be said about the 
localized ritualistic pattern of classical Confucianism.  
 Neo-Confucians claimed that the new universal paradigm they promoted was 
based on the Mencian ideal of universal sagehood and the search for the “lost mind” (求
放心). But in reality their universalism, as well as their philosophy of mind, was just as 
much or even more indebted to Buddhism than to the Mencian perspective. Although 
                                            
895 Correlative thought has often been contrasted with the logical thought of the West. 
896 Wing-tsit Chan, “Neo-Confucianism and Chinese Scientific Thought,” p. 325. 
897 I-Shu 2A:15b, in Chan ibid., p. 325, n.65. 
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Mencius claimed that all humans had the potential of becoming a Yao or a Shun, in 
reality sagehood was a lofty ideal rather than something that could actually be attained. 
Neo-Confucians changed this picture by providing individuals with real prospects for 
self-transformation. As discussed earlier, they did this by developing a philosophy of 
mind that transcended the specific mind of humans. The universal mind, or as Neo-
Confucians called it, the daoxin (道心), was a clear emulation of the Buddhist reliance on 
a pan-human cognitive apparatus. Neo-Confucians, in a typical conflation of terms, 
believed that the mind of the way was synonymous with Principle. Lu Xiang Shan stated 
that “Sages appeared tens of thousands of generations ago. They shared this mind; they 
shared this Li. Sages will appear tens of thousands of generations to come. They will 
share this mind; they will share this Li. Over the Four Seas sages will appear…”898 Here 
again we see a philosophy of mind that is relevant to people over the four seas.  
 The shift towards a universal ethos in Neo-Confucianism can also be discerned in 
changes that took place in commentaries to the classics. As opposed to the commentary 
of the prolific Han dynasty scholar Zheng Xuan (鄭玄, 127-200), Zhu Xi’s commentary 
to the Doctrine of the Mean, although building on Zheng’s work, adds a universal 
dimension that was absent prior to the Song. Nylan and Wilson contend that while Zhu 
Xi too “reads the text as Confucius’s discourse on cultivation, Zhu universalizes its 
message and applies it not just to the sovereign, but to all classically educated men—to 
the gentleman. Indeed, Zhu Xi places his greatest hopes not in the ruler, but in men who 
                                            
898 ibid., p. 326. Lu Xiangshan (Lu Jiuyuan) was a representative of the School of Heart who 
made no distinction between Principle and Mind. However, his notion of the universal mind is 
relevant to the School of Principle as well. 
  
498 
resolve to practice the Dao outside of government with the hope of transforming the 
world…Zhu Xi’s unmistakably innovative understanding of the Constant Mean [The 
Doctrine of the Mean] derives from his strategic selection from the Four Books to 
formulate a teaching well suited to an age profoundly changed by Buddhism”899 These 
changes were directly related to the central Confucian notion of human nature. One of the 
most important contribution Neo-Confucians introduced in terms of moral philosophy 
was the view that all beings were endowed by the same inherent moral nature. Morality 
was no longer a product of acculturation but rather part and parcel of our original 
essence. Here again we see a departure from cultural particularism towards a universality 
that is founded upon humanity’s shared essence. It is also another example of the way 
Neo-Confucians anchored their axiology in their revolutionary metaphysics. The idea of a 
universally shared moral nature was derived from the Neo-Confucian dictum that “what 
Heaven impart to man is human nature.” Nature was then associated with the Principle of 
man and as such it was both good and shared by all human beings. 
 In all the examples above we see how Neo-Confucianism developed in close 
conformity to Buddhism. My argument has so far focused on the field of metaphysics but 
Buddhism also exercised a profound influence on Neo-Confucian ethics.900 With respect 
to our topic, it is important to bear in mind that classical Confucianism was very much 
opposed to the idea of a universal ethics. Mozi who advocated a the idea of Universal 
                                            
899 Michael Nylan and Thomas Wilson, Lives of Confucius: Civilization’s Greatest Sage Through 
the Ages (New York: Doubleday, 2010), pp. 123-124. 
900 Since the essence of the Neo-Confucian project was to provide traditional Confucian axiology 
with a metaphysical underpinning, it is impossible to detach Neo-Confucian moral thought from 
its metaphysics. 
  
499 
Love (兼愛) was bitterly attacked by Confucians for failing to see the value of the 
Confucian notion of “love with gradation” (爱有差等). Mencius famously said that 
“Mo's principle is ‘to love all equally,’ which does not acknowledge the peculiar 
affection due to a father. But to acknowledge neither king nor father is to be in the state 
of a beast.”901 In Neo-Confucianism this somewhat nepotistic picture dramatically 
changes such that we see the emergence of a much more inclusive and universal form of 
empathy, one that “sought to infuse the entire society with a revitalized spirit, class 
barriers notwithstanding.”902 This is where Zhang Zai’s influential Western Inscription (
西铭) became especially important. In the famous opening passage of this treatise Zhang 
states: 
Heaven is my father and Earth is my mother, and even such a small creature as I, finds an 
intimate place in their midst. Therefore that which fills the universe I regard as my body 
and that which directs the universe I consider my nature. All people are my brothers and 
sisters, and all things are my companions.903  
 
It is not hard to detect the Buddhist undertones in this ecumenical passage. Zhang Zai’s 
idea of universal commiseration clearly echoes the Buddhist stress on the Bodhisattva’s 
compassion. His radical materialism helped him argue that reality, including things, 
affairs, and people, are seamlessly connected through qi. The Western Inscription became 
                                            
901 Mencius, 3B:14: 楊氏為我, 是無君也; 墨氏兼愛, 是無父也. 無父無君, 是禽獸也. For other 
examples see Mencius 3a:5: 孟子曰: 夫夷子, 信以為人之親其兄之子為若親其鄰之赤子乎? 
and 7A:26: 墨子兼愛, 摩頂放踵利天下, 為之. 
902 James T. C. Liu, China Turning Inward. p. 138. 
903 Wing-tsit Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1963), p. 497. The Western Inscription was originally a chapter in Zhang’s Correcting 
Youthful Ignorance (正蒙). 
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a favorite of Neo-Confucians and was generally accepted by all future generations of 
lixue thinkers. Theodore de Bary notes that Fan Zhongyan’s political motto “to be first in 
worrying about the world’s troubles and last in the enjoyment of its pleasures,” discloses 
clear “overtones of the Bodhisattva ideal of seeking the salvation of others before passing 
to one’s own reward as a Buddha.”904 It can be said that this universal tendency reached 
its culmination in Zhu Xi’s Treatise on Humanity (renshuo, 仁说), in which the central 
notion of Humanity (ren, 仁), the most important of the five Confucian virtues, takes on 
an unprecedented universal meaning. In this work Zhu Xi claims that the nature of the 
mind of Heaven and earth is to incessantly produce things. Heaven and Earth impart this 
mind to all creatures, and in humans the mind is expressed in the form of Humanity. This 
is how Zhu Xi manages to associate the classical notion of Humanity with cosmic 
creativity. Chen Chun notes that “Humanity is the totality of the mind’s principle of 
production. It is always producing and reproducing without cease… therefore humanity is 
the root of love.”905 Humanity becomes associated with the mind of man, and when this 
mind is fully realized it is expressed in the form of an all-encompassing love and 
commiseration. Humanity therefore becomes the essence of the mind and the final 
destination of self-realization. Cheng Yi claimed that “Humanity is universal impartiality; 
it is the foundation of goodness.”906 In another instance he sound suspiciously Buddhist 
when he associates Humanity with the elimination of desires: “humanity is simply the 
absence of even an iota of selfish desire. As soon as there is any selfish desire, there will 
                                            
904 William de Bary “Common Tendencies” in Confucianism in Action, pp. 33-34. 
905 Chen Chun, Neo-Confucian Terms Explained, p. 71. 
906 I Chuan 2:34a, Commentary of the hexagram 24 fu “return” (復). 
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no longer be humanity.”907 In other words, selfishness is contrary to the inter-
connectedness of all things and therefore the opposite of universal love.  This 
interpretation of Humanity is a dramatic departure from classical Confucianism’s stress 
on love with gradation and Mencius’ attacks against Mozi’s universal love. Here again, 
we see how Neo-Confucians skillfully reinterpreted their traditional vocabulary in order 
to respond to the attractive ethical universalism of Buddhism. The notion of Humanity 
was “cosmologized” and transformed to denote a cosmic unity motivated and realized 
through love and commiseration.908 
 As these examples suggest, Neo-Confucians shifted towards a dramatically new 
understanding of the relationship between man and the cosmos and an increasingly 
universal and normative picture of reality. The cross-cultural applicability of their new 
metaphysics and the normative nature of central concepts such as Principle, the Mind of 
the Way, and Humanity represented a shift towards a more inclusive worldview. Their 
moral philosophy was transformed such that it became relevant to all social strata and 
ethnic groups regardless of status and background. Zhu Xi stated that “from the son of 
Heaven on down to the commoners, all without exception should regard self-cultivation 
                                            
907 Cheng Yi quoted by Zhu Xi in his Commentary to Analects (論語集注) 6.5 -6.7: 子曰: 回也, 
其心三月不違仁, 其餘則日月至焉而已矣. Cheng Yi: 程子曰: 三月, 天道小變之節, 言其久也, 
過此則聖人矣. 不違仁, 只是無纖毫私欲. 少有私欲, 便是不仁. 
908 Zhu creates a correlation between Heaven’s mind, which consists of origination, flourishing, 
advantage, and firmness (元, 亨, 利, 贞). With the four Confucian virtues: humanity, 
righteousness, propriety, and wisdom. According to Zhu the four virtues “in their emanation and 
function, constitute the feeling of love, respect, being right, and discrimination between right and 
wrong—and the feeling of commiseration pervades them all.” Chan, Source Book, p. 594. 
Humanity represents the perfect manifestation of the Mind and is also seen as the Principle of 
love. This theory is based on Mencius’ Four Beginning. 
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as the root.”909 As opposed to the strict designation of roles and responsibilities according 
to the classical Confucian hierarchy, Neo-Confucians believed that the procedure for 
moral perfection presented in The Great Learning was a “universal standard for learning 
based on what is common to all people.”910 Their absorption of new ideas about universal 
love, compassion towards living things, the common moral nature of all humans, active 
philanthropy, and the universal duty of self-cultivation all bear the clear signs of a 
Buddhist impact which “gave Confucianism a new, decidedly humane face.”911 
4.7.8 Neo-Confucian Particularism  
 In order to understand the dilemmas and concerns that Neo-Confucians faced in 
their appropriation of an increasingly universalistic worldview, it is important to 
understand the complex historical realities of their time. The first and most important fact 
to bear in mind is that the Song period represents a historical shift in the power relations 
between the Han Chinese and northern non-Han groups. For the first time in Chinese 
history we see the emergence of extremely powerful and well-organized dynasties that 
posed a real threat to Chinese hegemony. During the early Song period it was initially the 
Khitan Liao dynasty (遼, 907–1125), then the Tangut Xi Xia dynasty (西夏, 1038-1227), 
later the Jurchen Jin dynasty (金, 1115–1234) that forced the Song to the south, and 
finally the Mongols Yuan Dynasty (元, 1271–1368) which brought to the final demise of 
the Song and its replacement by the first foreign dynasty in history to gain full control of 
                                            
909 Bol, Neo-Confucianism in History, p. 116. 
910 Ibid., p. 136. 
911 Kuhn, The Age of Confucian Rule, p. 112. 
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the entire central plain. In fact, in 319 years of Song rule there was no real “China” at all. 
Territories were divided among different nations and states with no one showing clear 
supremacy; a situation that is best defined as regionalism rather than the rule of a single 
dynasty.912 It goes without saying that this was a huge humiliation in the eyes of Chinese 
conservatives who refused to come to terms with the idea of China as equal among, or 
even inferior to others. For instance, the Shanyuan treaty (1005 C.E.) between the Song 
and Liao was an unprecedented Chinese acceptance of equality among powers. This went 
against the idea of a centralized and unified Middle Kingdom and prevented the Song 
from achieving the same kind of glory that was associated with the great Han, and 
especially the powerful Tang dynasty.913 Indeed, mutualism frequently felt more like 
subordination which included appeasing the Liao as well Xi Xia and Jin with tributes and 
indemnities, thereby recognizing their rulers and imperial courts as legitimate political 
entities.914 The constant military humiliations the Song suffered led to a rise in 
xenophobic sentiments among Confucians and a strong urge to revive their classical 
tradition.915 It is especially relevant that Neo-Confucians clearly represented the hawkish 
wing of Song politics, which refused to accept these new realities and constantly pushed 
for military action against the barbarians. Fortunately the emperor was surrounded by a 
                                            
912 Naomi Standen, Unbounded Loyalty: Frontier Crossing in Liao China (Honolulu: University 
of Hawaii Press, 2007), p. 3. 
913 Kuhn, op. cit., p. 46. 
914 The Shanyuan treaty included an annual indemnity payment of 200,000 bolts of silk, and 
100,000 ounces of silver. In 1042 this treaty was re-negotiated and the indemnity was increased 
to 300,000 bolts of silk and 200,000 ounces of silver. This payment was a substantial burden on 
the Song economy. Other tributes were payed to the Xi Xia dynasty in 1044 and especially to the 
Jin dynasty in the twelfth century in the peace treaty of 1141. See Kuhn ibid., pp. 45-46. 
915 Gardner, Zhu Xi’s Reading of the Analects, p. 19. 
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camp that preferred pacifying the foreigners and thereby saved the militarily weak Song 
from further embarrassment.  
 After the humiliating arrest of emperor Song Huizong (1126) and the subsequent 
relocation of the Song court to the south, the expanding Jin dynasty presented itself as the 
true holders of the Mandate of Heaven.916 Even worse, in 1142 Emperor Gaozong signed 
an official document accepting the status of the Song dynasty as a vassal state of the Jin. 
The superiority of a barbarian state over China became an official fact, one that was hard 
to stomach for many critics of the pacifying diplomacy of the Song court. Zhu Xi, for 
instance, “could no longer beat the thought that China and her civilization were dislodged 
from the heartland.”917 In a memorial to Chen Liang he wrote: 
your obedient servant ventures to suggest that only China—the standard energy of 
Heaven and Earth—is that which the heavenly mandate to rule endows, where the hearts 
of the people gather, where the ritual of civilization cluster, and that which kings and 
emperors have inherited for a hundred generations. Is it at all conceivable that such a 
country could be violated by the perverse energy of the barbarians?918  
It seems that at least on this issue Zhu Xi and his ideological opponent, the utilitarian 
Chen Liang agreed. Chen warned that “just as the sages of antiquity did not share the 
central plain with the barbarians. China should share neither culture not rituals with the 
                                            
916 Liu Yangzhong, “Perception of “Inner China” and Legitimate Cathay Concepts in the 
Literature of Jin Dynasty,” in Frontiers of Literary Studies in China 1, no. 3 (2007): 431-48. For 
more about Song Jin relations see Hoyt Tillman and Stephen H. West, China Under Jurchen 
Rule: Essays on Chin Intellectual and Cultural History (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1995). 
917 Kuhn, The Age of Confucian Rule, pp. 78-79. 
918 Hoyt Tillman, Utilitarian Confucianism: Chen Liang’s Challenge to Chu Hsi (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1982), p. 173. 
  
505 
barbarians.”919 In common to these assertions is that both Zhu Xi and Chen Liang were 
unhappy with the barbarian’s adoption of Chinese norms and rituals, and both of them 
agreed that only the Chinese empire could control the center of the world and unit 
Heaven and Earth. Indeed, one of the most alarming things about the ascendency of 
foreign powers during the Song, was that they adopted the Chinese model for rulership 
including the characteristically Confucian imperial rituals.920  
 Once the Northern Song provinces were captured by the Jin dynasty, the minority 
Jurchens became the de jure rulers of a ninety-percent Han majority,921 Including 
thousands of Confucians that served in the Jurchen imperial court. The Jin dynasty began 
to organize itself according to the traditional Confucian model, they “adopted the Chinese 
calendar in 1137, reinstituted the civil service examination in 1138, imposed rules of 
imperial audience, including Chinese robes for the emperor and officials and Song music 
at court in 1139, honored Confucius in 1140, and built imperial ancestral temples.”922 
During the reign of Wanyan Liang (b. 1149) who pushed for an intense program of 
sinicization, it became clear that the Jurchens were eager to establish themselves as a 
legitimate Chinese dynasty.923 Liang’s successors went a step further; not only did they 
claim that the Jin possessed the Mandate of Heaven but they argued that “the Jin was a 
                                            
919 Kuhn, The Age of Confucian Rule, p. 8. 
920 Ibid., p. 50. 
921 Ibid., p. 80. 
922 Tao Jing-Shen, The Jurchen in Twelfth Century China: A Study in Sinicization (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 1976), p. 42.  
923 Dynastic History of the Jin (金史) Comp. Tuo Tuo (1344) (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1975), 
24:550.  
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natural link in the historic chain of Chinese dynasties [正統].”924 The growing similarities 
between the Jin and Song courts, together with the fact that the Jurchens were militarily 
superior, must have been extremely alarming for those who were eager to stress the 
traditional boundaries between China and barbarian groups. In his analysis of the non-
Han northern dynasties Rolf Trauzettel argues:  
these non-Chinese people rapidly learned how to establish functional government and 
how to employ administrative and ethical principles over which the Chinese claimed a 
cultural monopoly. This barbarian astuteness and its political consequences could not 
help but shake the self-assurance of the scholar-officials of the Sung.925  
With the Song paying tribute to the Jin, some very troubling questions must have haunted 
conservative Confucians: In whose hands was the Mandate of Heaven? Who was the true 
representative of the timeless dao? And most importantly for our discussion, could the 
Han Chinese afford to subscribe to a radically universalist worldview detached from their 
cultural heritage? Wouldn’t that potentially entail the replacement of Han culture by 
foreign powers who simply emulated Chinese models of rulership?  
 It is a grave mistake to assume that the Chinese perception of “Chinese-ness” was 
confined to a cultural particularism. It is important to remember that “Culture” was 
mainly associated with the intellectual and spiritual legacy of the Han ethnicity. Dieter 
Kuhn contends that the “Song emperors and their officials feared their neighbors as a 
formidable threat to their dynastic dominance and ethnic superiority.”926 Although today 
                                            
924 Kuhn, The Age of Confucian Rule, p. 83 [My brackets]. 
925 Rolf Trauzettel “Sung Patriotism as a First Step towards Chinese Nationalism,” in John 
Winthrop Haeger ed., Crisis and Prosperity in Sung China (Tucson, Arizona: The University of 
Arizona Press, 1975), pp. 201-202. 
926 Kuhn, The Age of Confucian Rule, p. 5. 
  
507 
the “Chinese speak of their various ethnic groups as “non-Han but Chinese” and so pay 
lip service to the modern idea of a multiethnic state, this was not the perspective of the 
Song…”927 During the Song being Chinese meant being Han Chinese. It is in this light 
that we need to consider Song conservatism and the Neo-Confucian phenomenon: on one 
hand, the spiritual conquest of Buddhism a barbarian religion form the west (India), on 
the other hand, the military and political conquest of the barbarians form the north. As 
James T.C. Liu observes the real danger non-Chinese groups posed to the Han legacy led 
to a more particularistic worldview among Neo-Confucians: 
to many an intellectual who still regarded the peace relations a great humiliation, a soul-
searching question remained inescapable: What had gone wrong? what should be done to 
make the Sung supreme? On these questions, the transcendental moralists [Neo-
Confucians] emerged as particularly vigorous in their advocacy of strict adherence to 
classical Confucian principles according to their new elucidations and interpretations.928   
This restorationist approach on behalf of Neo-Confucians reached a climax during the 
Southern Song; the third phase in the three-phase periodization I proposed. This third 
phase represents a mature reaction of conservative Neo-Confucian forces to Buddhism, 
barbarian military encroachment, and the progressive policies of the Wang Anshi faction. 
Just as the more universalist faction of Wang Anshi advocated an accommodating 
approach towards Buddhism, so was this camp behind the pacifying policies towards 
barbarian dynasties, and according to Neo-Confucians, responsible for the collapse of the 
Northern Song. Therefore, Neo-Confucianism during the Southern Song period can be 
                                            
927 Ibid., p. 8. See more on Han Consciousness in Trauzettel “Song Patriotism,” in Crisis and 
Prosperity in Sung China, pp. 199-213 
928 T. C. Liu, China Turning Inward. p. 133. 
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seen as a reaction to progressive forces both in politics and in religion. Accommodation 
towards barbarian powers and barbarian religion was seen as a real danger to the 
distinctiveness, indeed to the survivability, of Chinese culture. Southern Song 
intellectuals were scarred by humiliation, by their retreat to the South, by the capturing of 
their Emperor and his family, by the forcing of Jurchen customs on the Han majority in 
the north, and by the fact that Han Confucians served in the Jurchen imperial court. The 
first Southern Song emperor Gaozong’s pleading to a Jin general can give us an idea of 
the disgrace that conservative Han Chinese intellectual had to endure. Emperor Gaozong 
wrote: 
At present, there is a lack of manpower for our defense… just as there is no place for us 
to run to… It is  hoped that Your Excellency will pity us… As indicated previously in 
several communications from us, we are willing to eliminate our old title [of emperor]. 
This means that all places between heaven and earth would become parts of the Great 
Chin [i.e. Jurchen Empire].929  
It is clear that this type of submission to the uncultivated barbarians had an impact on 
Chinese mentality. As a consequence the Southern Song—the same period that Neo-
Confucianism reached full maturity—is well known for China’s “turn inwards,” and the 
beginning of a neo-traditionalist ideology.930 Therefore, in spite of their construction of a 
more universalistic metaphysics and axiology, the increasingly conservative Neo-
Confucians made sure to anchor their thought in a particularistic paradigm that stressed 
the uniqueness of Han-dominated Chinese culture. It has been observed that one of the 
                                            
929 Quote from ibid., p. 59. 
930 As in James T.C. Liu’s excellent book China’s Turning Inward. As opposed to the optimism 
and outward looking of the Northern Song, the Southern Song was characterized by a more 
pessimistic worldview. Liu, Turning Inwards, pp. 9-11. 
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most salient aspects of the Neo-Confucian legacy in China was an ethnocentrism that 
rejected certain ideas as inherently evil just because they were foreign.931 In the following 
pages I will try to give a few examples of how a particularistic worldview was integrated 
with many of the universalistic elements that were adopted by Neo-Confucians.  
 I have already noted the way the philosophy of li provided Confucianism with a 
more universalistic thrust, but it is important to remember that the School of Principle 
continuously stressed the indispensability of the Chinese Classics in the process of 
investigating Principles. In other words, one was not likely to penetrate the essence of 
Principle by secluded contemplation and certainly not by studying the outrageous 
behavior of the uncultivated Khitans, Jurchens, or Mongols; li was to be found in the 
actions of the Chinese sages as they transpired in the pages of the Classics. Moreover, the 
xenophobia and ethnic particularism that characterized many Neo-Confucians led to a 
revival in historical studies. Indeed, the “Sung exceeded all previous ages in producing 
historical writings,” and some of these major works were authored by prominent Neo-
Confucians.932 Theodore de Bary notes that there was a “noticeable stimulation of 
historical writing on the grand scale in the Sung, Ou-yang Hsiu, Ssu-ma Kuang, Chu Hsi, 
Cheng Ch’iao, Ma Tuan-lin (thirteenth century), and Wang Ying-lin, among others, 
leading the effort to recapitulate and reassess the whole course of Chinese history… 
always they kept in mind that history was a guide to moral and political action…”933 
                                            
931 William de Bary, “A Reappraisal of Neo-Confucianism,” In Studies in Chinese Thought, 
Arthur Wright ed., (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 84. 
932 Ouyang Xiu wrote his influential History of the Five Dynasties privately but it was 
nevertheless recognized as an official compilation. See Ibid., p. 31. 
933 William de Bary “Common Tendencies,” in Confucianism in Action, pp. 42-43. 
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History was therefore presented as yet another channel for the investigation of 
Principle,934 and it also fostered in the Chinese a more conscious appreciation of their 
unique past and cultural roots It was in the Classics and in works of history that students 
were supposed to find the essence of reality. Therefore not only was Principle believed to 
be found in the world of human affairs, but more specifically, it became most clearly 
manifest in the particular affairs of the Han Chinese. Zhuxi’s important Reflections on 
Things at Hand, concludes with an important chapter “On the Dispositions of Sages and 
Worthies” (觀聖賢) which was dedicated to a close analysis of the behavior of admired 
historical figures. This tendency stood in stark contrast to the Buddhist practitioner’s 
search for Buddhahood by following an abstract and mental procedure rather then 
searching for answers in human behavior. In his chapter on “Heterodoxical Doctrines” 
Zhuxi attacks Buddhists for attempting to ”understand the great Way without study. Thus, 
before understanding the mind of the Sage, they have already concluded that the 
manifestation of his mind in historical facts need not be investigated, and, before 
understanding the purpose of the superior man, they have already concluded that it is not 
necessary to devote oneself to the concrete expression of that mind.”935 The Neo-
Confucian insistence on the centrality of the Confucian Classics, native historical studies, 
and the emulation of paradigmatic Confucian sages, meant that the Chinese worldview 
remained the indisputable model for moral behavior.  
 The importance of the Classics also meant that Neo-Confucianism, in spite of its 
attempt to relate to a broader population, remained a relatively elitist philosophy. The 
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935 Zhu Xi and Lu Zuqian, Reflection on Things at Hand, W.T. Chan tr., pp. 288. 
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School of Principle’s scholasticism was therefore an obstacle for attracting a more 
diverse population from different social classes let alone other cultures. Indeed, Neo-
Confucianism lacked the accessibility characteristic of proselytizing and universal 
religion. One example of this lack of accessibility can be seen in their approach towards 
the investigation of things and self-transformation. As opposed to the Neo-Confucian 
School of Heart that followed the sudden enlightenment model (dunwu, 頓悟) of the 
Southern Chan School, the School of Principle conformed more closely to the Northern 
School’s gradual enlightenment model. This meant that instead of the Chan’s easy road to 
enlightenment and reliance on sudden intuition, the Lixue School submitted to a rigorous 
procedure of personal development. Here again, we see a philosophy that could only be 
practiced by fairly privileged people who could afford to immerse themselves in classical 
culture. All these characteristics reflect different impediments on a tradition’s attempt to 
become truly universal. Although the message of Neo-Confucianism was universalistic 
enough to cross to neighboring countries, it was nevertheless too particularistic to 
influence countries that were outside of the traditional Chinese sphere of influence.  
 
4.8 POLITICS AND CULTURAL REFORMATION (教化) 
 According to Neo-Confucians, the leaders of the empire had the moral duty to 
educate and instruct the populace. This was related to a greater Neo-Confucian interest in 
“cultural transformation” or “transformation through instruction” (jiaohua, 教化) which 
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was a sort of Neo-Confucian equivalent to Buddhist proselytization.936 Neo-Confucians 
were trying to promote their creed in the exact places where Buddhist were engaged in 
missionary work or otherwise in uncivilized areas where the people have not yet been 
exposed to high-culture. Their efforts were clearly intended to counter the expansion of 
Buddhism and to provide the populace with a new and native lifestyle. In fact, many 
academies were constructed right next to Buddhist and Daoist temples in order to target 
the same populations as well as convert Buddhists and Daoists to Confucianism. One 
concerned official reporting from the distant borders complained that Buddhist and 
Daoist temples are “spread out here and there, like figures on a chessboard, lined up like 
innumerable stars.”937 As Linda Walton notes, “such claims were frequently used to 
justify the need for academies in order to transform and Confucianize (jiao-hua) people 
who were susceptible to the influences of Buddhism and Taoism.”938 In many areas the 
efforts of jiaohua bore fruit and managed to win the heart of those who were formerly 
“seduced by Buddhism.” Therefore, many Confucian academies were clearly built as 
missionary outposts aimed at transforming the people and introducing civilization to 
peripheral areas of the empire.939 In one county the magistrate built an “academy to 
encourage the “Confucianization” of the area, reputed to be disorderly and uncivilized…” 
upon the completion of the building and the performance of the Confucian rites the 
people were stuck with awe and the town was renamed Ruxue (儒學, Confucian 
                                            
936 Walton, “Neo-COnfucian Academies” in Ebrey Religion in China, p. 349. Walton translates 
jiaohua as ‘Cultural Transformation,’ Pater Bol prefers “transformation through instruction.” 
937 From an inscription on the Weng Islet Academy by Ying Kueiweng in Chih-cheng Ssu-ming 
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Learning).940 Such missionary efforts were associated with the Great Learning‘s famous 
opening passage: “The way of the Great Learning is to make the luminous virtue shine 
forth, and renew (transform) the people…”941 Although Neo-Confucianism bore the signs 
of an elitist paradigms its new popular orientation stood in stark contrast to the extreme 
elitism of classical Confucianism. But instead of the more universalist Buddhist message, 
Neo-Confucians were promoting a more local paradigm that made a typically anti-
universalist distinction between natives and barbarians. Transformation meant the 
acceptance of a Confucian order and a cultural legacy that was particular to a specific 
group of people: the Han Chinese. Non-Han minorities were more than welcome to join 
the Chinese worldview but it entailed a type of submission that was not required in one’s 
conversion to Buddhism. The dedicated efforts to transform the populace reflect both the 
Neo-Confucian attempt to become more universal and open to people of different 
backgrounds, while simultaneously disclosing a qualified universalism that was based on 
the superiority of a specific cultural paradigm.    
 One of the features that most clearly tempered the universalist tendencies in 
Confucianism was the intimate relationship between politics, cosmology and ethics. 
While universalist traditions certainly create a correlation between the ethical and 
cosmological, their worldviews do not involve a specific political system. Jesus, the 
Buddha, and Muhammad were not legitimized or supported by any particular political 
order; on the contrary, their message is exactly that their divine source of legitimation 
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transcends the sphere of politics. Here again Neo-Confucianism introduces a type of 
ambivalence that stems from their synthesis of analytic and synthetic characteristics. On 
the one hand they undermined the imperial claim to moral authority. According to one 
perspective, the emperor was not automatically endowed with the Mandate of Heaven, 
instead, such a privilege depended on his conduct, sincerity, and learning rather than on 
his noble status. According to Hu Anguo’s influential commentary to the Spring and 
Autumn Annals “it was not simply that dynastic claims to “heaven’s mandate” were false, 
but that heaven’s mandate had in fact shifted away from rulers to those who practiced 
true learning…Confucius had the right to take on the authority of a king, because he, not 
the Zhou king, had become the locus of moral guidance”942 This more universalistic and 
moralistic understanding of political legitimacy notwithstanding, Neo-Confucianism 
disclosed a clear particularism regarding the relationship between the Chinese dynastic 
institution and the world at large. Although Neo-Confucians reinterpreted the classical 
conception of rulership, what remained in common with the classical period was that the 
Chinese Son of Heaven had a unique and cardinal function in reality. One obvious 
example was that self-cultivation on behalf of the emperor, supported by his ministers, 
was absolutely crucial for the transformation of society and the attainment of social 
harmony. Zhu Xi himself wrote an essay called Learning for emperors and Kings (帝王
之學) in which he argued that “all affairs in the world have their basis in one man, and 
the person of that one man has its master in one mind. Thus, once the mind of the ruler of 
men is correct, then all affairs in the world will be correct; but once the mind of the ruler 
                                            
942 Bol, Neo-Confucianism in History, pp. 130-131. 
  
515 
is deviant, then all affairs in the world will be deviant.”943 Therefore, the traditional 
connection between Heaven and dynastic power, which persevered in Neo-Confucianism, 
was qualitatively different from the de-politicized worldview of Buddhism.  
 While tribal people could adopt Buddhism without feeling that they were 
surrendering to the values of a foreign culture, practicing Confucianism among non-
Chinese people was frequently accompanied by cultural tensions. In a sense the Chinese 
were expecting foreigners to accept the superiority of the ancient Chinese sages and the 
imperial order. For some the cost of sinicization was too high; when the Jin emperor 
Shizong (金世宗) introduced the jinshi degree and translated the Chinese Classics to the 
Jurchens language in 1173, Jin dynasty conservatives complained that they were studying 
Chinese virtues.944 This was the same period that Jin hardliners launched a conservative 
attack against Wanyan Liang’s efforts towards sinicization. Whereas universal traditions 
constantly appeals to what is common to humans in terms of consciousness, cognition, 
the mind, the intellect, or rational soul, Neo-Confucians promoted what was seen by 
foreigners as a conventional cultural model. Although it is clear that the Neo-Confucian 
paradigm introduced a new appeal to our inherent universal capacity for self-
transformation, we are nevertheless constantly reminded that the unique behavior, ritual 
patterns, and social and political structure of the Chinese empire represents the ideal 
model for harmony between man, Heaven, and Earth. As one scholar notes, the slogans 
Neo-Confucians used such as “restore the old order” (復古), were not merely an attempt 
                                            
943 Ibid., p. 133. Zhu Xi (diwang zhi xue) Ji ii.439, from 1162. (see p. 297 n. 58). 
944 Kuhn, The Age of Confucian Rule, p. 82. 
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to revive classical Confucian axiology but also an attempt to revive the culturally specific 
formal institutions and the rituals that accommodated them.945  
 The unique character of the Chinese Classics is another point to consider; as in the 
case of the Talmud, the contents of the Classics were far less accessible than religious 
texts intended for universal dissemination. Understanding the Classics requires a deep 
familiarity with the minutiae of Chinese culture. Sometimes it seems like the reader is 
intentionally challenged, as if the text is expecting a certain degree of cultural 
sophistication. In contrast, Buddhist sutras, although certainly complex and profound, 
were less concerned with cultural knowledge per-se; the stories they tell are less 
culturally specific, being oriented towards the alleviation of ignorance and the gaining 
knowledge about the nature of reality. In regards to the inaccessibility of Confucianism, 
Daniel Bell raises another important point that pertains to language: 
[It is] true that Confucianism has spread beyond China to such countries as South Korea 
and Japan, and that several philosophers of Western descent have also embraced 
Confucian values. But Confucianism is closely tied to the Chinese language. The fact is 
that most of the texts in the Confucian tradition have been written in Chinese, and 
consequently most adherents of Confucianism have the ability to read Chinese. The early 
Confucian classics have been translated, but even the best translators such as Roger Ames 
recognize that deeper engagement with the tradition requires reading knowledge of 
Chinese.946 
                                            
945 William de Bary, “Common Tendencies” in Confucianism in Action, pp. 34-35. 
946 Daniel Bell, China’s New Confucianism: Politics and Everyday Life in a Changing Society 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2008), p. 161. This may be related to the fact that 
non-Indo-European languages have a tendency to conflate single terms with a broad range of 
meaning, which deems the Chinese Classics (as well as the Talmud) much harder to translate. 
Their non- linear and open-ended structure is another reason for their inaccessibility. 
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As Bell suggest, there is a certain impenetrability to the Chinese language. Such 
linguistic opaqueness together with the insistence on the indispensability of the Classics 
reflects the difficulties involved in introducing Confucianism to foreign cultures, 
especially those outside China’s East-Asian sphere of influence.    
 Neo-Confucians found themselves in quite a conundrum; on the one hand they 
were led by an “unshakable Chinese belief in the universality of their civilization,” while 
on the other hand the conviction that there was a one-to-one correlation between Chinese 
culture and the civilized world could no longer be maintained during the Song. The Liao 
and Jin dynasties disclosed an undeniable cultural sophistication and ingenuity that 
undermined the universalist pretense of many Chinese intellectuals. The outcome of these 
social and political conditions was what Trauzettel refers to the first signs of Chinese 
nationalism and forms of patriotism that were based on ethnic and political parameters 
rather than simply cultural lines. It is no wonder that “during the Song dynasty, a new 
self-consciousness and self-esteem took shape among the people who identified 
themselves as descendants of the Han Chinese.”947 The dynamic of appropriation and 
subordination could not be clearer; on the one hand the Lixue School introduced into 
Confucianism an unprecedented level of universalism, the all-inclusive accessibility of 
sagehood, the philosophy of Principle as a “response to Buddhism’s universalizing 
pronouncements based on Dharma,”948 the shift towards concepts of universal 
compassion and the interconnectedness of all sentient beings, and the missionary efforts 
to “transform” the people and level the plane field between elites and commoners, are all 
                                            
947 Kuhn, The Age of Confucian Rule, p. 1. 
948 Michael Nylan and Thomas Wilson, Lives of Confucius, p. 125. 
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examples of important historical changes towards a more embracing and universal 
worldview. On the other hand, Neo-Confucians were to a great extent the clearest 
reflection of the Song dynasty’s turn inwards and away from the cosmopolitanism of the 
great Tang dynasty. They stressed their native classical resources, traditional Confucian 
virtues, Confucian ritualism, and the Chinese imperial structure as normative models for 
individual, social and cosmic transformation. As in Kabbalah they devised a 
metaphysical architectonic with a cross-cultural transportability that was nevertheless 
contextualized in an unprecedentedly conservative and particularistic framework that 
limited its cross-cultural transportability. This turn inwards entailed newly imposed 
restrictions on marriage with non-Han minorities, the strengthening of clan ties, the 
revival and systematization of local rituals, the construction of ancestral temples and 
academies, the revival of historical studies, and the composition of genealogies; all of 
which were seen as measures designed to distinguish the Han Chinese from other 
groups.949 Neo-Confucian philosophy was characterized by a conservative and 
particularistic element that sought to protect the superiority and distinctiveness of 
Chinese culture. It represented what scholars saw as forms of “fundamentalism,” 
“restorationism,”950 or “neo-traditionalism”951 that were an antithesis to the standards of 
universal traditions. This certainly explains why Neo-Confucianism, in spite of its 
profound impact on the traditions of Japan, Vietnam, and especially Korea, never 
                                            
949 Kuhn, op. cit., p. 147. 
950 William de Bary op. cit., p. 34. 
951 T.C Liu, China’s Turning Inward, pp. 9-11 and 43-51 passim. 
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managed, or perhaps never really tried, to become a universal tradition in the same way 
that Buddhism and Christianity have.  
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5. METHDOLOGICAL REMARKS  
 In the following chapter I will revisit some of the methodological topics I raised 
in the first chapter. I will attempt to better understand the underlying characteristics of 
cultural systems and their shift from periods of homeostasis to morphogenesis and back 
to homeostasis. I will also further explore the qualities of the synthetic and analytic 
modalities; their constituting features, inner dynamics, general boundaries, and capacity 
to react adaptively to external pressures. I will conclude by listing the parallels this study 
has detected between the emergence of Neo-Confucianism and Kabbalah, specify the 
central contributions of this dissertation, and offer suggestions for future applications of 
genetic morphology to the study of religion and culture.   
 
5.1 CULTURES IN MORPHOGENESIS  
 Traditional societies had to constantly adjust to changes in their environments; 
plagues, wars, occupations, exiles, natural disasters, and interactions with foreign systems 
of thought were all potentially destabilizing. As I argued in the first chapter, although 
change is certainly unavoidable, not all change results in what I refer to as 
morphogenesis. As opposed to alterations that a tradition can sustain without major social 
disruptions, morphogenesis refers to a unique and rare type of change, one that 
necessitates a thorough restructuring of a tradition. Before we proceed to explore this 
topic, I would like to ask a more fundamental question: what happened in the Jewish and 
Chinese environments that triggered the succession of events that eventually led to the 
emergence of Kabbalah and Neo-Confucianism? I have argued earlier that the central 
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destabilizing factor to which the Jewish and Chinese traditions were responding was the 
ascendency of analytic paradigms in their respective environments. A question that 
comes to mind is why did these paradigms become such a threat precisely during these 
periods in history? As I have attempted to demonstrate in my analysis of the historical 
background of Neo-Confucianism and Kabbalah, changing social conditions were a 
major factor in the destabilization of both the Jewish and Chinese traditions. The cultural 
circumstances that nourished the ascendency of analytic paradigms were strikingly 
similar. In the two contexts, a more confident and prosperous economic and social 
environment led to the emergence of an educated and relatively wealthy middle class. It 
stands to reason that cultural tensions intensified at this time because the emergence of 
new elites necessitated the formation of an ideology and institutions that reflected and 
accommodated their rising power. But the question still remains; what enables such 
social changes to occur in the first place? I believe that this has to do with rise of 
powerful empires and their ability to project power.  
 
5.1.1 Analytic Cultures and Power  
 I have already mentioned that the adoption of an increasingly analytic mindset 
was conducive to the expansionist interests of powerful empires. Supported by extensive 
data, studies in cross-cultural and social psychology have recently shown that there exists 
a connection between the accumulation of power and analytic thinking. These studies 
suggest that power fosters a greater tendency towards abstract thinking and 
individualism, both of which are prerequisites to a more universalistic and analytic 
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worldview. Experiments conducted by Yuri Miyamoto and Ji Lijun have supported Basil 
Bernstein’s insights in the sociology of language, showing that an increase in power leads 
to a more inclusive and de-contextualized linguistic code, while the lack of power leads 
people to think more holistically and place events in context (synthetic). Building on 
earlier studies, Miyamoto and Ji demonstrate that power:  
facilitates the use of adjectives [de-contextual] and discourages the use of verbs 
[contextual] to describe others…[it] also promoted taxonomic [de-contextualized], 
instead of thematic [contextual] categorization… [in addition] high SES [Socio-
Economic Status] individuals made more taxonomic categorization than did low SES 
individuals, and a sense of agency partially mediated the SES differences in 
categorization.”952  
 
These findings suggest that well-educated and wealthy populations that emerge as a result 
of an increase in power promote social autonomy, a change in one’s use of language, and 
a more abstract way of thinking. This data clearly supports Bernstein’s argument that 
sociality, education, and language are intimately linked. On a broader cultural level, this 
rationale correlates with the socio-political realities that transpired in China and the 
Muslim world between the tenth and thirteenth centuries. In other words, the prosperous 
Tang-Song and Geonic-Andalusian periods led to the emergence of a more educated 
middle class, economic affluence, a more intense sense of individualism among new 
                                            
952 Yuri Miyamoto and Ji Li-Jin, “Power Fosters Context-Independent, Analytic Congnition.” 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 37, no. 11 (2011): 1449-58 [my brackets]. Miyamoto 
and Ji define power in terms of the capacity to influence others. The increased use of verbs means 
that people will stress what others do in a specific situation and therefore in context, while the use 
of adjectives will stress people’s abstract, and therefore universally shared traits. For more on 
power and the emergence of abstract thinking see Smith, P.K., Trope, Y. “You Focus on the 
Forest When You’re in Charge of the Trees: Power Priming and Abstract Information 
Processing,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 90, no. 4 (2006): 578-96. 
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elites, and the emergence of a cosmopolitan temperament that facilitated a more 
universalistic worldview.953 The rise in power and the ability to project it externally was 
therefore a prerequisite for the rise in cultural confidence, prosperity, and individualism, 
which created the necessary social conditions for a broader acceptance of analytic 
formats of thought.  
 The shift from a phase of homeostasis to morphogenesis, so I believe, was first 
and foremost spurred by the ascendency of strong empires that sought to project power 
over neighboring groups. These more inclusive, imperialistic tendencies were 
nevertheless undermining the foundations of conservative paradigms such as the 
Rabbinic and Confucian traditions. In my discussion of Kabbalah I have pointed to the 
relationship between assimilation and philosophy’s universalistic worldview.954 Greek 
formats threatened to strip the Jewish tradition from its normative status, making it more 
likely for progressive elites to cross cultural boundaries. A potential decline in the 
population of Jewish communities as a result of conversion presented a real existential 
threat to the vulnerable and relatively small Jewish tradition. The danger of Buddhism in 
China was just as serious. Zhu Xi deplored the “great number of Confucian students and 
scholars in his times [that] had been one by one drawn into Ch’an Buddhism.”955 
Historian Chen Mu went as far as claiming that China was on the verge of becoming a 
                                            
953 Here I am specifically referring to the cosmopolitan Tang. It is during this period that the old 
elites and their supporting institutions collapsed as a result of changing social and political 
realities. 
954 Oliver Leaman, “Introduction to the Study of Medieval Jewish Philosophy,” in The Cambridge 
Companion, p. 8. 
955 Charles Wei-Hsun Fu, “Chu Hsi and Buddhism” (quoting Qian Mu) in Chu Hsi and Neo-
Confucianism, p. 378. 
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“Chan Nation.”956 This was happening at the same time that barbarian powers were 
continuously defeating the Song Dynasty, leading to unprecedented national humiliation. 
As these examples suggest, in both the Jewish and Chinese cases, the crises that took 
place represented a considerable and palpable threat.  
 The relationship between power, the emergence of a new middle class, and the 
rise of analytic thought was also related to the substantially different intellectual 
discourses of analytic and synthetic cultures. The new middle class that came to the fore 
during this age demanded a theology that would suit its needs. Although both analytic 
and synthetic discourses entailed arduous training, the cognitive skills that were honed in 
each case were substantially different. The Talmudic and Chinese reliance on history and 
narrative demanded an extraordinary familiarity with a wealth of information that 
necessitated life-long dedication. The synthetic insistence on preserving earlier layers of 
the tradition and the constant reference to precedent meant that the more information and 
content retained by scholars, the more effective they were in advancing and supporting 
their positions. Such a demanding procedure imposed a substantial burden on one’s 
mnemonic devices and may have led to a certain ideological conservatism and the barring 
of broad participation. In contrast, the analytic elimination of narrative and context meant 
that arguments were much less reliant on extensive memorization; instead, intellectual 
discourse was oriented towards logical coherence. This is reflected in the Greek and 
Buddhist tendency towards refining arguments by replacing interchangeable units of 
information in a constant linear progression of ideas. Beyond the fact that analytic 
                                            
956 Qian Mu, Zhuzi Xin Xue-an [朱子新学案] Vol. 3 (Beijing: Jiuzhou Chubanshi, 2011), p. 1. 
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formats were more accessible in terms of methodology, the contents of analytic 
discourses were far more in tune with the mindset of the emerging middle class. The 
philosophical and Buddhist stress on cognitive individualism, self-realization, and 
universalism had the qualities to attract a new middle class that was excluded from the 
demanding and increasingly outdated discourses of synthetic traditions.  
 The most immediate implication of this new cultural ambience was the decline in 
the explanatory power of traditional canon and the weakening of central control. This 
enabled new elites to assert themselves culturally; their growing wealth and education 
helped them improve their social position. This new loosening of institutional 
restrictions, together with the urgency to equip the Chinese and Jewish traditions with an 
updated paradigm, led to unprecedented social fragmentation and the formation of 
contending ideologies and schools of thought.    
 
5.1.2 Morphogenesis and the Proliferation of Ideologies    
 Periods of morphogenesis are characterized by the emergence of acute social 
tensions and the rise of contending ideologies. It is worth noting that such competitive 
intellectual environments were very rare and a-typical in synthetic traditions, which 
generally stressed communal consensus and compromise over factionalism and 
confrontation. As far as I am aware, periods of morphogenesis only occurred once prior 
to the rise of Neo-Confucianism and Kabbalah. In Judaism it occurred between the 
second century BCE and the formation of rabbinic Judaism after the destruction of the 
second Temple in 70 CE. This period gave rise to severe tensions between Sadducees, 
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Pharisees, Essenes, Zealots, and the nascent Christian movement. In China a process of 
morphogenesis took place during the famous period of the “hundred schools of thought,” 
(百家争鸣), which preceded the unification of the empire under the Qin and more 
conclusively under the Han dynasty. As the name suggests, this period was characterized 
by an exceptional proliferation of different schools, the most dominant of which were the 
Yin-Yang School, the logicians, Mohists, Daoists, legalists, and Confucians.957 Similarly, 
the proliferation of ideologies prior to the emergence of Neo-Confucianism and Kabbalah 
was striking. In the Jewish case we initially witness the emergence Karaites, Kalam 
philosophers, and later different strands of a more rational philosophy, which was 
roughly divided among Aristotelians, Neoplatonists, and various combinations of the 
two.958 Within the general stream of Kabbalah we see the Iyyun Circle, ecstatic Kabbalah, 
theurgic Kabbalah, and within the latter school we see theurgists with Neoplatonic 
tendencies and others with Gnostic tendencies. During the same period German pietists 
also divided into various mystical schools, while French Tosafists and traditional 
Talmudists represented old orthodoxies.959 In China there were various forms of 
Buddhism, Daoism, and the unprecedented factionalism between reformers led by Wang 
Anshi, conservatives led Sima Guang, promoters of cultural studies headed by Su Shi, 
and the Neo-Confucians which were led by Cheng Yi and later Zhu Xi. Within Neo-
                                            
957 Both the Jewish and Chinese traditions go through another major transformation during the 
modern period. This third phase was different in that Confucianism and Rabbinism no longer 
sought to replace the enlightenment-based worldview that came to dominate the modern world. 
958 Karaites could be Kalam philosophers but not all Jewish Kalamists were Karaites. 
959 The French Tosafists were very much within this conservative camp but they also disclosed 
their own unique focus on critical elaborations and corrections to Rashi’s commentary. 
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Confucianism we have several strands including the School of Principle, the School of 
Heart, the utilitarian school of Chen Liang, and the Hunan School of Hu Hong.  
 Morphogenesis is therefore a rare occurrence, a unique situation in which a 
tradition’s worldview is increasingly irrelevant in face of profound pressures. During 
these periods, the conditions emerge for greater experimentation that is usually condoned 
or simply beyond the control of a declining central authority. Such social realities 
encourage intellectuals to tap into every possible resource of the tradition, including 
previously marginalized resources, in an attempt to find possible native solutions to an 
impinging problem. To some extent, as in the animal kingdom, cultures tend to deploy 
their available defensive strategies when confronted with acute danger. Indeed, diversity 
stands at the foundation of adaptive changes in organisms; it creates a situation in which 
the probability for the selection of the most superior adaptive response to boundary 
environmental conditions is highest. In this regard, Carl Folke claims that “diversity can 
contribute to persistence by providing a means of innovation and exploration in new or 
changing environments, as well as buffering against destabilizing perturbations.”960 The 
                                            
960 Carl Folke, “Resilience: The Emergence of a Perspective for Social–Ecological Systems 
Analyses,” Global Environmental Change 16 (2006): 253–267. Others have notes that “an 
interesting feature of many systems is that diversity, variability, and noise seem necessary for 
interesting complexity to evolve, contributing to system robustness, functionality, and the ability 
to explore possibilities and alternatives in structure and function,” see Francisca Cho and Richard 
King Squier, “Religion as a Complex and Dynamic System,” Journal of the American Academy 
of Religion 81, no. 2 (2013): 357–398. In the same article Cho and Squier note that “diversity is 
not necessarily problematic (Crutchfield 2009) but perhaps essential for the continuity of complex 
systems (Csete and Doyle 2002). It contributes to persistence by buffering against random events 
that would be catastrophic for simpler systems.” James P. Crutchfield, “The Hidden Fragility of 
Complex Systems— Consequences of Change, Changing Consequences,” in Cultures of Change: 
Social Atoms and Electronic Lives, ed. G. Ascione et al., (Barcelona, Spain: Actar D Publishers, 
2009), pp. 98–111.; Marie E. Csete and John C. Doyle, “Reverse Engineering of Biological 
Complexity,” Science Signalling 295 (2002): 1664–1668. 
  
529 
proliferation of schools during periods of morphogenesis is highly reminiscent of Thomas 
Kuhn’s notion of “periods of crisis,” in which old scientific paradigms decline thereby 
leading to a dynamic competition between contending school that propose new research 
programs for the future. As in the case of Neo-Confucianism and Kabbalah, such periods 
of crisis and intellectual diversity are followed by a return to a fairly unified discourse, in 
which contradicting tendencies are diminished.    
 The proliferation of ideologies during periods of morphogenesis can therefore be 
seen as a cultural strategy for better exploiting the various possibilities that are at a 
traditions’ disposal. The interaction between competing ideologies is not only effective in 
exploring possibilities for reform and change, but it is also a way to foster a more intense 
dissemination of ideas between schools as well as an efficient tool for the rapid 
refinement of ideas on a broad communal level. Therefore, environmental pressures lead 
cultural systems to explore their potential in ways that are unnecessary in times of social 
stability.  
  
5.1.3 Cultural Systems and Information    
 I have pointed out that acute crises entail the decline of a tradition’s central locus 
of information. Periods of morphogenesis are so extreme that the intensification of 
commentarial activity as a means for adaptation is deemed insufficient, thereby leading to 
more dramatic alterations in a tradition’s central canon. In the shift from second Temple 
Judaism to Rabbinic Judaism, we see the emergence of the Mishnah and the Talmud as 
supplements to the Bible, while the shift from classical Judaism to the post-Kabbalistic 
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period led to the emergence of the Zohar. In China, the shift from the warring state period 
to the rise of the Han was accommodated by the emergence of the Five Classics, while 
the shift from classical Confucianism to Neo-Confucianism led to the rise of the Four 
Books. In all these examples, periods of crisis and morphogenesis entailed changes in the 
informational locus of a culture. This is only one obvious example of how radical 
restructuration of cultural systems is intimately related to information. My objective is to 
understand the relationship between cultural systems and information and especially the 
role of information during periods of crisis and morphogenesis. In terms of information 
theory, focusing on pre-modern traditions has its advantages. The relative simplicity of 
communication forms between the tenth and thirteenth centuries makes it easier for us to 
understand how information was stored, transmitted, and processed. This relative 
simplicity stands in stark contrast to our advanced age of radios, TVs, cell-phones, 
satellites, and the internet, in which it is almost impossible to adequately trace what 
happens to information circulating in such a complex matrix of technologies. Moreover, 
the fact that traditional societies were far more centralized eliminates the confusion of 
trying to understand how information is processed among varying centers of power (e.g. 
secular government, religious institutions, the financial sector, the media). Essentially, 
the central channel for storing information among classical axial traditions was in written 
form. Therefore, the first advantage of mature axial traditions was their ability to educate 
portions of the population such that literacy secured the storing of information and its 
reliable transmission across generations. Literacy also meant that such traditions could 
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accumulate layers of information that would otherwise be impossible to store through 
oral transmission.  
 The multi-layered nature of complex traditions is relevant to our discussion of 
periods of morphogenesis. Not all traditions have the inner resources to deal with extreme 
states of pressure. As anthropologist Wade Davis has demonstrated, not only have 
thousands of cultures gone extinct throughout history, but they continue to disappear at 
an alarming rate at present.961 In order for a culture to sustain itself over time it must 
develop the capacity to react and adapt to change; this is also related to its ability to 
generate what systems theorists refer to as “noise” or redundancy. The notion of noise 
means that robust cultural systems will include certain features that seem redundant or 
unnecessary at first glance. It is precisely these seemingly superfluous elements that 
might prove to be absolutely crucial during periods of crisis. Therefore unused resources 
provide a system with a certain resilience and ability to react to unexpected perturbations. 
In contrast, a scarcity of resources might deem a tradition too rigid and therefore 
incapable of adaptation.962 The Jewish and Chinese traditions are typical examples of 
robust cultural systems that contain the necessary internal complexity to undergo an 
extreme process of morphogenesis. As an example, Sefer Yetzirah, a fairly unimportant 
cosmological treatise prior to the tenth century became one of the cornerstones of 
                                            
961 Wade Davis, Light At the Edge of the World: A Journey Through the Realm of Vanishing 
Cultures (London: Bloomsbury, 2001). 
962 In systems theory we call this a “critical state.” Imagine an economy in which all the industries 
and technologies rely on a single source of energy. This means that a minor disruption, such as 
the sudden lack of access to energy can lead the system to collapse. It is in cases like this that 
systems need variation (noise) or “modularity” which will provide it additional channels to 
sustain itself during critical period until a solution is found. 
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Judaism’s reaction to rational philosophy. Neo-Confucians shifted their attention to The 
Great Learning and The Doctrine of the Mean, both of which were formerly marginal 
chapters of the Book of Rites (The Classic of Ritual). Both Neo-Confucians and Jewish 
mystics began to explore earlier layers of their tradition such that relatively dormant 
resources were tapped into, amplified, re-purposed, and manipulated in favor of dramatic 
reform.  
 
5.1.4 Internalizing, Processing, and Externalizing Information   
 Another crucial mechanism for adaptation is the ability of cultural systems to 
extract information from their external environment and react to that information 
adaptively. In both the Kabbalistic and Neo-Confucian stories a proficient group of 
translators who were able to transmit information from one linguistic medium to another 
were absolutely crucial. I have commented on the long and complex process of 
translating Buddhist scripture into Chinese. It is important to note that when these 
translations reached maturity with Xuan Zang (602 – 664 CE), Buddhism began to exert 
its strongest impact upon Chinese culture. These translations also symbolized 
Buddhism’s most analytic phase, which was absorbed but also subdued by more sinicized 
schools of Buddhism. In other words, the short lived and analytic form of Buddhism that 
Xuan Zang introduced to China was immediately reacted against, representing a turning 
point towards the development of more synthetic forms of Buddhism.963 In the Jewish 
milieu, the famous Tibbon family played a crucial role in the cultural dialogue that 
                                            
963 This was the Consciousness Only School known as weishi zong 唯識宗 or faxiang zong 法相
宗. 
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emerged among Talmudists, philosophers, and mystics; the Tibbonite translations were 
responsible for transmitting advanced knowledge from the Muslim milieu to Jewish 
communities that had no command of Arabic. The Tibbonites were likewise known for 
their rationalistic tendencies, which even outstripped Maimonides’ philosophical 
rationalism. Therefore, the role of translators in the Rabbinic confrontation with Greek 
philosophy and the Confucian encounter with Buddhism was absolutely crucial and 
represents a critical moment of escalating analytic tendencies and subsequent native 
counter-attacks.  
 From a systems perspective, one of the central functions of traditional authority 
was to process information. Since power resides in the hands of leaders, central authority 
is the most obvious body in charge of processing information in the name of the 
community. While translators were responsible for accurately transmitting information 
from their traditions’ external environment internally, centers of authority were the main 
receivers of this information as well as those responsible for responding to its possible 
destabilizing effects. Although the diversity of ideologies led to a decline of traditional 
authority, the cultural prestige and communal responsibilities of these authorities meant 
that they remained an important and influential force. It is therefore not surprising that 
most of the translations of philosophical and Buddhist writings were commissioned by 
centers of authority such as the influential rabbis of Provençe and the Tang imperial 
court. Through these translations, foreign information reached centers of authority 
thereby giving them the opportunity to promptly and effectively respond to new social 
pressures. It therefore makes perfect sense that the most acute phase of the Maimonidean 
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controversies took place in Provençe between 1200-1235, immediately after 
Maimonides’ philosophical works became available in Hebrew at the same location.964 
Similarly, Buddhist translations prompted the indigenization of Chinese Buddhism as a 
reaction to analytic Indian schools, which indirectly led to the anti-Buddhist sentiments 
harbored by Confucians of different factions during the Song. 
 Finally, cultural systems have official and unofficial channels to communicate 
their response to their external environments. This was mainly accomplished through 
public debates and the emergence of a literature of polemics and apologetics. In China, 
the famous Six Dynasties and early Tang debates are a good example of the Chinese 
reaction to the Buddhist religion.965 During the Tang-Song transition Confucianism went 
on an offensive that was reflected by countless polemical attacks by many conservative 
Confucian factions. Almost all Neo-Confucians were steeped in Buddhist thought and 
most of them dedicated substantial portions of their work to anti-Buddhist polemics. In 
Judaism, we see several polemical and apologetic works, including the participation in 
public court debates. Public disputations were very frequent during the period leading to 
the appearance of the Zohar. In many cases communities sent official figures to represent 
Judaism in face of Christian and Muslim attacks. It is worth noting that in all these cases, 
conservative Jews and Neo-Confucians were well acquainted with the paradigms they 
                                            
964 This second climax of the controversies involved extreme rationalists such David Kimhi and 
more conservative figures such as Solomon ben Abraham of Montpellier, Nahmanides, and Jonah 
Gerondi. 
965 Friederike Assandri, “Inter-religious Debate at the Court of the Early Tang: An Introduction to 
Daoxuan’s Ji gujin Fo Dao lunheng,” Friederike Assandri and Dora Martins eds., From Early 
Tang Court Debates to China’s Peaceful Rise (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2009), 
pp. 15-32. 
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confronted. Such an acquaintance was crucial for effectively representing Judaism and 
Confucianism; it was also a prerequisite for devising the new ideologies of Neo-
Confucianism and Kabbalah. In both the Chinese and Jewish contexts we see a relatively 
swift reaction to the analytic challenge, which represents these cultures’ ability to 
respond to information effectively. Therefore, complex adaptive cultural systems have 
the mechanisms to store, extract, process, and adaptively react to information in their 
environments. 
 Although all traditions have the basic ability to interact with their surroundings, 
not all traditions have the capacity and resources to withstand extreme periods of crisis 
and change. As an example, an important feature of robust traditions is their capacity to 
sustain a certain unified cultural objective across generations and geographical locations. 
Thomas Kuhn pointed out that radical shifts that necessitate a re-appreciation of a large 
body of former data are never the work of a specific person or even a specific group of 
people at a given time.966 As the Chinese and Jewish experiences suggest, Kuhn’s 
observation applies to the sphere of culture as well; periods of morphogenesis require an 
ongoing communal effort and a long experimental phase in which new options are 
examined and old assumptions reevaluated. This gradual refinement of a tradition’s 
response to new information requires large networks of interactions that take place within 
and across generations. This topic has been widely explored by Randall Collins in his 
masterful Sociology of Philosophies, in which he traces revolutionary ideas, frequently 
attributed to a specific individual or a confined group of individuals, to complex inter-
                                            
966 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p. 7. 
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generational networks.967 This is clearly the case in Zhu Xi’s monumental project of 
synthesis, which represents the completion of a cultural project that can be traced all the 
way back to the mid-ninth century. The Zohar, traditionally attributed to R. Moshe de 
Leon is in fact an outcome of the cumulative efforts of Jewish thinkers that stretch back 
centuries prior to its publication. Like any multifaceted system, religious traditions have 
an extremely sophisticated causal architecture that stores and processes information 
across time and space. Robust cultural systems contain the necessary complexity to react 
to external forces in a collaborative fashion in which different groups perform different 
tasks in the process of adaptation. In both the Chinese and Jewish traditions we see the 
way the native reaction to the analytic worldview was gradually refined through a process 
of public debate in which information was efficiently communicated to different 
communities living in distant geographic locations and periods of time. 
 
5.1.5 From Appropriation to Subordination    
 Throughout this study I have mentioned that the schools of Neo-Confucianism 
and Kabbalah were distinct in their ability to initially appropriate features from analytic 
paradigms and later subordinate those borrowings to synthetic sensibilities. In the 
following section I would like to investigate what this means in terms of information. In 
both cases the response to the analytic worldview began with a phase of emulation, which 
was followed by a period of creative reaction. In other words, Jewish mystics and Neo-
Confucians initially formulated their ideas in close conformity to philosophy and 
                                            
967 Randall Collins, The Sociology of Philosophies: A Global Theory of Intellectual Change 
(Cambridge, Mass.; London: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1998). 
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Buddhism, and only later managed to temper their exaggerated dependency on analytic 
ideas with a more sophisticated formulation of their newly devised synthetic positions. In 
the Jewish case we see that the first mystical commentaries to Sefer Yetzirah followed the 
lead of philosophers who detected the instrumentality of this work.968 During this early 
phase, Kabbalists followed philosophers in tapping into the available resources the 
Jewish tradition had to offer for the construction of an updated metaphysics. The next 
generation of Kabbalah in Gerona, especially R. Azriel, R. Ezra, and Ya’acov Ben-
Sheshet, showed more obvious philosophical proclivities. As scholars have noted, much 
of R. Azriel’s terminology was taken from the philosophical works of the Tibbon Family, 
which was in turn indebted to Maimonidean thought.969 This strategy of emulation began 
to change during the next prolific phase of Castile, in which Kabbalistic works moved 
towards a more dense symbolism and an increasingly non-analytic stance.970 This can 
also be reflected in a shift from a Neo-platonic strand of Kabbalah to an increasingly 
gnostic strand. In China we see a very similar dynamic; the first phase of reaction during 
the Northern Song period was far more reminiscent of Buddhism than Zhu Xi’s final 
synthesis. Zhou Dunyi and Zhang Zai showed a conspicuously non-Confucian interest in 
the unmanifest or hidden aspects of reality.971 Later Neo-Confucians also marginalize 
                                            
968 The first mystical commentary to Sefer Yetzirah by Isaac the Blind was authored at the same 
place, and not too long after, Judah Barzillai composed his influential philosophical commentary 
to the same book. 
969 Dan, Toldot Torat ha-Sod, Vol. 8, p. 11. 
970 One of the watershed moments of the transition from a period of emulation to creative reaction 
in Kabbalah was Ya’acov ben Sheshet’s Meshiv Devarim Nechohim which can be seen as the first 
explicit theurgic attack against rationalism, especially the philosophy of Samuel ibn Tibbon. 
971 See Julia Ching, The Religious Thought of Chu Hsi, pp. 239-241; 311. Zhu Xi was 
uncomfortable with Zhou’s opening statement of the Diagram of the Supreme Ultimate “from 
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Zhou’s focus on the idea of tranquility (jing, 靜) by shifting to the more pro-active and 
world-affirming notion of reverent attentiveness (jing, 敬). Due to the non-Confucian 
aspects of his philosophy Shao Yong was excluded from Zhu Xi’s anthology of the 
Northern Song philosophers. Similarly, Zhu Xi reacted against the radical transcendence 
of the Cheng Yi’s understanding of li by defining it in terms that were more world-
affirming and typically Confucian.972 He also opposed the strong stress some Neo-
Confucians laid on the Chan-like subjective and intuitive penetration of the mind. 
Instead, he shifted to stress the typically Confucian concrete investigation of Principles in 
things and affairs.973  
 In both the Jewish and Chinese cases the initial phase of grappling with the 
analytic paradigm was characterized by a relative scarcity of resources, which forced 
early thinkers to resort to a more conspicuous strategy of emulation. However, imitation 
was also an extremely efficient strategy for the appropriation of foreign ideas. It was 
                                                                                                                                  
wuji (limitless) emerges taiji” (自无极而为太极). Zhu therefore modified the sentence to the 
more world-affirming “wuji and taiji” (无极而太极). In Zhu Xi’s new version the two notions are 
equated; taiji, or being, no longer emerges from the more primal and unmanifest wuji; instead, 
they are presented as two sides of the same coin. This small alteration had far-reaching 
consequences since the conceptual prioritization of wuji was completely eliminated. Zhu Xi 
himself admitted the fact that he changed the original wording but he insisted that he did so 
because of a mistake in the rendering of Zhou’s version. Robin Wang claims that many 
commentators disagreed with Zhu Xi “mistake explanation” and insisted that the original diagram 
used “zi wuji er wei eaiji.” 
972 Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, p. 591. 
973 Koichi Shinohara, “Ta-Hui’s Instructions to Tseng K’ai: Buddhist “Freedom” in the Neo-
Confucian Context” in Meeting of Minds, pp. 186-188. Other examples of the moderation of 
foreign elements was the way Shao Yong, for instance, was not included in Zhu Xi and Lu 
Zuqian’s anthology of Neo-Confucian thought. In spite of Shao’s clear contributions to Neo-
Confucian thought, he was perceived as distastefully Daoist. In what sounds like a Buddhist 
position, the early Neo-Confucian Li Ao claimed that the essence of human nature is tranquility 
and that evil comes from the stirring of emotions. 
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therefore both an inevitable result of a lack of native tools and an effective way to create 
an initial correlation between foreign ideas and native concepts. In terms of information, 
this early phase can be seen as a fairly straightforward replication of information. In both 
the Neo-Confucian and Kabbalistic cases, this was an important step before a more 
mature and creative reaction could unfold. Once the basic frameworks of Neo-
Confucianism and Kabbalah were established through imitation, a second phase of a bold 
and creative dissemination of ideas led to the emergence of a more mature and well 
articulated native response. This two-phase dynamic can be seen as the way cultural 
systems initially replicate foreign ideas through emulation, and later reinterpret those 
borrowing in a fashion that conforms to a native mindset. I would add that these two 
phases were followed by a final stage in which information was integrated or synthesized 
into the new textual corpus that emerges. This stage represents the final integration of 
foreign ideas into a tradition’s official locus of information. 
  The appropriation of analytic ideas and their subordination to native tendencies is 
a fascinating feature of Neo-Confucianism and Kabbalah; one which makes them both 
more analytic and more synthetic than the classical traditions that preceded them. This 
seemingly contradictory character made these schools powerful alternatives to Buddhism 
and Greek philosophy. The fact that Neo-Confucianism and Kabbalah became more 
analytic is fairly obvious; as I have argued in the third and fourth chapters, appropriating 
many features from the Buddhist and Greek traditions equipped these schools with an 
analytic undercurrent. But what does it mean to become more synthetic than a tradition 
that was synthetic in the first place? I would argue that once medieval mystics and Neo-
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Confucians integrated analytic elements into their ideologies, their return to a synthetic 
mode of operation had to account for their new analytic leanings. Therefore, the type of 
synthetic sensibilities to which Kabbalah and Neo-Confucianism returned was a 
corrective to their new analytic characteristics. An example can help us understand this 
process; under analytic influences, Neo-Confucians and Kabbalists shifted to the domain 
of metaphysics, which also led these schools to “ontologize” their traditional synthetic 
worldviews. Therefore, analytic borrowings directly impinged on the native reaction that 
ensued. Kabbalah and Neo-Confucianism shifted from classical narratives that were 
based on sheer faith, or will, to systematic paradigms that were supported by the 
normative metaphysical pretenses and logical coherence of the analytic mode. This new 
level of normativity cemented synthetic features such as ritualism, particularism (esp. in 
Kabbalah), this-worldliness (esp. in Neo-Confucianism), and social embeddedness in 
what was presented as an indisputable ontology. The point I wish to stress is that the 
prioritization of native characteristics over analytic borrowings led Neo-Confucianism 
and Kabbalah towards an ultra-conservative worldview, one which was ironically more 
synthetic than the classical traditions that preceded them by virtue of being anchored in a 
normative analytic cosmology.  
 The appropriation of foreign ideas can be seen in the way Neo-Confucians and 
kabbalists worked diligently to anchor their new perceptions of reality in an ancient past, 
thereby painting a fluid and seamless continuity with the traditions that preceded them. 
Both schools sought to attribute their new literatures to prominent early figures in their 
traditions. Neo-Confucians claimed that The Great Learning and The Doctrine of the 
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Mean were authored by the student and the grandson of Confucius, while the Zohar was 
attributed to the Tannaic hero Shimon Bar-Yohai. Similarly these schools constructed 
imagined lineages of transmission; Neo-Confucians introduced their famous daotong, 
which stretched all the way to first sages of the tradition. Many Kabbalists claimed their 
mystical lore originated with a series of mysterious visions experienced by the prestigious 
rabbis of Provençe. According to this view the prophet Elijah revealed the celestial 
mysteries of the Kabbalah to this important circle of Rabbis.974 This was an efficient way 
to legitimize and give credibility to an ideology that clearly broke away from past 
tradition. Another shared characteristic of Neo-Confucians and Kabbalists was their 
appropriation of foreign ideas using native terms. In discussing Zhou Dunyi’s 
philosophy, John Berthrong notes that ”if one expects some kind of novel invention of 
new language, one will be disappointed. But if we can learn to see the uncommon ways 
someone like Chou [Zhou] manipulates his inherited vocabulary in order to give old 
terms new meanings, then we can begin to catch a glimmer of why this new philosophy 
was so powerful.”975 Neo-Confucians skillfully excavated their native repositories of 
meaning; they detected old terms, sentences, and passages that could facilitate their goals 
of reinterpreting ancient terms in a radically new light. Like Confucians, Kabbalists used 
native symbols, many of which came from aggadic literature, the Talmud, and early 
                                            
974 Gershom Scholem, Origins of the Kabbalah. (Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press, 
1990), p. 35, and more on pp. 35-39; 238-243. The famous sage that experienced the Giluy 
Eliyahu (the revelation of Elijah) were Abraham ben Isaac (d. 1179), Abraham ben David (the 
Rabad d.1198), Jacob ha-Nazir (the nazarite), and Isaac the Blind (d.approx. 1232), see ibid., p. 
37. 
975 John Berthrong, Transformation of The Confucian Way, p . 102 
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Heikhalot mysticism to construct their ideology. Both schools therefore continuously 
stressed the authenticity of their ideas, refusing to acknowledge their foreign origins.  
 
5.2 SELF-ORGANIZATION OF COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS    
 This brings us to the way traditions gradually shifted from a destabilized state of 
morphogenesis back to homeostasis. The first question that comes to mind is the 
following: if periods of crisis represent the decline of central authority, who is in charge 
of the complex process of restructuring a tradition following periods of acute crisis? Here 
again, it is important to emphasis that central power is by no means absent during phases 
of morphogenesis. Instead, there is a weakening of institutions such that decisions are 
less exclusively in the hands of traditional authorities. In China, for instance, the Song 
dynasty was clearly in control of the empire but different factions were coming in and out 
of power influencing emperors towards opposing policies, which led to a crippling 
political deadlock. In Judaism the whole Rabbinic world was torn between rational and 
anti-rational factions that led to unprecedented social tensions. This decline in power not 
withstanding, traditional authorities remained important and highly respected by all 
contending factions in both the Jewish and Chinese experiences. In other words, there 
always remained some form of regulatory mechanism to which contending factions 
constantly referred.976  
                                            
976 One of the reasons that old authorities remained important was their association with a 
tradition’s canon. As I have argued, this venerated body of literature can be seen as the essence of 
a tradition’s cultural memory, identity, and ultimate concerns. The readers are reminded that even 
when the Talmud and the Five Classics were being harshly criticized, most factions were adamant 
in recognizing their authority. The only exception is perhaps the Karaites in the Judaism. 
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 Since the creative forces behind the Kabbalistic and Neo-Confucian revolutions 
were middle class elites that were competing to consolidate their power, it was crucial for 
various factions to win popular support and especially the support of traditional 
authorities. As social psychologists have observed, “innovations are accepted by a given 
population if they have been previously accepted by opinion leaders, but they are rejected 
by the population if more conservative opinion leaders do not accept them. This is known 
as prestige biased transmission and had proved to be an extremely powerful social 
determinant even when the ideas advocated by conservative authorities are clearly 
detrimental to the populace.977 Interestingly, social psychologists have noted that the next 
crucial factor in the ascendency of ideas is the early adoption of these traditionally 
sanctioned ideas by people with a progressive and prosperous background. In his 
discussion of these “secondary elites,” J. Heinrich notes that “transmission is enhanced 
by their greater social networks and higher social status, more money, more cosmopolitan 
contacts, and greater exposure to mass media outlets…”978 It seems that the process of 
gaining support from conservative authorities followed by dissemination of ideas by 
progressive elites took place in both the Jewish and Chinese contexts. In Judaism, one of 
the main advantages of mystics over philosophers was their ability to gain the favor of 
respected Talmudists who were engaged in communal leadership and legal rulings. In 
China the decision of imperial authority to support factions was absolutely crucial; it was 
                                            
977 J. Heinrich, “Cultural Transmission and the Diffusion of Innovation: Adoption Dynamics 
Indicate That Biased Cultural Transmission is the Predominant Force in Behavioral Change.” 
American Anthropologist 103 (2001): 992-1013; E. M. Rogers, Diffusion and Innovation. 3rd and 
4th ed., (New York: Free Press, 1962). 
978 Heinrich, ibid. 
  
544 
the imperial court that brought the reform faction to power and it was the same court 
under new emperors that later reacted against the New Policies and slowly shifted 
support towards the conservative Neo-Confucians. In both cases traditional sanctioning 
of new ideologies were carried and enthusiastically transmitted by and educated and 
cosmopolitan elites of the time.   
 Although central authority remained important in regulating communal affairs, it 
lacked well-articulated solutions for dealing with the growing pressures that the Chinese 
and Jewish worlds were facing. This new reality in which power was more broadly 
diffused between traditional authorities and different factions meant that final decisions 
were made in a more de-centralized manner. The contending factions were therefore 
dependent on a combination of support from old authorities and support from 
commoners, especially the emerging middle class. The Jewish and Chinese stories 
suggest that once popular support crossed a certain watershed line, the pressure exerted 
on others to follow was virtually impossible to oppose. I tend to associate this sudden 
tendency towards supporting a certain ideology with what systems theorists refer to as an 
“attractor state;” a point in time where a certain inclination or a “bias” begins to cascade 
throughout the system thereby sparking a process of self-organization in which 
conflicting forces begin to align themselves in conformity with a dominant cultural 
temperament. In China and Judaism this watershed moment took place once Neo-
Confucians and Kabbalists managed to construct a mature and viable reaction to analytic 
paradigms. The merits of their new worldviews attracted the growing support among 
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traditional authorities and later commoners, which eventually led to a process of re-
organization according to their new ideology.979  
 If the recipe for success in these highly competitive cultural environments was the 
seemingly random support of commoners and old elites, why did the culturally 
conservative schools of Neo-Confucianism and Kabbalah emerge as victorious in these 
struggles? Is this just a coincidence or is there a deeper reason for the success of 
conservative schools? I think that Roy Rappaport’s use of ‘Romer’s Rule’ of adaptation 
can add an interesting dimension to our understanding of the Neo-Confucian and 
Kabbalistic success. Paleontologist Alfred S. Romer (1894–1973) argued that “the initial 
survival value of a favorable innovation is conservative, in that it renders possible the 
maintenance of a traditional way of life in the face of changed circumstance.”980 Romer 
used the example of the evolution of bones in the limbs of certain fish, which enabled 
                                            
979 The sudden alignment with a certain cultural trend can be explained with the concept of 
culturrgen introduced by Lumsden and Wilson in their gene-culture coevolution model. 
According to them a culturegen is a “relatively homogeneous set of artifacts, behaviors or 
mentifacts [cultural mental representations].” Lumsden, Charles J., and Edward O. Wilson, 
Genes, Mind, and Culture: The Coevolutionary Process (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1981), p. 27 [my brackets]. Their idea of the “exponential trend watcher” is such that “as 
more people adopt one culturegen, the probability of others switching to it increases 
exponentially. If people are strongly inclined to follow what others around them are doing, then 
small initial differences in switching propensity can be dramatically magnified at the level of the 
group.” See more in Ute Schonpeflug, Cultural Transmission: Psychological, Developmental, 
Social, and Methodological Aspects (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 
pp. 9-30. 
980 See Roy Rappaport, The Sacred in Human Evolution. More on Rappaport’s cybernetic 
approach see Ritual and Religion in the Making of Humanity (1999), and “Ritual, Sanctity, and 
Cybernetics,” American Anthropologist 73, no. 1 (1971): 59-76. Alfred Sherwood Romer, Man 
and the Vertebrates, 1:43 ff. Penguin, 1954 (first published 1933). Romer’s rule is also related to 
the Red Queen Effect, an evolutionary principle, first proposed in 1973 by L. Van Valen, that 
much of the evolution of a lineage consists simply of keeping up with environmental changes 
rather than occupying or adapting to new environments. The red queen in Lewis Carroll's novella 
Through the Looking-Glass, had to run as fast as she could only to remain in the same place. 
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them to crawl over land and find new ponds at times of drought. In other words, the 
development of bones among these fish was the most conservative and energy efficient 
way to preserve their aquatic (traditional) way of life.981 Applied to our story, cultures 
will undertake the minimum possible alterations (conservatism) in order to maintain their 
traditional modes of life rather than adapt to new ones. In the case of Judaism and 
Confucianism I believe this “traditional way of life” is represented by the unique 
structural characteristics of the synthetic modality. Therefore, the ability of conservative 
Neo-Confucians and Kabbalists to both invigorate their traditions and articulate a 
worldview that conformed to the morphology of their traditional paradigms meant it was 
less energy consuming for these schools to reach a compatibility with their classical 
tradition. It is in this sense that I believe that the notion of an “attractor state” applied to 
culture can be associated with the emergence of a unique synergy between a declining 
central authority and a new ideology that reinvigorates a tradition’s old paradigm. Such 
internal synergies are a well-known quality of complex adaptive systems; their role in the 
emergence of Kabbalah and Neo-Confucianism was crucial.  
 
5.3 ATTRACTOR STATES AND SYNERGIES BETWEEN SYSTEMS AND SUB-
SYSTEMS  
 In the methodological chapters, I argued that morphology can be applied to 
different scales of analysis, both whole traditions and sub-traditions. Throughout this 
study I have shown that in spite of the fact that Neo-Confucianism and Kabbalah were 
                                            
981 Rappaport, ibid. 
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certainly an integral part of the orthodox Chinese and Jewish traditions, they were 
nevertheless distinct groups with distinguishable characteristics and boundaries. 
Kabbalists had their own peculiar practices, their distinct times of congregating, their 
own methods of prayer, a unique set of texts, and a substantially different theology than 
followers of the traditional Rabbinic worldview. Similarly, Neo-Confucians were a 
unique group with clear idiosyncrasies and exclusive habits. In fact, they were so distinct 
that court officials attacked them as more than just a faction, but something like a 
religious sect reminiscent of Buddhists and Daoists.982 They were also criticized for the 
presumptuousness of their pedantic mannerisms; their clothing (white silk shirts and 
black hats), long fingernails (symbol of refinement), obsessive ritualism, their cautious 
and slow walk, and many other distinct habits.983 The daily lives of Neo-Confucians and 
Kabbalists were dominated by interactions with like-minded people; this conforms to the 
way systems theory defines sub-systems as components that are distinct by virtue of their 
dense intra-connectivity in relation to their interconnectivity to other components.984 This 
is also known by the term “modularity,” namely, that systems contain internal agents that 
are both distinct as well as part of the whole. Here again, I will try to interpret the 
relationship between traditions and sub-traditions in terms of information.  
                                            
982 Bol, Neo-Confucianism in History, pp. 139-140. 
983 James T. C. Liu China Turning Inward, p. 142. Liu notes that Neo-Confucians “sought to 
create for themselves a strong identity of their own… this was manifest chiefly in two areas: rites 
and manners… Many scholars of this persuasion insisted upon rites in a solemn atmosphere, 
almost like a religious service. Discarding the conventional rites as below standard, they 
advocated the revival of archaic forms.” Ibid. For more on Neo-Confucian exclusivism see Bol, 
Neo-Confucianism in History, pp. 229-230.  
984 Francisca Cho and Richard K. Squier, “Religion as a Complex and Dynamic System,” p. 367. 
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 Systems are enclosed and defined according to various parameters. Rain forests 
are distinct by virtue of climatic boundaries, cells are set apart by their membranes, while 
human groups are mainly defined by shared loci of information that impact their modes 
of behavior, activities, and institutions. Indeed, the radical ideologies that Neo-
Confucians and Kabbalists followed, strongly informed their identity, modes of worship, 
their activities, and their psychological temperaments. John Holland claims that “adaptive 
agents are defined by an enclosing boundary that accepts some signals and ignores 
others…”985 Boundaries are both mechanisms for self-enclosure as well as semi-
permeable borders “permitting easy passage for some resources and difficult passage for 
other.”986 Choosing what information to engage with is therefore an extremely important 
determinant of boundaries between sub-systems and systems. Neo-Confucians and 
Kabbalists are typical examples of groups that carefully monitored, and were clearly 
distinguished by the type of information with which they engage.987 Just as the Bible, 
Talmud and the Five Classics defined the limits and borders of the Rabbinic and 
Confucian traditions respectively, so did the specific textual resources that informed 
Kabbalists and Neo-Confucians shape the boundaries of their ideologies on a smaller 
                                            
985 John H. Holland, Signals and Boundaries: Building Blocks for Complex Adaptive Systems 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2012), p. 24. 
986 Ibid., p. 16. 
987 Neo-Confucian works such as the various treatises composed by the Northern Song 
philosophers and the Four Books with Zhu Xi’s commentaries, informed the lifestyle and beliefs 
of members. It was the acceptance of those texts as the true interpretation of the Classics, which 
made a “normal” Confucian become a Neo-Confucian. This was equally the case with the new 
and revolutionary Kabbalistic theology that emerged during the thirteenth century. This new 
mystical worldview was carried in a large number of treatises which culminated with the 
publication of the Zohar, and created a distinct informational locus that deemed theurgic 
kabbalists very different form traditional Talmudists, philosophers, and other groups of medieval 
mystics. 
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scale. In terms of information, the central prerequisite for traditions and sub-traditions to 
establish a synergetic relationship is whether their textual traditions are complementary. 
As I have demonstrated in chapters 3 and 4, Neo-Confucians and Kabbalists skillfully 
established a continuity between their new literature and the traditional Confucian and 
Jewish canon such that these two loci of information could co-exist and even support 
each other.  
 The approach I am proposing can help us understand why the School of Principle 
and theurgic Kabbalah managed to outstrip other alternatives in their respective 
intellectual environments. The unstable state of ideological conflicts during periods of 
morphogenesis cannot be sustained for too long; cultural systems show a propensity to 
resolve tensions and gravitate towards a communally sanctioned solution. This process of 
self-organization is such that no particular element in the system is exclusively in charge. 
Instead, order emerges spontaneously as a result of a structural commensurability 
between various components. As I have noted earlier, the conformity of conservative sub-
traditions to the synthetic mode of operation meant it was much easier for them to 
establish a synergetic relationship with orthodoxy. Although progressive schools claimed 
continuity with tradition, they nevertheless sought to transform the old order and promote 
paradigms that undermined many of the basic features of the classical Chinese and 
Jewish worldview. This included their stress on individual realization in detachment from 
the community, their conventionalization of ritual, and their promotion of an increasingly 
inclusive and universalistic worldview. Buddhism clearly undermined the Confucian 
worldview, but even the progressive camp of Wang Anshi sought to eliminate two of the 
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Five Classics, the Spring and Autumn Annals and the Yijing, both of which were 
absolutely central to the Neo-Confucian project. In Judaism, the school of ecstatic 
Kabbalah promoted a hermeneutic that completely undermined the literal meaning of the 
biblical texts, which theurgic Kabbalists sought to preserve. Therefore, the adoption of 
ideologies with analytic and progressive tendencies by synthetic traditions would 
necessitate a much more radical and energy consuming process of restructuration that 
would probably entail the undermining of traditional authority.988 Such radical change 
would possibly lead to a system’s collapse, or at the very least to its transformation 
beyond recognition. Humberto Maturana and Francisco Valera have convincingly argued 
that once a system loses its original structure and organization, it is no longer the same 
system.989 In other words, there are limits to the structural changes a system can tolerate 
without loosing its identity.  
 The fact that the Chinese and Jewish traditions were originally structured 
according to a synthetic organization meant that there was a general bias towards change 
that preserved their synthetic traits. Such biases favored sub-systems that were inclined 
towards conservative change. The prioritization of synthetic sensibilities over analytic 
borrowings among Kabbalists and Neo-Confucians was therefore not only a strategy for 
                                            
988 The examples of the school of ecstatic Kabbalah as well as different strands of philosophy 
reflect an attempt to integrate analytic features into Judaism without a sufficient reformulation of 
those borrowings in synthetic terms. This represented a direct challenge to traditional authorities 
since the adoption of these new analytic trends would entail a radical change and the undermining 
of traditional power. 
989 Francisco Varela and Humberto Maturana, “Autopoiesis: The Organization of Living Systems, 
Its Characterization and a Model,” Biosystems 5 (1974): 187-96; Idem., Autopoiesis and 
Cognition; the Organization of the Living (Boston: Reidel, 1980); Idem., The Tree of Knowledge: 
The Biological Roots of Human Understanding (Boston: Shambhala, 1987). 
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concealing the adoption of foreign ideas, but rather a way to remain within the legitimate 
boundaries of tradition. Crossing those boundaries could be perceived as rebelling against 
a tradition’s most foundational sensibilities and a violation of the basic principles that 
perpetuate a traditions underlying logic. Therefore, the shift from the instability and 
fragmentation of periods of morphogenesis back to a state of homeostasis is instigated by 
a synergy between a new theology promoted by sub-systems (Kabbalah and Neo-
Confucianism) and declining traditional centers of authority. This synergetic relationship 
both reinvigorates the tradition as a whole, as well as mitigates the distinctiveness of sub-
traditions such that they are gradually integrated into the greater system and even come to 
represent a new orthodoxy.990  
 The equation for the establishment of such synergies was a delicate balancing act 
between adaptation and conservatism. In this complex process, leaning too strongly 
towards reformation and change led to allegations of heresy and anti-traditionalism, while 
leaning to heavily towards conservatism failed to provide an effective response to the 
crisis at hand. The Kabbalistic and Neo-Confucian adoption of analytic elements and 
“return” to a synthetic ethos was crucial for their ability to lead their respective traditions 
                                            
990 The escalating symbiosis between an emerging theology and the old paradigm creates a 
“feedback loops;” another central feature of complex systems. The concept of feedback loops is 
usually associated with a sub category of systems theory known as cybernetics. Generally 
speaking, feedback loops represent a recursive circulation of information or behaviors. Positive 
feedback is an action that produces more of the same (e.g. global warming leads to the melting 
arctic sea ice, which in turn leads to the further warming of the oceans and increase in global 
temperature). Negative feedback produces less of the same action (e.g. real-estate prices go up 
leading to a decrease in demand for housing, which in turn leads to the price of real-estate to go 
down). Positive feedbacks are usually destabilizing since they represent a certain tendency that 
cascades through the system (e.g. loss of confidence in the banking system leading to an 
economic meltdown. in contrast, negative feedback is a form of self-regulation that promotes 
stability in a system. Stable complex systems will usually have negative feedback loops to temper 
positive feedback. 
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from a destabilized process of morphogenesis back to a stable state of homeostasis. 
Complex cultural systems are therefore perturbed by external pressures to which they 
react adaptively. They generate solutions through an internal process of fragmentation 
and experimentation. Stages of crisis and destabilization slowly shift towards a process of 
self-organization and a renewed state of equilibrium instigated by the establishment of 
synergies between the system’s various components. In our case the main compatibility 
that is established is between a new a cultural ideology devised by a dominant sub-
tradition and the classical paradigm that preceded it represented by the greater tradition.991  
 
5.3.1 The Symbiotic Nature of Cultural Systems 
 In the above pages I have examined periods of morphogenesis and the unique 
synergy that can be established between sub-traditions and whole traditions. In the 
following section I will explore the nature of synergies between the different components 
of the analytic and synthetic modalities. In the methodological chapter I introduced what 
I believed to be the irreducible components of these modes of operation; I proposed three 
morphological levels—the cognitive, social, and cultural— arguing that each of these 
levels is composed of a set of self-enforcing morphological features. While the three 
morphological levels of the two modalities are identical, the morphological features that 
compose each level consist of a set of binaries that set the synthetic and analytic modes of 
operation apart. Now that we have become more familiar with the Chinese and Jewish 
                                            
991 As opposed to Kuhnian paradigm shifts, cultural systems favor an accumulative approach in 
which old layers are not jettisoned but rather supported by new layers. Therefore, in both the case 
of the Zohar and and Four Books we see a new scriptural layer that functions as an extension to 
the canonic literature that preceded it. 
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traditions and the emergence of Neo-Confucianism and Kabbalah, I will attempt to 
propose how the symbiotic dynamic of cultural systems operates. Note the table from the 
methodology chapter illustrating the general structure and constituents of the analytic and 
synthetic modalities: 
 
 Analytic Modality  Synthetic Modality  
 Atomization of data  Integration of data (holism) 
   
Cognitive 
Level 
De-contextualization  Contextualization  
   
 Self-enclosed, linear systems  Open-ended, non-linear systems 
    
   
Social Level Social autonomy (personal)  Social embeddedness (positional)  
  
 
 
 Contemplation  Ritual  
   
Cultural 
Level  
Other-worldly  This-worldly  
   
 Universalism  
 
Indo-European  
Particularism  
 
Non-Indo-European  
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5.4 CULTURES IN HOMEOSTASIS 
 All synergies or relationships are in some form or another a result of 
communication, which in turn is the opposite of “separability” — a state of no 
communication.992 When something is radically autonomous or separate it means that 
what ever happens to it does not impinge on anything else. This is precisely the opposite 
of communication in which changes in component x will have immediate implications on 
any other component to which x is related. Therefore, when different components of a 
complex system are organized in relation to each other, there exists some type of 
communication between them - even if it is in this very general sense. Such relationships 
create certain constraints on reality such that a peculiar type of organization will 
necessarily eliminate other possibilities. For example, while components x and y are 
theoretically unconstrained when they are in a state of autonomy, once they establish a 
relationship certain restrictions emerge on both of them. Although this relationship can 
certainly entail new possibilities it also creates restrictions that are absent when x and y 
are not in a state of mutual dependency. When applied to the symbiotic relationship 
between the various components of the synthetic and analytic modalities, communication 
between two or more morphological features entails a certain logical resonance. In other 
words, cultures tend to gravitate towards a constellation of self-enforcing sensibilities that 
preclude other possibilities.   
                                            
992 Ross Ashby, “Principles of the Self-Organizing System,” In Principles of Self-Organizaion: 
Transactions of the University of Illinois Symposium, H. von Foerster and G.W. Zopf, ed., 
(London: Pergamon Press, 1962), p. 256. 
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 Consider the following interrelationship between the constituting features of the 
analytic mode of operation: The adherence to [a] social autonomy (cognitive 
individualism) resonates with a type of [b] universalism that is predicated upon a pan-
human cognitive apparatus. Such universalism will tend to downplay the particularistic 
stress on local ritual in favor of [c] contemplative techniques oriented towards the mental 
facets of reality. This contemplative and abstract approach sees the body (ritual) as 
problematic and therefore tends to prioritize [d] other-worldly spheres of existence that 
transcend the blemished world of matter. Such sublime spheres of existence are beyond 
the contingencies of historical events and therefore highly [e] decontextualized. This 
logical organization can similarly begin with the cognitive tendency towards [f] 
atomizing data which manifests itself in the domain of cosmology in the form of [g] 
substance metaphysics, in which autonomous substances interact causally and form a 
unified and [h] self-enclosed system. The atomization of data in terms of society leads to 
social autonomy in which individuals are seen as distinct agents. Such individualism goes 
hand in hand with an [i] elaborate linguistic code that stresses one’s independence and 
uniqueness and in turn leads to a more [j] universal dialogue in which people are 
encouraged to express their opinions explicitly in detachment from the restricted symbols 
and ritualism of particularistic societies. Again, this is only one possible angle of looking 
at the symbiotic logic that leads different cultural, social, and cognitive traits to cluster 
into robust homeostatic cultural systems.  
 However, there is a clear disadvantage to the presentation of such reinforcing 
relationships in a linear fashion. The robustness of a homeostatic system stems from the 
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fact that each constituent part reinforces and in turn is reinforced by several other 
components. Therefore, one of the main traits of complex cultural systems is their non-
linear nature. This symbiotic dynamic is such that the various components of a system 
will operate according to a multi-faceted, interlocking, and self-enforcing organization. It 
therefore makes more sense to understand such systems as an interconnected web of 
relationships. 
 
Diagram 3: Symbiosis in the Analytic Modality 
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A similar logic applies to the synthetic mode of operation: the Chinese and Jewish 
adherence to [a] social embeddedness is such that individualism will be marginalized. 
Such family-based and communal social structures will highlight the [b] world-affirming 
features of reality such as procreation, inter-personal ethics, and [c] ritual behavior. These 
“mundane” features are seen as legitimate channels for religious expression as well as 
reinforcements of social bonds (embeddedness). A culture’s specific set of rituals and 
local social conventions will highlight a tradition’s [d] particularistic ethos vis-à-vis other 
groups. Similarly, particularistic traditions are characterized by intellectual discourses 
that are based on a culture’s unique historical biography. The importance of historical 
narratives leads to the stress on the [e] contextualization of information, which will also 
entail [f] inconclusive and open-ended discourses. The particularistic ethos of synthetic 
traditions will also tend to evolve towards discourses based on a [g] restricted code that is 
inaccessible to foreign participation. Such intellectual discourses are likely to be based on 
[h] commentary and communal consensus rather than polemics and the advancement of 
thesis. Here, too, we could have theoretically chosen several other ways of demonstrating 
the internal logic of synthetic cultural systems. The important point to stress is that an 
internal resonance of ideas makes it likely for such cultural traits to gravitate towards a 
self-supporting, symbiotic dynamic 
 
 
 
. 
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Diagram 4: Symbiosis in the Synthetic Modality 
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with a strong sense of coherence. This brings to mind Clifford Geertz’ famous definition 
of religion in which he states: 
religion is a system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive, and long-
lasting moods and motivations in men by formulating conceptions of a general order of 
existence and clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the moods 
and motivations seem uniquely realistic.993 
 
Geertz hints at the powerful ability of symbols to infuse our “worlds” with a sense of the 
“really real,” which in turn makes our symbolic world feel authentic and profoundly 
significant. If fact, the world that cultural system create are so powerful that they 
profoundly alter who we are, our thoughts, skills, yearnings, and motivations. This has 
been supported by research in social psychology where it has been demonstrated that 
while personal choice in individualistic societies improves performances, it does not 
improve performance among individuals in cultures that conform to the model of social 
embeddedness.994 This suggests that when one is caught up in the matrix of a communally 
oriented culture, not only will the community discourage personal autonomy, but the 
                                            
993 Clifford Geertz “Religion as a Cultural System” in The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected 
Essays (New York: Basic Books, 1973), pp. 87-125. 
994 Sheena S. Iyengar and Mark Lepper, “Rethinking the Value of Choice: A Cultural Perspective 
on Intrinsic Motivation,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 76, no. 3 (1999): 349-66. 
Iyengar and Lepper, “When Choice is Demotivating: Can One Desire Too Much of a Good 
Thing?” Journal of personality and Social Psychology 79, no. 6 (2000): 995-1006; Sheena 
Iyengar, The Art of Choosing (New York, NY: Twelve, 2010); Miyamoto and Ji argue something 
similar when they note: “power was associated with an analytic, focused perceptual style, 
possibly because such an analytic perceptual style serves cultural imperatives to pursue self- 
defined goals independently from social contexts (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). This pattern was 
absent or weakly reversed in Japan, where the primary imperative—to fulfill socially prescribed 
roles and fit into social contexts—may require people to attend to and process contextual 
information even when they exert power over others.” see “Power Fosters Context-Independent, 
Analytic Cognition,” pp. 1456. 
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facts on the ground will convince individuals that personal choice is not at all conducive 
to success. Said differently, the type of people communal (synthetic) cultures 
“manufacture” are ones that are unable to translate personal autonomy into benefit in 
performance. This also means that individuals will be encouraged to operate within 
communal boundaries not out of blind conformity, but out of sheer self-interest. The 
system on all levels is simply not geared to certain types of behavior. Social structures, 
human cognition, and cultural norms are all organized in an interlocking relationship that 
will impose constraints on certain inclinations and modes of behavior.  
 Another way of understanding the symbiotic nature of cultural systems is by 
illustrating the incommensurability of synthetic and analytic features. In other words, a 
hypothetical culture composed of a combination of synthetic and analytic characteristics 
will fail to coalesce into a robust and long-standing system. The lack of an internal 
coherence will deem such a system internally vulnerable, and incapable of organizing 
into a self-supporting constellation. Consider a hypothetical system that conforms to the 
analytic mode of operation with two exceptions; instead of social autonomy it will 
conform to social embeddedness and instead of de-contextualization, it will adhere to the 
synthetic tendency towards the contextualization of information. The result will be a 
dynamic of opposing cultural forces that will create irresolvable contradictions and result 
in social instability. In other words, the ethos of social embeddedness, family cohesion, 
and filial piety, and the emphasis on procreation is diametrically opposed to the analytic 
stress on contemplative seclusion, monasticism, celibacy, and other-worldliness. 
Similarly, the synthetic propensity towards contextualization does not conform to the 
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analytic prioritization of universalistic cosmologies that highlight cross-cultural and pan-
human commonalities. The combination of analytic and synthetic features will lead to a 
dissonance that is simply unsustainable. The organization of analytic features gives rise 
to constraints that will preclude the possibility of opposing synthetic tendencies. 
 
Diagram 5: The Incompatiblitiy of the Analytic and Synthetic Modalities 
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tendencies and irregularities. All systems, both natural, and I believe cultural as well, 
gravitate towards effective solutions and equilibrium; Terrence Deacon refers to this as 
an inherent proclivity in systems to reach as state of a ‘least-discordant-remainder.’995 
Once a certain cultural tendency becomes dominant it begins to bias a system towards a 
certain logic of operation that will seek to organize in the least discordant fashion such 
that contradictory features will be eliminated.    
 I argue that the incommensurability between the analytic and synthetic modes of 
operation means that in order to avoid instability, cultural systems will tend to gravitate 
towards one temperament or the other. This further illustrates why analytic traditions 
posed such a threat to the Confucian and Jewish traditions. The adoption of analytic 
elements is impossible without a radical restructuring of a tradition, which ultimately 
entails its transformation beyond recognition. As I have shown, even radical periods of 
morphogenesis and change do not shift a system away from its native physiognomy. 
Traditions will vigorously resist over-stepping the limits of their tolerance for change 
such that alterations in important features will be accepted for the sake of defending more 
                                            
995 This is a tricky concept that forces us to look not at what is present but at what transpires once 
contradictions are eliminated. According to Deacon “it’s not so much what was determined to 
happen that is most relevant for future states of the system, but rather what was not cancelled or 
eliminated. It is the negative aspect that becomes most prominent. This is the most general sense 
of constitutive absence: something that is produced by virtue of determinate processes that 
eliminate most or all of the alternative forms.” ⁠ As in all complex systems, cultures tend to 
coalesce into what is left once contradictions are eliminated. See Terrence Deacon, “Emergence: 
The Hole At the Wheel’s Hub,” in The Re-Emergence of Emergence: The Emergentist Hypothesis 
From Science to Religion., edited by Philip Clayton and Paul Davies (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006), pp. 143-144. In his seminal article on self-organization, Ross Ashby claimed: “thus 
the presence of “organization” between variables is equivalent to the existence of a constraint in 
the product-space of the possibilities… whence comes this product space? Its chief peculiarity is 
that it contains more than actually exists in the real physical world, for it is the latter that gives us 
the actual, constrained subset.” ⁠ Ross Ashby, “Principles of the Self-Organizing System,” p. 257. 
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basic ones. Rappaport claimed that the fundamental question to ask about any 
evolutionary change is “what does this change maintain unchanged?” He goes on to 
argue that “modifications or transformations in the descriptions of substructures may 
preserve unchanged the truth value of more fundamental propositions concerning the 
system as a whole in the face of changes in conditions threatening to falsify them.”996 My 
argument here is that those “more fundamental truths,” which reflect the limits of a 
system’s tolerance for change are represented by the morphological organization of a 
tradition, be it synthetic or analytic.    
 
5.5 THE PERVASIVENESS AND COMPLEX NATURE OF BINARIES   
 My goal in this final chapter is to challenge the idea that binaries are in anyway 
simplistic. As trivial as it may sound, the only way we understand things is by 
conceptualizing them in contrast to their opposition; we cannot understand of even begin 
to explain what the term complexity means without somehow referring to simplicity, and 
in order to define the idea of darkness we would inevitably have to explain it in terms of 
the lack of light. Binaries represent the boundaries of human conceptualization; they are 
inevitable and absolutely crucial for framing the limits of our discourses, perceptions, and 
desires.997 The importance of binaries has not escaped the attention of philosophers and 
                                            
996 Roy Rappaport, Ritual and Religion in the Making of Humanity, p. 6; idem., “Ritual, Sanctity, 
and Cybernetics,” pp. 59-76. 
997 Laozi has beautifully captured the idea of binaries as the outcome of the limits of human 
conceptualization: “all in the world know the beauty of the beautiful, and in doing this they have 
(the idea of) what ugliness is. So it is that existence and non-existence give birth the one to (the 
idea of) the other; that difficulty and ase produce the one (the idea of) the other; that length and 
shortness fashion out the one the figure of the other; that (the ideas of) height and lowness arise 
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scientists. From the Yijing to Hegel, from Leibniz to Structuralists, all the way to modern 
binary code, and neurology, binaries have never ceased to intrigue thinkers throughout 
the ages. In the cultural arena, binaries are not only apparent between what I called 
analytic and synthetic cultures but are also existent within the confines of these modes of 
operation. I have already mentioned that within the synthetic ethos of the Chinese 
tradition, analytic strands of thought were relatively marginal but nevertheless 
discernible. Similarly, the mainstream of analytic thought in post-enlightenment Europe 
was frequently challenged by a romantic and more synthetic position. Binaries are 
therefore multi-layered; they exist within each other leading to striking complexity both 
in nature and culture. Binary tensions become exceptionally clear in politics, where 
parties tend to converge into left/right, democratic/republican or progressive and 
conservative camps. The United States is a good representation of such a binary system 
in which policies advocated by smaller parties are usually adopted or integrated by the 
two major parties that dominate the political landscape. Although bi-partisanship is seen 
as an ideal, left/right affiliations remain important and real.998 Political systems that are 
based on multiple parties similarly tend to split into fairly clear right and left distinctions. 
Moreover, single party systems are no exception; the Chinese communist party has 
always disclosed a very distinct and at times extremely violent factionalism between 
                                                                                                                                  
from the contrast of the one with the other; that the musical notes and tones become harmonious 
through the relation of one with another; and that being before and behind give the idea of one 
following another.” Laozi Ch.2: 天下皆知美之為美，斯惡已。皆知善之為善，斯不善已. 故
有無相生，難易相成，長短相較，高下相傾，音聲相和，前後相隨。是以聖人處無為之事
，行不言之教；萬物作焉而不辭，生而不有. 為而不恃，功成而弗居。夫唯弗居，是以不
去.  
998 American political culture also discloses a typical internal tension within each camp such as in 
the case of hardline conservatives (Tea Party?) and more moderate conservatives. 
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radicals and moderates. In fact, the Chinese case is telling, since it shows that traditions 
that try to present a unified facade inevitably fragment into contending ideological poles.   
 Binaries form in intellectual discourses between Platonists and Aristotelians, 
between rationalists and empiricists, idealists and materialists, realists and nominalists, 
and perennialists and postmodernists. In spite of substantial differences between various 
social, intellectual, and political environments, common to all of them is the frequency of 
binary tensions. That there exists a variety of possibilities between oppositions should not 
divert us from the fact that most systems show a proclivity towards forming two central 
positions that dominate their environments.999 Scholars of culture have long been aware 
of confronting cultural dispositions that are apparent between Eastern and Western 
traditions. As I have noted in the methodological chapter, various thinkers have referred 
to these distinctions using different terms such as analytic, paradigmatic, and rational on 
the one hand, and narrative, holistic or synthetic on the other. Moreover, research in 
social psychology and cross-cultural psychology has confirmed these dichotomies, 
showing that modes of cognition in various Asian and Western cultures disclose a clear 
conformance to what many have termed analytic and holistic thought. In spite of this 
pervasiveness, binaries have been constantly attacked—most lately by postmodernism—
                                            
999 The tendency towards the formation of polarities in cultures may be related to the limited 
capacity of cultural systems to sustain a large number of ideologies. An exaggerated number of 
positions leads to potential social instability. The tendency of cultures to gravitate towards a 
relatively stable equilibrium can therefore be seen as a mechanism for the elimination of the 
destabilizing effects of exaggerated diversity. For more on this topic see Randall Collins, The 
Sociology of Philosophies, (1998). 
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as simplistic and totalizing.1000 Indeed, when used irresponsibly binaries can lead to very 
problematic generalizations, but this should not stop us from probing into their nature.  
 Why then do traditional cultures tend to organize according to the synthetic or 
analytic modes of operation? Why such a limited set of options? I will offer an example 
from nature, one that has been used by Terrance Deacon to explain how order emerges 
out of disorder. Although Deacon’s solution was devised for systems in nature, it might 
help us understand something about culture as well. Picture a large stone in the center of 
a river. The water flowing down the river and on both sides of the stone will collide and 
form eddies, or little whirlpools, right behind the stone. “Before” the eddies are formed, 
the currents from both sides of the stone collide, creating random contradictions of 
opposing or undermining forces. What leads order to emerge out of this chaotic interplay 
of forces is nature’s inherent tendency towards economy and regularity. In our case, such 
economy is reflected by the way nature resolves the irregularities of different currents of 
water by self-organizing into a dynamic pattern - a whirlpool. This is nature’s way of 
efficiently dissipating an otherwise chaotic interaction of contradictory forces thereby 
reaching a more energy effective pattern of regularity. What happens is that opposing 
forces of water currents will at some point show a slight bias towards one direction or 
another. This is what I referred to as an attractor state, which will lead various 
oppositional forces to slowly align themselves with that initial bias. Once enough force 
has gravitated towards the direction of the initial bias the system will enter into a 
whirlpool motion. To the question, why a whirlpool? Deacon’s answer is that “the 
                                            
1000 Victor E. Taylor and Charles E. Winquist, "Binary Opposition” and “Binarism” in 
Encyclopedia of Postmodernism (London; New York: Routledge. 2001), pp. 36; 360. 
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dynamical geometry of the whirlpool affords one of the few ways that the constant 
instabilities can most consistently compensate for one another.”1001 In other words, the 
whirlpool is first and foremost an outcome of what is not there, it is the ‘least discordant 
remainder’ of otherwise energy consuming irregularities and contradictory forces. 
Therefore, the order that emerged is the result of the elimination of disorder and the 
canceling out of contradictions.  
 Pertinent to our discussion is that Deacon shows that while irregularities and 
chaos can manifest themselves in an almost endless range of possibilities, regularities 
take the shape of a restricted number of possibilities and are actually fairly rare. 
Regularities are rare because somewhat counter-intuitively, nature offers a very restricted 
number of “architectures that are not self-undermining.”1002 Indeed, if we take the 
example of spiral shapes or whirlpools, we will realize that they tend to reappear all over; 
we see them in our bathroom sinks when we drain the water, in various forms of 
vegetation, in shells, in endless different types of animal horns, in weather systems, and 
in the shapes of galaxies. This is because the unique shape of a spiral is an efficient 
structural solution for the emergence of order out of disorder, a solution for the 
elimination of undermining irregular forces. Other examples can be seen in the relatively 
restricted number of geometrical shapes that reappear in snowflakes, stones, beehives, 
and salt crystals. Similarly, organic patterns with an identical ratio of bifurcation reoccur 
in plant roots, lightning formations, river networks, and lung structures. Although all 
these shapes manifest themselves in different materials and substantially different scales 
                                            
1001 Terrence Deacon, “Emergence: The Hole At the Wheel’s Hub,” pp. 120-121. 
1002 Ibid., pp. 120. 
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they nevertheless share a similar, almost identical recursive pattern. The awesome 
diversity of nature, in other words, can be reduced to a fairly limited number of regular 
structures that disclose an efficiency in bringing undermining irregularities to a state of 
order. It is not surprising that as the perceptive Goethe was immersed in nature he 
became gradually convinced that he found the prototype plant structure that stood at the 
foundation of all plants. Indeed, morphology can be seen as the field that attempts to 
make sense of these recurring patterns.  
 These analogies from nature bring us a step closer to understanding why cultures 
tend to confine themselves to a fairly limited number of structural possibilities. Like 
recurring patterns in nature, cultures have a limited number of options to form into robust 
and stable states of homeostasis. The synthetic and analytic modalities are efficient ways 
of “doing culture,” such that humans, ideas, social structures, and institutions operate 
coherently without undermining each other. This might be confusing in light of our 
constant fascination with the mind-boggling diversity of cultures. One of the reasons the 
field of anthropology was the main force behind the anti-comparative attack was because 
anthropologists became all too aware of cultural variation. In their detailed fieldwork, 
they developed a keen sensitivity to how unique different traditions and societies were. 
This new appreciation of uniqueness clashed with the simplistic Western categorization 
of thousands of sub-traditions as “African” or “Oriental.” Ethnographers began to 
highlight the substantial distinctions between various societies, even neighboring tribes. 
The postmodern contribution to intellectual discourse has been a sobering and 
humanizing development. It has enabled us to problematize sweeping categories and 
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appreciate the nuance of being, but it also diverted our attention from general patterns. 
One of the central arguments of this study is that behind the awesome diversity of the 
human “ethno-sphere” there exists a limited number of structural possibilities for doing 
culture. I believe that the methodology I am offering can provide a more convincing 
response to those who have vehemently attacked cross-cultural patterns as totalizing and 
impressionistic.  
 I will refrain from determining whether the analytic and synthetic modalities are 
the only ways to construct culture, but I would venture to argue that they are certainly the 
two most pervasive possibilities. As argued, this binary approach does not undermine the 
existence of diversity. It is important to remember that there is a vast number of cultural 
variations that can take place within each modality. The fact that traditions as different as 
Rabbinic Judaism and Confucianism conform to the same synthetic mode of operation 
highlights the great range of possibilities that the category “synthetic” can encompass. 
The diversity of possibilities within each morphological modality is an outcome of a 
complex interaction of a large host of cultural, social, cognitive, environmental, and even 
genetic variables. These differences together with the almost endless configuration in 
which they manifest themselves, lead to an exponential growth in diversity, which in 
turns leads to the development of cultures that seem drastically dissimilar in spite of their 
common morphological foundations.  
 Diversity within a common morphological modality brings us back to the analogy 
I drew between cultural systems and the notion of gene expression in epigenetics. Just as 
identical genes have the ability to express themselves differently as result of varying 
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environmental conditions, so do cultures express their morphological physiognomy 
differently depending on context. Among the synthetic morphological features of the 
Confucian tradition, we find that the tension between world-affirming and world-
negating tendencies became much more central than it was in Judaism. This is related to 
the unique cultural and intellectual circumstances in which Confucians and Buddhists 
operated. Kabbalists, on the other hand, were concerned with a different set of dilemmas; 
their response to philosophy was particularly focused on the normative and ontological 
status of the commandments, and by extension, the need to highlight the particularistic 
features of Judaism vis-à-vis Greek thought or other traditions. Therefore, in the 
confrontation between the synthetic and analytic modalities, Kabbalists and Neo-
Confucians expressed their synthetic morphology differently. Expressing the same 
synthetic physiognomy in divergent ways can also take place within the same 
morphological attribute. As I have showed, although the Confucian and Rabbinic 
traditions certainly conformed to the model of social embeddedness, each tradition 
expressed this structural trait differently. While Confucianism constructed a highly 
hierarchical social structure, the Rabbinic tradition was far more egalitarian.1003 This is an 
example of how traditions that belong to the same morphological category, in this case 
synthetic, disclose different variations or “expressions” of common structural 
characteristics. The detection of variation within the same comparative category is 
essential to the comparative project as an ongoing process of refinement. Here I am 
                                            
1003 Yao Xinzhong seems to agree when he claims that Jews are all one under god (egalitarianism) 
while in China what is equal to everyone is the fact that each needs to follow his role (hierarchal). 
The hierarchal structure in Judaism may exist to a certain degree but social distinctions are 
nevertheless mild in contrast to the highly stratified Chinese model. Yao, op. cit., pp. 148-9. 
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following Robert Neville’s comparative methodology in which relatively broad and 
intentionally “vulnerable” comparative categories are gradually refined through a process 
of escalating specificity.1004 J.Z. Smiths offers a similar methodological corrective to 
comparative categories when he suggests “four moments in the comparative enterprise: 
description, comparison, redescription, and rectification.”1005 In our case the highly 
generalized and vague category of “social embeddedness,” to which both the Chinese and 
Jewish traditions conform, is refined so that a higher level of specificity is reached, 
namely, egalitarian embeddedness and hierarchical embeddedness.  
 Although binaries entail a certain form of reductionism, they should not be seen 
as simplistic. The binary morphology this study proposes seeks to point our attention to 
pervasive structural patterns that stand at the foundation of cultural variation. The 
morphological dichotomies between the synthetic and analytic modes of operation are not 
rigid but rather flexible and continuous. Distinctions such as analytic vs. synthetic forms 
of cognition, social autonomy vs. social embeddedness, universalism vs. particularism, 
and all the other dyads that set the two modalities apart should be conceived as a 
continuum stretching between two extremes that can be expressed to various degrees. 
This is also true in respect to the modalities as a whole; cultures can disclose extreme 
forms of an analytic or synthetic morphology and they can also disclose more moderate 
expressions of these morphologies. The binary distinction is nevertheless important 
because as long as a culture is synthetic or analytic it will disclose a self-supporting 
                                            
1004 Robert Neville, The Human Condition (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001), 
ch. 1, pp. 9-20 passim. 
1005 J.Z. Smith, “The “End” of Comparison: Redescription and Rectification,” in A Magic Still 
Dwells, p. 239. 
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dynamic of the morphological features that belong to that specific mode of operation. 
That fact that cultures resist a combination of synthetic and analytic features shows that 
binaries are important for understanding two fundamentally distinct cultural 
temperaments.     
 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
5.6.1 Further Methodological Applications  
 The binary morphology I have introduced in this study can have a host of 
applications in the study of religion and culture. It would be interesting to explore the 
first phase of morphogenesis in the Jewish and Chinese traditions; namely, the emergence 
of Rabbinic Judaism after the destruction of the second Temple, and the establishment of 
Confucianism as state orthodoxy during the Han dynasty. I think that exploring these 
periods will enable us to probe deeper into the nature of the axial age, its relationship 
with literacy, the rise of new elites, and the decline of old ones. Other fascinating 
examples to explore will be the bifurcation of Second Temple Judaism and Christianity, 
and the similar division of the Hindu traditions and Buddhism. Applying genetic 
morphology to these periods can enhance our understanding of the way sub-systems (the 
Christian movement and the early Buddhist Sangha) overstepped the capacity of their 
original traditions to tolerate change, thereby embarking on a new path that led to the 
birth of the first universal religions.1006 Such an analysis can perhaps shed light on how 
cultural systems divide into independent entities. Another interesting case to explore is 
                                            
1006 The universalism of Christianity and Buddhism originated in universal currents that were 
native to Judaism and Hinduism respectively. 
  
573 
the emergence of rational thought in Greece, a development that has been associated with 
the reaction of new philosophically inclined elites against the old aristocracy that was 
more closely associated with Homeric thought. This historical period may give us more 
information about the reasons and processes that led to the emergence of the first full-
fledged analytic tradition. Finally, it will also be interesting to explore Islam, a religion 
that has stubbornly eluded traditional typologies of religion.1007 Of special interest would 
be to follow the shift from Islam’s highly analytic worldview during the Muslim golden 
age and its slow retreat back to its native geographical origins together with its 
subsequent shift towards a more synthetic worldview. Interestingly, in spite of Islam’s 
synthetic characteristics, it retained many central traits of the analytic modality, most 
notably its commitment to universal dissemination. This ambivalence may be one of the 
reasons that Islam has resisted so many different classifications. Genetic morphology can 
help us better understand some of these idiosyncrasies. 
 A more general application of morphology could further explore the relationship 
between power and the emergence of analytic paradigms. This naturally leads one to ask 
what types of traditions tend to remain within a synthetic mode of operation. As I 
tentatively argued, I believe that each mode of operation is efficient at achieving different 
cultural goal; while analytic traditions have the capacity to efficiently impose cultural 
agendas on foreign populations, synthetic traditions are structured in a fashion that is 
conducive to the preservation of data, the perpetuation of traditional narratives, and a 
                                            
1007 For a good discussion on the ambiguity of categorizing Islam see Tomoko Masuzawa, The 
Invention of World Religions: Or, How European Universalism Was Preserved in the Language 
of Pluralism (Chicago & Londone: University of Chicago Press, 2005), especially ch. 3,5, and 6. 
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more defensive position with respect to foreign elements. The synthetic worldview 
spends most of its energy on reality-maintenance; this does not preclude great creativity, 
but innovations will tend to respond to practical needs rather than satisfy theoretical and 
intellectual curiosity. This can be linked in interesting ways to questions about the 
expenditure and conservation of energy and their relation to the accomplishment of 
divergent cultural tasks.     
 It is important to note that the specific way I have presented the synthetic and 
analytic modalities is mostly relevant to pre-modern societies. In order for these 
distinctions to remain instrumental in the contemporary world, we need to re-articulate 
them in modern, secular terms. In other words, the synthetic/analytic distinction I 
proposed for the analysis of medieval societies was expressed in theological terms that 
were relevant to a pre-secular worldview. Although distinctions I made on the cognitive 
and social levels remain fairly unchanged, distinctions on the cultural level are no longer 
relevant or central to a modern context. For example, a dichotomy such as this-
worldliness vs. other-worldliness is far less important today than it was in the past. The 
synthetic/analytic contrast, if applied to the present can be an efficient tool for 
understanding quintessential differences between traditionalist and religious communities 
which will usually conform to a synthetic worldview, and secular progressive 
communities and scientific materialists who will tend to be more analytic. Our pluralistic 
modern age also gave rise to interesting combination of synthetic and analytic 
dispositions that were not possible, or at least very rare, in the pre-modern world. One 
such example are libertarians; applying morphology to explore the unique physiognomy 
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of such ideologies can shed light on new structural possibilities that were made possible 
by modernism.  
 The morphological method can also help us become aware of the qualitative 
differences between characteristics that are known to be ubiquitous to all religious 
traditions. For example, ritual is known to be a common structural component or 
institution in all religions. A central misconception morphology can underscore is that 
Confucian and Rabbinic ritualism are not merely quantitatively distinct from conceptions 
of ritual in other major tradition. In other words, since many scholars have shown that 
ritual is a pervasive and universal phenomenon, they are led to believe that traditions 
such as Confucianism or Judaism simply do more of it. What morphology can help us 
demonstrate is that the function of ritual in synthetic cultures is both quantitatively as 
well as qualitatively different than its function in analytic traditions. Scholars frequently 
resort to the Confucian and Jewish traditions as quintessential examples of highly 
ritualized systems, but they seldom explain why they share a proclivity towards 
ritualization. Analyzing ritual using morphology can give us a clearer idea of how 
ritualism and embodied knowledge are developed and function within an interrelated web 
of isomorphic morphological features, and how their function is qualitatively different 
from those in analytical traditions where ritual was relatively marginalized in favor of 
different strategies of meaning. As a preview, ritual in synthetic traditions is far more 
concerned with the establishment of differences and the reinforcement of internal 
cohesion, whereas ritual in analytic traditions is more frequently a vessel of theological 
meaning and a channel for the communication of ideas. Ritual can take on different forms 
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in both the synthetic and analytic traditions, but the stress these traditions laid on one 
form or another is nevertheless significant. When we appreciate ideas and modes of 
behavior within the larger context of symbiotic relationships, we can begin to see how 
universal traits common to all religious traditions manifests function in completely 
different ways.  
 Finally, there are several places in which morphology as a methodology for 
cultural analysis can be improved. I am certain that additional categories can be proposed 
to my differentiation between the analytic and synthetic modes of operation, and there are 
certainly ways to further refine the categories I have already introduced. 
 
5.7 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS STUDY 
 This dissertation aimed to achieve several objectives. I conclude by listing what I 
believe to be the main contributions of this study. 
 
5.7.1 A Systematic Distinction between Synthetic and Analytic Modes of Operation  
 This study established a more methodical and multi-layered understanding of 
what it means to operate according to the synthetic and analytic modes of operation. 
Although similar distinctions have been made by scholars in the past, most of these 
contrasts lack a clear methodology and tend to focus of the domain of cognition. In 
contrast, I have provided a more systematic interpretation of the way the synthetic and 
analytic worldviews apply to entire cultural complexes, including cognition, social 
structures, cultural temperaments, linguistic orientation, and the relation of these 
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characteristics to the peculiar historical environments in which they operated. I based my 
distinctions between the analytic and synthetic worldviews on insights provided by 
scholars from a broad range of disciplines. I believe that the data strongly supports my 
position that structural patterns should be an important consideration in our analysis of 
cultures and religions.   
 
5.7.2 Challenging Traditional Taxonomies in the Study of Religion  
 The categorization of the Jewish and Chinese traditions as synthetic, and the 
Greek and Indian traditions as analytic, challenges traditional classification in the study 
of religion and culture. The very common distinction between Eastern and Western 
traditions has the obvious disadvantage of pigeonholing traditions as dissimilar as 
Confucianism, Hinduism, and Buddhism into the same family of religions. Similarly, the 
idea of Western religions ignores the fact that monotheistic traditions can operate 
according to diverse cultural sensibilities. In contrast, the classification of traditions 
according to the synthetic/analytic distinction sheds light on a whole new set of cultural 
qualities that are otherwise much harder to recognize. It reorients our understanding of 
East and West and helps us see the nuance that exists within these traditional 
classifications. A few examples should suffice to highlight the instrumentality of a 
morphological typology. The analytic/synthetic distinction emphasizes the radical 
transformation that took place in monotheism as Christianity began to operate in a Greek 
intellectual environment. The shift from Judaism to Christianity reflects a unique moment 
in which monotheism shifts from a synthetic physiognomy to an analytic one. Exploring 
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the way synthetic and analytic cultures interpret a common religious tradition can offer us 
a fresh perspective for understanding Judaism and Christianity.    
 In the Chinese case, scholars have often drawn parallels between Neo-
Confucianism and Greek thought, especially Platonism. Although such parallels are not 
misplaced, they fail to point out that these ‘strange’ resemblances were not a matter of 
coincidence and certainly not anything enigmatic, but rather a result of the impact of 
Buddhism, which shares similar analytic features with the philosophical Greek tradition. 
Claiming that Neo-Confucianism discloses similarities with Greek rational thought 
ignores the real origins of this resemblance. The fact that Chinese schools of Buddhism 
have undergone an intense process of sinicization has obscured the impact of analytic 
Indian thought on late medieval Chinese philosophy. The “Platonic” features of Neo-
Confucianism are therefore mainly a result of a restricted number of conceptual 
possibilities to which analytically inclined theologies tend to gravitate. Therefore, the 
Indian worldview has led Neo-Confucianism to develop along lines that are extremely 
reminiscent of Greek thought. Although scholars have duly recognized the common Indo-
European roots of the Greek and Indian traditions, they have tended to ignore the great 
potential that an in-depth exploration of these commonalities can offer our analysis of 
Hinduism, Greek thought, Christianity, and especially the transformations that Buddhism 
has experienced as it was implanted in different cultural environments.   
 Finally, the connection the synthetic classification establishes between Judaism 
and China can help scholars make sense of a host of similarities, some of which were 
formerly detected, but never set in a more systematic methodology. I believe that the 
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Rabbinic and Confucian traditions are the best examples we have of synthetic axial age 
traditions that have persevered to the present. A more in-depth comparative analysis of 
these traditions can help us further explore the nature of synthetic traditions, their central 
cultural tasks, their unique approaches to authority, and their ongoing resistance to the 
onslaught of analytic paradigms. The fact that the Jewish and Chinese traditions operated 
in such dramatically divergent contexts is actually an advantage since commonalities are 
more likely to be a result of their similar morphology than an outcome of sheer 
coincidences. In the course of my research, the comparative analysis of the Jewish and 
Chinese traditions has frequently helped me notice aspects that would have otherwise 
seem trivial and unimportant. The traditional tendency to contrast China and the West can 
therefore benefit from information originating in the Jewish tradition, just as 
understanding Judaism can be enriched by data from the Chinese tradition. Placing 
Judaism and the Chinese tradition in the same synthetic category, and the Greco-
Christian and indo-Buddhist traditions in a similar analytic category, completely 
problematizes traditional East-West distinctions and offers a new typology for the 
analysis of religion and culture.  
 
5.7.3 Systems Theory in the Humanities  
 Due to the complex nature of cultures, the application of systems theory to 
concrete traditions and real historical circumstances has been extremely rare. Although 
there have been attempts at applying systems theory to religion, most notably Roy 
Rappaport’s important Ritual and Religion in the Making of Humanity and several works 
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by Niklas Luhmann, as far as I am aware no one has attempted a detailed systems 
analysis of a religious tradition over an extended period of time, let alone a comparative 
systems analysis.1008 Instead, most applications of systems theory have been based on 
abstract generalizations, computational models, or the use of piecemeal observations 
from different historical instances and unrelated situations. This highly theoretical 
approach makes it extremely difficult to understand how hypotheses transpire in reality. 
The absence of historical grounding also leaves theorists with a lack of data for correcting 
and fine-tuning their initial assumptions. It is for these reasons that focusing on a 
continuous, diachronic analysis of two specific traditions at a critical moment in their 
respective histories becomes so helpful. This study has explored cultural systems in real 
life as they developed and evolved throughout time. It has provided a relatively thick 
description of the social, political, and economic conditions that informed Neo-
Confucians and Kabbalists in their confrontation with Buddhism and Greek thought 
respectively.   
 There are two central advantages to the historical approach to systems theory. The 
first has already been mentioned; the fact that pre-modern societies were both less 
complex and far more centralized than their modern counterparts provides us with a rare 
                                            
1008 Notable applications of systems theory to religion include, Talcott Parsons, The Structure of 
Social Action (New York: Free Press, 1968); Idem., The System of Modern Societies (Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971); Roy Rappaport, Ritual and Religion in the Making of Humanity 
(Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Idem., “Ritual Sanctity and 
Cybernetics,” American Anthropology 73, no. 1 (1971): 59-76; Niklas Luhmann, Religious 
Dogmatics and the Evolution of Societies (Lewiston, N.Y.: Mellen, 1984). Idem., A Systems 
Theory of Religion (California: Stanford University Press, 2013). Paul Cassell, “A Semiotic and 
Emergent Theory of Religious Communities, ” (PhD diss., Boston University, 2011); Francisca 
Cho and Richard King Squier, “Religion as a Complex and Dynamic System.” 
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glimpse into cultural systems that operated on a relatively intelligible level of complexity. 
The historical material provides us with a fairly reliable picture of the socio-economic 
conditions of the time, the channels through which information reached centers of 
control, and the way traditions stored, processed, and reacted to this information. We 
have data about contending factions and ideologies, their members and positions, and 
their anxieties regarding the paradigms with which they were grappling. In other words, 
centralization as well as relatively simple modes of communication during the emergence 
of Neo-Confucianism and Kabbalah provides us with the type of accessibility that is 
highly informative for grounding a systems approach in concrete historical data. The 
second advantage of focusing on this specific historical period is that we are able to 
explore a unique phase of transformation. Such dramatic structural shifts in traditions 
bring the salient features of cultural systems into sharper relief. Said differently, periods 
of morphogenesis provide us with the ability to contrast unprecedented historical changes 
with periods of relative stability. Exploring this rare historical moment in which a 
tradition restructures itself is invaluable for understanding the dynamics of complex 
cultural systems as they adapt to changing conditions.  
 The comparative nature of this study is yet another advantage since it enhances 
our ability to identify generalizations in the expected behavior of systems. In other words, 
the concordance between Chinese and Jewish modes of operation with the predicted 
patterns characteristic of complex adaptive systems functions as a strong indication that 
we are dealing with more than just coincidences. The triangulation of data between two 
distinct traditions together with an understanding of the way complex systems behave 
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provides us with additional points of reference for the verification of data as well as a 
better idea of where to look for significant details. One of my main objectives is to 
demonstrate that the combination of comparative religion with a diachronic, binary 
morphological approach to systems theory can provide us with a powerful framework for 
the analysis of culture.   
 
5.7.4 The Integration of Diachronic and Synchronic Approaches to the Study of 
Religion 
 One of the major tensions in the study of religion has been between historians and 
phenomenologists. This study tries to offer a way to integrate these frequently opposing 
approaches; it does so by arguing the existence of cross-cultural patters, but 
simultaneously claiming that such pattern undergo subtle alterations in respect to 
changing environmental conditions. Such an approach enables us to use historical 
analysis as a potent tool for penetrating the nature of robust cultural structures as they 
adjust and adapt to shifting contexts. Instead of arguing for static categories using a 
synchronic methodology, genetic morphology stresses the dynamic nature of pervasive 
cultural patterns, thereby dissolving the traditional tension between historical narratives 
and structuralism. While synchronic approaches tended to emphasize singular patterns, 
genetic morphology creates a binary distinction that highlights differences both between 
synthetic and analytic traditions as well as differences between traditions that subscribe to 
the same modality. Such an approach created a complementary relationship between 
history and structuralism or phenomenology. The term genetic-morphology, genetic 
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being diachronic and morphology being synchronic, tries to capture this synthesis of 
approaches towards the analysis of culture. 
 
5.7.5 A New Understanding of the Rise of Neo-Confucianism and Kabbalah 
 In this study I have provided a fairly detailed investigation of the emergence of 
the schools of Kabbalah and Neo-Confucianism. The comparative nature of this analysis 
forced me to go into considerable length in order to provide non-specialist readers with a 
clear picture of traditions with which they may not be familiar. In what follows I will 
provide a brief summary of the parallels this study has identified between the Chinese 
and Jewish traditions and the emergence of Neo-Confucianism and Kabbalah:     
 1) The classical Jewish and Chinese traditions conform to the synthetic mode of 
operation as demonstrated in the second chapter. Judaism entered a state of homeostasis 
during the first and second centuries with the establishment of the Rabbinic tradition and 
the emergence of the Mishnah and Talmud as its representative literature. The Chinese 
tradition entered a period of homeostasis during the early Han dynasty in the second 
century BCE with the establishment of Confucianism and the Five Classics as state 
orthodoxy.  
 2) Orthodox Confucianism and Judaism persevered as homeostatic synthetic 
paradigms until approximately the tenth century, after which both traditions were 
destabilized by the growing popularity of foreign systems of thought. 
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 3) The Buddhist and Greek traditions by which Confucianism and Judaism were 
destabilized respectively, share an Indo-European ancestry and conform to the analytic 
mode of operation as demonstrated in the second chapter.  
 4) Buddhism and Greek philosophy flourished in environments that were 
dominated by powerful cosmopolitan empires, economic prosperity, technological 
advancement, and unprecedented cultural confidence. 
 5) As a result of prosperity, both the Jewish and Chinese traditions experienced 
the emergence of a new middle class of prosperous and educated people that were 
attracted by the foreign analytic paradigms that began to dominate their respective 
environments. The main carriers of these increasingly popular analytic paradigms were 
members of new elites that were excluded from traditional communal leadership. 
 6) Due to acute cultural pressures the Jewish and Chinese traditions were forced 
to undergo extreme adjustments. The periods of cultural crisis that ensued represent a 
shift form a state of homeostasis to a state of morphogenesis.  
 7) The immediate consequences of these crises were the proliferation of 
contending ideologies and the weakening of traditional authority.  
 8) One of the most apparent signs of the decline in central authority was 
unprecedented criticism against the classical corpus of both traditions; the Five Classics 
and the Talmud. 
 9) The process of morphogenesis begins with a strong push for change by 
progressive factions. In China this was represented by the New Policies in the political 
sphere, and the growing institutionalization of Buddhism and its increasing influence 
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upon commoners, elites, court literati, and emperors. In Judaism, a progressive agenda 
was promoted by rational philosophers of various schools.   
 10) Once the influence of analytic tendencies reached a climax, a counter-reaction 
of conservative schools gained momentum. In both cases the beginning of the 
conservative reactions was contemporaneous with critical moments of crisis such as the 
collapse of the Northern Song in China and the Maimonidean controversies in the Jewish 
world.   
 11) The initial phase of the conservative reaction was characterized by a fairly 
direct emulation of analytic ideas followed by a more creative reinterpretation of these 
ideas in terms drawn from a synthetic mindset.    
 12) The victorious schools in both traditions were conservative factions—the 
Neo-Confucian schools of Principle and theurgic Kabbalah—which slowly gained the 
support of traditional authorities and commoners.  
 13) Neo-Confucians and Kabbalists were successful in creating an impression of a 
seamless continuity with the traditions of the past. 
 14) Neo-Confucianism and Kabbalah managed to successfully integrate analytic 
elements into the classical Confucian and Rabbinic traditions respectively, and 
subordinate those borrowings to a more radical and updated synthetic worldview. 
 15) This dynamic of appropriation of analytic elements and their subordination to 
synthetic characteristics enabled Neo-Confucianism and Kabbalah to establish a long 
standing compatibility with their greater traditions.   
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 16) Both groups disclosed strong anti-foreign sentiments, and in spite of their 
conservative streaks, promoted radically innovative forms of exegesis and a revolutionary 
worldview.   
 17) The Neo-Confucian and Kabbalistic paradigms were encapsulated in a new 
locus of information; the Four Books and the Zohar. These new literatures were gradually 
acknowledged as part of their traditions’ official canon. 
 18) Among the main characteristics of the Neo-Confucian and Kabbalistic 
projects were a) the construction of more systematic worldviews b) the shift towards the 
construction of a new metaphysics c) the anchoring of Confucian and Rabbinic ethics in 
these new metaphysical conceptions d) The re-articulation of traditional ritual according 
to new modes of thought e) the construction of a more accessible theology, and e) the 
creation of new procedures for individual self-realization.  
 19) The establishment of Neo-Confucianism and Kabbalah as orthodoxies 
represents the gradual decline of Buddhism and philosophy in the Chinese and Jewish 
traditions respectively. 
 20) The eventual emergence of Kabbalah and Neo-Confucianism as orthodox 
schools together with the institutionalization of the Zohar and the Four Books as 
extensions to traditional canon, represented the gradual return of the Jewish and Chinese 
traditions to a state of homeostasis and stability.   
 21) On a more general sociological note, the emergence of new elites as a result 
of a prosperous, tolerant, and cosmopolitan environment required the Jewish and Chinese 
traditions to devise a form of theology that could serve these new populations. At their 
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very foundation, Kabbalah and Neo-Confucianism can be seen as systems of thought that 
sought to furnish a new middle class with a more challenging cultural paradigm, one that 
could offer a native alternative to analytic systems.  
 
5.7.6 The Significance of Kabbalah and Neo-Confucianism  
An important objective of this study has been to understand the emergence of 
Neo-Confucianism and Kabbalah from a new perspective. The methodology I have 
proposed has analyzed these schools in relation to their greater traditions as well as their 
hostile external environments. This methodology sought to explore the structural 
foundations of these cultural systems, their constituent parts, the dynamic interaction of 
those parts, the function of information in terms of textuality, the function of information 
in framing the boundaries of traditions, the ability of cultural systems to change and adapt 
according to discernible pattern, and the relationship of all these factors to the historical 
environments of the Jewish and Chinese traditions between the tenth and thirteenth 
centuries. I have also tried to clarify the relationship between the projection of power and 
tensions between synthetic and analytic paradigms. This more methodic perspective can 
help us understand the Neo-Confucian and Kabbalistic phenomena in the broad context 
of the formation and evolution of culture. Kabbalah and Neo-Confucianism should 
therefore be seen as defense theologies or adaptive mechanism that complex cultures are 
capable of launching at times of acute environmental pressures. The two schools are 
fascinating examples of the ability of cultural systems to withstand radical change. 
Framed in terms of Rappaport’s question “What does this change maintain unchanged?” 
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Neo-Confucianism and Kabbalah enabled the Chinese and Jewish traditions to preserve 
their respective traditional ways of life. I see two interrelated features that these defense 
theologies sought to defend: the first was the earlier textual layers of the Rabbinic and 
Confucian traditions. The Talmud and the Five Classics were provided with an extension 
that satisfied certain populations that would have otherwise been antagonistic to the 
orthodox tradition that excluded their participation. The fact that the Zohar and the Four 
Books provided new elites with a suitable paradigm meant that former pressures and 
criticisms against the traditional canon were to a great extent removed. The new textual 
layers provided both traditions with a greater division of labor, in which different texts 
were oriented towards different types of religious discourses. Most importantly, those 
discourses could take place in a complementary fashion without undermining each other. 
The second factor is related to the first; conserving and enriching a culture’s 
informational resources enabled the Jewish and Confucian traditions to preserve their 
native synthetic morphology. Therefore, the extreme and unsettling changes introduced 
by Neo-Confucians and Kabbalists enabled their respective traditions to preserve their 
traditional characteristics and thereby resist the dangers of mass conversion in the Jewish 
case, and the Buddhist conquest of China in the case of Confucianism.   
I have spoken extensively about the new analytic features that Neo-Confucianism 
and Kabbalah appropriated from Buddhism and Greek philosophy respectively. Due to 
these borrowings, the two schools injected the Confucian and Rabbinic traditions with a 
heightened sense of spirituality that was far less discernible prior to their emergence. 
Neo-Confucianism and Kabbalah devised religious discourse that transcended the 
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pragmatic domain of legalism, administration, and rulership. Both schools introduced a 
spiritual layer that functioned as an extension to the more pragmatic, socio-political 
concerns of the classical Confucian and Rabbinic traditions. This idealism was reflected 
in two central domains; the methodical treatment of the personal and cognitive facets of 
human experience, which were prior, so to speak, to the traditional socio-political sphere, 
and the construction of a revolutionary cosmology that transcended the socio-political 
sphere. This enabled Neo-Confucianism and Kabbalah to create a link between the 
cognitive, socio-political, and metaphysical levels of reality that was crucial for the 
typical medieval search for unity. This came at a time in which synthetic traditions 
became aware of their lack of coherence in face of analytic traditions. Neo-Confucianism 
and Kabbalah represent monumental projects of synthesis in which a wealth of traditional 
information was integrated into a coherent framework. It is in this sense that these 
schools became the most systematic and representative statements of Judaism and 
Confucianism. As opposed to the open-ended nature of traditional Confucian and 
rabbinic discourses, Neo-Confucianism and Kabbalah introduced a complete picture of 
reality, describing its origin and evolution to its present state and the function of humans 
in preserving and perfecting it.  
 Together with the introduction of a heightened sense of spirituality, Neo-
Confucianism and Kabbalah introduced a teleological element into the Chinese and 
Jewish traditions, a worldview that offered a much more pro-active understanding of the 
human project. We can wee this as a shift from a paradigm concerned with reality-
maintenance to one that actively seeks reality-construction, or reality completion. Indeed, 
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the new teleological streak that Neo-Confucianism and Kabbalah introduced led to forms 
of idealism unknown in the classical Confucians and Rabbinic periods. In Kabbalah we 
witness the emergence of mystically inspired messianic movements such as Lurianic 
Kabbalah and later the more radical, and at times antinomian, Sabbateans. Yet later, 
Kabbalah was expressed in the more internalized mysticism of the Hasidic movement. 
Each of these strands of Kabbalah was infused with a strong sense of spiritual aspiration 
that was very different from the legalistic rabbinic paradigm. It can be argued that the 
analytic, other-worldly and individualistic elements that were integrated into Kabbalah 
added a subversive feature to the Jewish tradition that remained in constant tension with 
Talmudic orthodoxy. It has been observed that in the Chinese tradition, the long-term 
legacy of Neo-Confucianism was at once both traditionalist and nonconformist.1009 It is 
therefore a mischaracterization to assume that Neo-Confucianism was confined to serving 
the interests of the ruling elites. The new lixue paradigm contained a highly 
individualistic strand of thought that could be extremely critical of the imperial order, the 
abuse of power, and the decline into shallow materialism. The Neo-Confucian worldview 
infused many of its members with a stoic sense of social responsibility and discipline that 
transcended quotidian life and political concerns.1010  
 The fusion of analytic and synthetic qualities in Neo-Confucianism and Kabbalah 
gave these traditions a very peculiar and somewhat ambivalent position in the Jewish and 
Chinese traditions. Both movements came to represent orthodoxy but were also 
                                            
1009 William de Bary, “A Reappraisal of Neo-Confucianism,” p. 87 
1010 For more on Neo-Confucian “purism” see Bol, Neo-Confucianism in History, pp. 218-219; 
222-223. 
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continuously criticized for their idiosyncratic way of life and radical interpretations of 
canon. The idealist streak inherited from the analytic worldview lifted Judaism and the 
Confucian traditions from the sphere of worldly affairs and carved a space for forms of 
religiosity that were detached from practical earthly concerns. Although communal 
responsibility remained central to both schools, it was interpreted in ways that were 
potentially subversive to traditional authorities and normal order. Therefore, the 
complementary relationship that Kabbalah and Neo-Confucianism established with their 
respective traditional orthodoxies was never quite guaranteed; there always remained an 
ambivalence about these schools that could oscillate between extreme conservatism to 
forms of radicalism that verged on heresy.1011      
 Finally, on a more general note, Neo-Confucianism and Kabbalah represent 
urgent reactions of axial traditions to a hostile environment. The emergence of these 
schools was a result of a typical process that is characteristic of complex adaptive 
systems. A state of homeostasis takes place when various cognitive, social, cultural, and 
environmental variables coalesce into a self-enforcing and interlocking constellation. The 
analytic and synthetic modalities are the two most common possibilities for such robust 
cultural structures to emerge. During states of morphogenesis, cultural systems 
experience a decline in central authority and the fragmentation into contending 
ideological factions. Eventually, a victorious ideology will offer a new paradigm that 
successfully responds to environmental pressures. This will be accompanied by the 
                                            
1011 Zhu Xi’s funeral was referred to as a “gathering of heretics from all over the empire to follow 
the arch-heretic to the grave,” See Bruce, J. Percy. Chu Hsi and His Masters: An Introduction to 
Chu Hsi and the Sung School of Chinese Philosophy (London: Probsthain, 1923), pp. 85-88; 91. 
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emergence of a new informational locus and the establishment of a new compatibility 
with earlier layers of the tradition. The new symbiotic relationship established between 
sub-traditions and whole traditions sparks a process of self-organization such that an 
updated ideology is integrated into the greater tradition. This represents a successful 
adaptation to destabilizing perturbations, the dismantling of external pressures, and the 
gradual return to a state of homeostasis.   
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